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Abstract 
The number of police recorded incidents in England and Wales involving cannabis 
more than doubled between 2004 and 2009 even though use of the drug was in decline 
and official policy was geared towards tackling drugs ‘that cause most harm’(Home 
Office 2008). Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in a single London 
borough during the 12 months leading up to the 2011 riots, this research examines the 
place of drugs within everyday policing, focusing on the working lives of street-level 
police officers who are not attached to specialist drug squads.  The concept of 
bifurcation (Garland 1996, 2001) is used to make sense of, ”a series of policies that 
appear deeply conflicted, even schizoid, in their relation to one another” (Garland 
2001, pg. 110). Analysis of the ethnographic data shows how the ‘structured 
ambivalence’ of state responses is evident in relation to front-line policing, including 
the policing of drugs. We find that the backbone of modern policing, Response Teams, 
are being pulled towards a ‘classic’ style of policing where officers ‘act out’ and 
impose order through the visible exercise of their powers, reasserting the authority of 
the state. This is a far cry from officers in Safer Neighbourhood Teams who work 
predominantly on Community Policing efforts, adapting their working styles, engaging 
with community partners, and focusing on ‘damage limitation’ efforts. The thesis 
charts these different orientations in relation to officers’ general activities, before 
going onto show how they are visible in the way each team approaches drugs policing. 
From here it will be argued that the increase in recorded incidents involving drugs 
reflects the influence of New Public Managerialism and the focus on output-based 
targets. These performance targets were easily fulfilled by targeting low-level drugs 
offences, and once met, officers were free to police as they saw fit. Instead of officers 
evolving their practices as the organisation evolved, NPM allowed officers to stand 
firm and maintain their culture, policing practice, and sense of mission. The author 
accompanied both Response Teams and Safer Neighbourhood Teams of the 
Metropolitan Police Service during their shifts, and also conducted 23 interviews with 
officers. This research also developed new digital ethnography methods that might be 
utilised by ethnographers in other disciplines.
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
I tried to convince myself that my hands were shaking because it was unseasonably 
cold and my coat wasn’t warm enough, but I knew it was a lie. In truth, I was scared 
and adrenalin was beginning to pump though my body. I’d arrived with two police 
officers to an incident outside the Bird of Paradise bar on Watling’s1 high street, and 
was quickly swallowed up by the crowd. I had seen hostility aimed at officers plenty of 
times since I started my fieldwork with them, but this was the first time it was targeted 
at me. Despite the bulletproof vest I was required to wear, I felt isolated and vulnerable 
surrounded by the crowd. A woman screamed at me, “Leave us alone you fucking 
bastard!”, seemingly oblivious to the large cut on her hand. A few second later, several 
other units rushed in, having received a call that there was some action to be had. As 
these officers pushed their way in, members of the crowd streamed past them in the 
opposite direction trying to find help. Amidst the confusion and screaming, officers 
went about sorting out the ‘good guys’ from the ‘bad guys’.  
 
The incident was over in a matter of minutes. Several men were in handcuffs, the 
crowds began to dissipate, and officers stood in small groups discussing how they 
subdued these ‘thugs’, ‘bastards’, and ‘little shits’. One officer, quite young in service, 
turned to his colleagues and said, “We should search these cunts right now and nab 
some cannabis or maybe even a bit of Class A.” An older office rebuked him, “There’s 
no need. We’ve shown them who’s in charge in this borough... We need cars on the 
roads tonight, not people at desks.” The officers began filtering back to their IRVs2 
and dispersed. The officers I was accompanying beckoned me over to our car, and we 
departed with little fanfare. In those few minutes of bedlam, I had witnessed many of 
the themes that would find their way in to this thesis.  
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to understand why there was such a dramatic increase 
in low-level drug seizures in recent years despite the deprioritization of such targets in 
policy documents, and will do this by examining how drugs policing fits in to the 
working lives of police officers in a London borough. Particular attention will be paid 
to understanding how the response I have seen on the street is related to changes in the 
                                                 
1 All names used in this research are pseudonyms, in order to protect the anonymity of the respondents 
and the location of the research.  
2 Incident Response Vehicles 
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criminal justice system. Discussions of drugs in academic work have difficulty 
bringing together issues of policy, policing, and the implementation of practice, 
because they often focus on each area in isolation. I will overcome this problem by 
first addressing the changing structure of drugs policy, exploring their implementation, 
and then discussing the forces acting upon local implementation of drugs policing.  
 
The primary research questions driving this project are: 
 
What is the role of drugs in the working practices of street-level police officers not in a 
specialist drugs unit? 
 
Why did the number of police recorded incidents involving cannabis possession 
double between 2004 and 2009? 
 
Do we see evidence of Garland’s theories on bifurcation in the criminal justice system 
when examining the previous questions? 
 
To help demarcate the influences on both policing and policy, I will attempt to utilize 
theories on bifurcation in the criminal justice system as the main conceptual driver for 
this research (Garland 2001, 1996). I believe the concept of bifurcation is useful as an 
explanatory device to bridge the gap in current assessments of the role of drugs 
policing in the larger milieu of police work, and the role drugs policing efforts play in 
maintaining normative orders in policing (Herbert 1998). Garland describes 
contradictory changes to institutional reasoning and operations in response to the 
collapse of the penal-welfarism in postmodernity.  He proposes first that as part of 
adaptive efforts administrative actors have reshaped their focus from retrospectively 
addressing criminality in an individual, to prospectively managing crime in the 
aggregate. This is achieved shifting the focus to community partnership, targeted 
prevention in ‘hot spots’, and the defining down of deviance.  Co-existing alongside 
these changes Garland describes non-adaptive changes as expressive punitive 
sanctions in response to the inability to control crime or criminality. These Sovereign 
State Strategies (Garland 2001), “…conditions criminal justice institutions to actin in 
an exclusionary and punitive manner, exemplified by the incapacative potential of 
prisons and ‘zero-tolerance’ policing strategies…” (Hughes and Mclaughlin 2003, pg. 
4). 
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So while the most prominent measures of crime control are increasingly 
oriented towards punitive segregation and expressive justice, there is, at the 
same time, a new commitment, especially at the local level, to a quite 
different strategy that one might call preventative partnerships. Today’s 
most visible crime control strategies may work by expulsion and exclusion, 
but they are accompanied by patient, ongoing, low-key efforts to build up 
the internal controls of neighbourhoods and to encourage communities to 
police themselves (Garland 2001, pg. 17)  
 
Additionally, this work brings empirical focus to the theory of bifurcation as advanced 
by Garland - a theory most often addressed in the literature at the conceptual level 
(Shiner 2013). Within the research context, I am able to try to assess if the theory of 
bifurcation holds when examining the situation at street-level - extending its reach 
from theoretical to practical. Deployment of Garland’s theories in this way may 
highlight the theory’s limitations in describing street-level police activity. Finally, this 
research has developed and implemented a new form of digital ethnography to 
improve data collection by increasing the accuracy of recording and recollection of 
events taking place in the field.  
 
1.1 Why Study This Area 
It is important to understand the role that drugs play in a policing landscape that 
appears, on paper, to be changing significantly. Drug searches make up approximately 
50 per cent of the searches conducted by the MPS during the period of fieldwork 
(HMIC 2013, Eastwood, Shiner, and Bear 2013), and are a regular and growing part of 
the policing activity undertaken by street-level units. The introduction of community 
policing initiatives and increased focus on performance management has corresponded 
with a massive increase in low-level police activity against drugs. I use the term 
‘massive’, because between 2000 and 2010 the number of drug offences brought to 
justice (OBTJ) jumped by 98.3 per cent (Ministry of Justice 2010c).  This shift is 
unprecedented in the criminal justice system. From previous research, we know that 
policing efforts to target this type of crime can impact the police/community 
relationship (Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 2009, Delsol and Shiner 2006). This 
relationship is further impacted by the high levels of disproportionality found in 
analysis of stop and search activity for drugs (Eastwood, Shiner, and Bear 2013). In 
Watling, black people were 3.3 times more likely to be stop and searched for drugs 
than their white counterparts, and 3.8 times more likely to be issued a Cannabis 
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Warning Form3. It should be noted that fieldwork for this thesis concluded only hours 
before the start of the August 2011 riots in London - an event that provides a stark 
example of the continued problematic relationship between the community and police 
even after more than six years of community-based policing efforts (HMIC 2013, 
Singh 2012).  
 
  
Drug offences 
Brought to Justice 
(in thousands) 
All Offences 
Brought to Justice 
(in thousands) 
Drugs Offences as 
a Percentage of 
All OBTJ 
2000 117 1,013 11.58% 
2001 117 1,001 11.65% 
2002 129 1,031 12.50% 
2003 122 1,060 11.54% 
2004 119 1,127 10.51% 
2005 157 1,274 12.35% 
2006 188 1,405 13.35% 
2007 220 1,456 15.15% 
2008 243 1,404 17.33% 
2009 235 1,346 17.48% 
2010 233 1,263 18.47% 
Percentage Change 
2000-2010 +98.83% +24.71%  +59.49% 
Figure 1: Increasing prevalence of drugs offences in OBTJ. Source: (Ministry of Justice 2010c) 
 
When I began designing my doctoral research, I was primarily interested in changes to 
drugs policy, but I realized that I could not study the resultant figures of drugs policing 
without understanding how drugs fit in to the new structure of a police service focused 
on community policing efforts. The changes to drugs policy have been addressed quite 
thoroughly by several authors (Reuter and Stevens 2008, Stevens 2011, Seddon 2007, 
Seddon, Ralphs, and Williams 2008, Shiner 2013, Bayer and Oppenheimer 1993, 
Bennett and Holloway 2010, Caulkins and Tragler 2004, Hunt and Stevens 2004, 
Maccoun and Reuter 2001), but I felt that their focus missed the intricacies of 
implementation taking place on the street. Policy documents may have changed, but 
research suggests officers have little knowledge of policy documents (Bear 2009), and 
it was therefore necessary that this research explore the role of drugs in situ. I will 
briefly address the changes to both police and to drugs policy that prompted this 
research. 
 
                                                 
3 Based on data obtained from the Metropolitan Police Service from a Freedom of Information request.  
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Two important changes have come to policing in London in the last decade; the 
introduction of Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNTs) as part of new community 
focused policing efforts (Rehman 2009), and the increased emphasis on performance 
management as part of New Public Managerialism (NPM) (Fielding and Innes 2006). 
Through these changes, the organisation has tried to develop new practices to suit the 
community policing focus (Savage 2007). However, operational activities do not 
necessarily develop to buttress the new organizational priorities (Dean 1995). The 
police structures may remain disconnected from the new community focus due to its 
core role as the states’ administrator of coercive force (Bittner 1967, Klockars 1988). 
In addition, many of the performance targets introduced to policing focus on the 
‘classic’ role of officers, and measure outputs such as arrests and sanctioned 
detections. Within the conflict created by the gap between the stated goal, and the 
actual work and performance measurement of the job, police risk becoming loosely-
coupled from the organization (Knight 2008). Like any public sector organization, 
officers faced performance pressures that create undue focus on targets emphasizing 
outputs instead of outcomes, and that only measure part of their role (Munro 2011). In 
this thesis, I will show how officers responded with unintended changes to their 
policing practice, and malleable feelings towards drugs.  
 
Unintended outcomes are always a risk when introducing new performance targets, as 
they may cause the public services to focus on hitting the targets, not on delivering 
good service (Munro 2004). These evolutions in British policing provide an 
opportunity to revisit themes of discretion, racism, a focus on action, responses to 
domestic violence, police culture, and others identified in previous works (Smith and 
Gray 1983, Collison 1995, Reiner 1999, Manning 1977, Van Maanen 1978, Dorn and 
Lee 1999, Skogan 1999). However, there is a particular focus placed on how the issue 
of drugs fits in to the working lives of street-level police officers, and the previous 
issues are discussed in order to help contextualise the issue of drugs policing.  
 
The problem of drugs and the policies guiding the criminal justice response to them 
have spurred much debate in recent years. This thesis will not attempt to tell the 
complete history of British drugs policing. Instead, it will address the current policies 
to provide context when describing the implementation of drugs laws at street-level 
and their place within the working lives of officers. Key in the debate about drugs 
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policy is the question of the ‘criminalisation’ theses. Several authors have pointed out 
that British drugs policy has evolved a propensity for punitive criminal justice 
responses that did not previously underpin the welfare based approaches championed 
in earlier drug policy efforts (Stevens 2011, Seddon, Ralphs, and Williams 2008, 
Seddon 2012). Other authors argue that this new turn towards expressive penal 
sanctions has always been a part of British drugs policy, and seen in the efforts by the 
police to engage in anti-drugs work (Shiner 2009, 2013).  
 
On the policing front, there have been several excellent pieces examining the role of 
drug detectives (Collison 1995, Bacon Forthcoming, Manning 1980). These sources 
provide us with an excellent overview of many of the issues that all drugs policing 
faces, but they are limited as they provide the perspective of a small minority of the 
officers who actually engage in anti-drugs work. Further, the type of anti-drugs work 
of detectives is far different from those of general street-level officers. Examining the 
policy developments in British drugs policing is an important and well-covered topic. 
However, to understand the staggering statistics emanating from the Home Office 
regarding drugs (Mulchandani, Hand, and Panesar 2010, Coleman 2011, 2012), we 
must see the situation on the streets and understand how it connects back to policy 
developments.  
   
1.2 What Will Be Covered 
In Chapter Two, I will examine the literature of several key areas in order to set the 
scene for the empirical chapters to follow. In the literature section, I will first cover the 
general policing literature to understand the key changes to the role, structure, and 
culture of the police over the last thirty years. Key amongst these issues will be the 
questions of what are officers being asked to do, and how are they being empowered to 
do it. If we were to examine the culture of officers without understanding the context 
within they were being asked to operate, we would have little idea if the culture is 
providing a help or a hindrance to their specified role.  
 
After examining the broader policing literature, I will explore the drugs policy 
literature. There have been significant changes in this area - whether or not this fits 
with the criminalization thesis will be discussed at a later point. Importantly, I will 
examine how there is evidence of a multi-pronged approach to British drugs policy in 
 17 
recent years. The development of the cannabis Warning System (CWS) provides 
formal warnings instead of arrest for cannabis possession offences and is a sign of the 
inability of the state to meet the demands of prohibition. This defining down of 
deviance is similarly seen in the introduction of arrest referral schemes for drug 
addicts, and increased focus on treatment instead of incarceration. At the same time, 
the Coalition Government and its Labour predecessor have ramped up the rhetoric 
against drugs in order to present the idea of the state being capable of meeting to 
promise of protection against the risk inherent in the neo-liberal structures of late-
modernity British criminal justice. I will show how cannabis, the most widely targeted 
drug, fails to elicit more than a few scattered sentences anywhere in the drugs policy 
documents. Further, the policing of drugs at street-level is only discussed in abstract in 
these same documents, and often only when discussing operations against major drug 
traffickers.  
 
I will then address Garland’s ideas of bifurcation presented in Culture of Control 
(Garland 2001) as the main theoretical concept supporting this work(Garland 2001). I 
believe that Garland’s description of non-adaptive strategies provides an important 
interpretation of how many actions taken by police against drugs and against local 
communities represent acting-out by the state in attempt to retain legitimacy. Where 
the officers reside amidst this bifurcation will be discussed only after we have 
thoroughly examined the empirical findings.  
 
In Chapter Three, I will cover the methodology used in this research. Ethnographic 
fieldwork was conducted with five teams, comprised of two Response Teams (RT) and 
three Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNT) in the London borough of Watling. This 
fieldwork included more than 500 hours with officers over the course of a year, and 
was supported by 23 interviews of officers and their commanders. I also attended 
community events and meetings where the police and community interacted. 
Throughout the fieldwork, I developed and used a new digital ethnographic data 
collection method. This method utilized the iPhone 4 to record data in near real-time 
and with more detail than previous methods allowed. 
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From here, I move to my empirical findings. Chapters Four and Five explore the 
bifurcated nature of policing in the borough of Watling through the two types of police 
units studied during fieldwork. By splitting policing activities by unit type, we can 
observe the extent of bifurcation at the street-level and the implications of Garland’s 
theories on bifurcation. First, I will examine the activities of Response Teams in 
Watling, followed by an examination of Community Policing in the borough, with 
particular focus on the Safer Neighbourhood Teams. My intention in these two 
chapters is to highlight the challenges, activities, and concerns shaping both RTs and 
SNTs as they engage in the full context of their policing responsibilities. Each type of 
unit has been given a set of core tasks that broadly fits within the bifurcated structure 
identified by Garland. Crudely speaking, RTs fight crime, maintain order, and 
apprehend suspects through the use of their legal powers and the flashing blue lights of 
their IRV. They are the ‘backbone of policing’ (Bennett 1983) and are reliant on non-
adaptive efforts to successfully conduct their role. Their ability to respond to crime and 
their efforts to proactively search for illicit activity supports the myth that the state can 
stop crime through strong penal-based enforcement. I will pay particular attention to 
how RTs respond to various criminal behaviours and their use of stop and search as a 
tool to assert their legitimacy.  
 
SNTs partner with the community to identify concerns, create a reassuring police 
presence through visible foot patrols, and deal with chronic nuisances4 by engaging in 
partnerships with the community and other organisations. While SNTs rely on adaptive 
policing tools to successfully achieve their core tasks, these are often only a façade for 
non-adaptive efforts supporting their public facing activities. The apparent dichotomy 
represented in the core duties of the two units is evidence of the discrete roles each is 
slated to undertake as part of the larger policing effort. While there are distinctive 
differences in the policing activities undertaken by each type of unit, there is actually a 
surprising amount of overlap in some areas, especially evident in the propensity to use 
tactics most closely associate with sovereign state strategies. At this point, the reader 
will have a clear understanding of the role, structure, and activities of RTs and SNTs. 
Attempting to label RTs as engaging solely in sovereign state type activities and SNTs 
                                                 
4 SNTs were also at the forefront of the Met’s efforts against crack houses, though this is not widely 
known by the public, and the efforts were undertaken as a part of wider efforts to clear up local 
problematic hot-spots of crime.  
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as engaging in only adaptive strategies, would fail to acknowledge the confused and 
overlapping demands placed on the units. 
 
In Chapter six, I will directly address the policing of drugs by street-level units in 
Watling. The trends visible from fieldwork observations, MPS data, and Home Office 
statistics provide a shocking picture of the scale of both adaptive and non-adaptive 
policing practices against drugs. Although elements of drugs policing will be discussed 
in addressing the wider actions of each unit type, it is prudent to address the policing 
of drugs separately to capture the full situation. Far removed from the policy 
documents and political speeches, drugs policing on the street-level must respond to 
maelstrom of pressures and organizational demands. Street-level policing of drugs is 
an amalgamation of policy efforts and mixed messages that result in a chaotic node of 
activity within a larger and even more chaotic work environment.  
 
The reader should appreciate that policing of drugs is but one part of day-to-day 
policing, rather than its entirety. Between June 2011 and July 2012, there were 33 
crime types that resulted in more males arrested in Watling as a result of stop and 
search activity than any single drug offence. These 33 crime types resulted in a total of 
550 males5 arrested. However, there were also more than 1,500 cannabis warnings for 
males during that same period - almost all of these from stop and search. During the 
period of fieldwork, the 800+ officers of Watling conducted more than 30,000 
searches6, of which about 50% were for drugs7. Drug offences made up less than 10% 
of total offences in Watling, while violent crimes made up more than 25% and theft 
more than 30%8. As these numbers show, drugs are a major component of the policing 
effort in Watling, but drugs policing can only be understood in light of the other efforts 
police execute.  
  
This work will also show how practices aimed at partnering the police and the 
community were forced to surmount policing’s long-held practices and limited 
capabilities. While the idea of Neighbourhood Policing had, by the time the fieldwork 
                                                 
5 This is admittedly an odd fact to use, but there is limited data available about the scale of activity 
against specific criminal offences.  
6 Some of these may have been conducted by units not based in the borough such as TSG.  
7 MPS Freedom of Information data.  
8 Watling Safety Partnership Violent Crime Plan, 2010-2015 
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started in August 2010, been transformed in to a comprehensive network of SNTs and 
local partnerships, the processes of how the police and community groups interacted 
and set local priorities did not yet project a comfortable coexistence.  As police 
acclimatized to the idea that they need to work in partnership with the community, 
they confronted these new tasks with the same powers as before, and without any 
diminishment of the, “hedonistic love of action” (Reiner 1985) - a core element of 
police culture. The move towards community policing put pressure on the professional 
self-image officers had of themselves, and challenged them to change their activities 
and their idea of what policing should entail.  Instead of reaffirming their legitimacy 
by responding to crime, they had to respond to the community as partners. 
 
If hard enforcement tactics and low-level cannabis crimes were not community 
concerns, why did street-level police in Watling regularly prioritize these issues in the 
year leading up to the August 2011 London riots? Although this research is unable to 
show causality for why the riots occurred, if the experiences I observed whilst in the 
field are typical of how other boroughs operate, then we might be able to understand 
the anger that saw the worst rioting in London for 30 years.   
 
1.3 Telling This Story 
Deciding how to tell the story of street-level policing of drugs in Watling was a 
difficult task. The tone of this work must, and will, maintain an academic rigor 
necessary to fulfil the requirements of a PhD. However, in the author’s perspective, the 
beauty of using ethnographic methodologies is that they allow the researcher to gain 
access to the nuanced and intimate perspective of the chosen group. After a year of 
fieldwork with the teams, not only could I record their expressed thoughts on various 
topics, but I could also see how their body language changed in certain settings and 
how they were affected by different incidents. I was able to put these components 
together to identify how the officers operated within their world. As such, I will 
attempt to infuse this thesis with a writing style that allows the reader to access the 
officers’ story without having had to spend a year in the field. I have attempted to 
ensure the primacy of officers’ thoughts and experiences without the jarring 
detractions or overly complex structuring of prose that can interrupt the flow of a good 
story (Fairbairn 2004). 
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I hope to convey not only the intensity of incidents, but also how the innumerable 
types of incidents shape implementation of police practice on the street. Additionally, I 
will add comments in the footnotes to explain certain processes to increase the readers’ 
understanding of the police world in Watling. Appendix G provides additional details 
on the structure and personalities of the two Response Teams I worked with.  
 
The use of the available academic literature is an essential component of academic 
writing (Brodkey 1987), and this thesis will not suggest otherwise. However, while 
many PhD theses feature a chapter devoted to the literature, and then spend a 
considerable portion of each subsequent chapter specifically addressing the literature 
relevant to that chapter, this thesis will differ. Chapter Two is devoted to addressing 
the literature, and each empirical chapter will incorporate the tailored literature 
throughout. These chapters will not be unbalanced by an overly detailed literature 
discussion at the beginning of each. 
 
In addition to writing more intimately about the officers I worked with, I will include 
comments on my perception of situations. Whether a situation made me 
uncomfortable, scared, excited or giddy, at times I will include such information to 
help convey how the experiences in the field may engender powerful feelings for those 
present; officer and researcher alike. Field-notes will be addressed somewhat 
differently than in previous ethnographies. While many authors endeavour to separate 
their field-notes from the flow of their text, I will not. The stories, quotes, and 
descriptions of fieldwork are all based on field-notes, both written and audio, and were 
analysed extensively. I have decided to use the data to tell a more unified story, and 
felt that stopping to insert a block of text from my own notes would take away from 
the flow of the larger story. When an officer is quoted, it can be from interviews or 
observations in the field; I have elected not to make the situations separate on paper. 
 
A distinguished Professor in the Social Policy Department once told me that academic 
writing can have difficulty developing a good flow, both for the reader and the writer, 
because of the need to supplement the paragraphs with citations so prodigiously.  
Certainly sections of this work will bear this quality, but at times I will step away from 
this as I attempt to illustrate the world of street-level policing in Watling and the role 
of drugs within officers’ working lives.  
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Chapter 2- Literature and Policy Review 
This chapter will focus primarily on four areas of the literature in order to construct the 
academic base for the empirical findings. I will first examine the policing literature, 
with due concentration on the ideas of discretion and policing’s working culture. In 
looking at the ideas of policing I will focus on what policing is intended to be, and how 
it is actually done, within the evolving roles and constructs of late modernity. From 
here I will examine drugs policy, its place within the evolving criminal justice system, 
and the apparent absence of cannabis in drugs policy documents in the UK despite its 
prevalence in police statistics. A key question when looking at drugs policy literature 
will be to see how effective it has been in reaching its stated goals.  The development 
and deployment of New Public Managerialism will be my third area of focus, and will 
help us understand some of the forces acting upon street-level policing. Finally, we 
will examine the ideas of bifurcation in the criminal justice system that provide a 
theoretical structure supporting this research (Garland 2001).  
 
I believe that criminal justice theory has been relatively accurate, or at least reflective, 
when assessing the state of policy responses to the challenges of a criminal justice 
system tasked with prohibiting the possession, distribution, and consumption of illegal 
drugs. But these policy responses to drugs are situated within a broader shift in the 
criminal justice system. The theory presented by Garland (2001, 1996, 2004) of a 
bifurcated response to criminal justice issues in late modernity appears to be 
appropriate for examining both the broader justice changes and also those 
developments in drugs policy and policing.9. However, we would be remiss in 
reaching that conclusion without exploring the developments that brought us to the 
current situation in the UK. Additionally, it is necessary to appreciate that relocating 
Garlands ideas from the sphere of policy to that of practice is not automatic or without 
problems.  In the proceeding empirical chapters we will see that while there may by 
                                                 
9 Garland is not the only author to note the changing structure of the criminal justice system in late-
modernity, and a discussion of Cohen’s Visions of Social Control(1985) will be discussed as well . His 
writings are used to define the theoretical constructs of this work in order to ensure a consistency that 
would be difficult to maintain if this thesis tried to thoroughly address the various idiosyncrasies of each 
author’s take on the subject. Other authors’ work will be addressed in order to help define the 
boundaries of Garland’s work. Perhaps Garland’s work is the best example of the literature available on 
this topic; or perhaps I just read his work first.  
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synchronicity visible between theory and policy in many aspects, they do not 
necessarily translate in to effective practice.   
 
2.1 The What, How, and Who of Modern Policing 
In the midst of all of the policy documents, strategies, and discussion regarding the 
theory of criminology, there is the Police Constable, working for one of the 43 police 
services in England and Wales. It is important to address what policing is conceived to 
be in popular imagination and how it is actually done by the street-level actor in order 
to understand the place of drugs within policing.  Though maintaining order is seen 
today as the primary overarching goal (Chan 2004, Reiner 2010), original orders to 
constables stipulated, “The principal object to be obtained is the prevention of crime” 
(Newburn 2007, pg. 26). Between these two pillars we will construct the current role 
of police in London. 
 
2.1.1 What Is Policing Today, and How is it Occurring? 
Any discussion of policing will quickly dispose of the notion that policing is 
synonymous with law-enforcement. It was, and is, a profession more often involved in 
peace-keeping (Banton 1964) and social service (Punch 1979). That said, policing is, 
at its core, about employing citizens as crime fighters empowered to use coercive force 
to thwart illegal activity (Bittner 1975). “[Police] are authorized with substantial 
original powers to intervene in the lives of citizens and can exercise considerable 
discretion in determining how to use these powers (Mclaughlin 2007, pg. 173) This 
unique position has retained much of its legal power since its inception, losing only 
small portions with the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service in 1985 (Reiner 
2010). It has lost even less culturally (further discussion to follow), engendering a 
popular myth both within and outside the organisations that officers are tough, cynical, 
and regularly invoke their legal powers to detain and arrest. But these powers are often 
kept in the background as officers resolve situations using effective interpersonal skills 
(Bittner 1967).  
 
In a denial of the limited relevance of crime intervention for modern policing, a 
flourishing ‘hard cop’ approach has gripped some municipalities (Reiner 2010, pg. 
156). This focus on high levels of stop and search, and introduction of zero-tolerance 
policing aims to reassert tactics that can force away crime problems. This perception 
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was touted by many influential politicians and police chiefs (Jones and Newburn 
2006), but has shown little basis for success (Bowling 1999). This approach ignores 
the inability of the state to affect crime patterns to the degree once believed (Garland 
1996), but provides effective talking points for politicians and police chiefs looking to 
hire more officers. These approaches still rely on officers using their traditional powers 
and tactics, but in an amplified manner.  
 
But the reactive ‘fire-brigade policing’ often associated with ‘hard cop’ approaches has 
its limitations. New ‘smart cop’ (Reiner 2010) initiatives began to try and focus police 
resources more effectively. Goldstein’s Problem Oriented Policing (POP) focused 
criminal justice responses on the need to address both social problems as well as 
criminal problems(Goldstein 1979). POP seeks to go beyond incident driven policing 
(Stickels 1999) moving to proactively analyse and respond to crime. Research has 
confirmed that POP brings small but significant improvements in crime and disorder 
problems in communities (Weisburd et al. 2010). Whatever changes have occurred to 
policing in the preceding decades, the core functions and roles of the police have not 
radically altered (Klockars 1988). New ways of policing share roots and a persistent 
character with old tactics (Loftus 2009), but attempt to integrate the community in to 
the fold.   
 
2.1.2 A Turn Towards Community Policing and Community Confidence: 
Some have thought that integrating community policing in to the current structures of 
policing is an impossible task given the nature of policing’s authorization to use 
coercive force (Klockars 1988). However the refocusing away from ‘fire-brigade’ 
based policing responses was deemed necessary in order to support the continued 
legitimacy of the police.  “[Community Policing] thus aims to restore legitimacy and 
public support, partly to enhance crime control through encouraging cooperation, 
partly as good in itself” (Reiner 2010, pg. 156).  
 
Since Goldstein’s call for more proactive policing, community-engagement has been 
pushed to the forefront through the development of Community Oriented Policing 
(COP), the focus on the service role (Reiner 1999) and providing accountability to 
communities (Chan 1999, Bullock and Leeney 2013). Where once the police relegated 
community members to the periphery of criminal justice activities (such as acting as 
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witnesses), the new COP methods bring the community’s views to the fore, and flatten 
the hierarchy between the police and the community (Stanko and Bradford 2009). But 
having a voice in policing comes at the cost of having to bear more responsibility for 
the defence of the community. While the headline descriptions focus on 
communicative developments between the two groups to ensure democratically 
influenced policing (Innes and Jones 2006) the community is also asked to become 
active in hampering criminal activity (Wakefield, Garland, and Von Hirsch 2000).  
The new community based efforts not only encourage police to make use of the local 
resources outside of their own organisation, it also develops a responsibilization 
ethos10 (Garland 2001). COP programmes, acknowledge the limitations of the state to 
control crime, and communities are tasked with taking on responsibility for abating 
criminal behaviour (Loader 2000). This includes taking part in neighbourhood watch 
schemes and police sponsored consultative forums, but also less systematized activities 
like taking steps to burglary-proof one’s home. However involved communities and 
individuals become in police-organized community policing programmes, 
accountability for the reduction of crime rests with the police, and becomes even more 
pronounced as officers create situations for communities to voice concerns over the 
organisation’s performance. Of course, this all assumes that there is a single unified 
voice with which the community speaks, a situation not readily found once these 
efforts are employed (Sklansky 2005). 
 
2.1.3 A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: The Role of Community Policing 
The main goal COP efforts was not primarily to reduce crime, but rather to reduce the 
fear of crime, decrease disorder, and provide opportunities for police to move away 
from the classic enforcement efforts that were failing to impede the high crime figures 
seen between the 1970s and late 1990’s (Skogan 2006a). Additionally, the Scarman 
report (1981) had identified the poor coordination and communication between police 
and the black community in particular, as an important factor in the Brixton riots 
(Savage 2007). The subtext of the report was that the legitimacy of policing was 
waning. COP provided an opportunity for police to bolster their legitimacy by 
accepting the mantle of authoritative service provider (Reiner 1999) in prescribed 
                                                 
10 As will be discussed elsewhere, Garland identifies many other adaptive strategies such as defining 
deviance down and changing how success is measured. These ideas are not discounted here, but the 
issue of responsiblization takes precedent in examining these community initiatives.  
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interactions with the community. These new partnerships would be seen as giving the 
community a voice in how they wished to be policed (Mclaughlin 2005), but in doing 
so it also reasserted the pre-eminence of policing. Wary of being labelled ‘soft on 
crime’ the Home Office said, “Neighbourhood policing is not a soft option, it is a hard 
edged strategy that recognizes the importance of visible, accessible, responsive and 
intelligence-led policing to combat all crime, from nuisance neighbours to drug 
dealers” (Home Office 2005c). 
 
The most prominent form of COP today is the Neighbourhood Policing Team, 
launched in 2004 to bring dedicated sets of officers to every community in England 
(Home Office 2004a). In London they were developed using slightly different 
nomenclature, and are referred to as Safer Neighbourhood Teams (Rehman 2009). In 
developing the idea of community policing through the SNTs, the Home Office 
appears to have not tried to promise too much to communities: 
 
We are not harking back to some mythical bygone age of policing. There 
never was, in reality, a bobby on every street corner in Britain. But we do 
want policing to be more visible and accessible – and to make the absolute 
best us of the record numbers of police officers we have now. (Home 
Office 2005b, pg. 7) 
 
SNTs are but one part of the community/neighbourhood focused apparatus within the 
MPS and the wider policing apparatus of England and Wales. Bolstered by £1billion 
from the then Labour Government to expand across the country, and focused on the 
‘Single Confidence Target’ that scrapped all performance measures other than 
community confidence (HM Treasury 2009), SNTs were to be the forefront of visible, 
proactive policing efforts that would, “build confidence and trust in the police, and 
through that compliance with the law” (Home Office 2010f, pg. 11).  
 
The ideas underpinning COP helped form the basis for Reassurance Policing (RP), a 
programme whereby officers and communities would work together to identify signal 
crimes (Innes 2004) and promote activities that improved the community’s perception 
of those problems, and increase their confidence in the police.  Instead of addressing 
the ‘fear of crime’ as the result of the rate of crimes, signal crimes theory identifies 
perceptions of disorder and how they effect changes in the beliefs and actions of 
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individuals within the community.  By focusing on community confidence the police, 
local authority, and other agencies are joined together (Stanko and Bradford 2009) in a 
more horizontal structure (Considine 2002)  in an effort to better manage issues that 
trigger a lack of confidence in policing.  However, the drive to achieve confidence 
made some police worry that the direct role of crime fighting was being overlooked 
and that police forces were being stretched to accommodate roles they had not been 
designed to fulfil (Barnes and Eagle 2007). 
 
The gaps in the literature mean that it is hard to see how these practices are actually 
changing policing at the street level (Maguire and King 2004, Shilston 2008). Fear of 
crime issues and the measurement of ‘community confidence’ only served as the 
benchmark for local success for a short time (Dann and Hinchliff 2009, Keenan 2009, 
Rehman 2009, Stanko and Bradford 2009).  Theresa May dispensed with many of the 
new developments in community confidence measurement when she announced that 
under the Coalition Government police were to focus on cutting crime, and nothing 
else (May 2011). While the infrastructure supporting community policing remains, and 
the Met remains committed to measuring community confidence and fear of crime 
(MPS 2012b, 2011c, 2010a), the national policy has stagnated in the area of 
community confidence.  
  
2.1.4 The Constable and Police Culture 
With the increasing complexity of their roles, police are expected to be able to switch 
from covert surveillance and strong enforcement tactics to humane and less punitive 
approaches (Povey 2001). The danger becomes that the introduction of policing 
priorities based on community feedback can damage morale by making street-level 
police view the changes as more accountability, an attempt to thwart their traditional 
discretionary powers, and preparation by senior officers pre-emptive defence against 
criticism (Chan 1999). Whilst some see refocusing on community policing as a 
potentially positive step for policing (Sergeant 2008), Simon (1964) points out that 
proceeding towards new organisational goals will entail adapting elements of any new 
policy in order to meet internal organizational constraints. This is not a new 
phenomenon, and adaptive behaviour has been witnessed in police research for many 
years (Bevan and Hood 2006, Collison 1995, Reiner 1999, Smith and Gray 1983) . As 
Garland (2001) points out,   
 28 
  
Socially situated, imperfectly knowledgeable actors stumble upon ways of 
doing things that seem to work, and seem to fit with their other concerns. 
Authorities patch together workable solutions to problems that they see and 
can get to grips with. Agencies struggle to cope with their workload, please 
their political masters, and do the best job they can in the circumstances. 
There is no omnipotent strategist, no abstract system, no all-seeing actor 
with perfect knowledge and unlimited powers. Every ‘solution’ is based 
upon a situated perception of the problem it addresses, of the interests that 
are at stake and of the values that ought to guide action and distribute 
consequences. (Garland 2001, pg. 26)  
 
Strategic emphasis on improving confidence leads to targeted efforts to combat 
identified problems, but may not address ‘low level’ policing practices still reliant in 
part on measures  such as ‘sanctioned detections’.  Policing activity strategically 
targeting criminality identified in partnership with community groups requires that the 
tactical implementation actually reflect the contribution from outside groups, or the 
community contribution becomes an ‘empty ritual’ (Arnstein 1969). 
 
With each structural change to department activities comes new targets - both in the 
statistical and criminal sense of the word (Mastrofski, Worden, and Snipes 1995, 
Wilson 1968).  This requires officers to narrow the gap between their personal work 
limitations and the service ideal. Lipsky argues that while perversions to service ideals 
may regularly take place, the officers will attempt to find a path that meets the 
structural setup of the organisation, their own psychological wellbeing, and the needs 
of the community (Wilson 1968, Lipsky 1980).  
 
 Operating on the edges of society, Bittner describes the modern police officer as: 
  
…a character who is ambivalently feared and admired, and no amount of 
public relations work can entirely abolish the sense that there is something 
of the dragon in the dragon-slayer. Because they are posted on the 
perimeters of order and justice in the hope that their presence will deter the 
forces of darkness and chaos, because they are meant to spare the rest of 
the people direct confrontations with the dreadful, perverse, lurid, and 
dangerous, police officers are perceived to have powers and secrets no one 
else shares.  (Bittner 1975, pg. 7) 
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Police officers see the social world and their unique role in it through a subculture 
traditionally referred to as ‘cop culture’ (Reiner 1999), which has been commented on 
similarly in many research papers (Collison 1995, Manning 1977, Van Maanen 1974, 
Reiss 1971, Skolnick 1966). Police culture is by no means monolithic (Reiner 1999, 
Waddington 1999b); some have argued that only a subset of officers ascribe to that 
culture (Cochran and Bromley 2003)  and that it varies between urban and rural 
settings (Christensen and Crank 2001).  
 
There has also been acknowledgment that different operational duties and the officer’s 
rank will create different subcultures in policing (Chan 1992, 1996). Still others would 
define ‘cop culture’ as a series of normative states (Herbert 1998) that guide officer 
interactions within the community of police officers (Wilson 1968). Although this 
culture may prominently affect behaviour in informal situations, some research 
suggests the more chauvinistic and racist expressions fail to appear when involved in 
application of police powers (Snipes and Mastrofski 1990, Smith and Gray 1983). 
Acknowledging the difference between what is said in the canteen and the actions 
officers take on the street helps us identify the potential for ‘canteen culture’ to be used 
as a form of stress release (Waddington 1999b). 
 
Whatever the variances in its perceived ubiquity amongst police, patterns of culture 
specific to police officers are routinely observed by researchers, and show similarities 
that have remained for generations despite large shifts in the role of police.  According 
to Loftus (2009), this can be the case because the pressure of being a police officer has 
remained largely the same despite changes to a variety of expectations, activities, and 
roles. Even if changes to operational activities do occur, the popular image of policing 
is portrayed as remaining constant, and so creates an image to live up to for new 
officers (Reiner 2010). Foster (2003) argued that the influx of police recruits who were 
not white, heterosexual men may help diversify the culture as they diversify the ranks. 
However, Chan has rightly pointed out that the doxa (Brodeur 1983) of policing 
remains as crime fighters even with the introduction of a more diversified recruit base 
and the strategic prioritization of community policing. Reiner describes it best when he 
says: 
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The core of the police outlook is this subtle and complex intermingling of 
the themes of mission, hedonistic love of action and the pessimistic 
cynicism.  Each feed off and reinforces the other, even though they may 
appear superficially contradictory, they lead to a pressure for ‘results’ 
which may strain against the legalistic principles of due process.  (Reiner 
1999, pg. 91) 
 
Within that hedonistic love of action the stress of knowing officers may be seriously 
injured or killed while carrying out their duties. Skolnick (1966) observed that officers 
spoke regularly about the dangers of policing, the potential for harm to the officer, and 
the participation in practices to reduce the chance of injury during routine encounters. 
Officers’ daily encounters with unpleasant situations may produce manageable levels 
of stress that can be dealt with through the expressive talk of the canteen (Waddington 
1999b). However, when compounded by Critical Incident Stress, occurring from “… 
any event that has unusually powerful, negative impacts on police personnel” (Miller 
2008, pg. 11) such as an incident involving serious injury to a fellow officer or the 
traumatic deaths of children, officers may test the limits of their cognitive defences 
(Miller 2008). These stressors may be more or less common for different officers, but 
their potential presence for anyone with a warrant card helps reinforce the idea that 
policing is a dangerous profession.  
 
Henry (2004) has described policing as ‘civilian combat’ in reference to the 
similarities the stresses encountered in both policing and military based combat. This 
notion of ‘combat’ is in contrast to the reality that most policing is a form of peace-
keeping based social service that only rarely involves arrest and formal investigation 
(Punch 1979). Still, lack of actual ‘combat’ does not diminish the stress of attending to 
these social calls and the often distasteful scenes that we will examine in the empirical 
chapters. Accounting for the stresses faced by police, both in everyday tasks and the 
shock of traumatic incidents, allows a greater appreciation for the use of dark humour 
and canteen culture observed regularly in policing literature (Waddington 1999b). 
Beyond organisational control issues, there remains the officer concerned with making 
it home at the end of their shift.  
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2.1.5 Discretion: The Heart of Policing? 
Policing policies that seek to mandate tactics, targets, or outcomes must contend with 
the traditional application of discretion in policing. Definitionsmacht, the German 
word for police discretion, does not invoke the ‘discernment’ aspects of the word 
‘discretion’, but rather the officer’s power to define the response to criminal activity 
(Kleinig 1996)11.  This initial distinction helps focus our look at how discretion is 
used, Lipsky’s ideas on the subject, factors influencing its application, and its effects 
on criminal justice policy. Even Rowan and Mayne (1829) understood that the guiding 
instructions of their police force could, “…not be understood as containing rules of 
conduct applicable to every variety of circumstance that may occur in the performance 
of [officer’s] duty;” (Kleinig 1996, pg. 81).  A century and a half later, this tenent was 
still prominent when Lord Scarman (1981) said: 
 
The exercise of discretion lies at the heart of the police function. It is 
undeniable that there is only one law for all: and it is right that this should 
be so. But it is equally well recognized that successful policing depends on 
the exercise of discretion in how that law is enforced… Discretion is the 
art of suiting action to particular circumstances. It is the policeman’s daily 
task. (Scarman 1981, pg. 63) 
 
More recently, discretion was directly incorporated into the reclassification of cannabis 
from a Class B to a Class C drug (Warburton, May, and Hough 2005). The Association 
of Chiefs of Police officially stated that officers’ presumption should be against 
arresting individuals for simple possession of cannabis as a Class C drug, barring 
aggravating circumstances (ACPO 2003, pg. 2.1). By using the word ‘presumption,’ 
ACPO officially recognized officers’ discretion to define the nature of their official 
response to crime. However, police are not afforded discretion in all aspects of their 
duties.  Every time an officer makes a choice in the field, he/she is not exercising their 
professional discretion (Kleinig 1996).  While police do not exercise discretion 
regarding the pursuit of high profile criminals involved in a murder, they are often able 
to use this power in what Goldstein (1960) refers to as ‘low visibility’ aspects of police 
                                                 
11 This ability to define their response will become an important factor in the empirical chapters when 
examining how officers shifted their response to cannabis after the advent of the Cannabis Warning 
System. 
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work. These ‘low visibility’ aspects are the unsupervised and unregulated12 tasks 
commonly prescribed to street-level officers away from central control and oversight. 
Klienig (1996) describes police discretion as being part of a ‘normative condition’ 
used to make a ‘practical determination’.  
 
The need for this practical determination is due to the fact that policing exists in a, 
“…corrupted world of service… with insufficient resources and vague policy goals,” 
(Lipsky 1980, pg. xiii). Low-level actors mould policy through individual responses 
guided by the structural norms of their institutions; even if this is sometimes an attempt 
to subvert institutional objectives born out of frustration over the policy disconnect 
between capabilities and objectives. Furthermore, Lipsky argues that the situations 
faced by SLBs are too complex to ever fully dispense with professional discretion 
through increased managerialism. Provided the culture of the organisation promotes 
shared understandings of appropriate uses of discretion, Lipsky upholds the idea of 
maintaining discretion amongst SLBs, and chastises what he sees as attempts to 
hamstring discretion.    It is widely recognized that officers do not simply follow the 
formal rules and regulations of policing, but adhere to a normative practice engendered 
from within the ranks (Herbert 1998): 
 
…the formal and informal commingle in ways that merit investigation. 
Legal and bureaucratic rules do partially determine police activity, but 
officers are able to interpret these rules in particular ways. One needs, 
therefore, a way to examine how formally constructed rules become real in 
the daily practices of officers. (Herbert 1998, pg. 344) 
 
Evans and Harris (2004) point out that Lipsky (1980) perceives discretion as being 
good. However, they argue that discretion is neither good nor bad, and that it can cloak 
misconduct or be an ‘important professional attribute’ (Evans and Harris 2004, pg. 
871). Moreover, their central point is that routinization does not necessarily mean a 
corresponding decrease in discretion.  Evans and Harris seem to give credence to 
Howe’s (1991) belief that Lipsky’s notions on the fundamental and continuous nature 
of discretion cannot hold in settings where power is transferred away from the 
practitioner level to high-level authorities. However Howe’s(1991)  focus on policy 
                                                 
12 This is not to assume that there are not regulations guiding things like car stops or other police 
activity. ‘Unregulated’ refers to the ability of the officer to adopt their response based on the unfolding 
situation.   
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level changes to discretion circumvents the truism that social policy only becomes 
policy when employed by the SLB, and that SLBs will continue to manipulate the 
implementation of policies in order to meet their needs in the field (Lipsky 1980).  
While Howe is not wrong, he does fail to grasp the basic tenet that ‘low visibility’ 
work is largely unaccountable, and that no project designed to increase accountability, 
whether to the community or to central management, has been able to also 
fundamentally improve the other Lipsky-defined drivers of SLB’s reality. Policing is 
one of the only SLB organisations where discretion increases down the chain of 
command (Wilson 1968, Novak et al. 2002) and efforts to constrain discretion may 
just displace it or cause it to remain unacknowledged.  Even when discretion exists and 
is not under threat, officers may deny its existence in order to simplify their 
responsibilities and make the job more palatable (Evans and Harris 2004). 
Lipsky acknowledges the challenges faced by providing officers discretion when he 
says,  
 
At best, street-level bureaucrats invent benign modes of mass processing 
that more or less permit them to deal with the public fairly, appropriately, 
and successfully. At worst, they give in to favouritism, stereotyping and 
routinizing – all of which serve private or agency purposes. (Lipsky 1980, 
pg. xii) 
 
 
2.2 An Analysis of UK Drugs Policy: Hugs By Way of Handcuffs? 
Tracing the history of UK drug policy could be an entire PhD in itself and is a topic 
well covered directly and indirectly by many previous authors, (Kohn 1992, Seddon, 
Ralphs, and Williams 2008, Shiner 2009, Stimson 1987, Strang and Gossup 1994, 
Hunt and Stevens 2004, Stevens 2011, Reuter and Stevens 2008). I will not attempt to 
replicate their efforts, but rather will focus on the national and local drug strategies in 
place at the time this research took place, in order to create a framework within which 
drugs policing was  intended to operate. While few police officers know of the 
existence of drug strategy documents or their prescribed focus, these policies are 
supposedly translated in to practice on a daily basis, and therefore it is important that 
we briefly examine them here. It appears to some that a distinct bifurcation is 
occurring in policy documents (Home Office 2008, 2010c, Soca 2009, MPS 2007a, 
2010a), and while implementation may not play-out on the street exactly in the way it 
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is written, an appreciation of these guiding documents will allow us to later observe 
the misapplication of their intent when implemented.  
 
2.2.1 National Level Drug Strategies 
The 2010 UK drug strategy (Home Office 2010c) has moved away from previous drug 
strategies that supported the use of methadone maintenance for Heroin addicts, and 
instead promotes abstinence based recovery and strict conditionality on benefits. Some 
have argued that this document represents the high-water mark of a ‘creeping 
moralization’ of British drug  policy (Monaghan 2012, pg. 29). In the 27 page strategy, 
police and policing receive less than one page to have their role defined. At least half 
that space is taken up promoting the National Crime Agency, Police and Crime 
Commissioners, Interdiction efforts by the UK Border Agency, and new crime maps16.  
The limited section detailing policing’s focus suggests that police will work with 
Community Safety Partnerships (CSP) and other drug treatment groups to, “Deter 
those who would otherwise terrorise our communities” (Home Office 2010c, pg. 15). 
The focus of this section seems to be on Class A drug use and distribution, but officers 
‘in some areas’ may target drugs outside of Class A if there are ‘significant problems’ 
associated with such drugs. Localism, ‘recovery’, and a harsh penal response for 
distribution networks are the order of the day in the 2010 strategy. Police crop up 
everywhere in the drugs strategy, except when it comes to discussing how they can 
implement the policy on the street.  
 
Policy documents reflect a managing of the drugs problem and are, “…scaling down 
expectations, redefining their aims, and modifying the criteria by which success is 
judged” (Dorn and Lee 1999, pg. 92). The 2008 Drug Strategy makes a bold 
pronouncement that is telling in its aim: “Our ambition is clear. We want a society free 
of the problems caused by drugs” (Emphasis Added, Home Office 2008, pg. 4).  
 
 
                                                 
16 The Crime Maps, launched in February 2011 originally did not contain information about drug related 
offences. “We will not classify drug problems at a local level as anti-social behaviour – drug dealing and 
drug possession is a crime” (Home Office 2010c, pg. 14). This was altered in September 2011, though 
information about the type of drug or type of offence is still omitted.  
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In another attempt to focus attention on the harm caused by drug users, the Prolific and 
Other Priority Offender Programme (PPOP) pushed increased police focus on the 
small number of offenders who significantly contributed to overall crime rates At one 
point it was estimated that problematic drug users (PDUs) were responsible for 99% of 
the £15.4bn total cost incurred by society because of drug use, of which 90% of that 
figure was directly attributable to their associated criminal activity (Gordon et al. 
2006). These figures may over represent the impact of drugs use on society, and the 
inflated figures may be used to push an agenda where drugs are treated as a criminal 
matter and not a health matter (Stevens 2008).  
 
The current drug strategy represents a mixed message of policy objectives. It calls on 
police to  partner with community organisations in providing drug education, offer 
access to treatment services as soon as offenders enter custody suites, and to keep, 
“bearing down relentlessly on those involved in the drugs trade” (Home_Office, 2010, 
p. 2). When it comes to cannabis the strategy only calls on better community policing 
to identify and disrupt the markets affecting the communities, and does not mention 
targeting small time users, even though they are most often the target of police activity 
in Watling (Bear 2011, Bear and Shiner 2011).  In fact, the Cannabis Warning System 
is not mentioned at all in the strategy, and a defined role for law enforcement is only 
listed in the ‘Reducing Supply’ chapter of the strategy.  
 
2.2.2 Metropolitan Police Strategy Documents 
The MPS 2007-2010 drug strategy identified their goal as, “Disrupt the supply and 
reduce the use of illegal drugs” (MPS 2007a, pg. 2). They appeared quite keen on this, 
with 28% of all drug UK seizures in 2011/12 taking place in London even though it 
boasts only 13% of the total UK population20. The strategy document is vague on 
quantifiable goals or specific operational activities, and uses words like, “disrupt”, 
“tackle”, and “reduce” frequently, reflecting the new managerialism and redefinition of 
organisational success highlighted by Garland (1996). Though linguistically related to 
NPM and its redefinition of success, those words still described a classic police 
response to drugs. The MPS strategy lays out seven key areas for the MPS to focus on, 
                                                 
20 Drug usage rates for adults in the last year are 10.5% in London, while the English average is only 
9%. 
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including, “Disrupting open markets – tackling blatant use in public places” and, 
“Working together in partnership – supporting communities” (MPS 2007a, pg. 4). 
However, even if police manage to ‘disrupt’ criminal drug dealing organisations, 
researchers have found that after an initial gain, sustained improvements are  rarely 
due to the resiliency of distribution networks (Mazerolle, Soole, and Rombouts 2005, 
Mcsweeney and Turnbull 2008). These classic enforcement efforts based on arrests, 
raids, and drug searches may in fact cause harm to the community (Aitken et al. 2002, 
Maccoun and Reuter 2001, Reuter 2009). The 2007-2010 strategy focused a great deal 
of time to the harms of ‘crack houses’, and discussed how Safer Neighbourhood 
Teams would be used to identify and shut down the locations. Though it largely 
discussed the crack houses in terms of community safety and locally identified 
priorities, the strategy still essentially called for drug raids on the locations.  
 
By the time the most recent MPS drug strategy was released in 2010, the headline 
ideas of reducing supply and demand for drugs in the 2007 edition had expanded to 
require the MPS to “…improve safety and security and to increase public confidence 
by working with communities and partners to disrupt the supply of and reduce the 
demand for, controlled drugs.” This clear limit of the sovereign state and the  “defining 
of success in such limited terms” (Shiner 2009, pg. 168) showed a clear dent in the 
armour of prohibition.  Many of these enforcement efforts may in fact cause harm to 
the community (Aitken et al. 2002, Maccoun and Reuter 2001, Reuter 2009). Taylor 
(1999) argues that the current system of punitive sanctions against drugs facilitates an 
‘outsider culture’ against certain aspects of the community, reflecting Garland’s (2001) 
criminology of ‘the other’.   
 
The current MPS strategy seems disconnected from the reality underlying drug 
policing, failing to mention cannabis in any context outside of commercial cultivation 
despite the fact that there were more than 12 times the number of possession offences 
compared to trafficking offences between 2010-2012 in the Met, and cannabis has in 
both 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 comprised 70% of all drug possession offences21 
(2012). In the second sentence of the current drug strategy the MPS sets itself towards, 
“…a renewed focus on reducing the harm caused by illegal drugs to communities” 
                                                 
21 This has been fairly consistent since at least the late 1990’s. (May et al. 2007) 
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(MPS, pg. 3). Only inches later it reiterates the call for partnership (though does not 
identify with whom they should partner) and cites that officers will, “Target drugs 
crime from a law enforcement, crime prevention, and harm reduction perspective.” 
(pg. 3). Pulling back from any hope of completely removing drugs from the streets of 
London, the strategy identifies that, “…The most important deliverables are 
community confidence, safety and security. Our activities and the resource we commit, 
must be targeted at those aspects of drugs crime which cause local communities most 
concern.” (pg. 6).  The document takes an unambiguous approach on prioritizing 
resources to drug crime that is most harmful to communities, focusing largely on Class 
A drugs and their distribution.  The report manages to feature a picture of police 
officers helping a tourist in a tube station, and an unremarkable shot taken of the view 
from the Drug Squad’s window at New Scotland Yard, but it fails to mention low-level 
cannabis use.  
 
Additional police strategy documents would allow us to more clearly identify the 
message being given to unit commanders, but unfortunately such documents appear to 
either not exist, or have been lost in the system. When I requested, “…any policy, 
tactical, or strategic guidance documents that deal with police enforcement of drug 
laws, and are issued to leaders of SNT, Drug Squads, or Response Teams in the 
borough of [Watling] between 2004-2012” in a FOI request in August of 2012, I was 
told that no such documents existed. Instead, the MPS sent over digital copies of both 
the 2007-2010 and 2010-2013 MPS Drug Strategy documents22.   
 
2.2.3 He Who Must Not Be Named: cannabis and cannabis Warnings 
Though largely absent from strategy documents, cannabis possession made up 65% of 
all drug seizures at minimum23 in 2011/12.  Police were involved in more than 113,000 
incidents involving cannabis possession in 2011/12, down from more than 130,000 in 
2008/924. Despite the frequency of engaging with cannabis, only a very limited number 
of MPS, MPA or Home Office documents discuss the issue. Until 2004 cannabis was a 
                                                 
22 It should be noted that these documents are easily accessible on the MPS website, and the research 
already had both hard and digital copies of both documents.  Further requests for previous drugs 
strategies went unfulfilled. The MPS information team admitted that while previous MPS strategies did 
exist, they were unable to locate a copy, digital or physical, anywhere in their systems.  
23 Total seizures for cannabis are measured separately for possession disposals. It is also possible that 
multiple seizures only lead to a single prosecution, thereby skewing the numbers.  
24 Fun fact: In 1999 there were only 112,000 drug offences recorded for all drugs (May et al. 2002) 
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Class B drug, subject to arrest and a two year prison sentence, though many officers 
would use their discretionary powers to informally deal with minor cannabis 
possession incidents (MPA 2002). Cannabis was reclassified from Class B to Class C 
at the end of January 2004 in an effort to reduce the time and cost of arresting and then 
cautioning adults in possession of small amounts of cannabis (MPA 2002). At the time 
of the change it was estimated to cost £350 million a year to deal with cannabis 
infractions, and consumed the time equivalent of 500 full-time officers (May et al. 
2002). The most drastic legal ramification to occur as a result of the change was that 
officers were given the power to issue a cannabis Warning25 to adults in possession of 
cannabis.   
 
The warning scheme was first trialled in the borough of Lambeth in July 2001 and set 
to run for six months26. Lambeth was short on officers, suffering an increasing crime 
rate, and when borough Commander Brian Paddick surveyed his officers he found they 
were frustrated at having to spend so much time dealing with minor cannabis 
possession cases. Instituting what became known as the ‘Brixton Experiment’, Paddick 
gave officers the ability to issue warnings to offenders, greatly reducing the officer’s 
time spent engaging with the case, and saving more than 4,000 hours of officers’ time 
despite the fact that  there was a 110% increase in cannabis related incidents resulting 
from the new trial (MPA 2002). Upon finding a personal amount of cannabis on an 
individual, officers were to confiscate the cannabis, take the details of the person, and 
record that information into the Police National Computer (PNC). When the policy 
was formally adopted across the MPS, guidance notes stipulated that the officer should 
inform the offender that continued illegal activity may result in punishment.  
 
The changes to cannabis regulation also instilled a presumption against arrest, 
something not specified in policy documents relating to any other drug (UKDPC 
2008). To preserve officers’ discretionary powers, the option to arrest for possession of 
                                                 
25 Originally the warnings were referred to as ‘formal warnings’ and were only renamed ‘cannabis 
Warnings’ in 2007. For the sake of ease and because the only thing that changed was the name, I will 
use cannabis Warning to refer to all of the warnings issued since 2004.  
26 Interestingly, the BBC reported that while police had arrested 278 people for cannabis from July to 
November in 2000, under the trial of the warning scheme they had issued 381 warnings during that same 
period in 2001, a 72% increase. The Met spokesperson commented that, “The number of warnings is 
higher than the number of arrests which shows that our officers are not ignoring cannabis possession. 
(BBC 2001)”   
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Class C drugs was introduced when cannabis joined the class. The Home Office 
praised the initial effects of the change in classification, citing that in the first year 
alone they had saved nearly 200,000 police person-hours and reduced arrests by 1/3 
while an increased focus on Class A drugs allowed them to close 155 crack houses 
(Home Office 2005a). Even while praising a liberalization of drugs policy, a Home 
Office press release ended by saying, “we are continuing to take tough action to tackle 
drug users, dealers and the organised criminals who supply the drugs which end up on 
our streets”  (Home Office 2005a, pg. 1). The introduction of cannabis Warnings also 
appear to have significantly reduced the number of individuals fined or given ‘other’ 
sentences27 (Reuter and Stevens 2007). From the outset in 2004, ACPO guidelines 
dictated that issuing a cannabis warning would result in a Sanctioned Detection 
(ACPO 2003), the impact of which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. As a 
preface to that discussion it is worth noting here that previously it took an average of 
five hours to arrest and caution someone for cannabis (Home Office 2002, May et al. 
2002), but the cannabis warning scheme allowed the  entire process to  consume  less 
than an hour, with only a few minutes of actual contact between the officer and civilian 
(Warburton, May, and Hough 2005).  
 
The MPS official policy on cannabis28 contains a very compelling section. 
A police officer finding an adult person in possession of cannabis who is 
satisfied that the drugs is intended for that person’s own use should give a 
cannabis warning and not arrest the offender unless additional factors 
necessitating arrest apply. The drug must be seized but no further action 
should be taken in respect of the offence other than completing 
administrative procedures. Where it can be verified that an offender has 
received two previous cannabis warnings, a further warning should not be 
considered. This policy is not intended to interfere with the discretion of a 
police officer, but to provide direction and focus towards Governmental 
and policing priorities. This policy provides a framework to allow seizure 
of cannabis without arrest, protecting the officer and the offender. This 
approach to cannabis assists in removing a source of friction between the 
police and young people. It will reduce the amount of time devoted to 
policing the possession of a drugs which is undoubtedly harmful to 
individual health but does not cause harm to the community on the scale of 
crack cocaine, cocaine or heroin (Emphasis added, MPS 2007c) 
 
                                                 
27 This can include a conditional discharge of the charge.  
28 The policy was developed before cannabis was moved back to a Class B drug in 2009, but was 
reviewed in 2011 and remains in effect.  
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The quote is compelling for a number of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, the policy   
does not compel any specific action other than seizing the cannabis, and phrases the 
bulk of the process as being an administrative procedure. The second area of note is 
that the policing of cannabis is recognized as a potential friction point between officers 
and the community, and as such paints the reduced interaction between the two groups 
as a potential benefit, with the subtext that this might help improve community 
confidence. Finally, it positions cannabis as the less harmful cousin of Class A drugs, 
giving cover to the idea that potentially pulling back on cannabis would allow for the 
focus on more harmful drugs. This idea, that you can more effectively manage one 
drug in order to free the resources to crack down on more harmful drugs, embodies the 
interlocking nature of Garland’s ideas of bifurcation.  
    
Cannabis was moved back to Class B in January 2009, though the Cannabis Warnings 
System (CWS) remained in place. Under the changes announced by Home Secretary 
Jaqui Smith in May 2008 and implemented in January 2009, there would no longer be 
cannabis Warnings issued to people found in possession of cannabis multiple times. 
Instead, a new power to issue a Penalty Notice for Disorder (PND) with a fine for £80 
was to be instituted for people found with cannabis a second time within 12 months. 
Additionally, the MPS added conflicting information to their cannabis Monitoring 
Report, stating that, “It is important that, in applying this escalation policy, officers 
retain their operational discretion, albeit arrest should remain the first presumption, 
taking into account all relevant circumstances” (MPS 2010b, pg. 3). While it is 
unlikely that street-level officers are reading the monitoring reports coming from New 
Scotland Yard, this highlights a potential problem. Is there confusion within the MPS 
as to what the presumed   action should be when dealing with cannabis possession, or 
is this a case of the MPS deliberately showing that enforcement mechanisms remain 
robust and available to officers, even if they are infrequently used? 
 
ACPO noted at the introduction of the CWS that many officers currently did not 
prosecute individuals for cannabis possession, though they did not elaborate as to the 
reasons why. ACPO pitched the change in powers as a smarter way to be tough on 
drugs, justifying this by highlighting that individuals caught with cannabis would have 
their details recorded, and they may still be arrested if circumstances dictated. ACPO 
denied any liberalization of drug laws when cannabis was reclassified from Class B to 
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Class C, and even increased the penalties for trafficking cannabis to a maximum of 14 
years imprisonment (Reuter and Stevens 2007).   When cannabis was reclassified back 
to Class B in 2009, the potential penal penalty for possession of a Class B drug 
increased from two to five years, and the fine increased from £1,000 to £2,500 (Home 
Office 2009a). 
 
ACPO guidance suggests that officers can still arrest offenders if they feel the offender 
won’t change their ways after receiving a warning form, or if there is a community 
concern about anti-social behaviour associated with cannabis use (Byrne 2009). The 
number of arrests and cautions has fallen somewhat since the 2004 introduction of 
cannabis warnings, but it has been more than offset by a near doubling of the overall 
number of cannabis related police incidents (Coleman 2011).  
 
 
Figure 2: cannabis and Policing, (Coleman 2011) 
 
2.2.4 A Drugs Predicament 
Overall the emphasis of UK drugs policy is on containing the damage from drugs and 
their associated harms (Shiner 2006), with a strong but undefined role for police on the 
street. As part of the increasingly bifurcated national levels drug policies, officers have 
been given an increased role to use their powers to reduce the harm of drugs, both on 
the community and also on the user (Midford et al. 2002). Some of this power is 
directed towards amelioration and management; some towards the classic drug war 
tactics of taking down doors. Focusing police resources towards the criminal behaviour 
of drug users was seen as a way of more effectively engendering a positive impact on 
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the community through direct street-level action due to the inability to catch high level 
drug dealers (Sutton and James 1996). The shifted focus represents an opportunity to 
have direct impact on the quality of life for the community, but requires that as targets 
for prosecution change, so must the definition of success. Whereas once the 
nomenclature used was ‘war’, more recent policy documents emphasize ‘disruptions’ 
to drug dealing operations (Dorn and Lee 1999) while also calling for seizing of all 
assets related to drugs dealing (Home Office 2008).  But where health and 
rehabilitation of the individual were once a constant theme alongside the penal 
elements of anti-drug work, Stimson points out that, “Drug policy has now focused 
down on the link between drugs and crime’ leading to ‘the introduction of a punitive 
and coercive ethos” (Stimson 2000, pg. 260). State control is strengthened under the 
‘threat’ posed by increasing crime trends and the desire to protect society from the 
harmfulness of drugs (Elvins 2003).  However, misidentifying police as the sole units 
capable of protecting society from the harm of drugs fails to appreciate the 
contextualized nature of drug related offending (Midford et al. 2002) and the myriad of 
supporting agencies and practitioners needed if the goal is rehabilitation.  
 
2.3 New Public Managerialism and Policing 
New Public Managerialism began under the Conservatives in the 1980’s, but gained 
prominence with the election of New Labour in 1997. Such was the inculcation of 
NPM that by 2000 Dorn argued, “…[drugs policy] performance management and 
auditing will not lightly be brushed aside” (2000, pg. 300). The key principles of NPM 
involve streamlining, marketization, and managerialism. In ‘streamlining’, public 
sector bodies are reconfigured or trimmed to operate more efficiently, while 
‘marketization’ opens up new avenues of control and competition (Legrand 2003). 
Managerialism focuses on measuring the application and success of public sector 
bodies against a set of performance indicators (PI). The police have been most affected 
by managerialism (Knight 2008), though they have also faced pressure to streamline 
their operations in the ‘age of austerity’ (HMIC 2012). 
 
For managerialism to be effective, performance indicators are needed. There are four 
common types of statutory performance indicators: Input, Process, Output, and 
Outcome (Collier 2006). Input indicators look towards what the police are being asked 
to do, such as the number of crimes occurring and calls for assistance. Process 
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indicators refer to how police engage in the acts of policing. These include things like 
how quickly they respond to calls, and time spent in public view. Output indicators 
focus on arrests and sanctioned detections, and show the impact if not the effectiveness 
of police efforts. Outcome indicators measure satisfaction with policing, and are 
intended to highlight the positive impacts of police efforts. How and which 
performance indicators are used can be part of efforts to shape developments in how 
policy is perceived and designed (Johnsen 2005).  
 
Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPI) was formally incorporated in to policing 
with the 1999 Crime Reduction Strategy (Home Office 1999). The BVPI developed 
specific targets for the decrease of specific criminal activity (Kornicki 2000). 
Eventually this target based approach would become the Policing and Performance 
Assessment Framework (PPAF), led by HMIC. The PPAF introduced statutory 
performance indicators directed at ‘citizen focus’ and ‘local policing’. This led to the 
Assessment of Policing and Community Safety (APACS), in 2008. This measured not 
just the police efforts at fighting crime, but all partner elements. PPAF came about 
because, “…the UK police service was considered to have lagged behind many other 
public services in terms of the extent, robustness and transparency of their 
performance measurement”(Willis and Homel 2008, pg. 312). These were all 
eventually replaced by the Single Confidence Target (SCT) that sought to remove the 
complex web of performance management regimes so that all policing efforts would 
be focused on improving community confidence (HM Treasury 2009). In all of these 
cases the decision to focus on decisively measuring the performance of public sector 
bodies, “...ignores the long-established understanding that public sector goals are 
ambiguous, multiple, complex and frequently in conﬂict with one another” (Jackson 
2011, pg. 15).  
 
In addition to targets developed for performance management efforts, new frameworks 
were developed to categorise the activities police were engaging in, including Offences 
Brought To Justice (OBTJ)  in 2002 (Neyroud 2008).  “An offence is brought to justice 
if it results in either a caution, a conviction, a penalty notice for disorder, a formal 
warning for a cannabis offence, or is taken into consideration by a court” (Ministry of 
Justice 2010a, pg. 79). Given the options to bring offences to justice without 
necessarily arresting an individual, the OBTJ was intended to more accurately 
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catalogue the number of individuals coming before the CJS. The OBTJ reframed the 
way police recorded crime, but also introduced additional targets based on the new 
framework. Initially the OBTJ sought to document increases across all crime types, but 
in 2008 the OBTJ was amended to focus on only serious crimes (Ministry of Justice 
2010a). This was in part because: 
 
The current system of measuring police performance has distorted 
operational priorities, criminalised many individuals for trivial 
misdemeanours, and prevented forces from focusing on what is important 
locally…. Generic targets for offences brought to justice and sanction 
detections, which encouraged forces to focus on the easiest crimes to 
resolve rather than those which have the most significant impact on public 
safety, have been removed from the 2008/09 statutory performance 
indicators. These changes should be reflected in local practice and must be 
reinforced by an alignment in performance measures between the police 
and the Crown Prosecution Service. (Select Committee on Home Affairs 
2008, pg. 40) 
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of All Offences Brought to Justice(Ministry of Justice 2010b) 
  
2.3.1 Why Agencies and Governments Use Performance Management 
While this research will highlight the unintended consequences of performance 
management, there are good reasons to implement performance management 
frameworks in to policing. Implementation of these schemes is often begun at the 
highest levels of the police service in the hopes that it will trickle down the 
organization (Barber 2008) and correct the failings plaguing a police service (Chan 
1999). Using guidelines and crime reduction targets is thought to clarify the 
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organizational goals and associated core values (Bratton and Knobler 2009). The 
targets can be seen as goals for the organisation to achieve, and structure how they will 
achieve them. Having these goals can help to justify the continued existence of the 
organisation in the current form, and further strengthen organizational direction 
amongst staff (Zhao, Lovrich, and Robinson 2001). Targets can also reinvigorate the 
public sector, giving them a raison d’etre in situations that are often conflicting and 
full of misaligned objectives (Bevan and Hood 2006). Not only can these efforts unite 
the organisation, they can help generate information to confirm the ability of the 
organization to itself and to others.   
 
If agencies cannot generate performance information, then they cannot 
perceive themselves, or be perceived by others, as professional or properly 
managed, they cannot demonstrate that they are deploying their resources 
rationally, and they risk political pillory and economic damage. (Dorn 
2000, pg. 301) 
 
The above reasons tend to focus on a theoretical concept of how performance targets 
will impact the criminal justice organisations themselves. But governments 
implementing performance management efforts often are thinking of the impact on 
crime and the perception of the criminal justice system, not the wellbeing of the 
criminal justice organisations themselves. To that end there are three main reasons to 
implement performance management efforts.   
 
Firstly, there is strong incentive to improve the financial efficiency of public sector 
bodies (Rogerson 1995). This can involve the actual trimming of staff and budgets, but 
a larger concern is that criminal justice systems are processing individuals efficiently. 
Non-adaptive practices require constant monitoring and control of a deviant sub-
population of ‘others’, and this must be done with efficiency given constraints on 
money and manpower (Brownlee 1998). It is no coincidence that the initial programme 
of efficiency was called ‘Best Value Performance Indicator’. But public sector bodies 
are defined by their service to the citizenry, not the profit margin that guides private 
sector entities (Hughes 2003).  
 
The second reason often cited for enacting performance management regimes is 
accountability (Chan 1999). Accountability schemes can aim to improve democratic 
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control, provide bureaucratic means of assessing performance to one’s superiors 
(Stenning 1995), or horizontally with collective self-regulation (Somerville 2009). In 
most cases, the performance management frameworks offered in UK policing serve to 
notify the public and senior managers of performance, but limit ability for democratic 
oversight (Delsol and Shiner 2006). While the task may be to shed light on an agency’s 
practices, the fear of public criticism from this new accountability can engender overly 
cautious performance management techniques (Lees, Meyer, and Rafferty 2011). The 
development of performance management techniques that ascribe to improve the 
accountability of public services require auditing mechanisms, but these are, “…in 
danger of being destructive, creating a simplistic description of practice and focusing 
on achieving service outputs with little attention to user outcomes” (Munro 2004, pg. 
1075). In short, accountability is often about managing risk, not improving practice 
(Chan 1999). 
 
Finally, a driving factor in adopting performance management techniques is to 
improve the appearance of an organisation’s performance. This differs from the idea of 
accountability in that accountability is about providing mechanisms to audit and learn 
from organisational performance, while improved appearance is entirely about 
projecting a positive image without any liability to act on what comes forth. The 
actions of NPM can be interpreted as building a buffer for the organisation, protecting 
it from criticism and giving it space to operate as it sees fit provided the numbers tell 
the story the public and Government wants to see.  
 
Simply stated, organizational change can reflect the purposeful 
organizational effort to both generate public support and build ‘legitimacy’ 
by making the organization simultaneously look good to outsiders and 
appear stable to insiders. This means that organizational change can take 
the shape of a process of creating new programs and increasing the use of 
new symbols, and rituals, while at the same time the core mission of an 
organization and functional priorities remain substantially intact. (Zhao, 
Lovrich, and Robinson 2001, pg. 368) 
 
Manning (1988) refers to this as putting ‘old wine in new bottles’. In focusing on 
representation of police responses to crime, any limited focus on accountability may 
turn in to nothing more than an exercise in superfluous image management (Chan 
1999). As  Reiner pointed out, the legitimacy necessary for the police to operate in a 
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democratic society is constantly being renegotiated with the community (2010), and 
the use of NPM provides public evidence of the effectiveness -and therefore 
legitimacy- of policing organisations.   
 
2.3.2 The Challenge for NPM in Drugs and Community Policing 
Measuring activity around drugs is problematic, and community policing efforts are 
not necessarily compatible with the need to hit specific crime reduction targets (Moore 
and Braga 2003, Herrington and Millie 2006).  As discussed earlier, arrests and drug 
seizures may misconstrue the problem and are too ambiguous to be effective tools. 
These are output measures that demonstrate effort, not impact. The disruptions, arrests, 
and confiscations are all based on figures that fail to account for, “drugs not seized, 
persons not captured, and organisations not disrupted or dismantled, etc” (Dorn 2000, 
pg. 310). And yet, these output measurements are exactly what the officers, especially 
RT officers, are being guided by. These top-down measurements may miss the ‘low 
culture’ aspects of pragmatism and discretion in policing (De Lint 1999, Goldstein 
1960) as they attempt to enhance accountability to an outside audience not versed in 
police practice 
 
Police agencies are inclined to measure outputs even while outcomes can be seen as a, 
“direct measure of the value that police seek to produce. Unless we can see the value, 
we cannot be sure that police efforts are worthwhile” (Moore and Braga 2003, pg. 
443). Communities rarely call for more arrests, but they often want to see less crime or 
feel more secure. These require outcome measurements. The CWS attempts to show 
output, in the form of detections and helps push up the overall sanction detection rate 
for all crime types. In 2010/11 drug offences had a 94 per cent detection rate29, while 
offences against vehicles had just 11 per cent, and the overall figure for all crime was 
28 per cent (Home Office 2011a)30.  The Home Affairs Select Committee had called 
                                                 
29 It is worth noting that there is an enormous number of drugs offense that remain unknown to the 
police and which are never reported, so the detection rate is artificially high because offences tend only 
to be known about or recorded when they’ve been cleared up  
30 The official definition for sanction detection is as follows. 'A sanctioned detection occurs when (1) a 
notifiable offence (crime) has been committed and recorded; (2) a suspect has been identified and is 
aware of the detection; (3) the CPS evidential test is satisfied; (4) the victim has been informed that the 
offence has been detected, and; (5) the suspect has been charged, reported for summons, or cautioned, 
been issued With a penalty notice for disorder or the offence has been taken into consideration when an 
offender is sentenced.' This is different than a simple ‘detection’ which indicates a case resolved through 
administrative means.  
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for police forces to hit a 25 per cent sanction detection rate for all crimes in 2008, but 
acknowledge in the same report that, “in order to meet this kind of quantitative target, 
it is easier for officers to pursue minor offences than the more complex crimes, and to 
abandon their professional discretion in how they might best deal with these incidents” 
(Select Committee on Home Affairs 2008, pg. 23). Fully 35% of all drug related 
sanctioned detections in England and Wales were cannabis warnings, representing 7% 
of all sanctioned detections that year.  The next best percentage for formal outcomes 
not involving arrest in the criminal justice system, at only 6% of the total, is for 
Penalty Notices for Disorder for drugs possession (Home Office 2011a).   
 
Figure 4: Sanction Detection Rates, MPS, 2011 
 
2.4 The Criminological Predicament:  
The ideas of bifurcation are used as my main conceptual driver in this research, and in 
this section we will examine those ideas. The concept of bifurcation rests on the idea 
that the penal-welfarism of yesteryear has transformed into a new criminological 
predicament based on, “the normality of high crime rates and the acknowledged 
limitations of the criminal justice state” (Garland 2001, pg. pg 106). Other authors 
have identified similar changes to social control mechanisms (Simon and Feeley 1995, 
Cohen 1985), though they have interpreted the structure of these changes differently. 
According to Garland (2001) this predicament brought about a new bifurcated 
structure to criminal justice policies. Adaptive responses that define deviance down 
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and measure success in terms of input instead of outcome were wielded at the same 
time as non-adaptive strategies (also known as sovereign state strategies) attempted to 
reassert the power of the state through punitive enforcement based measure. With 
administrative state actors still mired in maintaining effective policy solutions based 
on their scarce resources, politicians react to ‘shocking but atypical media stories with 
‘impassioned’ partisan pressure (Garland 2001, pg. 112). The tension between the two 
responses becomes more polarized, and actors who are both politicians and 
administrators (often Ministers leading a department) are stuck in a structured 
ambivalence where they must balance the need to pursue an agencies’ mission whilst 
adhering to political platforms. 
 
2.4.1 A Bifurcated Approach: 
Adaptive strategies stress prevention and partnership as criminal justice agencies seek 
to retain their legitimacy despite a normalization of the criminal behaviour they are 
chartered to thwart. These strategies often take the form of ‘low-visibility 
administrative decisions, but can also be seen in the wider efforts to reshape policing 
through development of high-visibility reforms to accountability for criminal justice 
organisations.  Garland says that in adaptive strategies,  
 
… the state works through civil society and not upon it, and emphasizes 
proactive prevention rather than the prosecution and punishment of 
individuals. Adaptive solutions of this kind are politically difficult and 
institutionally radical. (Garland 2001, pg. 348) 
 
Adaptive responses are often formulated far from the media spotlight at the ‘shallow’ 
end of the criminal justice process, and is perhaps most evident in the New Public 
Managerialism (NPM) that swept through Britain during the New Labour government 
from 1997-2010. In its most basic form, NPM is an attempt to convey the management 
practices of private corporate enterprise into the realm of public agencies (Mclaughlin 
2007, Kirchener 1998), bringing efficacy, efficiency and accountability to the forefront 
of performance measurement. Bringing market based measures of success to public 
bodies created a target mentality that sought to identify singular causes of crime within 
the rational criminal(Sergeant 2008). This idea developed alongside the idea that 
success can be had in successfully managing problems if not abating them (Shiner 
2009).  
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At the same time sovereign state strategies were employed, representing expressive 
punitive endeavours based upon a denial of the state’s ability to tackle high crime 
rates. Penal welfarism gave way to expressively punitive sanctions that emanated 
freely from political actors as they responded to populist sentiment. According to 
Garland, the state was forced to act out with ever increasing punitiveness in an effort to 
reassert its dominance over crime.  For Garland, the changes bringing about ‘late 
modernity’ (changes to the family structure, city structures, and electronic mass 
media), brought with them criminal problems associated not with deprivation, but with 
the lack of internal and social controls. The policy response to this is to ratchet up the 
perceived missing control. As the neo-liberal state pulled back from providing the 
welfare safety net, it had to provide control over those who were unable to integrate 
into successful self-reliance.  Current sentencing laws are focused on the incapacitation 
of the offender, and in doing so protect the community from their destructive ways. In 
fact, in Garland’s world, the entire community becomes the victim of the criminal, 
and, “today the interests of convicted offenders, insofar as they are considered at all, 
are viewed as fundamentally opposed to those of the public” (Garland 2001, pg. 181). 
Even if rehabilitation has maintained a foothold in aspects of penal policy (see drugs 
strategy discussion) populist demand for strong punishments for offenders is well 
documented (Bottoms 1995, Garland 1996). 
 
Garland also sees the state adopting two ‘schizoid’ roles about the actors involved in 
crime. The first is the criminology of the self, portraying the actor as a rational deviant 
whose actions are calculated. The criminology of the other is focused on the stranger, 
the outside who invades the community. “… this figure is no longer the poorly 
socialized misfit in need of assistance, but instead an illicit, opportunistic consumer, 
whose access to social goods must be barred”(Garland 1996, pg. 451). These roles 
allow the state to push the notion that the rational actor is beyond the control of the 
state and is the responsibility of private actors to contain, whilst the outsider allows the 
state to invigorate its role in protecting society.  Garland believes that the criminology 
of the self is, “…invoked to routinize crime, to allay disproportionate fears and to 
promote preventative action.” While the criminology of the other, “…functions to 
demonize the criminal, to act out popular fears and resentment and to promote support 
for state punishment” (2001, pg. 137). 
 51 
 
When examining the bifurcated approach, Garland says, “One strategy seeks to build 
institutions better suited to the conditions of late modernity, another cranks up the old 
powers of the state in an attempt to overcome these same conditions” (2001, pg. 138). 
Perhaps not intentional in design, Garland believes these new criminal justice policies, 
and the gulf between them, are the result of a chaotic response by the state to the 
normalization of high crime (Matravers and Maruna 2004). However, Garland does 
not see this setup as decisively new, rather it is a,  “…reconfigured complex of 
interlocking structures and strategies that are themselves composed of old and new 
elements, the old revised and reoriented by a new operation context” (Garland 2001, 
pg. 23).  This is a key idea in Garland’s work, and its relevance will remain evident 
throughout this discussion. The idea of bifurcation does not necessarily suggest a 
clearly demarcated split between different types of policing activity.  Criminal justice 
policy making, when presented to the public at least, can produce a tangled mess of 
ideas that represent input from a whole host of stakeholders disconnected from the 
eventual implementation of said policies. What may seem to be an adaptive policy on 
the surface may still rely on strong penal enforcement mechanisms, and may in fact 
significantly widen the net bringing more people in to the criminal justice system. One 
need only look at Anti-Social Behaviour Orders to see the problems of a bifurcated 
response.  
 
The development of Antisocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) and Dispersal Orders were 
tools developed to support criminal justice responses to the demands generated by 
community partnership in police prioritisation. These tools are a cornerstone of the 
shift towards adopting expressive punitive strategies to show that the criminal justice 
system has a response to unyielding criminality, while actually serving manage an 
unbeatable problem (Garland 2001). The national level strategies developed under 
New Labour guided a turn towards community confidence but often increased 
assertive control by the state for problematic citizens (Reiner 2007). For example, the 
ASBO can be seen as an extension of state control, criminalizing behaviour that 
previously would not have been punished by formal action. Sumner described the 
increased reach of the state as creating a ‘sociology of censure’ where social regulation 
has a distinct, “…political character... reliance on value judgments, and their formal 
bureaucratic character”  (Sumner 1990, pg. 35). The aim of many of these efforts was 
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to reassure the public that the police could and would take care of the issues that were 
identified as being persistent and harmful in their community. 
 
2.4.2  Structured Ambivalence:  
The ‘interlocking principles’ of rehabilitative interventions that characterized the penal 
welfare structure in place by the 1970’s  gave professionals and experts a ‘central 
place’ to guide a system intent on restoring the criminal and stopping crime (Garland 
2001).  But increasingly, formulated policy is the result of political actors, while 
administrative experts cobble together workable policies for front line staff. Those 
political actors who are also administrators and are caught between the administrative 
role that requires sure-handed management of a department (including not only its 
resources but also its role and mission), and being responsive to their political 
responsibilities of party and platform.  “They need to look both ways… To put in place 
viable policies but also to minimize the political risks entailed in doing so” (Garland 
2001, pg. 112).  Previously the rehabilitative ideal was, “an all-embracing conceptual 
net that could be cast over each and every activity in the penal field, allowing 
practitioners to render their world coherent and meaningful…” (Garland 2001, pg. 35). 
While it would be foolish to claim political influence was non-existent, formulation of 
policy was, at one time, based on expert opinion that reported to politicians.  But what 
may be seen as common sense approaches by practitioners may often appear far uglier 
when caught in the full lights of the media.  Politicized responses can put pressure 
against practical solutions, stalling both in their tracts and constructing an unofficial 
ambivalence.  
 
Garland notes that a new ‘sociology of punishment’ (1991) developed whereby 
criminal actors and criminal justice policy are no longer just at the periphery of 
society. Instead, penality has become central to our everyday life, a part of our daily 
consciousness. In trying to both manage and punish criminality, administrators of the 
system have had to make the general citizenry acutely aware of the problem and then 
find ways of visibly attacking the perceived assailants in a way that still allowed the 
system to function.  
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Where once Penal welfarism understood the role society played in 
offending and tried to rehabilitate the offender, now we find that new 
penology blames the offender for their rational choice to offend, and tries 
to protect society from the outsider seeking to harm them (Reiner 2007, pg. 
125) 
 
2.4.3 Criticisms of Garland: 
Of course, Garland’s theories are not without criticism. Zedner (2002) points out that 
welfarism was never completely in vogue, and that throughout modernity there was a 
continued and steady growth in penal based responses.  This was because there was 
never a uniform or even all-encompassing state of welfarism obtained.  For Zedner, the 
political ideal of welfarism that Garland draws upon was never able to meet the 
implemented reality of a rapidly transforming post-war society, and Garland may have 
been too idealistically portraying the strong push of the welfare state. Matthews 
(Matthews 2005) rejects the punitive turn proposed by Garland, identifying that while 
incarceration may increase, this can be due to iatrogenic impacts caused by modern 
policy, not necessarily an aim towards punitiveness. Reiner points out that, “…there 
has not been an unbroken and unilinear march towards the ‘culture of control’ since 
the 1970s” and that “The change was not a reversal but rather a sharp accentuation of a 
trend towards harder crime control discourse and policies, embedding them much more 
deeply”(Reiner 2007, pg. 118).   Indeed throughout the post-war period the use of fines 
in the penal system increased dramatically whilst the use of the more rehabilitative 
focused probation actually dropped (Bottoms 1983).   
 
Nor was Garland alone in labelling the changes from a progressive penology that 
sought to rehabilitate, to what Feeley and Simon have dubbed ‘New Penology’ (1995, 
1992). They identified the development of risk based penal policy that forgoes 
rehabilitation and instead relies heavily on imprisonment and monitoring of offenders 
to protect society via an, ‘actuarial consideration of aggregates’ (1992, pg. 449).  For 
Simon and Feeley: 
 
“The New penology is neither about punishing nor about rehabilitating 
individuals. It is about identifying and managing unruly groups. It is 
concerned with the rationality not of individual behaviour or even 
community organisations, but of managerial processes. Its goal is not to 
eliminate crime, but to make it tolerable through systemic coordination” 
(1995, pg. 455) 
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Other authors have examined the topics covered by Garland and come to a different 
interpretation. Wacquant (2009) describes the transformation in the neo-liberal state as 
an attempt to use mass incarceration in place of the welfare state. What Garland (2001) 
sees as an expressive penal response to an inability to control, Wacquant sees as a new 
way to control the poor through the retraction of welfare through ‘reform’. Where 
Garland sees bifurcation in the types of responses, Wacquant sees it in the populations 
targeted; a libertarian state for the rich, and an all-encompassing penal state for the 
poor (Lynch 2011).  
 
Stanley Cohen (1985) also addressed many of the changes identified by Garland. 
Where Garland sees bifurcations, Cohen saw official oscillation between policies that 
build extra social control and those that tried to weaken control. For Cohen, even 
programs aimed at diversion are actually empowered to extend coercion through 
iatrogenic feedback loops (1985). Cohen’s iatrogenic processes are less about 
expressive penal sanctions, and more oriented towards maintaining control through 
classification. Cohen was writing more than 15 years before Garland, and so it is 
possible that his observations see less demarcation between what Garland described as 
adaptive and non-adaptive because they had not yet fully blossomed. That said, 
Cohen’s work provides a demystification of the of the changing nature of social 
control and could have provided a valuable alternative conceptual driver for this 
research. 
 
Another common criticism of Garland’s work is the lack of focus on the street-level. In 
an effort to discuss the broader theoretical elements in his work, the intricacies of 
street-level implementation are sometimes overlooked by Garland. As Lipsky (1980) 
has pointed out, street-level implementation is often far removed from the original 
policy formulations. Garland fails to fully appreciate that the schizophrenic nature of 
policymaking may extend into the street-level implementation by criminal justice 
organisations.  Garland’s perceptions of a bifurcated approach also leaves out 
situations where non-punitive sanctions, like coerced drug treatment, are tied to threats 
of imprisonment (Matthews 2005).  In recent decades the use of community sanctions 
(seen as a non-punitive form of penal intrusion) has grown at similar rates to the prison 
populations (Matthews 2005). So where Garland may be correct in highlighting the 
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neo-liberal state’s desire to control, the situation may not be so clearly biased towards 
the punitive elements.  
 
Additionally, whilst Garland understands these changes to be a response to the reactive 
nature of the public in late modernity, Hough and Roberts (1999) find that the public 
opinion is generally in line with sentencing practices at the time, albeit that the public 
often is unaware of what sentencing policy actually looks like. “Populism is seen to 
fuel the ‘punitive turn’ because the public harbours deep-seated punitive sentiments. 
These sentiments, it is argued, were once kept in check by a benign and enlightened 
group of experts” (Matthews 2005, pg. 188). But populism may not intrinsically seek 
blood, and has been a part of progressive movements throughout history.  What 
Garland hits upon, though perhaps not centrally enough, may be the role of the media 
so widely disseminating the concerns created by structural changes in late modernity.   
 
Finally, it is worth considering disconnect between Garland’s ideas about the 
dismantling of the welfarism of yesteryear and the managerial practices supporting that 
transition. Managerial practices themselves are not capable of creating expressive 
penal sanctions, they are merely capable of performing those new functions (Cheliotis 
2006). Garland has suggested that the role of administrative actors may have only 
limited impact on trends in the criminal justice system (1985). As I will show in later 
chapters, the administrative direction imposed on the street-level actors can radically 
mutate the intended effects of criminal justice policies.  
 
Whatever the case, Garland’s work has struck a chord with many scholars. Reiner 
described Culture of Control as having, “…deservedly become exceptionally 
influential” (Reiner 2007, pg. 117). Garland sees a bifurcated system populated by 
chaotic responses to maintain the role of the state, and given the growing assertion of 
the role of drugs in both criminality and the degradation of the state, it is important to 
examine the situation at street-level.  Garland’s high altitude view paints the picture 
whereby the main actors are organisations, political institutions, and bureaucratic 
entities. While the accuracy of his ideas is, in this author's opinion, quite high, 
engaging with those changes at the level that Garland explores leaves us without a 
more detailed view portraying street-level actors who take policy and transform it into 
practice. Garland does begin to touch on the professionalism engendered within these 
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organisations, but a more detailed exploration of the sharp end of the stick is required. 
Hopefully Garland’s work will be helpful in attempting to understand the role of drugs 
in street-level policing.   
 
2.5 Conclusion: 
A clear trend is emerging from the literature; policy is becoming bifurcated, politicians 
are keen to clamp down on dealers while helping addicts, community policing remains 
despite its associated measurement tools being dismantled, and policy documents 
avoid discussing what police will actually do on the street. We are left with a situation 
where the ferocity of politicians’ denouncement of criminality is tempered by 
administrative actors. The practicalities of implementation, limits to organisational 
capabilities, and execution by administrative actors all serve to distort the final picture 
of street-level activity.  
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Chapter 3- Methods 
 
Too often social analysts offer generalizations about organizational and 
government actions without concretely explaining how individual citizens 
and workers are affected by the actions, how the behaviour of individuals, 
when aggregated, give rise to the actions, or how and why the actions in 
question are consistently reproduced by the behaviour of individuals. 
(Lipsky 1980, pg. xi) 
 
The best advice I could offer to a researcher just entering a police system 
would be precisely the same were he a recruit: simply keep quiet and to 
himself virtually everything he hears and sees…  (Van Maanen 1978, pg. 
341) 
 
This project employed ethnography, observational data, formal and informal 
interviews, and document analysis, in order to produce a case study of the role of drugs 
in street-level officers’ policing activity. The research took place in the London 
borough of Watling, with officers from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) of 
London, and involved work with Response Teams and Safer Neighbourhood Teams 
from August 2010 to August 201131.The research included spending nearly 600 
hours32 with officers in five different units, observing more than 300 incidents, and 
conducting 25 in-depth interviews. This chapter will examine the logic of choosing 
these methods, how data was analysed, the process of gaining access, the conduct of 
the researcher, and the ethical quandaries faced in the field. The research questions 
guiding this project are: 
 
What is the role of drugs in the working practices of street-level police officers not in a 
specialist drugs unit? 
 
Why did the number of police recorded incidents involving cannabis possession 
double between 2004 and 2009? 
 
Do we see evidence of Garland’s theories on bifurcation in the criminal justice system 
when examining the previous questions? 
                                                 
31 Fieldwork actually ended on the morning of August 6, 2011 after completing an overnight shift with 
officers. Not 12 hours after I turned in my radio and said my final goodbye’s to the officers, rioting 
began in Tottenham. It would spread across England for the next four nights.   
32 It should be noted that Mastrofski and Parks (Mastrofski and Parks 1990) took two years and had 
several researchers in the field in order to compile 500 hours of field observations. That being said, my 
time was insignificant compared to Smith and Grey (1983).   
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3.1 Methodological Approach 
Ethnography is by no means a new method for researching police systems, and the 
multitude of previous efforts using this approach provide a strong base from which to 
develop this research (Collison 1995, Behr 2002, Richman 1983, Smith and Gray 
1983, Skolnick 1966, Manning 1980, Herbert 1997, Foster 1989). This research 
examines the role of drugs in street-level policing through observing those officers. 
The approach of working with street-level officers as an observer is based upon the 
idea that, “Any comprehensive assessment of what police accomplish must account for 
the actions of personnel at the lowest rungs of the organizational ladder—the rank-and-
file police officers and civilians in whom most of the organization’s resources are 
invested.” (Mastrofski 2004, pg. 100).  
 
 It should be noted at the onset that even while a detailed methodological plan was 
developed, flexibility is an important part of the evolution of a qualitative case study 
(Robson 2002). I was required to refine aspects of the fieldwork in order to, 
“….progressively focus the study on the features of the case which gradually appear to 
be most significant." (Marby 2008, pg. 216). The methodologies selected allowed this 
project to obtain what might be considered a typical case study (Fine 1991) wherein 
the subject is limited the role of drugs in the working lives of police officers in the 
borough of Watling. As a case study, the focus is on, “a system of action rather than an 
individual or group of individuals” (Tellis 1997). A case study may be limited to a 
single location or process (Bryman 2001),  but the need to understand the different 
perspectives contributing to the phenomena under study may require the research to 
address multiple cases. Integrating multiple perspectives allows the case study to be, 
“holistic, comprehensive and contextualized” (Ritchie and Lewis 2003, pg. 52).  
 
Though a case study is not necessarily generalizable, it, “…allows investigator to 
retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events such as individual 
life cycles, small group behaviour, organization and managerial processes.” (Yin 1993, 
pg. 4). In this situation, the research is described as a case not because of the number 
of locations studied, but because the focus of the research is on role of drugs within the 
larger context of street-level police work. To try and separate drugs policing from its 
place within the current policy reality would potentially leave us with a myopic view. 
The research aims to provide practical and functional analysis of a specific situation 
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that can, in aggregation with other research, develops a well-rounded picture of drugs 
policing (Stake 1980). Watling’s experiences with drugs allow us to see it as an 
exemplification of issues facing many inner-London boroughs. 
 
 
The focus of analysis in this thesis rests largely on the organisational factors impacting 
the delivery of policing in Watling. This could have easily been otherwise. The 
decision could have been made to place class, gender and ethnicity in the foreground 
of officers’ words and actions. Certainly this would have also produced thought 
provoking research. I have decided not to focus on these elements for two reasons. 
First is that it was much easier to ask officers about their role in the context of the 
wider profession and organisation than it would have been to pursue questions about 
class and ethnicity. As I will discuss in detail in this chapter, I have to carefully 
conduct myself at all times during fieldwork or risk exclusion. I felt that pursuing 
questions of ethnicity, gender and class outside of naturally occurring incidents would 
have jeopardised my access.  
 
Second is that the issues of class, ethnicity, and gender emerged holistically during the 
course of this research. Though they are not put at the forefront, they are included as 
contextualising features of the analysis. In Chapter Four (section 4.3.5) I have included 
a discussion of how officers attempted to justify the disproportionality seen in stop and 
search activity, shedding light on their ideas of ethnicity and class. This is perhaps less 
robust than others (Miller 2010, Lee, Steinberg, and Piquero 2010, Bradford, Jackson, 
and Stanko 2009, Bowling, Parmar, and Phillips 2008, Newburn, Shiner, and Hayman 
2004, Fitzgerald 1993), but it is that extensive availability of research focusing 
specifically on the questions of ethnicity that provides this work with the space to 
direct much its focus elsewhere. The primary aim of this research was to understand 
why there was such a dramatic increase in drug seizures in recent years by examining 
how drugs policing fits in to the working lives of police officers. The overriding 
component that impacted police activity in the area under examination seemed to the 
use of performance measurement targets, and so this issue is placed at the forefront of 
analysis.  
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3.1.1 Interviews 
This research also made use of data gleaned from 23 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews33. Though a more challenging method than a fully structured interview 
(Wengraf 2001), the openness of the questions and structure allowed the researcher to 
amend their line of questions as the interview progresses, in order to expand on issues 
brought up by their respondent (Kvale and Brinkmann 2008). “It takes training and 
practice to write open-ended questions… and then keep from transforming them into 
closed-ended questions, especially with a resistant subject, when actually conducting 
the interview” (Sofaer 2002, pg. 334). The interviews only began in April 2011, eight 
months after joining the teams. The delay was done intentionally so that I would have 
time gain the trust of the officers, and to work through many basic questions during 
informal chats with officers. Waiting to begin interviews paid dividends visible in the 
comfortability and eagerness officers had to take part.   
 
Officers were selected using a process that fell somewhere between heterogeneous 
purposive sampling (Robson 2002) and a ‘typical case’ purposive sampling. By 
seeking out typical cases it was hoped that the research sample took account of the key 
dimensions of policing in Watling, providing an overview of the issues at hand. Given 
the largely homogenous ethnic makeup of the teams, heterogeneity across rank, and 
time in service, the officer’s style of policing became the prime purposive criteria. 
While officers all start out on a Response Team34 at the beginning of their career, the 
32 different boroughs and numerous different roles they might take on over the course 
of a 30 year career meant that seeking heterogeneity across those dimensions, to find 
normality, was the best option.    
 
The precise timing of interviews and the selection of respondents took on an 
opportunistic element. With Response Teams I would generally try to interview 
officers between 1am-4am on a weeknight shift when the borough had less calls, so as 
to minimise the impact on the team’s ability to respond to calls. I sought permission 
from the Inspector to hold interviews during a specific shift, and once approved, would 
let at least two officers know that I was interested in interviewing them that shift. 
                                                 
33 See Interview Schedules in Appendices D and E 
34 Response Teams patrol boroughs and respond to calls from the dispatch communications centre. See 
the ‘Units’ section located in this chapter for a more in-depth explanation of what Response Teams do.  
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Ideally interviews would occur when the officer’s partner was completing paperwork. 
Often I would go out on patrol with the officers I intended to interview that shift so 
that I would be nearby when they became free. Patrolling with an officer during the 
shift in which they were interviewed provided a built in element of triangulation35. It 
also gave the shift a purposive conversation that often extended well past the end of 
the formal interview.  I did not interview officers when they were on their official meal 
breaks.    
 
I did not hide the fact I was asking some officers to do interviews and not others, and 
several times upon completion of an interview, officers would jokingly announce to 
the team the traumatic nature of the encounter they had just had with me. This 
prompted two officers to say that they thought they would be able to handle the 
interview process, and even though I had not specifically sought to interview these 
officers, I did so to maintain the working relationship. The teams were largely male 
and white, but I sought to interview women and minorities on the team in order to 
ensure the full-breadth of perspectives were acknowledged.  
 
Interviews were usually conducted in an empty office at the police station or an 
otherwise private space, excluding the interrogation room known as ‘the fishbowl’. 
Due to the large windows that made up one wall of the room, I felt that the visibility 
and connotation as places of interrogation might sour any interview conducted in the 
fishbowl. Once seated, officers were given a consent form36 to sign and return to the 
researcher, and an additional copy of the form to keep for their records. The officers 
were also asked to fill out a basic demographic questionnaire37 that asked for their age, 
ethnicity, and religious affiliation. This sheet was not designed to capture a wide 
breadth of descriptive information in order to draw inferences, but was a tool used 
largely to reinforce that the formality of the interview experience. While this might be 
seen as creating a barrier to rapport, I felt that rapport had already been established 
through eight months of interaction, and this symbolic gesture would highlight the 
formality of the interview. Officers were asked to confirm they had read the consent 
form, if they had any questions, and if recording could begin. I then reiterated the 
                                                 
35 See the next section for a further discussion of triangulation. 
36 See Consent Form in Appendix A 
37 See Demographics Sheet in Appendix B 
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anonymity the officers were being provided, their ability to terminate the interview at 
any point, and their right to refuse to answer any question for any reason. I also made 
sure they were aware that participation was entirely voluntary.  
 
The consent form, data sheet, recorder, notebook, and symbolic positioning across 
from one another were efforts to remind officers that I was a researcher. I was torn 
between wanting to get the best possible data and the knowledge that an officer might 
inadvertently reveal highly sensitive information to me. I erred on the side of caution.  
This action was taken in direct response to Wengraf’s (2001) suggestion that the power 
dimension can easily be overlooked in preparing for an interview, and despite the 
power afforded to police officers to enforce the law, they may be just as vulnerable to 
exploitation in the interview process as any other respondent. Was this the correct 
decision? I think so, and believe that my PhD would be tainted if I had not ensured 
appropriate protection for all participants.   
 
I designed the interview topics and delivery of the questions to reduce the appearance 
of asymmetries in power between myself and interviewees, though this may not be 
ever completely possible (Kvale 2006). Before beginning the interview officers were 
told that I had topics I wanted to explore but not a specific set of questions to 
complete38. I described the interview as a conversation where we could explore some 
of the issues they encountered while working as police officers. Interviews needed to 
balance the need for a formal structure and also my desire to diminish the “monopoly 
of interpretation” (Kvale 2006, pg. 484) often found in overly hierarchical interview 
formats. Officers had been shaping my understanding of their perspective for eight 
months by the time we began formal interviews, and while I wanted the interviews to 
delve in issues not always palatable over a plate of kebab, I didn’t want to lose the 
banter that had already engendered a relationship where sharing one’s views with a 
researcher were a regular occurrence.  I tried to provide space for interviewees to 
elaborate on their answers and engaging in ‘membership checks’ (Kvale 2006). This 
                                                 
38 It is true that I possessed an interview guide with full-sentence questions written out, but this was 
written as a requirement for the upgrade to PhD Candidacy. The interview schedule was utilised before 
interviews to help me determine how to word some key questions, but was not referred to during the 
course of an interview.  
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meant that I would summarise the ideas shared over the course of several questions on 
the same topic to ensure my interpretations were valid.  
 
I also used the numerous informal discussions occurring during a shift with an officer 
to take a directed turn towards issues I was interested in. Discussions about drugs 
policing wove their way in between discussions about a variety of topics. Football, 
food, and spouses were frequent topics of conversation during the long hours spent 
driving around Watling. Manning (Manning 1980, pg. ix) reflected on his time with 
police officers as “Human moments, suffused with the problematic of drug policing” , 
and this research attempted to use similar methodologies to bring out the 
contextualized role of police officers and an intensive examination of the drugs 
policing efforts in Watling. 
 
3.1.2 Validating the Data 
It has been said that,  
 
…qualitative sociology lacks methodological rigor and, accordingly, truly 
reliable or generalizable ﬁndings. Some social scientists view qualitative 
sociology, in no uncertain terms, as methodologically and empirically 
“soft” and highly subjective, if not completely solipsistic—a 
characterization that a few qualitative researchers have ironically 
embraced. (Goodwin and Horowitz 2002, pg. 33) 
 
Qualitative data utilizes the interpretive tradition’s emic perspective and discovery-
based focus to bring forth hidden phenomena, accessing data that may be concealed 
from researchers utilizing methods focused on supporting external validity 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995)39. Various attempts have been made to systematize 
qualitative methods, (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), including the formal adoption 
of rules of scientific inference akin to those found in quantitative research practices. 
King et al. argue that, “Precisely defined statistical methods that undergird quantitative 
research represent abstract formal models applicable to all kinds of research, even that 
for which variables cannot be measure quantitatively” and that, “… the rules are 
relevant to all research where the goal is to learn facts about the real world” (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994, pg. 6). This research does not attempt to abide by their 
                                                 
39 Thankfully we are no longer constrained by such archaic notions that, "All science is either physics or 
stamp collecting"(Birks 1963) (Attributed to Ernest Rutherford).  
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rules in mass; however two of their rules were part of the data-collection and analysis 
of this project40; namely their suggestion to, “collect data on as many observable 
implications as possible” and that, “The more evidence we can find in varied contexts, 
the more powerful our explanation becomes…” (pg.24)  
 
Some authors have argued that alternatives to the terms ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ 
should be used to more accurately reflect the different purpose of qualitative research 
compared to quantitative (Stenbacka 2001). In that vein, the term ‘dependability’ may 
be more accurate in assessing the reliability of this research (Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
Dependability is the ability to show that the findings are consistent and could be 
repeated, and in conjunction with transferability and conformability, generate 
trustworthiness for the research study (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Conventional ideas of 
validity and reliability are encompassed by the idea of trustworthiness, bridging the 
lessons from multiple research paradigms (Seale 1999). According to Stenbacka 
(2001), this research should be considered reliable if generates understanding of an 
issue but is unable to show causal explanation, as that is an entirely separate goal.  We 
must remain mindful that the complexity of drugs enforcement may be a result of 
contextually altered causal mechanisms; what Ragin (1987) refers to as ‘multiple 
conjectural causation’. To combat against the possibility of muddying the waters with 
unsupported, overly biased, or idiosyncratic observations, data triangulation is at the 
heart of the multi-methods ethnographic approach taken in this research. 
 
According to Mathison (1988), triangulation allows qualitative researchers to control 
bias and, “…establish valid proposition because traditional scientific techniques are 
incompatible with this alternate epistemology” (Mathison 1988, pg. 13). This is 
accomplished by investigating multiple sources, utilizing multiple methods, which 
bring additional breadth and depth to qualitative research (Fielding 1986) and help 
corroborate each other (Bryman 2001). This research benefited from access to 
government data sources, and a limited amount of data from the MPS itself, allowing 
us to triangulate trends in policing with information from the fieldwork (Yin 2003). 
                                                 
40 The two rules were adopted as a formal construct only after data collection ceased. The ideas put 
forward by those two rules were rather self-evident, and a part of the project’s goals from the very 
beginning. Credit goes to those authors for penning an authoritative scholarly article, but not for any 
invigoration to the already thriving practice in qualitative thought and practice engaged in by this an 
many other researchers.  
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The UK produces detailed analysis of drug seizures, usage rates, and crime levels. 
Additional information was received through the use of a Freedom of Information 
Request to the MPS41 in line with the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Though 
triangulation with qualitative and quantitative data seeks to unify multiple sources, it 
often results in inconsistencies which the researcher must account for, but that do not 
necessarily negate the worthiness of the data (Mathison 1988).  The lack of total 
convergence in the data may be the result of the type of data each source will yield 
(Ritchie and Lewis 2003) and should be considered a positive attribute of the 
technique provided it does not lead to ‘epistemological incoherence’ (Olsen 2004, pg. 
8). In addition to seeking outside quantitative measures to compare to fieldwork data, 
this research made us of multiple avenues of qualitative inquiry to explore street-level 
drugs policing. By interviewing officers in the middle of the period of fieldwork, I was 
able to observe if their actions in the field aligned with their answers during 
interviews. I was also able to see if the ideas from an officer on one team resonated 
with officers on another team. Finally, I kept in contact with three other doctoral 
researchers engaged in research with police officers around the UK to identify if our 
experiences married up.   
 
Vast amounts of data were obtained by just interacting with the participants on a 
regular basis (Gelsthorpe 1989), and documenting their comments and reactions to 
incidents.  Cultural ‘rich points’ (Agar 1996), where the ethnographer realizes that they 
do not understand the way in which the world works, occurred quite regularly at the 
initial stages of the research. Though I had some previous experience with police 
response and Safer Neighbourhood Teams, the extended interactions with a set of 
teams over the course of the year allowed greater intimacy, trust, and insights than my 
limited previous fieldwork had allowed. These experiences deciphering meaning from 
the respondents helped develop a frame from which I could then measure against 
information gathered at later encounters and interviews.  The interpretation of data 
from ethnography is made up of these ‘rich points’, but Agar is quick to highlight that: 
 
 
                                                 
41 See Appendix G 
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The representation you build is neither ‘theirs’ nor is it ‘yours’. Instead, it 
is built to fill the initial space where rich points occurred between you. It is 
a representation of the spaces between, built in collaboration by 
ethnographer and locals. (Agar 1996, pg. 36) 
 
3.1.2.1 Researcher Created Bias and Bias From the External Environment 
Aspects of Structured Observation (SO) technique (Bryman 2012, Riess 1968), an 
effort to enhance the reliability and validity of qualitative fieldwork, was briefly 
considered, but deemed incompatible with the restrictions of time and funding facing 
this research project. SO methodology involves having multiple researchers in the field 
at the same time comparing each other’s findings and developing coding frameworks 
together. Additionally, the SO structure seeks to limit what data is taken in and coded, 
a process too constrained for the inductive nature of this work. While unable to engage 
in comparative analysis with other researchers on this data, I used interactions with 
colleagues at both the British Society of Criminology and International Society for the 
Study of Drug Policy conferences to compare experiences in the field with their own.    
 
I must also address reactivity. “Reactivity involves changes in persons’ responses that 
result from being cognizant of the fact that one is participating in a research 
investigation” (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007, pg. 236). Commonly referenced as the 
‘Hawthorne Effect’, individuals will change their behaviour when they know they are 
being observed (Wickstrom and Bendix 2000).Though eliminating this effect 
completely is impossible (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995), over time officers grew 
more accustomed to my presence. Initial outings with officers sometimes would focus 
on drugs talk because they were aware of my research focus, but amidst the numerous 
tasks that beset officers each day there was plenty of policing topics to discuss. One 
officer did try persistently to get me to see a dead body, including once taking an 
otherwise ‘boring’ call to see if a person was dead or just sleeping in the park. This 
was similar to what was experienced by Jeremy Gray (Smith and Gray 1983) when he 
accompanied officers nearly 30 years ago, and my stomach was tested at the sight of 
several gruesome crime scene photos. Evidence of the reactivity of officers to my 
presence is visible throughout this research, but that effect is generally quite minimal 
compared to the effect on their actions created by the settings themselves (Becker 
1977).  
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3.2 Gaining Access  
Initial efforts to gain access began in February 2010, and attempted to use the same 
route utilized during my MSc work with the MPS; namely to seek approval from the 
Strategy, Research and Analysis Unit (SRAU)42 at the MPS.  I was asked to submit a 
research proposal, and this was done in April 2010.  Initial response to the proposed 
research plan was positive, but at the final stage it was rejected by a Commander who 
deemed work focused on drugs policing to be out of line with MPS priorities. After 
meeting with the head of the SRAU in May 2010 it was decided that I would submit a 
revised proposal that focused on the development of community confidence policing, 
and that such work would find a welcome reception in the borough in Watling. 
Attending this meeting was PC Callum. He was based in Watling, but was on 
secondment to the SRAU, and was already working on a report to commanders about 
community confidence issues in the borough. A compromise was reached whereby it 
was agreed I would execute the research for the PhD, and use the data obtained to 
prepare a report on community policing for the MPS. I was informed that failure to 
focus on community confidence would result in access being denied.   
 
The phrase ‘value for money’ was bandied about regularly by MPS staff, even though 
they were not actually funding this research. At one point, I was sent an Excel spread 
sheet with the various pay bands for officers of different ranks, and was asked to 
calculate the cost to the MPS for the amount of time officers would spend in 
interviews or otherwise not being at their most productive.  This of course was an 
impossible task given the complexities and unknown variables that might influence 
such a costing, and a number was roughly sketched out, quite literally on the back of a 
large envelope.    
 
The experience was useful in that it highlighted what was sacred and what was profane 
for the organization (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). The tone taken by the 
organization laid out the boundaries of our relationship: they were doing me a favour, 
and I should be grateful for the opportunity.  These bumps along the road to accessing 
the field were at times quite frustrating, but I took comfort in the idea that, “the 
                                                 
42 The unit was renamed during the course of the research and is now called the Strategy and 
Performance Unit, located within the Directorate of Strategy, Performance and Professionalism at the 
MPS. 
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negotiations themselves are data” (Pearson 1993, pg. xii). Furthermore, the disregard 
for drugs related research unless explicitly under the umbrella of community 
confidence was insightful as to the organisation’s focus. This was the beginning of a 
process of interpreting the normative order of the organization in an effort to avoid the, 
“significant and perhaps crippling resistance” (Herbert 1997, pg. 172) that one would 
face if attempting to work with police in a mode blind to their reality.  
 
The SRAU requested that the research examine how local units incorporate strategies 
to build community confidence in to their tactical responses, how they work with 
community partners to implement these new endeavours, and how the actions of police 
officers change as a part of this new assignment.  The result was to be an internal 
report of undetermined length, and unspecified content, provided it addressed the 
topics described above. The stimulus for the MPS to commission such research comes 
from the rapid expansion of community policing initiatives taking place in Watling and 
across the MPS.  Though the community initiatives were dominated by the SNTs, a 
series of similarly focused programs had been rolled out over the previous few years. 
Officers are well supplied with information on changes in community confidence, the 
crime rate, and various additional quantitative measurements. Much of this work has 
been carried out by members of the SRAU in conjunction with academics from the 
London School of Economics (Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 2009, Jackson and Gray 
2009, Jackson and Sunshine 2007, Hohl, Bradford, and Stanko 2010). While these 
works have been key in developing theory and policy, research exploring the execution 
of community policing plans outside of experimental conditions is lacking.  In short, 
the MPS knows if certain programs are improving the numbers, but not how officers 
are incorporating the community confidence focus in to their work.   
 
3.2.1 Completing a Background Check 
After agreeing to produce a report for the MPS, I was asked to undergo a full 
background check. This process dragged on from May through mid-July 2010, when I 
was notified that I had failed the background check because I had not been in the UK 
for three years. This is a standard applied to all Met background checks, and while the 
temporal issues were known to the MPS staff before beginning the process, no action 
was taken to notify me of the impending rejection. The problem was quickly overcome 
when it was determined that I would be able to fulfil all aspects of the work without 
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the need to access any MPS computer systems directly. This had never been part of my 
request. The background check process was very upsetting for me. I had just turned 
over full medical records, financial statements, and detailed accounts of my personal 
history as part of the background check. I had laid bare any and all past indiscretions, 
even explaining each and every hospital visit I had ever had. It was quite disturbing to 
think that someone had been given that privileged information when it was both 
known that I could not pass, and that the background check was not even necessary. I 
would remember this frustration during fieldwork when observing civilians who were 
left frustrated by an officer’s action or lack thereof. 
 
 The lack of a full background check did end up creating one problem. Without an 
MPS ID (available only after a background check was successfully completed), I was 
unable to enter police stations at will, and therefore had to call a member of whatever 
team I was coming to work with upon arriving at the station each time. This produced 
a clear sense of being an outsider to the organization. Only after about six months of 
regularly appearing at stations was I let in to the building without escort, and this only 
happened if a few select station officers43 were on duty at the front counter.  
 
The front door of a police station was not the only time or place I felt a degree of 
‘otherness’ while in the field. The issue would raise its head from time to time during 
the ‘messy business’ (Maher 1997, pg. 232) of ethnographic fieldwork.  By not being 
fully adopted by the organization I felt my position within the teams I went to work 
with was precarious. While I doubt that my position as an outsider would have 
changed much if I had an ID card, I know that I would have felt slightly more secure in 
my initial footing if there had been some sense of organizational support. While I 
could not overcome the historical differences (Maher 1997) that had brought me to be 
in the position of a researcher and my research subjects in the position of being police 
officers, I embraced that ‘otherness’ when necessary during the fieldwork. The lack of 
an ID card meant that I could play naïve, or unaccustomed to violence and gore. This 
allowed the officers to feel they had a role in teaching me about their job, something 
                                                 
43 A Station Officer is the person manning the front counter at a police station. Sometimes this is a 
member of staff, sometimes a PCSO, and sometimes a PC, depending on the station and what time it is. 
Station officers control access to the station, and handle public enquiries. They also open the back gate 
to the car park.  
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that greatly improved my ability to understand their perspective. Maintaining a level of 
‘otherness’ and working with five different teams also meant that I avoided having 
officers become less informative because they did not know what information I was 
gaining from my time with other teams (Agar 1986). 
 
3.2.2 Access to the Field Site 
The head of the SRAU suggested that Superintendent Anera in Watling might be 
receptive to the new research focus, and that his borough would be an ideal setting. 
Indeed, Watling was already one of several boroughs I had identified as a possible 
location for the fieldwork due to a number of factors discussed in greater detail below. 
Watling was eventually selected as it provided an experience similar to many other 
inner-London boroughs and would be easier to obtain permission from local 
commanders. Research approval from the SRAU meant only that I could work with 
officers, but it in no way guaranteed access to them; such was the discrete nature of 
each unit within the MPS.  
 
Superintendent Anera was Watling’s Territorial Policing lead, and a member of the 
boroughs’ Senior Leadership Team (SLT). A meeting was arranged with 
representatives from the SRAU and Supt Anera for August 1, 2010. At that meeting 
Superintendent Anera gave his approval to the research focus and methodology after a 
lengthy discussion and many questions. He offered to put me in contact with 
Inspectors from two Response Teams44 in the borough, and three safer neighbourhood 
teams.  
 
It appeared that the two response teams were selected by Supt Anera based on two 
factors. The first was that the Inspectors leading each team were in the good graces of 
Supt Anera. It was made apparent that to be in Supt Anera’s good graces, one needed 
to be a good leader of strong character, but also had to be able to produce the arrest 
and detection figures he needed each month. The second factor, at my request, was to 
follow one team from each of the two stations in the borough where RTs were based. 
                                                 
44 The borough operated response teams out of two of the six stations located in the borough, each 
station having four Response Teams on a rotation, numbered 1-4, and working 12 hour shifts. This was 
later switched to five lettered teams working 8-10 hour shifts in April of 2011.   
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The three SNTs were not selected at that time, and we agreed to start with one SNT 
and decide on others in the future.    
 
I had proven Van Maanen and Kolb were correct when they said, “Gaining access to 
most organizations is not a matter to be taken lightly, but one that involves some 
combination of strategic planning, hard work, and dumb luck” (1985, pg. 11). 
 
3.3 Watling, “A Jewel in God’s Crown” 
Watling is an inner-London borough, and like many it encompasses varied socio-
economic groups. There are vast tracks filled with soaring blocks of council housing 
that help to push up the population density of the borough. Unlike a borough such as 
Westminster, there are no roving bands of street sweepers with high-visibility vests 
and rolling trashcans, and as such the borough has many areas where it feels grimy, 
dirty, and choked with vehicle exhaust on the old and narrow streets.  Its history of 
manufacturing and heavy commercial activity are visible in the many of the older 
buildings and sporadic workers’ cottages that still stand near the old warehouses, many 
of which have been developed into expensive condos.  
 
Watling has a population of around 250,000 residents. Of the residents, about 60% are 
white, 25% African Caribbean, and the rest comprised of small groups of various south 
Asian and mixed ethnicity individuals. The white residents are the most numerous 
ethnicity in all but one of the wards, but make up a significant majority in several of 
the wards in the north part of the borough, and in a small affluent pocket in the south. 
Of the black population, there were about twice as many black Africans as black 
Caribbeans in Watling. Combined black populations were present in every ward, and 
made up a significant majority in Farmingham and a plurality in the surrounding 
neighbourhoods of Lettsom and Bunnington. The rate of employment in the borough is 
in the bottom quarter of all London boroughs, and it has one of the highest conception 
rates in London for girls under 18 years old (Piggott 2009). 
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Figure 5: Ethnicity in Watling 
 
Along the high street in Farmingham sits a small brick church, squeezed between an 
all-you-can-eat Chinese restaurant and a hair salon that stays open until 4am. The 
church dates from the 1840’s, and was built to serve the needs of a community rapidly 
expanding due to the new canals and industrial works that quickly transformed open 
fields in to expanses of soot belching factories. The steam power and canal boats are 
long gone now, but the small church remains, having survived bomb damage in the 
war, and sits now alongside a busy thoroughfare unimaginable to its builders. Strung 
across its stained glass windows is a brightly coloured sign that reads, “Farmingham 
and Watling! A Jewel in God’s Crown!”  Looking at the surroundings the old church 
now finds itself amongst, many would find the description overly enthusiastic.  
 
Farmingham is a notorious area of Watling, and aside from a few footballers it is 
known mostly for its poverty and gangs to people outside of the area. However, the 
residents of Farmingham have developed strong intercommunity organizations with 
vocal community organisers. Several prominent youth centres create after-school 
activities for children, and the community.  Amongst the neo-Dickensian squalor there 
is an energetic community that vibrates with sounds, smells, and colours of the dozens 
of countries from which the residents have immigrated. Small markets cater to the 
various communities. On the main shopping street in Farmingham a west-African 
White 
60% 
Black African 
17% 
Black Caribbean 
8% 
Asian  
10% 
Mixed 
2% 
Other  
3% 
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grocery store sits just a few doors down from an east-African grocery store, and in 
between there is a halal butcher.  
 
Watling, having similar characteristics, problems, and population as some of its 
neighbouring boroughs, is an ideal location to carry out this research. Watling had 
similar numbers in a variety of police statistics to many of its neighbours. Though 
generalization was not the goal in presenting the data, when picking a research site I 
did hope to find one that was not experiencing policing issues dramatically different 
than others nearby. An added bonus was that it took less than an hour to reach the 
police stations of Watling via public transport from my home. This may sound like an 
inconsequential factor in the pursuit of scholarly research, but it is hard enough to 
wake up early and be at the station in time for a 6am roll-call, or to make your way 
home after a 12-14 hour day without having to factor in a long journey to and from the 
research site.  
 
3.3.1 Police and Crime statistics of Watling 
Watling is in the top five London boroughs for ‘I Grade’ calls to police and total 
number of reported crimes. ‘I Grade’ calls are the most serious emergency calls, with 
about 1,900 received by the MPS each day (Piggott 2009). Police aim to respond to an 
‘I Grade’ in less than 12 minutes, and are authorised to use their lights and sirens when 
responding to such a call. This is also known as being ‘on the hurry-up’ or using ‘blues 
and twos’.  MPS officers deal with nearly 150,000 CAD incidents each year. The 
borough is one of the top ten boroughs, both in the number of problem drug users and 
also the rate of problem drug users. Between 2004-2008 the borough averaged more 
than 300 drug possession arrests, cautions and fines each month.   
 
3.4 In the Field 
Observing police activity alongside uniformed officers is not new in social research, 
and there were many excellent examples available to provide guidance on how to 
conduct such an endeavour. According to Mastrofski and Parks:  
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Trained  observers accompanied patrol  officers during their tours  of  duty,  
observed what happened,  and  recorded  their  observations  in  field  
notes.  Observers were instructed to minimize intrusion into the police 
officer’s work. They were admonished to “fit in,” to maintain objectivity, 
to avoid as much as possible influencing the play of events, to limit 
conversation to neutral topics, and to avoid direct participation in police 
work if at all possible. Observers were told not to inquire about the 
officer’s choice of action, lest the officer feel self-conscious about both 
being observed and judged. The purpose, of course, was to avoid creating 
artificial police or citizen actions in reaction to the observer’s presence. 
(1990, pg. 476) 
 
While some of their ideas were utilized, when it came to inquiry about an officer’s 
choice of action I took a different approach intended to grasp not just what officers 
were doing, but why. This required questioning their motivation and intent. This was 
undertaken extremely carefully as each interaction had the potential to nullify my 
position as a trusted observer (Emerson and Pollner 2003). Questioning an officer had 
to be in a manner free from judgment or disagreement or it risked alienating the 
officer. Early in my time with the teams I played up my naiveté to make the questions 
less threatening. This developed over the course of the fieldwork, eventually allowing 
me to ask more directed questions about specific actions situations. Even with the 
trust, my questions were always aimed at seeking understanding, not judgment.  In this 
respect I employed the idea of an unstructured ‘debrief’ (Mastrofski and Parks 1990) 
in an attempt to learn, and my efforts were generally positively received45. It is well 
documented that officers may mistrust outsiders (Skolnick 1966) and questioning took 
place only if the situation felt appropriate. I never questioned officers’ tactics during an 
incident, in front of suspects, or around colleagues who were not present at the initial 
incident. 
 
3.4.1 Appearance 
Gaining trust was one of my primary goals during the first few shifts, and maintaining 
it a background concern at all times. The first step in gaining trust was to make sure 
that my outward appearance would fit within a police culture, since having similar 
personal characteristics to others helps improve their attitude towards you (Park and 
Lennon 2008). To this end, my normal dress consisted of dark blue-jeans, a button 
                                                 
45 The other benefit of naiveté was that it allowed opportunities to hear different officers describe the 
same law, policy, or procedural component of policing, thereby generating data as to how that officer 
interpreted their role and activities. 
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down shirt, and police style boots. My boots were the only clothing items that closely 
resembled police issued uniforms, and this was done for two reasons. Firstly, the boots 
provided protection and stability in the variety of environments that I found myself in 
during the course of fieldwork. Secondly, the boots were a subtle symbol that I was not 
just some wimpy civilian wearing loafers in my office based job, but rather someone 
who was ready to hit the streets46. I purposely kept the boots mildly scuffed up, never 
fully polishing them so that they appeared more well-worn then they really were. The 
goal was to appear similar to officers without mimicking their uniforms. 
 
Observing officers to make sure my appearance fit with theirs, I came to understand 
that the way an officer wears their boots says quite a bit about them. Some officers 
spend several hours building up a shiny toe cap of their boot, buffing it regularly so 
that a few square centimetres are mirror-like. Officers with shined boots tended to 
wear a heavy combat style boot, be ex-military, and were more aggressive in their 
policing style. Some officers wore a lighter style boot, and typically left it unpolished. 
Their shoes were in good order, but like their belt or vest, it was treated as just another 
piece of kit. A few officers, mostly older, wore Doctor Martin’s loafers. Officers had 
many ways in which they manipulated their uniforms, and talk about the ‘new kit’ that 
was supposedly going to be issued was a regular point of discussion. MPS officers still 
wear a clip-on tie, and many would unclip it as soon as they were in the station. Some 
officers preferred to carry a large baton normally reserved for public order incidents. 
They cited that it was more reliable than the collapsible batons normally worn by 
officers. As it was not collapsible, the larger baton served as a poignant reminder that 
the officer was carrying a weapon normally not permissible to those they were 
interacting with.  
 
I wore a Level IIa bullet-proof vest whenever in the field with officers. The vest was a 
different model that what officers wore and did not bear the patches identifying me as 
a police officer, though was generally similar in appearance. The MPS refused to issue 
                                                 
46 As discussed in chapter 2, policing often requires more paperwork and engagement than action, but 
the perception of an action based career led most officers to wear ‘combat’ style boots. The symbolism 
and intricacies of footwear choices by officers could probably be a full chapter if one felt so inclined.  
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me a bullet proof vest, and I was forced to buy my own online47. While initially 
frustrated by the extra expense, the MPS penny-pinching actually proved helpful. 
Officers could tell the vest was not MPS issued kit. They had a good laugh whenever I 
explained to them that I had to purchase my own personal protective equipment 
(PPE)48, and that as a student I could only afford to purchase a used vest. When it was 
discovered that my vest was actually more heavily armoured than theirs, it was 
suggested by some that I might be useful to take cover behind should we encounter a 
particularly dangerous situation. I did not agree with that plan.   
 
Regularly wearing a bullet-proof vest is quite a remarkable experience, and gave me 
great insight in to a key tactile and psychological element of police work. The rigid 
structure of the vest’s 6.5kg Kevlar armour plates make you ‘carry the vest’, not just 
wear it. You have to keep good posture so that the weight does not throw off your 
balance, and as consequence the wearer appears to have a stiffer gate. A Velcro panel 
ensures it is snug against you, and I found it reassuring to feel that slight pressure 
around my chest. The vest also provides a convenient place to rest your arms if you 
hook your thumbs in to the armpit holes. This allows you to keep your hands warm 
while also not affecting your ability to quickly bring them to use. The position 
engenders a relaxed but slightly aggressive stance, and is a favourite of officers across 
the MPS. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the relief of taking your vest 
off.  Coming in from the street, the simple act of unzipping the vest represents that 
you’re back in safe territory. It certainly feels good not to be carrying the extra weight, 
but it feels even better to know that you are ‘safe’ again49.    
 
In early January 2011 I was issued with a MPS radio after I had a charged encounter 
with an angry civilian. Officers had entered a building in pursuit of a fleeing suspect 
and asked me to stay near the car to keep an eye on another suspect already in 
handcuffs. A resident of the tower block, thinking I was a police officer, started 
screaming at me and the situation escalated nearly to the point of him assaulting me. I 
                                                 
47 If you ever want to have an interesting experience, go online and try to figure out how much you’re 
willing to spend on a bullet-proof vest for yourself, and what level protection you can afford...   
48 It should be noted that while it is mandatory for all officers to wear their vest when on duty, several 
officers at RT2 regularly flouted this rule. These were, with one exception, officers with more than 20 
years on the job, and I never saw them admonished by any Sergeant of Inspector for their lack of PPE.  
49 The perception of a lack of safety outside the station is an important element in officer’s psychology 
when interacting with civilians.  
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was spared when the officers returned and defused the situation. Having been unable to 
call for assistance, it was decided that I needed a radio in case I ever became separated 
again. I had been with the team for four months at that point, but no one had ever 
thought to obtain a radio for me. Holding my ground against the enraged resident 
solidified my access with the team, and indicated that I had earned a place, like all new 
recruits, whereby I was guaranteed the mutual protection afforded to colleagues by 
other officers (Van Maanen 1974). It was good to know that I had that protection, but 
it was hard earned, represented access to the inner workings of policing, and was 
constantly subject to renegotiation.  
 
Though I never had to use the radio to call for help, having it was certainly helpful. For 
one thing I could now clearly hear calls as they came out over the radio, instead of 
straining to hear updates on an officer’s radio50 in the front seat. Secondly it was a 
symbol of belonging I could display at will. When in a police station or crime scene 
where there were officers who didn’t know me, having a radio poking out of my bullet 
proof vest pocket might as well have been a MPS staff card hanging from my neck. 
When in someone’s home, or other situation where I didn’t want to give the 
impression I was a police officer, I could easily hide it.  
 
3.4.2 Building Trust 
Trust is key to obtaining access to the hidden dimension of policing (Hunt 1984), and 
building a relationship with the officers was not going to be accomplished by simply 
wearing the right clothes and equipment. While I was afraid of getting the cold-
shoulder (Chan 1996), this was, perhaps, less of an issue because I was not considered 
a full outsider (Brown 1996, pg. 179) due to my previous research with police, 
something I mentioned to each unit early on. My previous experience with the police 
also helped prevent most of the ‘culture shock’ experienced by researchers upon 
entering fieldwork with a new group (Dewalt 2011). This outsider/insider status 
                                                 
50 There are actually two types of radios used by officers in an Incident Response Vehicle (IRV). The 
first is their personal radio, a small hand-held device that is primarily tuned to the local dispatch 
channel. Most borough level communication takes place using this radio. In addition to the personal 
radio, officers have access to a ‘main-set’ located in every vehicle. The main-set is usually tuned to the 
MPS-wide dispatch channel. Officers rarely actually broadcast on the main-set, but they keep it on to 
listen for major incidents or vehicle pursuits that may be headed their way.  The main-set channel will 
often stay quiet for extended periods, but when it picks up you are often treated to a rush of adrenaline 
fuelled voices calling in ‘real’ police emergencies.   
 78 
afforded me some breathing space in my first few weeks, allowing me to establish my 
identity and relationships within the team. My efforts to build trust with the teams 
were assisted by several things. Just as Rowe (Rowe 2005) experienced, I had the 
advantage that I was a white male in my mid to late twenties, a description that fit most 
of the team members I worked with. This similarity, especially in gender and age 
meant that officers and I ‘spoke the same language’, and so my questions to them may 
not have felt as alien as they might have been from a more senior researcher (Williams 
and Heikes 1993).  I could relate to the same music, TV, and sports they talked about, 
and often did to help build my relationship with them. Copies of The Daily Mail and 
The Sun were always available in the canteens, and I took to reading them online 
before a shift in order to be able to relate to the news they would be reading.  Also, I 
was also taller than any other officer, an American, and didn’t ask too many stupid 
questions in my first few weeks. In short, I wasn’t like what they expected a researcher 
to be like.   
 
There were other things that also helped develop trust with officers. Though I was not 
a smoker, I would sometimes go outside of the station with an officer and have a 
cigarette with them. This was usually only done during night shifts, and was one of the 
few times outside of a formal interview when an officer might be alone to speak to 
during their shift. Going outside for a smoke, even when other smokers were present, 
provided access to a different social context of the officer. Police are not allowed to 
smoke in view of the public, so the smoke breaks take place in the car park. The space 
is away from prying eyes or listening ears, and it was my sense that the officers used 
the time to shed their official roles, stepping away from the stress of their jobs51. 
Research has shown a predictive relationship between repeated exposure to violence 
and smoking (Cisler et al. 2011), so it is perhaps not surprising that approximately 
35% of the officers I worked with smoked52 (Bonnet et al. 2005), substantially higher 
than the national rate of 21% of adults in England (Eastwood 2010). Smoking was 
especially useful in soliciting knowledge after a challenging incident. In the car park 
the confident and blustery persona that was often on display in the writing room tended 
                                                 
51 Officers did not smoke in public except for the very rare 4am smoke in some out of the way place. These were special moments I was only done in front of me after a few months with a team. 
52 This is my estimate, though it is in-line with previous research about police substance use and misuse. 
(Richmond et al. 1999) 
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to give way to a more introspective demeanour that engendered thoughtful discussions 
about what had just transpired. The quote from PC Jack that launches Chapter Four 
came during one such moment.  
 
Tea and food were constant points of discussion and interaction when out with 
officers. What one was having on ‘refs’53 was a topic of conversation during every 
shift. Kebab and Chinese were the two dominant options in the take-away category, 
though pizza and a quick trip to Tesco’s were a good fall-back. Occasionally 
McDonald’s made the cut as well, though this was seen by many officers as being the 
‘unhealthy’ option.  I never brought anything more substantial than some trail-mix 
with me so that I could buy refs wherever the officers were buying theirs. One of my 
biggest successes in trust building came when I introduced an officer on an RT to a 
small kebab shop called Turkish Delight. I had not actually found the place, but had 
been taken their by an officer from an SNT, and I tried to tell the RT officer that. It 
didn’t matter. From then I was given credit by that officer and many others for 
introducing them to what quickly became the team’s favourite dinner location. It was 
close to the station, service was quick, and you got a delicious de-boned half chicken, 
chips, salad, and a drink for £5. The place was open late, and seemed to be neutral 
territory, because the officers never searched anyone in and around the shop no matter 
how unscrupulous they looked. Standing inside the narrow shop, officers had 
consistently positive interactions with the other customers waiting for their food. 
Given the shop’s late hours and location between a busy bus stop and a large night, it 
tended to draw a large number of drunken patrons; but this never resulted in a negative 
encounter between the two groups.  
 
Making tea was the duty of rookies or one of the female officers. Senior male officers 
almost never offered to ‘make a brew’. Being asked how I took my tea at the same 
time as the officers were asked was a noted accomplishment in my field-notes. After I 
had been with a unit for a few weeks I would tend to offer to help make the tea. 
Apparently the trick to ‘proper police tear’ is to never wash the kettle. Ever. “You’ll 
know it’s no longer fit for use when the bottom rusts out and just gives way one day. 
Then we’ll just get a new one.” (PC Gary, RT2). This participation in the mundane 
                                                 
53 ‘Refs’ is the term used for meal breaks, and is short for Refreshments. 
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elements of policing helped dismantle officers’ apprehension about my presence (Van 
Maanen 1988). Their reduced apprehension was, in part, visible when I noticed that 
stories about family and life outside policing increased in depth. Officers who had 
previously described ‘the misses’ when talking about their wives started actually using 
their names. This inclusion in the mundane activities by no means guaranteed my 
continued standing in their good graces. Even with this level of access I faced the real 
possibility that officers were not presenting their true working practices me 
(Waddington 1999b).  
 
The effort to build trust has to be balanced against the potential for the researcher to 
‘go native’ if they are not careful and become too closely involved in the phenomenon 
under study, taking for granted that which they should be critically engaging with 
(Adler and Adler 1987). I was fortunate that my need to work with each of the five 
different teams meant I was able to switch teams regularly, building necessary distance 
into the relationship. Still, at points I considered attempting to join the MPS as a 
Special Constable. Discussions with my supervisor helped me see where that desire 
was emanating from, and I decided against taking that path. The intensity of policing 
creates a camaraderie within the ranks that is quite seductive. I must admit that it felt 
good to know the inside jokes, to have people who can share in the experiences you’re 
observing, to talk of the challenges that shape one’s life; these connections, however 
tenuous, were desirable when I felt alone in an alien environment. Though I could 
share stories of foot chases with friends, discuss my feelings with my partner, and talk 
about my research with my supervisor, in the field I felt a strange sense of isolation 
throughout the fieldwork.  
 
Even when not in the field, I felt like I lacked the vocabulary to fully describe the way 
the fieldwork was changing me, and did not know how to share that with my partner or 
supervisor. While I could not share those feelings out loud with the officers I worked 
with, I knew that when I was with them, they might be going through some of the 
same things, and maybe by listening and observing them I could better understand 
what I was feeling. I met regularly with my supervisor to discuss my feelings, and he 
provided a valuable outside perspective that could appreciate the feelings in the 
context of doing good research. These discussions proved valuable in helping me see 
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past the quandaries I was encountering, and identifying how they fit in to my research 
question. 
 
I avoided going to events or parties with the team outside of the shifts, and luckily my 
busy schedule outside of fieldwork provided a reasonable excuse.  On one occasion 
however I felt uncomfortable at the level of trust I had developed with the officers. PC 
Jack had given me a ride home at the end of a very long night shift. We chatted about 
his days in the army on the ride, and when we got to my building he told me to wait a 
moment before jumping out. He pulled out his iPhone and brought up a picture to 
show me. It was an image from a sonogram. He beamed with pride as he said, “It’s 
three months today. I can finally share the news that I’m going to be a father! I wanted 
to let you know now, and I’m going to tell the team when I get back.” I smiled and 
congratulated him. But once inside my flat I felt angry that at such a joyous moment 
my first thought had been to evaluate the implications that such a level of sharing 
entailed. In my effort to avoid going native I felt like I had inadvertently removed 
some of the beauty available in life. I knew my job was to, “grasp the native’s point of 
view” (Malinowski 2002, pg. 25), and doing so required I become close enough to 
earn their trust and protection. But I felt that I was in some ways a liar as I could never 
reciprocate what I hoped to engender in officers.  
 
3.4.3 Risk 
The work carried out with police units entailed a significant amount of risk, and more 
than 150 Met officers died in the line of duty in the 20th century (Kyriacou et al. 2006). 
During the fieldwork I was nearly assaulted, was involved in a moderately serious car 
crash, and was present in many other situations where there was clear potential for 
harm. There was also a significant risk of psychological trauma from the work due to 
routinely being exposed to violent incidents. I will forever remember the sight of the 
young male victim with a bullet wound in his chest, laying on the pavement only 
moments after being shot54. The look on his face was initially calm, but turned ever 
more concerned as his breathing became more laboured. Even with an officer applying 
a thick bandage, the wound produced a mixture of foam and blood that ran down his 
                                                 
54 We had come upon the victim unexpectedly while driving an officer home. The shooting had taken 
place less than a minute before, and the smell of cordite still hung in the air when we arrived.  
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side. The scene, and the fact I could do nothing to help this person, were difficult to 
process. I tried to disconnect from my emotional response by forcing myself to 
remember that I was a researcher there to observe, not to gawk. Every available 
precaution was taken to ensure both physical and psychological safety throughout the 
research.  
 
A ‘Hazard and Risk Assessment for Fieldwork’ was completed in October 2010 in 
accordance with LSE guidelines. In it I described the risks entailed in undertaking 
fieldwork with police, and how we would attempt to limit those risks.  Beyond wearing 
a bullet-proof vest and a seatbelt, I made sure to keep myself in positions where I 
would be protected during encounters with suspects and citizens55. For psychological 
preparation I met with the LSE’s Mental Health and Wellbeing Manager, Jane 
Sedgwick, once before the fieldwork, once while in the field, and once after I had 
completed fieldwork. At our first meeting we discussed the signs of post-traumatic 
stress, how to deal with difficult situations, and access to resources should the need 
arise. Our further meetings involved discussions about how I was coping with some of 
the more troubling incidents. These meeting proved quite helpful because to talk about 
concerns about emotional processing of tragic events is often suppressed within police 
culture (Pogrebin and Poole 1991), and my role as an observer left me in even less of a 
position to seek support from the officers I was with.  
 
Each police unit also conducted a risk assessment in accordance with MPS regulations, 
and I went over this assessment with each team leader before my first shift. I also 
made sure to renew my CPR and First Aid training, and was taught how to use the 
emergency button on the police radio. When triggered on either the main-set or 
personal radio, the emergency button creates a ‘hot mic’ for ten seconds so that the 
officer can call for help without having to keep one hand on the transmit button.  
 
3.5 Digital Ethnography: Creating New Methodologies with a Smartphone 
Until recently pen and paper was the medium of choice for ethnographic field-notes. 
Every classic example of ethnography with police officers has relied upon the timely 
transformation of thoughts into written field-notes. It has been considered good 
                                                 
55 For additional information on this, please see Appendix F 
 83 
practice to do this directly after a shift or session was completed so that the ideas 
would still be fresh in the researcher’s mind. Researcher objectivity in the collection of 
data is addressed elsewhere in this chapter, but we must address the concerns relating 
to the recall capability of the human brain, especially evident in the literature 
identifying the imperfections of eye-witness testimony (Wade et al. 2002, Pogrebin 
and Poole 1991, Morgan III et al. 2004). From this literature base we know that 
witnesses’ memory is, “usually incomplete, fallible, subjective and malleable” 
(Ainsworth 2002, pg. 161). Even when notes are written shortly after the shift, a 
researcher faces issues of distortion during the encoding, storage, and retrieval of 
memories.  Additionally, short term memory is only able to retain about seven items at 
a time (Miller 1956), and this means there that a researcher may quickly use up their 
available memory capabilities while witnessing a protracted encounter between police 
and civilians. Stressful periods of activity encountered alongside police may also serve 
to push the researcher past an optimum level of stress (Yerkes and Dodson 1908) 
where the intensity of the situation diminishes the researcher’s ability to accurately 
recall information at a later date (Hope et al. 2012, Mcmorris et al. 2011, Morgan III et 
al. 2004).  The natural tendency to focus on central details, to the exclusion of 
peripheral items during these stressful encounters (Christianson 1992), further limits 
the comprehensiveness of field-notes written from memories recalled well after the 
event.  Further to all of the neurological limitations, the issue of prejudice amongst 
witnesses (Duncan 1976) is well documented, and may affect even the most well 
intentioned researcher.  
 
With these limitations in mind, I set out to develop new ethnographic practice that 
might reduce inaccuracies introduced into field-notes by current practices. Creating 
copious handwritten notes during a shift can be both unnerving to the respondent and 
also be unpractical given the physical demands placed on the researcher (Rowe 2005). 
Approaching the problem with tools already at my disposal, an iPhone seemed to 
present the most promising option.  Armed with an iPhone 4 and the iOS 4 operating 
system (later iOS 5 beginning in June 2011), I had at my fingertips a device capable of 
capturing audio, video, still pictures, GPS information, time, and a keyboard to input 
any typed notes. Unfortunately there was no piece of software specifically designed to 
support ethnography in the UK market. There was one ethnographic software 
application available to US iPhone users, but upon further investigation it became 
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apparent that the software offered by the US firm Everyday Lives56 was designed for 
commercial and marketing research and was not suitable. Much of the literature on 
technological innovation in qualitative research is focused either on the use of video 
(Shrum, Dunque, and Brown 2005, Rieken 2013), or on uses of digital technology to 
better understand consumer behaviour (Wood and Solomon 2009, Lantos 2010). I have 
not found any academic literature that describes using the powers of a smartphone to 
create new approaches to recording primary field-notes and other important 
contextualising data during empirical scholarly research.  
 
3.5.1 Software Selection 
Two important elements were needed to successfully incorporate the smartphone into 
field research: I needed to be able to take personal audio notes discretely while in the 
field, and wanted to be able to note the location and basic details of each incident I 
encountered in real time. I wanted to use audio based notes for several reasons. Firstly, 
the speed at which English can be spoken is far faster than it can be written. 
Conversations in British English tend to average around 210 words per minute 
(Tauroza and Allison 1990), compared to less than 30 words per minute when written 
by hand (Baron 2002)57. The first problem was, from a technological standpoint, easily 
solved with software built in to the iPhone.  A ‘voice memo’ function in the iPhone 
allowed for recording of any audio picked up by the iPhone’s built in microphone, and 
recorded it into an M4A digital audio file at 64kbs58.  
 
The problem of accurately tracking my activities with officers was more difficult. The 
software would need to produce an accurate GPS reading, useful coding options, keep 
all data private, and be stored in a suitable format. There were numerous offerings in 
the iTunes App Store that provided one’s current GPS location, but lacked the input 
                                                 
56 An additional concern about using this software was that it automatically uploaded all data to servers 
operated by the publishing company, thereby jeopardising the confidentiality and anonymity of the data 
I would be obtaining if I used the software.  
57 Given the more than 24 hours of audio notes I made, even at a moderate pace I would have recorded 
more than 300,000 words of notes, the equivalent of nearly 700 pages of A4 text. This is in addition to 
the written field-notes I took as well. 
58 Kbs stands for kilobytes per second, and is a measure of the data transfer rate of digital files. Music 
CD’s are recorded at 256kbs, and online streaming radio stations typically broadcast at between 64-
128kbs. The 64kbs rate is achieved by compressing the audio as it is recorded, which results in the loss 
of the very high and very low ends of the audio spectrum. This is not a problem if you are simply 
recording someone talking.   
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fields required to code and label multiple GPS coordinates. Eventually I purchased the 
GPS Log software developed by William Denniss as it needed only minor adjustments 
to the default settings to meet my needs. One of the key features available in GPS Log 
was the ability to ‘tag’ events. A tag was simply a designation for an event that could 
be quickly added to an incident’s files. I created a list of tags, but could also create 
new ones as needed. For example, I had tags that marked an incident as a stop and 
search, a drugs stop, and also if a cannabis warning had been given. This allowed for 
quick searches of incidents through the software during the analysis stage. 
 
 
Figure 6: Image of GPS Log notation 
 
3.5.2 Updating Old Field Practices 
Pen and paper were not abandoned as a method of taking field-notes during this 
research. I took written notes often, including after shifts were completed, and 
sometimes while officers were doing paperwork. I avoided doing so while out in a car 
or on foot patrols, but outside of those times the written word was always an option. If 
there was a room full of officers in the writing room I would usually partake in the 
conversations, but if only a few were present I would open my notebook and write 
field-notes so as not to be sitting around appearing bored. Though writing notes might 
have marked me as an observer (Emerson 2011) at other times, it was a natural activity 
in a quiet, and appropriately named writing room.  Like my predecessors in the 
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policing literature, written field-notes make up an important part of data from the 
observational fieldwork. Mine just happen to have been written with a digital pen. 
 
This research made use of a Pulse Smartpen produced by Livescribe Inc. The smartpen 
uses a camera located just above the ink cartridge to read micro-dots covering the page 
of a specially produced notebook. The camera can see exactly where the ink has 
covered, and captures that information to be transmitted to the Livescribe Desktop 
software package on a laptop when plugged in via a USB port at a later time.  From 
this an exact copy of written notes can be uploaded, and kept secure to analyse at a 
later point.  The pen can also convert the pages in to a PDF document suitable for 
printing. The digital storage allows for password protection of all notes. The pen also 
incorporates a microphone that can be activated by tapping on a small section of the 
notebook. If this is engaged it is possible to have audio that is synced precisely to the 
notes as they are written. Instead of having to write what the respondent just said, the 
researcher can write their thoughts, able to hear the audio that prompted such thoughts 
with a mouse-click whenever they want. The pen’s audio features where not utilized in 
everyday field work, but proved exceedingly helpful during formal interviews. Though 
I only took limited notes during a formal interview, the pen served as an unobtrusive 
backup recording device.  The physical research notebook could burn in front of me, 
and I wouldn’t lose a minute of sleep. This is an invaluable luxury given the breadth of 
possible challenges a researcher can face during fieldwork. 
 
Officers noticed that my pen was a bit odd, and on several occasions asked about it. I 
explained how it was a digital pen, and ran through its various features with them. 
Most seemed to find it quite interesting and wanted to give it a try. While several 
scribbled away, one officer decided I should suffer the same fate as anyone who left 
their pocketbook lying about. Since an officer’s pocketbook contains a detailed record 
of their actions it can be called upon in court to be examined. The punishment for 
being careless with your pocketbook and leaving it about is that you have a penis 
drawn in it to embarrass you the next time a judge asks to examine your pocketbook. I 
suffered the same fate, and page 21 of my field-notes contains a detailed depiction of a 
man’s external reproductive elements, captured in full digital detail.  Oddly, perhaps, I 
welcomed this defacement as another sign that I had been accepted by the team. 
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3.5.3 Developing New Field Practices: Audio 
Employing the new software required careful consideration of how it might be viewed 
by officers and civilians. Luckily the sight of an iPhone was and is a common 
occurrence on the streets of London. Nearly half the UK population owns a 
smartphone, and of those nearly 20 per cent are iPhones (Arthur 2011) . More than half 
the officers I worked with owned an iPhone and had it on them during their shifts. 
Physically, the iPhone remained exactly the same no matter what application it was 
running.  
 
Since I did not have to be directly involved in incidents as they occurred, my position 
nearby was not the focus of attention. Whenever I wanted to record information I 
could engage the voice memo function on the iPhone and speak in to it as though I was 
talking on the phone. I could also conceal the device in my hand, and bring it close to 
my mouth to quietly speak in to it without drawing attention to my actions. This 
proved to be quite useful for taking notes during an incident. On some occasions I was 
able to record several short comments over the course of an incident. By speaking for a 
few seconds, pausing the recording to observe, and then resuming the recording to 
update what had transpired, I could take down a detailed description in near real time 
without influencing the incident at hand beyond being present at the situation. This 
increased the accuracy of the encodings stage of memory creation, but also had the 
advantage of creating a cued recall situation that helped me remember additional 
details when accessing my field-notes after fieldwork was completed (Tulving and 
Pearlstone 1966).  
 
The voice memo function was also used in between incidents. When we stopped to let 
an officer go to the bathroom, return to the station to do paperwork, or for any other of 
the many possible reasons, it was quite easy to slip away for a minute to record notes. 
With the phone always by my side, I was able to engage the recording function within 
a few seconds. I was able to record notes on conversations or incidents within minutes 
of them occurring, and in a format more quickly delivered than handwritten notes. 
Over the course of a 12 to 14 hour shift, there could be dozens of occurrences that 
were noteworthy, and by being able to capture them in detail only moments after they 
had occurred I was less constrained by the limited capabilities of short term memory. 
An officer stepping outside to make a call in the car park was a common occurrence, 
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and so my habit of taking a few minutes to myself during downtime in the station was 
not seen as unusual. At the end of a shift I would also use the voice memo function to 
record between 6 to10 minutes of audio observations for the shift.   
 
On rare occasions the audio recording capabilities of the iPhone were used to conduct 
informal in-car interviews with officers. After becoming comfortable with my 
presence, some officers responded quite well to detailed questions about police 
practice while driving around on a slow shift, particularly late at night. The depth and 
breadth of these conversations would have been difficult to remember in sufficient 
detail, especially given the late hour and the numerous instances occurring both before 
and after the in-car conversation. On half a dozen or so occasions I asked the officers if 
-since we were having such an interesting discussion- I could record our conversation 
in the same manner that I was recording formal interviews. In all instances officers 
agreed, and the request proved no more than a momentary pause in the conversation. I 
should add that the practice of informal interviews rarely ever took place with SNTs 
due to the nature of the work59. In all of these instances I obtained the express verbal 
consent of the officers present. It should be noted that those officers had already 
received at least two separate briefings on the privacy protections and ability to decline 
participation in the research. There was a common joke floating around the station that 
I might really be an undercover reporter for The Sun newspaper, and when such jokes 
were made I would laugh it off and then tap my chest and loudly whisper in to my 
bullet-proof vest, ‘end transmission, mission compromised’.  With the issue of secret 
recordings clearly on their mind, I only used the in-car recordings sparingly and with 
express consent.   
 
3.5.4 Developing New Field Practices: GPS 
The use of GPS Log to track incidents helped bring an additional layer of information 
to the audio memos.  Upon arriving at the scene of an incident I would create a new 
event in the software which was already running. This would trigger the device to 
begin obtaining a GPS ‘fix’, and open a screen that allowed me to give the incident a 
title. The unit I was with was would be pre-tagged at the beginning of the shift, and I 
                                                 
59 You can’t get to the same level of inane chatter walking around London that you can in a police car at 
doing laps around the borough at 4am on a quiet Tuesday.   
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could add additional tags with a few finger flicks. Within ten seconds I could usually 
obtain a GPS fix accurate to within 50 metres, and that could be refined to accuracy 
within 10 metres in another ten seconds. On rare occasions the system would have 
trouble obtaining a precise fix on my location. While this is unfortunate, having the 
general location is still helpful because tags and shorts notes in each event provided 
important information.  
 
All of this could be taking place within my pocket, so the phone only was exposed for 
a few seconds while emerging from the car, rendering it an invisible assistant. This 
helped avoid the previously mentioned Hawthorne Effect. Additional notes could be 
added to the event at a later point, but I tried to get a few basic facts down before 
leaving each incident. When adding notes via the keypad my actions were 
indistinguishable from someone sending a quick text message. Although the software 
had the capacity to add a photo or high definition video from the iPhone’s camera 
directly into the entry, I did not engage this feature out of privacy concerns.  
 
The information from GPS Log provided a list of incidents that was searchable, and 
also a map that showed every incident by a pin at its location.  Unfortunately the 
number of pins so accurately maps the entirety of the borough and its boundaries that I 
cannot share that picture without giving away the identity of the borough.  The GPS 
data was time stamped, and this proved useful when trying to figure out how long an 
incident had lasted, or what exactly I was referring to in an audio note. This was 
assisted by the Google Maps Street View tool. Street View uses camera and GPS 
equipped vehicles to take 360 degree photos as they travel along every street in an 
area. The service was brought to the UK in March 2009. If I need to clarify the 
physical layout of an area where an incident took place I would have the map open the 
pinned location with Street View, and instantly I have an exact picture of the physical 
layout of an area. This is limited in situations that took place entirely within building, 
but having that trigger has proven to be quite helpful.  
 
3.5.5 Combing Audio, Visual, and GPS to Engender Episodic Memory Recall 
By harnessing the technological capabilities of the audio recordings, Street View 
information, and GPS data, I was creating an ideal trigger for episodic memory 
recollection. Episodic memory is, “… a system that receives and stores information 
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about temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-spatial relations among 
them.” (Tulving 1984, pg. 223). The process of creating field-notes has always been 
necessary to overcome the weaknesses of human memory (Bryman 2001), but this new 
technologically supported method is able to take experiences in the field beyond the 
jotted notes of a few words scribbled on scrap paper (Atkinson 1997, Ditton 1977) and 
bring thick description to the recorded experiences of the researcher.  
 
Episodic memory places us in the memory, marking the memory’s position 
on our personal, autobiographical, timeline. Retrieval of episodic 
memories constitutes a form of time travel in which we recover the 
encoding context of the previously experienced event. (Kahana, Howard, 
and Polyn 2008, pg. 467) 
 
Using this recall technique helps avoid some of the pitfalls of retrieval induced 
forgetting as it provides re-exposure to information with the context and key data of 
the event (Wimber et al. 2009). Written field-notes, without the breadth of 
contextualizing information contained in the added dimensions of GPS and Street 
View, are more prone to the natural retrieval inaccuracies of the mind. The benefit of 
episodic memory recollection proved invaluable during the analysis and writing 
periods of this project.  Listening to one section of audio recorded while at a very 
chaotic and violent scene, I was struck by the magnification of my feelings when I 
opened up the Street View image of the location and could suddenly remember all the 
individuals that populated the situation. It was like having a canvas to which I could 
add the figures of my mind, free to use my mind’s resources on that element instead of 
to recreate the basic scene.  
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Figure 7: Incident marker generated by GPS Log, as viewed in Google Maps Street View60 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
This research used ethnography comprised of participant observation and semi-
structured interviews, along with document analysis. Interviews took place with PCs, 
Sergeants, Inspectors, Superintendents, and a Detective Chief Inspector. The head of 
Watling’s Community Monitoring Group was also interviewed. Policy documents 
were obtained online and through Freedom of Information requests. Descriptive 
statistics were obtained through Freedom of Information requests, publicly available 
datasets, and through the London SafeStats database system. In addition, audio notes 
and written field-notes were collected.  
 
Interviews were recorded using and Edirol R-09 digital recorder in MP3 format, and 
transcribed manually. Transcription was, in part, completed by an appropriately trained 
postgraduate student from the Social Policy Department at the LSE. Her work was 
checked for accuracy against the digital audio recordings. None of the audio notes 
were transcribed, but this was not necessary as the audio could be directly uploaded to 
the qualitative analysis software.  
 
Transcribed interviews and some audio notes were uploaded in to the qualitative 
analysis software Nvivo, produced by QSR International. Using this type of software 
                                                 
60 This photograph has been altered to obscure the identity of the location.  
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speeds up analysis and helps ensure the data is rigorously examined (Silverman 2005). 
However, merely adding data to this type of software in a basic coding pattern is not 
analysis, and active interpretation of the material is still required (Coffey and Atkinson 
1996). After data was uploaded to Nvivo, each respondent was given a unique 
respondent code that was generated based on their rank, unit type, and numerical 
differentiator. 
 
Initial data management involved identifying initial codes in the data and then creating 
themes emerging form the interviews and voice notes. This research used an iterative 
approach, assessing and creating themes during data collection based on common 
motifs appearing during fieldwork (Bryman 2012). This allowed emerging themes to 
be examined while still in the field, without closing off avenue of investigation. The 
initial concepts were labelled ‘in vivo’, progressing towards more fixed and definitive 
concepts labelled with a mixture of literature, researcher, and respondent labels 
(Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The initial themes detected were then categorised under 
primary thematic coding groups once the fieldwork was completed (Ritchie and Lewis 
2003). This was done using ‘tree nodes’ in Nvivo, whereby secondary and tertiary 
themes could nest within a primary thematic coding group. A ‘self-understanding’ 
approach was used in order to interpret how the respondents understood their policing 
responsibilities and actions (Kvale 1996), and to refine the themes.  
 
Field-notes, both audio and written, were used in generating the coding framework, but 
were not regularly uploaded to Nvivo. The data from these sources was reviewed again 
after the coding framework had been established in order to add specific content to the 
appropriate thematic grouping. This data had already been given structure to an extent 
as they came from the researcher’s notes directly (Denzin and Lincoln 1994) and 
therefore were self-selective. 
 
This simple yet robust analysis process provided an efficient mechanism by which the 
extended participant observation and interview data could be organised and examined. 
Quotations used throughout this research are intended to highlight themes from the 
data and perspectives emerging from the analysis.  
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3.7 Ethics 
This research potentially involved significant ethical challenges related to protecting 
both my police officer respondents and the public they were engaging with. Ethical 
issues associated with working police officers was somewhat minimized by the fact 
that they faced minimal risk of harm, they had informed consent without undue 
invasion of privacy, and there was no intentional deception by the researcher (Diener 
1978). The MPS ran a risk assessment with each unit I worked with, determining that 
my presence would not jeopardize the officers’ well-being. Before beginning the 
research, considerable time was spent with my supervisor discussing different 
situations with civilians that might occur, and developing practical ways of addressing 
each potentiality in line with a broader set of ethical research practices. I attended a 
Research Ethics Seminar, completed the Ethics Review Questionnaire, and Ethics 
Review Checklist provided by the LSE.  My aim was to produce a set of ethical 
guidelines that would guide the fieldwork, and were not tied to specific types of 
encounters as situations rarely fit the preconceived scenario. Punch proffered that this 
method is, “more likely to promote understanding of the issues and compliance with 
them” (1986, pg. 83). This focus on a set of ethical principles instead of a rigorous 
structure was designed to help navigate the regularly occurring ‘molehill’ ethical 
issues that make up fieldwork with police (Rowe 2005). These are minor issues that 
the researcher encounters during fieldwork that need to be navigated efficiently. Such 
issues can crop up during arrests of suspects, while entering peoples’ homes, or even 
while in the canteen. Having discussed the potential ethical issues, my supervisor 
agreed that the research could proceed61. In order to test our judgment I met with a 
Professor in the Department of Social Policy independent of my supervisory team. 
After examining my paperwork and discussing the issues with me, the Professor 
concurred that we had sufficiently addressed the ethical issues and did not need to 
consult the Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Because of  a strong desire to promote ethical practices that would be applicable to the 
variety of potential situations, my supervisor agreed that it was best to adopt a 
situational view of ethics (Norris 1993).  As noted by Fletcher:  
                                                 
61 The LSE ethics guidelines require PhD students’ advisor to be satisfied that all ethical concerns have 
been addressed for research to proceed. Only in cases where the supervisor is unable to reach a decision 
on the ethical concerns will the Research Ethics Committee become involved.  
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The situationalist enters into every decision making situation fully armed 
with the ethical maxims of his community and its heritage and treats them 
with respect as illuminators of his problems. Just the same as he is 
prepared in any situation to compromise them or set them aside in the 
situation.(1966, pg. 17) 
 
This armed yet flexible approach best suited the nature of the research project. Given 
the limitless variations of ethically challenging scenarios the research might encounter, 
it would be impossible to predict every scenario and ascribe a specific response. It 
would also have been impossible to gain officers’ trust had I been constantly muttering 
a mantra of warnings regarding participation and anonymity.   
 
3.7.1 Ethical Issues with Officers 
One of the most important issues in modern qualitative fieldwork of this nature is 
obtaining informed consent from participants (Du Toit 1980, Bulmer 1982, Van Den 
Hoonaard 2002). The key point, as highlighted by Bulmer is that,  “…those who are 
researched should have the right to know that they are being researched, and that in 
some sense they should have actively given their consent” (1982, pg. 49). Officers 
were verbally informed about the nature of the research and their right not to 
participate on at least two occasions, including during my introduction to a team. 
Unfortunately written consent is not an appropriate option during every encounter with 
officers (Du Toit 1980, Punch 1986), however I carried consent forms with me at all 
times should any officer have requested details about my research practices. No officer 
ever asked to see a consent form. This practice was discussed with, and accepted by, 
unit commanders and research staff at the Metropolitan Police Service.  
 
In general I avoided participating in any activity that might be considered formal 
policing. On occasion I was asked to hold a torch, stand next to blood splatter on a 
sidewalk62, or carry a first aid kit; relatively benign actions. In the station I would 
make tea, grab a new battery for someone if I was going to the radio room, or loan a 
pen. Again, benign actions that served to build rapport. I never explicitly told officers 
what I would not do, and they generally did not push me to engage in activities that 
would have been out of line with my position as a researcher. The one occasion where 
                                                 
62 So no one walked on it until the Scenes of Crime Officer came by to mark it.  
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I was asked to watch a person in handcuffs while the officers pursued two teenagers 
was as far as it ever went. Afterwards I told the officers that I would prefer not to 
engage in activity like that again.  I had decided that under no circumstances would I 
detain a person, covertly engage in reconnaissance alone, or do anything that might 
take away the freedom of a civilian. I would engage in activities that would help 
people, and on several occasions was asked to flag down an ambulance and lead the 
paramedics to the location of a sick or injured person in order to speed up the arrival of 
medical services. Officers were legally empowered to call on me as a civilian to assist 
them, and I told them that if they ever called for my help in an emergency situation I 
would assist.   
 
Just as previous researchers have before (Smith and Gray 1983, Norris 1993), I 
witnessed misconduct by the police.  This included inappropriate jokes and comments, 
all the way to violence above and beyond what was necessary to carry out the job. 
Most frequently the inappropriate behaviour took the form of sexist jokes63and the 
misuse of stop and search powers under Section 1 of PACE64 and Section 2365. 
Numerous individuals were stopped using justifications that were either well short of 
the legal requirement or largely fictitious. The key point of engaging in Stop and 
Search under PACE is that there is reasonable grounds causing the officer to have 
suspicion about the individual. One clear way of obtaining reasonable grounds for a 
search under PACE is by citing the suspicious actions of the individual.   If an officer 
wanted to stop someone they would say, ‘look at the way he’s standing like that’. This 
type of behaviour was routine in RTs and present in the SNTs to a lesser degree. I 
decided to use those opportunities to ask officers to explain what had made them 
suspicion of the individual, and how they had learned to spot whatever signal it was 
they had seen.  I chose not to report those incidents because they generated 
extraordinary amounts of data. Reporting them would have breached trust and would 
have meant the end of the research66. I chose to remain a researcher, intent on 
                                                 
63 Just as Reiner (1978)experienced more than 30 years ago.  
64 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
65 Misuse of Drugs Act 1974 
66 I should note that I am well aware of the traumatic effect that being regularly harassed by state 
officials in your own neighbourhood must and can have on individuals. I in no way am trying to 
minimise the anger, frustration, and effect on self-esteem that these police interactions may have on 
someone, but I was not in a position to report each person who came away from a police interaction with 
their feelings hurt. I had to grit my teeth and perfect a dispassionate expression.  
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collecting data from a hidden phenomenon, and not react as I would had I been a 
community member. I relied on an internal narrative that told me that if my research 
were successfully completed, my findings may help improve policing practice and do a 
broader good for society. 
 
Amongst police there is an implicit limit to which other officers will help cover up acts 
of misbehaviour (Newburn 1999), and it is understood that a researcher is not 
necessarily bound by those same rules (Smith and Gray 1983). There is great difficulty 
in producing a definitive trigger for reporting such instances, and an absolutist 
perspective may not answer ethical dilemmas (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).  
 
One particularly difficult situation happened in Farmingham when 15 young black 
men were pulled off a bus by officers searching for people involved in a fight at a 
nearby party. It was reported that a group of men had fled the fight and boarded a bus 
nearby, and as the first unit on scene we blocked in the most likely bus. The two 
officers entered the bendy-bus at the front door, and walked through the bus as I 
watched from outside. I met them at the back door and they said that there was not 
anyone suspicious on board. As that conversation was taking place a van full of 
Special Constables67 arrived and their Sergeant led the way onto the bus, barking 
orders at his team to grab any young black males they found. Fifteen young men 
matching this general description were pulled off the bus. They did not seem to know 
each other and some were in sport clothes while others were dressed in silk shirts and 
polished leather shoes. The officers pushed the young men against the shop-fronts and 
began searching them roughly. The officers from RT2 that I was with eventually 
stepped in to help their fellow officers.  
 
One of the young men told the officer that he did not appreciate what they were doing, 
and that he wanted to know why he was being detained. The Sergeant leading the 
Special Constables held him by the wrist, shouted at him and attempted to place the 
man in a position to be handcuffed. The man pushed back, and as a busload of people 
                                                 
67 Special Constables are volunteer police officers who work about 16 hours a month. There were about 
1,500 such officers with the MPS during the period of research, though that number has increased since. 
They are fully warranted officers, and you would not know they were volunteers unless you knew to 
look for the number five preceding their officer ID number.  
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watched, was thrown to the ground by officers. PC Jeremy, an officer I had arrived 
with, moved in to help hold the man down. He later told me that he felt the physical 
force was unnecessary had the man been talked to more politely, but he had no choice 
but to join once the man resisted. He explained that he was on team ‘Police’, and that 
team needed him. I watched as the man screamed, ‘This isn’t right! You are fucking 
racist cops! Get off me! Fuck you! Fuck you and leave me alone!’  
 
Two officers had made an entirely different assessment of the situation only moments 
before the Sergeant arrived, and an innocent man ended up detained and forced to the 
ground.  But what could I do? The man had suffered no serious physical injury, and the 
force used by the officers was in line with what they could exercise on someone 
resisting a search. The consensus around the canteen that night was that the searches 
only took place because of the arrival of the Sergeant. The officers confided that while 
it was unfortunate that force had to be used, using force for compliance was sometimes 
part of policing. They added that while it may have looked quite violent, they were 
using restraining holds on the suspect, not hitting him with their batons or using CS 
spray68. The possibility of filing a complaint was brought up by one officer, but was 
dismissed as being unfeasible and inappropriate due to the Sergeant’s seniority over 
the officer. I weighed up what to do.   
 
Reporting the incident would have meant certain termination of my access, either from 
senior officers or by the cold shoulder of PCs (Skolnick 1966). Not reporting it meant 
that the Sergeant would probably keep treating people like that. I did not report the 
incident, but instead used it as a means to raise the issue of ethnicity and use of force. 
While I felt it was a disgusting misuse of police powers, the situation did not reach the 
level where I felt the impact on the offender justified notifying the unit commander. 
Many officers from the team had seen the search take place, so it served to facilitate a 
discussion that probably would not have happened otherwise.   I felt I had entered a 
researcher purgatory where I was not fully accepted but was also losing my place in 
society because I was complicit in a fellow citizen’s mistreatment by police.  I took 
solace in the classic lines of Bronfenbrenner, “…the only safe way to avoid violating 
                                                 
68 CS spray is an incapacitating spray, similar in effect to tear gas delivered in a spray can.  
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principles of professional ethics is to refrain from doing social research altogether” 
(Bronfenbrenner 1952, pg. 453). 
 
3.7.2 Ethical Issues with Civilians 
During interactions with civilians - either as suspects, prisoners, or others who came to 
the attention of the police -I informed them of my role providing doing so did not 
jeopardise the safety or professional conduct of the police officers involved. I was 
concerned about distracting the officers, but I also wanted to avoid the ‘observer 
effect’ (Norris 1993) where people will ‘play up’ to the researcher. In some instances I 
deemed it impossible to inform a civilian that I was not a police officer or gain their 
consent for my presence, due to the concerns listed above.  
 
Arrested individuals were always notified about my role as soon as possible after they 
had been arrested, and were informed that they could ask me to leave without 
repercussion. Generally prisoners are transported in the back of a police van, so 
contact with them post-arrest was usually quite limited. In the rare occasions when a 
prisoner was transported in an IRV I would inform them of my identity before getting 
in to the vehicle with them. Officers had me ride in the front passenger seat during 
such occasions. To avoid prompting the arrested individual to say anything that might 
harm their position I avoided making small-talk with them after informing them of my 
identity.  
 
There were some civilians with which I had regular contact during fieldwork. A group 
of about 20 young men aged 11-15 regularly came in to contact with police on their 
council estate known and ‘The Knottington’ and they came to know I was not a police 
officer, spreading the word to their friends in the area. Over the course of the research I 
was at incidents involving those young men at least ten times, including one foot 
pursuit after an assault. At first they would just eye me suspiciously, but after the 
fourth time one of them asked who I was. My American accent shocked him, and I told 
him I was a researcher observing the police. That seemed to settle the issue.  
 
I began to be referred to as, “the big one” whenever they saw me. On one of my very 
last shifts I was at a community event and the boys were hanging around, having a bit 
of banter with the local SNT officers. As I spoke with the community youth worker 
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who had organised the event, she told me that several of the boys were convinced that 
I was a CID69 officer. The youth worker told me that the boys had not understood what 
a researcher is, and a rumour had formed that I must be gathering intelligence for a big 
raid. This was confirmed to them by the fact that I just stood there silently watching 
whenever they were stop and searched, I didn’t have handcuffs or a baton, and that I 
was seen with different officers. She had only recently learned that the boys held this 
belief, and had tried to explain to them who I was.  
 
This community event was my first chance talk with the boys. I was able to dispel the 
rumours, and had a good 10 minute chat with the group after the youth worker 
encouraged them to approach me. We talked about what a researcher does, why one 
would want to study the police, and how you get to be a researcher. One of them asked 
to poke my bullet-proof vest to see what it felt like, and I let him. Upon doing so the 
group seemed to come to an unspoken agreement. No real police officer would let 
them poke him in the chest like that, and as a sign of my new non-police status, they 
subsequently began telling me the rudest jokes they knew.  
 
My relationships with civilians were not always as pleasant as the above incident. 
Sometimes - because people thought I was an officer - I was on the receiving end of 
abusive comments. On one occasion a man who was being removed from his home for 
domestic violence tried to pick a fight with each of the officers present. None were 
taking the bait, and when he turned to me he said, “Come on you big silent fuck. Do 
you polish knobs you knob polisher? Is your face like that from too many knobs 
slapping you in the face? I’m gonna clap you in the face Patches!70”. Many people, 
both before and after learning I was not a police officer, would ask my opinion on 
situations. “Do you think you’ll find the robber?” “C’mon, do you think they need to 
be arresting me over this?” I had to be very careful to not portray myself as having 
insider knowledge, or engaging in behaviour that might make the job of the officers 
                                                 
69 Criminal Investigative Division.  
70 I have a birthmark on my face, and he was referring to that in an attempt to mock me. Later when 
talking to an officer about the incident I told him that I’d been called a lot of names, but ‘Patches’ was a 
new one. He suggested that I should have punched the wife-beater in the face because, “none of us 
would have seen anything, none of us would have said anything. He was a cock, and deserved to learn to 
keep his mouth shut.” It was quite a surprising statement, and seemed to be said in all seriousness. I felt 
I had truly been taken in by the team, but at the same time was worried that they might actually do such 
things to people.  
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more difficult. Moreover, I had to avoid doing anything that would bring additional 
harm or stress to civilians. Though I often knew the answer I feigned a lack of 
knowledge.   
 
The research required me to enter people’s homes on a regular basis and, when I did 
so, I made an extra effort to inform civilians that I was not an officer. Most civilians 
seemed to take little notice of me.  I was only once asked to leave someone’s home, 
and that was after he had initially acquiesced to my presence. The man only revoked 
my access when he was informed that he would be arrested for sexual assault. This 
caused him to begin yelling at everyone to leave, in a vain attempt to avoid being 
arrested. Even though this was clearly an undirected request, and the officers were not 
about to leave, I complied. In doing so I actually made the situation worse because 
now he had spotted one small area where he had control. He started shouting that I had 
to leave his block, and then his neighbourhood, and eventually as he was escorted past 
me in handcuffs he told me that I needed to leave London because he no longer wanted 
me there. He was a very sad man looking for any semblance of control as he faced 
very serious charges. 
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Chapter 4- Response Policing: Astronauts Acting Out 
I’m glad you’re studying us, spending time on the street like you have 
been. You need to see how we really operate, what we experience, yeah, 
because you can’t understand policing until you’ve spent time on team. I 
mean, a barrister and I both know the law, but we’re different people. He 
can quote me all kinds of cases and precedent; he knows the law. But 
where he sees pictures of crime scenes, I’ve been there. I know the smell of 
iron in a pool of warm blood. I’ve held people as they die, whimpering in 
pain and knowing it’s all almost over. I know the law too, but I know its 
application in the most dire of society’s circumstances. The filth the 
barrister reads about is what stains my uniform... The difference between 
the barrister and myself is like the difference between an astronomer and 
an astronaut. The astronomer can tell you all about the formation of 
galaxies and stars’ orbits, but he’s never held a moon rock in his hand.  
(PC Jack, RT4) 
 
This chapter will explore the complex role of Response Policing in Watling. Through 
RT officers’ efforts to respond to emergency incidents coming in via 999, proactively 
searching individuals they encounter on the street, and stopping vehicles, they 
regularly engage in non-adaptive efforts to demonstrate that police can maintain order 
in the community and apprehend those that violate the law. The RT officers represent 
one side of the bifurcated developments in the criminal justice system. In Watling, 
their identity is built on the notion that through expeditious response and intrusive 
searches, they can bring criminals to justice. In reality, this is rarely the case. Often, 
officers are only able to take a report of an incident that occurred before they arrived 
on scene and fill out paperwork they will never see again. Combined with the seven 
per cent success rate for their stop and search activity, the moments of doing ‘real 
police work’ are more elusive than the image portrayed to the public. RT officers grasp 
for moments of triumph amongst endless miles of driving through empty 
neighbourhoods in the middle of the night. At times, it is a thrilling ride capable of 
inducing an adrenaline rush so strong it makes your ears throb and your hands shake. It 
can also be fun - meeting up with other team members for an illicit cup of coffee in the 
middle of a quiet graveyard shift, swapping weird and wonderful stories about 
characters you’ve come across that night. For the most part, however, it is draining - 
the constant motion of going from non-incident to non-incident, listening to people’s 
problems, and sitting for hours filling in endless paperwork in triplicate after anything 
exciting actually occurs. 
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Somewhere, amidst the highs of a vehicle pursuit and the lows of standing around a 
crime scene waiting for SOCO71 to arrive, there are drugs - smack and crack, coke and 
dope, though mostly just very small bags of cheap cannabis. Officers are armed with 
the same tools they carry to thwart muggers and murders as when they go after 
teenagers smoking a spliff72 in a stairwell. In order to explore the role of drugs fully, 
this chapter will first set the stage by identifying what street-level policing looks like in 
Watling. Once armed with this information and analysis the reader will have a 
significantly improved appreciation of the discussion in Chapter Six. In addition to 
helping identify the role of drugs in street-level policing, this chapter also provides 
evidence of bifurcation.  
 
In order to explore the general context of street-level policing I will first explore the 
Raison d'être of Response Teams, namely their ability to respond to calls via the 999 
system. Second, I will focus on the ‘proactive’ efforts of response teams, notably their 
frequent use of stop and search. Here I will show the full force of non-adaptive efforts 
as they are brought to bear on the community. Further, I will explore how officers 
decide to invoke their powers to search by looking at the schemas officers use to 
identify criminals and the discourse teams have created to explain their actions. 
Finally, the chapter will explore how RT officers interact with the community. The 
application of stop and search powers has persistently resulted in ethnically 
disproportionate statistics and a strained relationship between RT officers and the 
community.  By exploring these interactions, we will see how officers adopt a view of 
criminality that distances perpetrators from the ‘respectable community’. Further, I 
will show that officers use non-adaptive practices to engender a sense of mission and 
professionalism even as other parts of the police service in Watling have moved to 
incorporate adaptive practices.   
 
By the end of this chapter I will have shown that the role of response officers is fraught 
with conflicts about their role, and these conflicts are mitigated by officers pursuing 
action and police-work that reinforces the professional identity they seek to project. 
                                                 
71 Scenes of Crimes Officer. A forensic technician. As there is usually only one or two available for the 
borough, officers often have to wait for some time before the technician arrives to sweep for fingerprints 
or other forensic evidence. 
72 A spliff is slang for a cannabis cigarette, and can be used interchangeably with the word ‘joint’.  
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Unfortunately this attempt to minimise personal and professional conflicts disconnects 
the RT officers from the adaptive changes to policing, and generates its own conflicts 
with the community through the over-use of stop and search tactics.  
 
4.1 Being on Team  
The belief that RT officers are constantly responding to emergency calls is untrue. 
Although RT officers spend more than 50 per cent of their time outside of the station 
(Mclean and Hillier 2011), much of this is spent patrolling the borough or conducting 
proactive searches of individuals. RT officers often encounter a varied work 
environment due to their reactive role responding to calls for assistance, and proactive 
action against suspicious individuals. 
 
Thing is when you’re on response team, you are literally led by calls, so all 
the calls that come out you have to go to. If you get down time and there’s 
nothing that needs your immediate attention you will sort of head down to 
the areas you know there’s going to be drugs, being sold or dealt or people 
in possession of, you go down to areas where motor vehicle crime happens, 
burglaries. You’ll patrol different areas where you know there’s high rates 
of burglaries and it will literally be just to stop and search people, to try 
and prevent, to try and make an arrest, pull over, because you’re in a car 
you’ll be driving around and pulling over different vehicles sort of like 
checking documents trying to stick people on for no insurance, no driving 
license that sort of thing. Every day was different. (PC Sam, Blackburn 
SNT) 
 
PC Jenny had a concise description of the role of an RT team, “I answer 999 calls73.” 
Asking her to expand on other work an RT engages in, she continued, “Sometimes you 
get the opportunity for a bit of pro-activity, but I see my primary role as to answer 999 
calls and to go to people who need the police.” (PC Jenny, RT4). This emphasis on 
service through action (Smith and Gray 1983, Reiner 2010) was a common sentiment 
amongst RT officers, allowing them to differentiate themselves from the rest of the 
organization. Skolnick’s description of the police ‘working personality’ involving, 
“danger, authority and efficiency, as they combine to generate distinctive cognitive 
and behavioural responses” (Skolnick 1966, pg. 42) is particularly relevant to RT 
policing.  To an RT officer, taking action equated with the ability to engage in the real 
                                                 
73 999 is the official emergency phone number used to access police, fire, and ambulance services in the 
UK. A separate non-emergency number, 101, was introduced in July 2011.   
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policing that thwarted criminals (Waddington 1999b). Despite disparaging remarks 
about the communities in Watling and criticisms of their managers and political 
overseers, a call to action provided RT officers the chance to do the job they feel they 
were paid for. “Fuck’n aye I love my job!  I get paid to drive fast, bust bad guys, and 
take a roll on the ground when they put up a fight!”74  
 
The RT officers’ focus on action meant that patrolling was often only interrupted by 
incidents that were of an adversarial nature to community members (Reiner 2010), 
making positive interactions a rare occurrence. Other than when standing in a queue to 
purchase food, RT officers rarely interacted with community members who weren’t 
either the victim or suspect in a crime. Additionally, their constant patrolling in search 
of action created a skewed perception of the population of Watling. Officers spent their 
time looking for what was wrong with their community, often seeing innocent actions 
as nefarious.  
 
One of the first things I was taught in the borough is believe no one, and 
suspect everyone. And it doesn’t serve you far wrong, because if you 
approach everything with that attitude, and then you find out the facts, you 
then know who you’re easing off with and balancing it all out. Loads of 
people would disagree, but it works. (PC Bruce, RT2)  
 
Officers on team often feel they have a special role within the organization due to their 
emphasis on service through action. CID, SNT, and many other units are seen as 
attending crimes well-after the fact, and not involved in dangerous situations. 
Conversely, officers on TSG75, OSU76, DPG77, SO1778, and other action-oriented units 
are seen as kindred spirits. PC Hugh commented “I want to transfer to TSG because 
you’re a proper force. Done my SNT rotation and wouldn’t want to go back to that; I 
need action.” Many officers on team were inclined to evolve their career with postings 
that were action oriented, not community oriented. Research by the National Policing 
                                                 
74RT officer from the borough of Mayne (Bear 2009). Officers in Watling made similar comments, but 
this was perhaps the most beautiful expression of the idea I’ve ever heard.  
75 Territorial Support Group- Responsible for public order policing and major incidents 
76 Operational Support Unit- Responsible for high risk warrants and mental health assessments 
77 Diplomatic Protection Group- Responsible for protection of politicians, embassies, and government 
buildings. They can be identified by their red police vehicles. 
78 Firearms Team- Officers part of ‘Trident’ patrol in teams of three, armed with assault-rifles and 
handguns. They can be identified by the circular yellow stickers in the front and rear windscreens of 
their vehicles.   
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Improvement Agency has identified that Response officers spend nearly 23 per cent of 
their time dealing with an average of 5.2 incidents per shift, well above the 10 per cent 
of the time neighbourhood officers spend on or at incidents79 (Mclean and Hillier 
2011). Commenting on an assault he recently attended, PC Jack vented a common 
frustration at the expansion of the role of RTs, especially for instances where CID or 
an SNT might have previously been called to take over a situation. PC Jack 
highlighted how the ability to respond quickly to calls for help was being hamstrung, 
while other units were not able or willing to respond to the dangerous calls RT officers 
prided themselves in being able to handle.   
 
I dealt with it [as] the initial investigator, secured evidence, set up a crime 
scene, catched [sic] the bad guys, cared for the victims, reassured the 
community. That’s where my job should stop because the radio hasn’t 
stopped. There are more calls coming out; I should be able to extract 
myself from that and go on and do what I am being paid to do which is to 
answer 999 calls, because with the response team no one else is going to 
answer them, no-one else in the office is who might be dealing with these 
jobs are going go ‘oh that needs dealing with there’s a bloke kicking off at 
a pub, I’ll tell you what I am going to do I’ll put my Met vest on and go out 
there and deal with that.’ They won’t, that’s our job. (PC Jack, RT4) 
 
This sense of separation between RT and other units was seemingly built on real 
instances. While I was walking with a PCSO from Brunel Gardens SNT, a call came 
over the radio regarding a street robbery four blocks from our location. The crime had 
just occurred, and the victim provided a detailed description of the suspect. I looked to 
the PCSO to see if he heard the call, and he had, but remarked that, “We’ll just keep on 
heading this way, we’ve been out a while now.” A few minutes later, officers from the 
RT called in to say they had a suspect in sight and needed support to close off his 
escape paths. At this point, we knew we were less than 200 metres from the suspect, 
on the opposite side of the RT officers, and between the suspect and a busy shopping 
centre. Should the suspect flee, he almost certainly would have headed towards us. 
Again I looked at the PCSO. “That’s the RT’s job, they’ll be fine. Let’s take this bus 
back to the station. Do you have an Oyster card?” With that, we boarded a passing bus 
and drove past as an RT officer struggled with the suspect. When we arrived back at 
the station, the PCSO decided he would spend the rest of his shift putting together 
                                                 
79 Interestingly, the same research found that officers across all roles spent about 27per cent of their time 
on administrative and paperwork activities, or about 2.5 hours per shift.  
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information for an upcoming community meeting80. After sitting around Neckinger 
station for an hour, I rang up the RT commander and caught a ride with the next 
passing RT car, which I stayed with for the rest of their shift. I mentioned the earlier 
robbery incident to the RT officers involved in the apprehension of the suspect. 
“That’s just an SNT for you. We handle the real calls; they give hugs to old women 
when they moan about dog mess in their garden” (PC Ron, RT4). Looking back on the 
incident, I realize I had adopted the RT’s view that planning a community event held 
less value because it was not action oriented. Additionally, I assumed that all policing 
was, at its core, about apprehending suspects in response to a crime. For the SNT, this 
was not their remit81, and yet I viewed their aversion to action as a sign of failure.  
 
4.2 Responding to Calls: Being There When Things Go Bad 
At the time of fieldwork, Response Teams were responsible for responding to all 
emergency calls in Watling during their shift. This situation has changed in the 
intervening months, and the new Local Policing Model introduced by Commissioner 
Bernard Hogan-Howe has directed resources away from Response teams towards a 
more enjoined team community policing structure82. Response Teams now focus on 
responding only to ‘I grade’ calls, and the beefed up SNTs will, “…investigate all low-
risk, high volume crime that affects the day to day quality of life of local people on 
their ward.” (MPS 2012b). This is an important change because it removes the 
responsibility to respond to the numerous low-priority calls coming in each day, 
freeing up officers to respond to dangerous situations as quickly as possible. However, 
this change fundamentally alters the role RT officers played in the community during 
the period of fieldwork.  
 
 
 
                                                 
80 This would not necessarily take the full rest of the shift, but given the slow performance of the 
computers in Neckinger Station it was best to budget additional time. 
81 On the MPS website each SNT has a webpage with information on what activities they’re engaging in 
and how to contact them. Each of these SNT pages says, “We are not a 24-hour response team, so if it is 
an emergency please call 999” (MPS 2013b)NB: This is not an SNT in Watling, but the language and 
page structure are the same throughout the MPS) 
82 Officers across the borough refer to Response Teams as ‘team’. E.g. An officer in a Safer 
Neighbourhood unit might say something like, ‘When I was on team we used to do xyz’.   
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Attending to emergency calls dominated professional identity of RT officers, with the 
number and quality of calls being an important factor in determining if a shift had been 
successful. All other activity was secondary, but not all calls for help were treated 
equally. 
 
PC’s work so hard, they can’t afford to get too bogged down with the, dare 
I say, the social worker side of things. Their job’s demanding enough and I 
think they have to deal with things quick time. The slow time 
considerations, they need to be made by someone else, there isn’t that 
opportunity there for them anymore. (Inspector Bruce, RT2) 
 
RT officers were expected to respond to the wide variety of calls that came in to the 
999 system. For the purposes of the research, I divided the calls into four broad 
categories. Firstly, there were reports of crime in progress. These could include 
domestic assaults, robberies, assaults or frays, and shoplifting incidents. The second 
category included responding to crimes after they had occurred. These were often 
related to a robbery reported after the fact, a shoplifter already detained by in-store 
security, or criminal damage. The third was situations where no crime was occurring, 
but police were called anyway. These ‘service calls’ (Reiner 2010) take up a 
considerable amount of time, and most commonly included complaints about noise, 
family arguments, or disruptive neighbours. The fourth type of call was drug crimes. 
Drug offences mostly came to light through proactive stop and search activity. On rare 
occasions, officers would be called to respond to a report of someone using drugs in a 
way that had prompted a member of the public to call police.  
 
The unifying thread between these calls was that they were formally identified 
problems that the officers could respond to. This formality instantly limited the 
available avenues with which to proceed with the incident. When a call came through 
the 999 system a CAD83 was created for the incident, providing the details of the 
situation. Through the CAD, information from the public was translated in to practical 
knowledge, giving officers organizational and legal constructs under which to operate 
                                                 
83 CAD stands for Computer Aided Dispatch. The system gives the address and additional information 
provided by the dispatcher, and is displayed on the vehicles Mobile Data Terminal (MDT), a computer 
system with a touch-screen located between the driver and passenger. CADs had a unique number that 
reset at midnight each day. To find any call handled by the MPS, all you need is the date and the CAD 
number. Officers could also create a CAD at the scene of an incident they had proactively engaged in.   
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(Manning 1988). While the information provided on a CAD was often incomplete, it 
set up a framework for officers to understand the situation. This allowed them to focus 
on a limited set of responses to the situation. Given the numerous permutations each 
general type of incident could take, this narrowing effect was crucial to officers’ ability 
to successfully manage difficult and confusing situations.  
 
On a response team a call comes over the radio it could be anything from a 
rape all the way down to a harassment even just a shop lift and you need to 
have so much legislation going on, you need to be able to identify an 
offence and get it right because if you don’t then…if you can’t identify 
certain offences then you’re not very good at your job and you’re not doing 
what your paid to do. (PC Hugh, RT4) 
 
4.2.1 Crimes in Progress 
Most offences are not discovered until after the crime has been committed (Reiner 
2010). Thus, the majority of calls for service do not engender the energy and tension 
that a crime in progress creates. Officers seized upon crimes in progress that came out 
over the radio, and it was not uncommon for three or four units to assign themselves to 
the call. Receiving a call for an assault in progress was considered one of the more 
desirable calls to attend as an RT officer. It was the epitome of ‘real policing’. 
Responding to a crime in progress, particularly an assault, meant there was a high 
likelihood of action upon arrival, often a ‘real’ victim, and good chance to affect an 
arrest if a suspect was still present. As discussed, the action component was core to the 
image RT officers had of themselves. The idea of a ‘real victim’ further motivated 
officers’ when responding to such crimes (Christie 1986). The status of such victims 
was cemented almost instantly if they were female, weak, respectable, and blameless 
for the crime that had just occurred (Christie 1986). The opportunity to bring swift 
justice to a worthy victim was nearly as strong of a draw as the thrill of action.  
 
It’s very hard to find a real victim [in Watling]. The times that I find what I 
consider real victims is usually the street robbery… the mindless assault on 
a Friday and Saturday night when you’ve got somebody who is literally 
trying to go home or trying to get a cab, or he’s nudged somebody in a 
queue in the kebab shop, and he gets assaulted by some idiot. They’re a 
real victim. (PC Jack RT4) 
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Assaults between members of the public were superseded in the hierarchy of responses 
only by assaults against fellow police officers - the squealing alarm broadcast borough-
wide by an officer triggering the emergency assistance button on their radio would 
send officers scrambling to their vehicle. An assault on an officer was, without 
question, always the fault of the assailant, and the officer a ‘real victim’. On one 
occasion, PC Jenny and PC Brandy triggered their emergency transmit buttons while 
conducting a drug search. 
  
We saw him sniffing drugs off the back of his hand and obviously went 
over to speak to him. He was about 6ft2, Brandy and I are quite short, 
obviously smaller than him and we went to try and search him, he didn’t 
want to be searched so it became a bit of a tussle; although it basically 
involved me hanging on one arm and Brandy hanging on the other arm and 
being swung around by the rather large man who didn’t want to be 
searched. We did eventually get him in handcuffs… (PC Jenny, RT4)  
I was eating dinner at Ulverston station when this occurred and every RT officer in the 
canteen jumped and ran for the door as soon as the alarm went off. Officers jumped 
into the first vehicle they could before it went shooting out of the car park84. Though 
we arrived too late to participate in the arrest, the drive there was punctuated by 
fervent manoeuvres to slash every possible second off our response time. The situation 
was resolved by the time we arrived, and the officers were unharmed. Later in the 
evening, the team was praised by Inspector Bradley for their quick response85.  
 
Although officers often expressed excitement when heading to an assault between 
civilians, there was only terse and limited dialogue when on the way to an officer 
involved assault. One of the harshest criticisms an officer could levy at a colleague 
was that they were slow to respond to an emergency alarm from a fellow officer.  The 
need to back each other up in a dangerous profession was key to building solidarity 
among officers (Reiner 2010). Many officers believed that the public does not support 
the police, and they must protect each other from physical as well as rhetorical assault 
                                                 
84 It is for this ability to quickly leave the station’s car park that officers on an RT always park their 
facing outward.  
85 One of the darkest periods for RT4 came while I was away for several days. Officers were attacked by 
a man with a knife while investigating a complaint. They pressed their emergency button, but the 
dispatcher directed responding officers to the wrong location.  In the few added minutes it took to find 
the officers under attack one officer was severely beaten and had his jaw broken, and the other officer 
was seriously injured after being beaten and repeatedly stabbed. Luckily, most of the stabs hit her bullet-
proof vest, saving her life.   
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(Skolnick 1966). After leaving the scene of PC Jenny and PC Brandy’s call for help, 
PC Jack commented, “We’re the biggest gang in London, and we protect each other 
because god knows that the inhabitants of this borough don’t care fuck all what 
happens to us.”  
 
If a suspect was encountered during a crime-in-progress, usually the only proscribed 
response for officers was to arrest the individual.  If the victim had not suffered any 
injuries, and there were differing accounts of what happened, sometimes officers 
would convince both parties they should just walk away and not seek charges to avoid 
arrest. Additionally, not every ‘fight’ was actually a fight. In one situation, we were 
called to a report of four men fighting outside a pub. Racing there in WW186, we 
arrived to find two men grappling with each other and laughing hysterically. They 
stopped when they saw the police car arrive. The men explained that they were old 
friends who were just playing around after one of the ‘assailants’ had made an 
inappropriate joke about the other’s female family member. Given the total lack of 
mens rea and the absence of any harm to either party, the officers explained why they 
had been called, wished the men good evening, and went back to patrolling.   
 
Officers’ response to domestic assault CADs generally took two forms. If it was 
reported that there was actual physical violence taking place, the officers responded 
similarly to any other assault call, though often with dread about how ‘messy’ these 
situations could be. However, if only arguing was reported between parties, officers 
could proceed as if it was a non-crime incident, as will be discussed below.  In either 
case, the handling of ‘a domestic’ followed tightly proscribed responses that limited 
discretion. A 124D form was completed for every domestic incident attended by 
officers. This long and arduous form compiled all the necessary information about 
both parties, their living arrangements, and any children present in the house. This 
form was disliked by nearly every officer I spoke with due to its length and the 
requirement to enter information twice.  
 
 
                                                 
86 A high powered BMW response vehicle. 
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I get it, you know, that women are murdered all the time by their partners. I 
hate scum that treats their misses with anything but respect, but I don’t see 
how they need to take away all the discretion we once had. The job used to 
be about dealing with situations, and now it’s about following a script. 
Now that guy is out on the street, hasn’t learned to have a grown up 
conversation, and where’s he gonna go tonight? I’d be furious if you 
removed me from my own home for having a row. (PC Peter, RT2) 
 
Research by the NPIA showed this attitude was present across the country (Mclean 
and Hillier 2011). At domestic incidents, officers were required to remove one party 
from the premises and were compelled to arrest an individual if there was an allegation 
or reasonable grounds to suspect they had committed an offence. The MPS deemed 
this a “perpetrator focused approach” that “promotes positive actions for arrest and 
prosecution”(MPS 2009a, pg. 3). The law was changed to allow officers to arrest 
without a criminal complaint by the victim87. This effectively removes almost all 
discretion from a situation labelled as domestic violence.  
 
4.2.2 Crimes After The Fact 
If a robbery was reported within moments of occurring, a specialist robbery squad 
vehicle would usually attend the incident. These teams worked in unmarked cars and 
often took the victim to look for the perpetrator during the critical minutes following a 
street robbery. If these specialist teams were unavailable, or the victim had waited 
more than a few minutes to report the incident, RT officers attended. In the latter 
situation, officers tried to comfort the victim while also broadcasting the perpetrator’s 
details to the rest of the team so they could search for suspects in the area. The officers 
on scene generally only had time to take an official report and then drive the victim 
around for 10-15 minutes while other officers would stop and search suspects fitting 
the description of the perpetrator.   
 
Attending these types of incidents evoked a conflicted response from officers. 
Although there was the possibility of action if the perpetrator was caught, there was 
often little to do other than fill out paperwork and take a statement. Many officers 
viewed the ‘mopping up efforts’ as one of the less satisfying aspects of policing. 
However, they were able to bring some comfort to victims by showing up and 
                                                 
87 The MPS has identified that in situations where prosecution is not feasible, they will find alternative 
means to improve the situation by working with partner agencies in the community.(MPS 2009a, pg. 3) 
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demonstrating an effort to find the perpetrator, even though officers believed the odds 
of successfully finding the perpetrator were quite low. PC Paula put it succinctly; 
“People want to feel you’re doing something, so we do, when we can. You don’t know 
[what will happen].” 
 
4.2.3 Non-Crime Incidents 
Many incidents police are called to are not criminal in nature, and instead require them 
to become social service providers of sorts (Punch 1979). These include arguments 
between neighbours, noise complaints, and calls about ‘suspicious looking’ people.  
Officers did not appear to enjoy these situations and they would often hesitate to take 
on calls that were not going to generate any ‘real’ policing activity. Responding to a 
noise complaint call over the radio, PC Edmund debated the merits of attending as we 
were only a few hundred metres away. “We could go, but just our luck we’ll get stuck 
with some mouthy twat and be there an hour and miss some proper action.” On rare 
occasions, the RT Sergeant had to get on the radio and demand someone ‘put up’ for 
the call.  
 
We used to be a knife, sharp knife, and now we’re just like a big butter 
knife; big fat butter knife that spreads over everything else and we don’t do 
any of it particularly well, but we should just be tackling crime, which is 
what people think and imagine we actually do, but they don’t realize how 
much other stuff we get involved in. (PC Jack RT4) 
 
In many of these situations, officers were unable to provide any formal guidance, only 
words of advice. One incident in particular had left PC Jack incensed. A woman living 
in a council flat had called police saying she was afraid of being assaulted by her 
roommate. Upon arrival it transpired that the ‘roommate’ and her two small children 
were sub-letting the living room of the flat, and the woman who had initially contacted 
the police was trying to evict them without notice. Subletting a council flat is a civil 
infraction, not a criminal offence, and neither is eviction. PC Jack seemed quite 
frustrated as we walked away from the situation:  
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It agitates me, stuff like that agitates me, and bar from letting the council 
know there is not a lot else we can do there, we can’t prove anything, so 
calls like that we deal with them quite frequently. It’s not a police matter 
but I am quite happy to get involved and sort it out, as I say, I asked the 
female what her immigration status was just to clarify that as well because 
it’s not right and there’s young people who perhaps are trying to get jobs 
and perhaps are trying to get on the waiting list for a council house who 
can’t get one because of people like this. (PC Jack, RT4) 
 
 
At one such ‘non-incident’, officers were called to a council flat only a block from 
Farmingham station. The address was well known to officers as they were called there 
at least once a month. An elderly bed-bound woman lived in the flat with her two adult 
sons, both of whom had unspecified special needs. Turning to me as we walked 
towards the front door, PC Jake said, “You might want to stay outside, they’ve got 
fleas and it smells bloody awful”. The officers were called because, as usual, the sons 
were fighting again. One brother had accused the other of using his towel, and voices 
were subsequently raised at each other. Even though raised voices do not constitute a 
crime, the mother was unable to intervene and had called the police. The officers were 
right; the place smelled awful, and the hot stagnant air enveloped me. I excused myself 
after a few minutes of listening to the officers go back and forth between the two 
brothers, trying to settle them down. In the end, they asked one of the men to leave 
under the domestic violence guidelines in order to extricate themselves from the 
situation that had already lasted half an hour. 
 
I think a lot of neighbours who don’t like living next door to each other 
have now decided that the police are the people that you can just phone up 
and complain to and expect that a) they’re going to interested in dealing 
with your problems… We’ve sort of like turned in to, or we’ve had to turn 
in to bit more of a caring service, to be seen to be caring a bit more, rather 
than just being able to tell people ‘look that’s not a police matter, you 
know, you’re an adult sort it out yourself” which is what used to happen. 
(PC Sam, Blackburn SNT) 
 
At another incident, we were called to a small council flat by a woman having an 
argument with her 12 year old foster son. The officers knew the location well, and said 
they had been called there at least once a month for the last few years. Arriving at the 
front door, I was overwhelmed by the smell. Inside, several piles of animal faeces were 
visible, and the woman lounged in front of a massive flat-screen television with a full 
ashtray by her side. She had accused her foster child of stealing the £10 she had given 
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him to buy cannabis for her. The boy sat quietly against the countertop in the kitchen 
between a pile of takeaway wrappers and several unwashed dishes. As she couldn’t 
show that she actually had given the boy any money, and he denied everything, there 
was little the officers could do. As Goldstein pointed out (Goldstein 1960), an officer’s 
decision not to investigate those instances that they feel are not breaking the law, often 
go unnoticed by the wider community unless the failure is of sufficiently immense 
magnitude.  
 
These incidents cemented officers’ view that they were some of the few worthy 
individuals left in society, and that everyone else was either a criminal, lazy, 
unbalanced, or all three. “Say what you want, but there’s no way, not at all, that I’d 
raise my family around here. Children are influenced by their environment, and this 
environment is shit. Good thing we’re here” (PC George, RT4). Considering their 
contact with the community regularly involved many individuals who seemed to fit 
these roles, it is not hard to see how officers might begin to feel this way. 
 
4.2.4 Responding to Drug Calls 
On occasion, officers were called to respond to drug-related incidents by members of 
the public. These were usually either in relation to someone shooting up heroin in an 
alley or smoking cannabis in a stairwell. I was never present when a call came in about 
drug dealing. Both heroin and cannabis related calls were usually treated with a 
moderate level of interest from officers, though cannabis calls elicited slightly more 
attention. In the year I spent with officers in Watling, we never once responded to a 
report of drug use and actually found anyone using drugs. On one occasion, we did 
come close and could still smell the cannabis in the air when we arrived on the scene. 
This inspired the officers to hoist themselves over a fence and jump into a small 
garden, though their efforts came up empty. The officers were disappointed at having 
missed the culprits, but went back to patrolling after a few minutes. The call wasn’t 
mentioned again during the shift. 
 
Drug-related calls occupied an odd niche within response policing. The fact that the 
individual reporting the crime was not in danger because of the actions of drug user 
seemed to lower the priority for officers to respond, no matter what their personal 
feelings about drug use. At the same time, a drug call was still a call to action, 
 115 
requiring a speedy arrival in order to catch the perpetrator, and gave the officer carte 
blanche to search the nearby area if a description of the suspect had been provided. 
Any call to action was an opportunity to engage in police work, and maintaining a 
sense of mission trumped most anything else. 
 
4.2.4.1 Limited Responses to Reactive Work 
Responding to calls over the radio, no matter the call, was the hallmark of a good 
response officer in the eyes of many members of team. However, an officer was 
limited in what they could achieve when responding to a call. Calls for assistance to 
on-going situations were fairly rare, and the chance of catching a robbery suspect was 
low. As mentioned previously, the overall sanctioned detection rate in England and 
Wales was only 28 per cent (Home Office 2011a).  Often, it was difficult to identify 
the ‘real’ victim in a situation as both parties were often morally clouded. Even during 
‘real’ incidents, officers often only had the option of arresting an individual or perhaps 
giving a warning, and were limited by the enforcement options applicable to the 
situation as it had been constructed.  
 
In the exercise of their proactive roles, officers had much more leeway about how they 
enforced the law and when they chose to engage in action. As such, there was a tension 
between what constituted the proper activities of an RT officer. If an officer obtained 
positive stop and searches, he was lauded by the unit commander for combatting crime 
and bringing in good numbers. That officer also gained respect from colleagues 
because they were ‘fighting crime,’ a task seen as paramount for RT officers. At the 
same time, an officer who would not ‘put up’ for less exciting calls was quickly 
identified by the team and lost respect. PC Dominic was known as ‘Super Cop’ 
because of his presence and effective handling of challenging situations, however 
another officer on team pointed out that, “He probably hasn’t arrested a shoplifter or 
done an immigration check in years. I’m serious. You only hear him on the radio for ‘I 
calls’. Does he think he’s better than the rest of us?” (PC on RT4). Given the high 
volume of ‘service calls’, often the only opportunity for officers to engage in ‘proper’ 
police work during a shift was to proactively find criminal behaviour to deal with. 
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4.3 Proactive Policing with Response Teams 
Along with the requirement to attend calls, RT officers were tasked with ‘being 
proactive’. It quickly became evident that being proactive meant using police powers, 
or at least the implied threat of invoking those powers. Often this meant actively 
seeking individuals to stop and search. However, it also included traffic stops, drug 
raids or other large operations organized by the borough. In contrast to the call for help 
that prompted action when responding to a 999 call, proactive policing almost always 
involved an unwilling civilian participant, and generally lacked an immediately 
identifiable victim.  
 
In reality, there were not many drug raids handled by RTs,88 and large-scale operations 
were even less frequent. This left stop and searches as the primary means of 
proactivity. While that may sound restrictive, the ability to stop and search individuals 
carried far greater leeway about how and when officers could use their policing powers 
than did activities based on responding to calls. Officers could dictate what powers 
they employed, and to whom they employed it, within fairly wide parameters.  
 
Proactive work by RTs was justified by officers in three ways. Firstly, proactivity was 
seen as a sign that officers were stopping crime before it occurred. To officers, 
preventing crime signified that RTs were capable of maintaining order. Secondly, 
officers believed that proactive work was what the community wanted RTs to do. 
Thus, proactive policing in the form of stop and searches might have been seen as 
obtrusive by community members, but was seen by officers as the best way to target 
violent street-robbers causing fear in community members. During a community 
meeting, a TSG officer responded to a woman who had asked if officers really needed 
to conduct so many stop and searches, “You don’t want to get stabbed walking home 
with your shopping, so we need to search the lads that need searching; for your safety” 
(Unknown PC, Watling).  
 
Thirdly, proactivity was seen as seen as the best way for officers to demonstrate their 
abilities and meet the expected performance requirements. Positive searches were seen 
as a key indicator of development for officers on probation. Even for well-established 
                                                 
88 In chapter six I will look at some of the drug raids carried out by both RTs and SNTs.  
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officers, proactivity on the RT provided material to support the yearly Professional 
Development Review (PDR)89. During one encounter with a lost child, PC Jamie saw 
an opportunity to do just this. He got down on one knee and quietly spoke to the five-
year-old girl, gave her a smile, and asked her details about where she lived. When the 
incident was successfully resolved he remarked, “Did you see how I spoke to her. I 
took the initiative and communicated effectively with a citizen. This is going to look 
great in my PDR once I write it up all nice and proper” (PC Jamie, RT4). 
 
4.3.1 Stop and Search 
Stop and search activities are one of the best opportunities for RT officers to engage in 
proactive work during their shift. The output obtained from these stops often involves 
administrative-based punishments, a key element of adaptive practices.  However, the 
active searching represents an effort by state actors to govern through force and, 
“provide security, law and order, and crime control within its territorial boundaries” 
(Garland 1996, pg. 448). For officers, a stop and search is an opportunity for ‘real’ 
policing, and is a chance to enforce penal sanctions through the expression of police 
powers. Nevertheless, many of the outcomes of a stop and search are of an adaptive 
nature. This can be seen in the use of the cannabis Warning System (CWS) or Penalty 
Notices for Disorder (PNDs) that require the recipient to pay an £80 fine. Although the 
officer retains an element of discretion and is able to invoke their power (both 
important factors in maintaining professional identity), often they are transformed in to 
administrative actors.  
 
Even if an officer tones down the explicit state-based authority they have when 
conducting a search, this does not negate how the interaction is viewed by the 
individual being searched. It is almost certain the civilian will identify the experience 
as one of the state attempting to maintain control, and not one of administrative actors 
seeking to develop manageable solutions away from the political rhetoric. Even if the 
outcome of a positive search results in a formal warning instead of arrest, the search 
may be seen as a public display of power, consistent with sovereign state strategies. It 
is important to remember that a search is itself a denial of liberty for a brief period. 
                                                 
89 See chapters six and seven for further discussion of this.  
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Stop and search under PACE S.1 and MoDA S.23 require the same level of suspicion 
as one would need to justify an arrest90 (MPA 2005).  
 
 Police officers in England and Wales are legislatively empowered to stop and search 
individuals, provided they have reasonable grounds,91 and as long as the power is used 
“fairly, responsibly, with respect for people being searched and without unlawful 
discrimination” (1984, Code A1.1). While the power to stop and search is vigorously 
defended by the MPS as an effective tool for both uncovering illegal activity and 
generating information (MPS 2009b, 2011a, 2011c, MPA 2005), its use has proven 
contentious (Skolnick 1966, EHRC 2013, Police Federation 2012, Dai, Frank, and Sun 
2011, Rehman 2009, Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 2009, Qureshi 2007, Delsol and 
Shiner 2006, Lustgarten 2002, Quinton, Bland, and Miller 2000, Eastwood, Shiner, 
and Bear 2013). The power of stop and search is legislatively an investigative power, 
though police have manipulated their current practice to use the powers as a deterrent 
(Lustgarten 2002). Although the intention of search powers was to give officers the 
ability to find contraband without going through the process of arrest and depriving a 
suspect of liberty while a post-arrest search was conducted, Lustgarten (2002) argues 
that police now use their search powers to deter individuals from engaging in criminal 
behaviour.  
 
Section 1 of PACE is the broadest of search powers92, and allows officers to search for 
stolen items, prohibited articles, a bladed or offensive weapon, and illegal fireworks. 
PACE strictly limits the information and sources that can generate the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to stop and search someone in situations outside of the use of 
Section 60.   
                                                 
90 Informally, a colleague who had attended police training as an MPS Special Constable told me that 
the trainers advised the new recruits that they should set their standard of suspicion to be even higher 
than that required to arrest when deciding whether to conduct a search.  
91 This is true for Section 1 of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), Section 23 of the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, but not Sec 60 of the Public Order Act 1994. Section 60 is designed to allow 
officers to search any individual in a defined area and time if they suspect an incident of serious 
violence has or will happen, and does not require them to have reasonable grounds to do so. Sec 60 must 
be authorized by an officer of the rank of Superintendent or higher for a set period of time no more than 
24 hours, and only uniformed constables may use the power while it is in place. 
92 There are at least 18 different laws giving officers the power to search an individual, including 
Sporting Events Act 1985, Public Stores Act 1875 s6, and the Aviation Security Act 1982 s27. This 
chapter will mostly refer to searches conducted under PACE S.1, MoDA S.23, and Public Order Act 
1994 S.60. 
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There must be an objective basis for that suspicion based on the facts, 
information, and/or intelligence that are relevant to the likelihood of 
finding an article of a certain kind… Reasonable suspicion can never be 
supported on the basis of personal factors alone without the reliable 
supporting intelligence or information or some specific behaviour by the 
person concerned. For example, a person’s race, religion, age, appearance, 
or the fact that the person is known to have a previous conviction, cannot 
be used alone or in combination with each other as the reason for searching 
that person.  Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on generalizations or 
stereotypical images of certain groups or categories of people as more 
likely to be involved in criminal activity. (Bridges and Sampson 2007, pg. 
651) 
 
While the legislation provides the requirements needed in order to conduct a search, it 
does not address whether the officers should conduct the search, thereby retaining 
officer’s discretionary powers (Fielding 2005).  An officer could reasonably believe 
that a person is in possession of contraband, but choose not to search that person.  
 
The MPS has argued that, “Used appropriately and proportionately, stop and search 
can increase community confidence in the police and make a positive contribution to 
reducing the fear of crime with accountability to the public” (MPS 2009b, pg. 6). In 
2008, the Borough Commander of Watling decreed that, “"I have always championed 
the use of stop and search - I genuinely believe that it is one of the most effective 
policing tactics, particularly in relation to tackling knife and drug crime.93” However, 
research has estimated that searches reduced disruptive crime by only 0.2-0.4 per cent 
(EHRC 2010, Quinton, Bland, and Miller 2000), and personal, uninvited contact with 
police often has negative impact on the confidence of individuals in the police (Skogan 
2006a). Skogan’s finding has been challenged by Bradford et al, arguing that 
positively received contact with police officers operating under a procedural justice 
model may mitigate some of the negative feelings generated by the encounters (2009). 
The use of stop and search engendered passionate feelings by both community 
members and officers in Watling, despite its failure to accomplish its purpose of 
proactively reducing crime.  
 
                                                 
93 Exact citation has been omitted to maintain anonymity of the borough.  
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Over 550,000 drug searches took place under Section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971 in 2009/10 in England and Wales, with seven per cent of those resulting in arrest 
(Coleman 2011). Watling police officers conducted an average of nearly 1,500 Section 
23 searches a month, or about 50 per cent of all searches in the area94.  Based on 
PEEGs95 2009 population estimates and 2009 stop and search data, the search rate 
under S.23 for white residents of Watling was approximately 38 per 1,000 residents of 
the borough96 (Eastwood, Shiner, and Bear 2013). For black residents, it was 122 per 
1,000, and for Asian residents it was 27 per 1,000. This indicates a disproportionality 
ratio for black residents of 3.3197 compared to a 4.12 disproportionality ratio for the 
MPS as a whole98 for Sec 23 searches during the period of fieldwork. The MPS 
identified a disproportionality rate of 4.4 across all types of searches during Operation 
Pennant in 2006 (MPS 2006). These drug searches tended to have a minimal impact on 
drug markets.  
 
…it was unlikely that searches made a substantial contribution to 
undermining drug markets or drug related crime, given that drug searches 
tend to focus in practice on users rather than dealers, and cannabis rather 
than class A drugs. Although stop and search clearly leads to the detection 
and confiscation of drugs and weapons, its contribution to overall crime 
reduction is unproven. (EHRC 2010) 
 
Officers of both RTs and SNTs often based their decisions to engage in drug-related 
search activity on visible characteristics of low-level drug use. These included 
smelling cannabis, and youth loitering on council estates or in parks. When asked what 
made her conduct a search under Section 23 instead of simply using Section 1 of 
PACE, PC Jenny said: 
 
 
                                                 
94  Despite making Freedom of Information requests, I was unable to obtain data breaking down the 
number of searches conducted by each unit or unit type within the borough.  
95 Population Estimates by Ethnic Group (PEEG), compiled by the UK Office for National Statistics 
96 Information of the number of searches conducted under Sec 23 was obtained via a Freedom of 
Information request submitted by Release, a UK charity working on drugs law and drugs law reform. I 
calculated the disproportionality figures based on this information.  
97 This indicates that black people in Watling are 3.31 times more likely to be stopped than white 
people. These numbers may not reflect the actual disparity faces by residents, as there are a large 
number of individuals who come in or through Watling for work each day.   
98 When looking at Section 60 searches, it has been calculated that the MPS black/white 
disproportionality rate was 11.1 in 2010/11 and 10.8 in 2009/10 in.  (EHRC 2012) 
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Smell, what they look like, their behaviour, are they looking nervous and 
they fiddling with something….Eyes are all like dilated, stoned looking, 
red eyes, if they look like drugs users. Obviously the heroin addicts of the 
borough have a particularly distinctive appearance. (PC Jenny, RT4) 
 
Without a doubt, stop and search practices were the most contentious set of issues 
between police and the community I observed, especially with regards to officers’ 
interactions with black and minority communities. This is not a new phenomenon 
(Bowling, Parmar, and Phillips 2008, Delsol and Shiner 2006, Miller 2010), having 
been cited as a causal factor of the Brixton riots in 1981 (Scarman 1981), and again 
when riots broke out in August 2011 across London (MPS 2012a, Morell et al. 2011). 
 
4.3.2 Employing Stop and Search 
Stop and search powers were used in a variety of situations during this research, but 
they were more prevalent with RTs than with SNTs. The observed incidents can be 
split in to low-discretion and high-discretion stops (Ramirez, Mcdevitt, and Farrell 
2006). In low discretion situations, officers usually had a suspect description, or they 
were responding to a specific criminal event such as a recent street-robbery. Despite 
the narrow focus of searching for a specific suspect, these low-discretion searches 
actually gave officers the widest leeway for conducting stop and search. Having been 
supplied with a description from external sources, officers had broad discretion to 
search anyone resembling the description. Officers felt justified in targeting nearly 
anyone of the same ethnicity, gender, and general age range in a given area (Quinton, 
Bland, and Miller 2000).  
 
We were looking for a robbery suspect, and at 5 o’clock in the morning 
anyone on that area on that street is in play. It was a very minimal 
description; black male, dark clothing. So we’re driving round 5 o’clock in 
the morning in the area, [see a] black male, dark clothing. Stopped him, 
handcuffed him, explained he was going to be searched because we 
believed he was a suspect in a robbery, and as I search through him I could 
see he looked a bit spaced out, and I think he had 12 or 13 rocks of Crack 
in his pocket. He was dealing obviously, had been dealing. (PC Jack, RT4) 
 
Most drug-related searches came under the classification of a high-discretion search, 
meaning the officer had taken proactive efforts to find someone to search in the 
absence of a specific suspect description (Quinton, Bland, and Miller 2000, Fitzgerald 
1999).  
 122 
 
During fieldwork, officers cited grounds to engage in stop and search activity that 
appeared to fall outside of the guidelines provided. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) found that 27 per cent of stop and search records they examined 
did not appear to contain reasonable grounds to conduct a search (HMIC 2013). 
Fitzgerald (1993) highlighted that when officers are empowered to use their intuition 
in a high-discretion stop, they were likely to employ prejudices. Research has also 
found that under high discretionary situations, officers were likely to target specific 
ethnic minorities, because of underlying schemas (Tillyer, Klahm, and Engel 2012). 
Officers were supposed to rely on specific intelligence or facts, but the ‘gut feeling’ 
was often the closest they came in high-discretion searches.  
 
If I see someone and I think something’s wrong, you get that gut feeling of 
‘why are they here? Why are they acting like that?’ Then I will think 
something’s wrong, they’ve got something on them and I will search them 
but I just…I’m not interested in just searching anyone. (PC Elle, RT4) 
 
Skolnick’s (1966) assertion that prejudice may be the result of certain groups 
becoming a ‘symbolic assailant’ seemed to ring true in many of the high discretion 
searches observed during this research. Skolnick proffered that officers will identify 
criminality in ethnic groups based merely on the individual’s conformity to the crudest 
of stereotypes. Many officers have difficulty explaining what specific element 
triggered a stop (Quinton, Bland, and Miller 2000), but often officers’ justification is 
related to the behaviour the subject was engaging in. During fieldwork, the common 
behaviours cited by officers included suspects leaning against a building or vehicle, 
looking at the police, looking away from police, walking away from police, and 
dropping something when police approached. The PACE search guidelines require 
either specific intelligence or specific behaviour in order to generate reasonable 
grounds to search someone. Personal factors are not enough to justify a search. This is 
a fairly low standard, and officers would regularly cite subtle behaviours such as 
standing or leaning as a specific behaviour worthy of stopping someone. “Why’d I stop 
that kid? It was pretty clear, you know, with the way he stood there. On the corner, bit 
behind the Ford’s bonnet? That’s suspicious behaviour when you’re wearing a hoodie 
around here.” (PC Fred, RT4).  
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 Additionally, the behaviour exhibited by a citizen may not immediately generate a 
search, but will arouse suspicion and cause the officer to engage in a Stop and 
Account.  
 
[When in] areas that are known, where I have found things on people 
before, times of day, reactions; If there is a group when they see you, if 
you’re in uniform, and they see you and suddenly move, change direction, 
drop something, bend over, walk off, that’s normally a tell-tale sign. It’s 
not grounds, but it makes me interested in them and often I’ll stop and 
speak to people before I search them just to have a chat and if they’re 
evasive, they’re nervous when they talk to you then. (PC Jack, RT4) 
 
Ex post facto grounds, generated by eliciting information once an officer has stopped 
someone, but before the search, are prohibited under PACE but occurred regularly.  By 
stopping an individual for questioning instead of directly searching, officers could gain 
useful information that they would use to justify the search. A ‘stop and account’ as 
the interactions are known, also gave officers a way to assert their authority without 
engaging in searches - an act they knew could create tension in the community. 
 
I didn’t search him this time because I want him to have something next 
time, something good. I play with their heads. A quick chat here and there 
with no search makes them cocky, and they start to carry things because 
they think I’m not going to search them, put hands in pockets. But then I 
will, and then I’ve got them carrying some rocks or nabbis, or maybe a 
knife… and they can’t figure out why I searched them that time. (PC 
Marcus, RT4) 
 
I don’t need to search some YOB just because he’s a cunt 90 per cent of 
his waking hours. If he’s chatting with me, not being cunt at this very 
moment, and I’ve got better things to do, then I’ll leave him be. He walks 
away a little less angry at the uniform, sees we’re just people too, and I 
keep my hit rate up. (PC Maurice, RT4) 
 
Sometimes reasonable grounds were made to fit the situation, and attempting to 
regulate such behaviour has proved remarkably difficult due to the ability of police to 
‘find grounds’ seemingly at will (Savage 2003, Shiner 2011, Mastrofski 2004). The 
ability to create reasonable grounds was seen by officers as good police work. As an 
officer could, after the fact, have their notes reviewed if a complaint was made, 
constructing solid grounds was a skill utilized by good officers.  
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I used to have a Skipper99 that would have us stop dozens when we had a 
[Section] 60 in place, and that didn’t seem right to me. I’ll find the grounds 
I need to put my hands in your pockets, no matter what you’re doing or 
where you are. Section 60 is the lazy way for lazy police. Good police find 
the grounds. (PC Henry, RT4) 
 
4.3.2.1 The Attitude Test 
Any interaction with the community, especially stop and account situations, could turn 
into a stop and search if a civilian failed the attitude test (Van Maanen 1978). A 
civilian could fail the attitude test for complaining about being stopped by the police, 
challenging the officer’s account of the civilian’s actions leading up to the encounter, 
being rude, sarcastic, or too witty. Failing the test had more to do with showing 
defiance to the officer than a specific action.  Many officers interpreted argument as an 
attempt to hide something from them, “If you start mouthing off, thinking it’ll keep me 
from searching you, yeah, and I do, yeah, then you’ve won, because you probably had 
something on you to make you argue like that.” (PC Arnold, RT2). This response to 
defiance has been identified elsewhere in the literature (Quinton, Bland, and Miller 
2000, Fitzgerald 1999, Reiner 2010). The problem with these situations was that 
officers often misinterpreted annoyance as guilt (Bowling and Phillips 2007). The 
attitude test highlighted the wide discretion available to officers in the field, and their 
ability to employ non-adaptive responses during the exercise of what might otherwise 
be an adaptive element of the criminal justice system.  
 
4.3.3 Schemas and Organisational Messaging Shaping Stop and Search 
Quinton (2011) pointed out that a communicative process takes place when officers 
decide to engage in stop and search. He described this as taking in a variety of 
environmental and social signals, sorting them out, and then identifying which stand 
out (Quinton 2011, pg. 3).  
 
Communicative process which involved police officers identifying, 
interpreting and labelling information in their social environment. 
Particular signals in the right context were seen to stand out from the 
background noise which caused officers to be uncertain or mistrustful 
about a person, or to think they were involved in wrong-doing. (2011, pg. 
3) 
 
                                                 
100 IC3 is the police code for a Black person. 
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While on patrol in an IRV, officers only had moments to identify a potential suspect 
and determine if they should conduct a search. In these situations, officers were able to 
cite minute elements of a situation that stood out as suspicious. 
 
Officers’ conditioned schemas focus their perceptions before arriving on scene, 
influencing the communicative process. Smith and Alpert (2007) argued that past 
experiences, media exposure, and organizational messages develop officers’ schemas 
to help them interpret difficult situations. In addition, officers’ develop a ‘symbolic 
assailant’ (Skolnick 1966), which primes them to the potential criminality in civilians 
that they stop and search. Manning (1992) refers to ‘interpretive frameworks’ to 
describe how officers may interpret a quickly raised hand as a threat. To illustrate the 
point, on patrol one evening, PC Jane described the clothing a suspect had been 
wearing during an arrest the previous week as, “Not like an IC3100 type robber hoody”. 
An officer’s frame may be so conditioned by their experiences and imbibing of police 
culture that they suppress active interpretation while conducting a search. In other 
words, officers’ observe signals to fit the context and individuals they are policing. 
The attitudes expressed by officers during this research, portrayed an inflexible, 
pessimistic, and bitter frame towards those they policed. This was especially 
prominent in relation to black residents of Watling due to the frequent searches of 
black civilians based on weak reasonable grounds.  
 
I don’t need Section 60; I can find reasonable grounds to search anyone in 
this borough if I want. That guy eyed the car suspiciously, it’s late and he’s 
in an area known for drugs, [that’s] grounds right there. Just look where we 
are, look at the people. How many tax-payers, honest citizens, do you think 
there around here? Not many. The rest? The rest? They’re fair game. (PC 
Marcus, RT4) 
 
It seemed that officers were not merely separating signals from the background noise; 
they were suppressing signals to the background so they had clear reason to search. 
This was particularly true among RT officers. 
 
 
                                                 
100 IC3 is the police code for a Black person. 
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 As you’re driving down the street you’ll get that person who you catch eye 
contact with and then you think, well I instantly think why is that person 
catching eye contact with me is it because they dislike me or the uniform 
that I am wearing or is it because they’ve got something to hide and want 
to see where the police car goes before making a run for it. (PC Hugh, 
RT4)  
 
PC Hugh’s comments highlighted the inability of many officers to view a community 
as law-abiding or to understand why the community may have problems with the way 
stop and search is carried out. Officers seemed to have abandoned their critical 
thinking skills during interactions with the community even though they seemed fully 
capable of such faculties during other police work.  
 
This attitude led officers to treat community members with terseness and disdain in 
many interactions. During one stop just days before the August 2011 riots, PC Marcus 
and PC Neville saw two black teenagers with cans of pop and bags of Haribo candy 
walking about 20 metres behind a white woman pushing a pram. PC Marcus looked 
back at me and said, “She’s about to get robbed!” He pulled up alongside the boys and 
asked them to stop. They did not, and so both PCs jumped out of the vehicle and 
detained them. The taller of the two boys looked at the officers and said, “We don’t 
want to be searched, nobody does.” The officers separated the boys and began 
questioning them. PC Marcus told the shorter boy, “Your story is bollocks. What are 
you really up to?” The shorter boy still had his pop can in his hand and was gesturing 
while explaining where they had come from. PC Marcus told the boy to put the can 
down, but before the boy could even react Marcus pulled the drink out of the boy’s 
hand and threw it to the ground. Both boys were searched but nothing was found and 
they were not offered search slips. Once we were back in the IRV PC Neville said, 
“That woman doesn’t know how lucky she is that we were here.”  
 
Team leaders provided positive reinforcement for stop and search activity based on 
results, not personal communication skills. Inspector Bradley scolded his team to, 
“...bring me quality results, not just a lot of searches.” Although the Inspector wanted a 
high hit rate on the searches, he also scolded several officers on the team who had 
reported a 100 per cent hit rate. To this claim, he reminded them light-heartedly that 
they needed to, “…document every stop, not just the good ones.” Even though the 
public message was quality of searches over quantity, many officers viewed even 
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failed searches as effective in fighting crime, in the belief that such practices deterred 
criminals. This idea was supported by organisational messages to the community that 
emphasised the effectiveness and importance of conducting stop and search as a 
preventative measure.  
 
A low detection rate alone does not necessarily undermine the use of stop 
and search powers. Proponents of the power, especially under terrorism 
legislation, argue that its use disrupts and deters criminal activity rather 
than simply detecting it. (Police Federation 2012, pg. 6)  
 
Recently, the MPS has started to focus on improving stop and search hit rates.  
 
As part of efforts to continuously improve services to London’s 
communities, the MPS has reviewed stop and search policy and practice to 
examine ways of making its use more effective and of increasing public 
confidence… The new approach will see a renewed focus on reducing 
violence and for the power to be used in a more intelligence-led and 
targeted way, leading to more arrests and more weapons seized. (MPS 
2012d, pg. 1) 
 
Although successfully applying the organisation’s message on stop and search is 
rewarded, failure is not punished. As a result, bad habits that are occasionally 
successful may generate positive rewards frequently enough to engender a sense of 
their success. This cements a potentially warped perception of what works for officers, 
and equally warped rationalisations about why they police in the manner they do.  
 
In part, RT officers were keen to be ‘proactive’ while out on the street because the 
decision to stop and search someone was theirs alone to make. Even in a low-
discretion search, the officer wielded the power to act. Given the long tradition 
whereby discretion is highest at the lowest ranks of policing (Wilson 1968), it is 
difficult for Sergeants and Inspectors to continually monitor the low-visibility side of 
policing. Efforts to reduce discretion through bureaucratization have taken hold, but 
cannot eliminate discretion without fundamentally changing the nature of the criminal 
justice system. “I’m a professional, and I will respond to calls for help, from the 
public, and do my job, but I won’t be told not to search someone by another officer. 
That is my decision to make, to protect this community as I see fit” (PC Jack, RT4).  
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Greater Manchester Police have recently instituted changes to their stop and search 
procedure to instil some visibility to the decisions to stop and search (Greater 
Manchester Police 2012). This new effort asks officers to radio in their reasonable 
grounds to conduct a search once they have stopped someone. Officers are then told 
whether they are permitted to engage in the search. It is hoped that this oversight will 
improve community confidence because the community will, “…be reassured that stop 
and search is being used at the right times and in the right way, to target criminals and 
keep our communities safe.” (Greater Manchester Police 2012). This logic does not 
propose to employ procedural justice techniques that are shown to improve 
interactions in these situations (Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 2009), but relies on the 
public perceiving the stops as not arbitrary, and therefore acceptable. Implicitly, it 
seems the policy is trying to reduce the number of baseless searches conducted. One 
imagines that the knock on effect of this would be that officers would begin to conduct 
fewer spurious searches if they believed that their request would be rejected in front of 
the civilian already stopped. Of course, this relies on the street-level officer providing 
accurate information, and that the judgment of the arbitrating officer is just and sound.   
 
Although stop and search can be seen as aligned with the controlling tendencies of 
sovereign state strategies, some instances of stop and search were more clearly in line 
with adaptive measures to manage the problem of drugs, albeit without any of the 
partnership elements commonly found in other adaptive measures. As previously 
mentioned, Dorn and Lee (1999) have described the turn in drugs policing to a less 
heroic stance, and while that is certainly reflected in aspects of community policing 
and New Public Managerialism, the traditional ethos of the ‘drug warrior’ remains 
prominent in officers’ description of the implementation of drug related searches. 
These ideas will be expanded upon in Chapter Six.    
 
4.3.4 The Problem of Disproportionality  
The MPS is aware of the disproportionate figures generated by policing efforts across 
London. The perceived unfairness of stop and search practices was cited by many 
community members as a cause of the August 2011 riots (Morell et al. 2011, Singh 
2012). In July 2011, the stop and search disproportionality in Watling was 3.05 for 
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black residents, and 1.25 for Asians, across all types of searches excluding S.60101.The 
problem of disproportionality is particularly acute in stop and search due to the 
discretion officers exercise when conducting such activities.  
 
The unintentional result and impact [of stop and search practices] on ethnic 
groups is that they are disproportionately subjected to the powers. If it 
appears that powers [of stop and search] are being used disproportionately 
toward a particular group then this could lead to the development of 
negativity toward the police and the MPS as a whole and ultimately 
discourage participation and future engagement opportunities. (Watling 
Equality Impact Assessment 2010). 
 
The MPS is not the only organization that has identified the negative impact of 
disproportionate stop and search practices.  
 
Without a secure base of community support (‘consent’) the use of [stop 
and search powers]… rapidly becomes hazardous and ineffective. To 
maintain their effectiveness, therefore, their exercise needs constantly to be 
reassessed not merely in relation to arrests or clear up rates, but also in the 
light of the effect on the community as a whole. In other words, the 
satisfactory and fruitful exercise of powers in this area depends crucially in 
the long term on police action being perceived by individuals and groups 
as acceptably fair and rational (EHRC 2010) 
 
Beyond being searched disproportionately, black people were also twice as likely as 
whites to be strip-searched by the MPS (Newburn, Shiner, and Hayman 2004). The 
issue of disproportionality goes beyond ethnicity as well. Young people, 18-24 years 
of age, were searched at nearly 145 per thousand in 2009 across London under Section 
23 (Eastwood, Shiner, and Bear 2013). This equates to being 6.25 times as likely to be 
stop and searched as the rest of the population.   
 
The intermingling of drug searches and non-drug searches complicates the 
interpretation of the number of searches. For example, after a call is received about a 
robbery in progress with a black suspect, several cars may stop and search black men 
in the neighbourhood ostensibly to identify if the individual is the suspect in question. 
Although these searches are conducted under Sec 1 of PACE, they may have ulterior 
motives. As one officer explained during a stop, “I’m looking for that Blackberry, but 
                                                 
101 Data obtained from the March 2012 Stop and Search Monitoring Mechanism of the MPS 
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he looks like he might have some nabbis on him, so that’d be good either way” (PC 
Matt, RT2).  
 
 
Figure 8: Age Breakdown of Sec23 Searches in Watling, with Rates per Thousand 
 
Research has shown that reducing the disparity in stops and searches might also 
improve the community’s view of policing.  
 
A reduction in disproportionality does not have to result in a rise in crime –
on the contrary, in the case of both Staffordshire and Cleveland it has gone 
hand in hand with reduced crime rates and increased levels of public 
confidence in the police (EHRC 2010, pg. 14)  
 
 
Figure 9: cannabis Warning and Stop and Search Disproportionality, Best and Worst Performing 
Boroughs in the MPS, (Eastwood, Shiner, and Bear 2013) 
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4.3.5 Attempts to Justify Ethnicity Issues 
RT officers were largely ignorant of the full scope of disproportionality in their 
practices, but what they did observe they explained away. RT officers repeatedly 
explained that the makeup of the population was largely BME in Watling, and 
therefore the high numbers of BME stops was a reflection of the community and not 
policing practices. However, the population of Watling (over the age of 10) is more 
than 60 per cent white.  
 
I mean if you’re working in Farmingham, whether you’re a White or Black 
or Asian officer, you’re either going to be stop and accounting or stop and 
search or just dealing with victims that are going to be different race or 
maybe predominately black. I’d have to look at the numbers so you’re 
never going to get away from that…. If you look at the demographics in 
that area I think it’s something like 46 per cent of the population in 
Watling is BME, so it’s going to happen, that’s the area you police. (Insp 
Bradley, RT4) 
 
RT officers also cited the concept of having available populations, not just residential 
populations from which to search. The idea of an ‘available population’ refers to the 
notion that some groups are more likely to inhabit public spaces, and therefore present 
more opportunities to be searched. It has been argued that, “The explanation for why 
the proportions of racial and ethnic minorities appear high in stop and search figures is 
because they are compared to the residential population” (Waddington, Stenson, and 
Don 2004, pg. 910). The findings of this research discard the notion that minorities are 
either discriminated against by police or are more criminalized, and suggest the ‘more 
prosaic’ explanation resides in the ethnic makeup of the available population. While 
Waddington et al make a solid point in identifying that greater focus should be paid to 
the idea of whether stops are just, and not simply conducted at proportionally unjust 
levels, their reliance on the concept of available populations does not have such firm 
footing.  The EHRC has produced such a clear discrediting of the concept that I will 
leave it to them to make my point: 
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We acknowledge that an explanation based on ‘availability’ has some 
mileage, particularly in clearly defined areas with small resident 
populations. However as a general explanation for the overall pattern, it 
doesn’t hold up to scrutiny as it is self-fulfilling. Street availability is 
influenced by police decisions where and when to do stops and searches 
and these decisions heavily influence the people that are ‘available’ to be 
stopped and searched. This is compounded by policing that is geared 
toward street visibility. (EHRC 2010, pg. 52) 
 
Officers also argued that disparity in search numbers comes from the fact that most of 
the suspect descriptions they receive are for young black men, and therefore they are 
going to probably search more people fitting this description. As one officer put it, 
“When I’m responding to a robbery I can’t justify searching that pasty white scrote if I 
just got told the suspect was a dark skinned African”. The implication in these 
statements is that blacks offend at higher rates than whites, though research has shown 
that whites and blacks offend at similar rates (Bowling and Phillips 2002) and that any 
differences in offending can’t be used to explain disproportionality in searches (Delsol 
and Shiner 2006). The justification for disproportionality based on offending patters 
reached beyond street-level PCs. Official MPS documents state that the driving cause 
of disproportionality was the, “the profile of personal robbery suspects in London, a 
crime type that is widely held to be dominated by young black men” (MPS 2010b, pg. 
5). It is surprising that the MPS retains such a stance nearly 15 years after MacPherson 
said: 
 
It is pointless for the police service to try to justify the disparity in these 
figures purely or mainly in terms of the other factors which are identified. 
The majority of police officers who testified before us accepted that an 
element of the disparity was the result of discrimination. This must be the 
focus of their efforts for the future. Attempts to justify the disparities 
through the identification of other factors, whilst not being seen vigorously 
to address the discrimination which is evident, simply exacerbates the 
climate of distrust. (Macpherson 1999, para 45.10) 
 
The issue of disproportionality cannot be laid solely on the RT teams of the borough. 
However, the issue of disproportionality results from the larger issue of non-adaptive 
policing efforts that are the focus of this section, and to place it separately would not as 
effectively highlight the role that RT teams play in disproportionate policing effects. 
Certainly the work of TSG and other units has been identified as being problematic, 
but it is RT officers that are seen to be the front-line of officers protecting the borough 
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and doing the ‘real police work’. It is therefore important to also examine the 
accountability, or lack thereof, that RT units operate under.  
 
4.4 Response Teams’ Interactions with the Community 
Response Teams in Watling were not obliged to regularly meet with the community 
outside of their interactions with victims and suspects in the course of their duties. 
Unlike their SNT counterparts who devoted many hours to attending meetings with 
partner groups, organising community events, and walking a beat, RT officers usually 
only briefly came in to contact with civilians as part of an incident102.  
 
[On] team you're working all over Watling. You don’t particularly spend 
any amount of time in one place to get to know the community, so you’re 
basically… going out, popping a sticky plaster on it, and driving off to the 
next call, [where] you’re popping another sticky plaster on. For long term 
goals that’s going to be an SNT job…The only dealing a response team has 
with a community is when it turns up to a call. They’re not responsible for 
community (PC Hugh, RT4).  
 
Many officers liked that their role did not require much civilian contact, as they 
believed the civilians in the borough were mainly disreputable people. Many officers 
were concerned that increasing community interactions outside of active policing 
would result in the community being able to tell RTs how to conduct their activities. 
This tactical advice was something that officers felt the civilians were unqualified to 
do. As PC George put it, “Fire brigade doesn’t have meetings with civilian groups 
asking how they should put out fires, so why do the police need to?” (PC George, 
RT4). To these officers, they were policing the community, not policing for the 
community.  
 
                                                 
102 The notable exception to this is when officers get food from local establishments. Here, they tended 
to interact only with the shopkeepers themselves, avoiding contact with other people waiting in cues. 
Interestingly, if a conversation did start it was far more relaxed and jovial than most any other 
conversation I had witnessed. While waiting for food from Turkish Delight one night the smoke from 
the grill was filling up the whole shop to the point where all the customers were looking at each other as 
if to say, ‘is it normal?’. One young man, clearly a bit drunk and on his way home from a night out 
turned to an officer and said, ‘Bravs, you guys need to call your mates at the fire brigade and tell them to 
come investigate this smoke. Could be a fire or something. Do you have to call 999, or you got some 
special connection?’ The officers all laughed, and agreed that there was something wrong with the 
amount of smoke.  
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The lack of proactive community engagement in RT policing meant that community 
interactions either occurred when a victim called in to report an incident, or during a 
stop and search. When it came to interactions with civilians who were ‘legitimate’ 
victims, officers in Watling took on a different tone. PC Jack described how he 
witnessed this first hand during a ride-along with his uncle just before Jack joined the 
MPS. 
 
Seeing my uncle go in to somebody’s house and, you know he just turned 
it on, and I knew that wasn’t what he was normally like. It was real eye 
opening because we were at an unexpected death, and everybody had been 
making all these jokes about the death and stuff, and then here was my 
uncle being so professional with the family. (PC Jack, RT4) 
 
The idea of officers ‘turning it on’ is found in the literature (Smith and Gray 1983), 
and was often seen in Watling during incidents. Response officers were quite adept at 
meeting the emotional needs of victims of crimes, especially those accosted in a street 
robbery. However, this professional behaviour was not regularly present during stop 
and search activity. By far the most contentious experiences between police and 
community were during stop and searches. The following incident during my 
fieldwork stood out as a prime example of the poor relationship between RTs and the 
public.  
 
While riding with PC Hugh and PC Edmund, a call came over the radio about an 
officer requiring assistance during a drug search on a group of youths outside of the 
Wheatsheaf Estate.  We were only seconds away, and arrived to find two PCs arguing 
with a group of at least five black teenagers. The PC Joan103 quickly informed us that 
she had smelled cannabis while walking past the building and tried to get someone to 
open the security door so she could investigate. Despite ringing several flats via the 
intercom, she had been unable to reach anyone. Four young people then emerged from 
the door and she suspected they were the ones responsible for the cannabis smell. The 
youths tried to leave, claiming they had no idea what PC Joan was talking about. This 
was when she called for assistance. Upon arriving, PC Edmund and PC Hugh jumped 
in to action, and grabbed a suspect each to search them. The PC Joan was having a 
difficult time controlling the youth she was trying to search.  
                                                 
103 PC Joan was on a detail from another unit, and I had not worked with her before.  
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After searching one suspect, PC Edmund moved to assist PC Joan. PC Edmund told 
the young man that he was going to be searched under Section 23 of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act. The young man continued smoking a cigarette, seemingly unfazed by PC 
Edmund’s demands. The incident took place on a busy road, during rush hour, not 
more than 10 meters from a bus stop that served six or seven routes. During the 
incident, a crowd quickly grew. The police cars blocked in several busses already 
sitting at the stop, creating a two-tiered viewing gallery of bus passengers.  
 
PC Edmund reached for the cigarette, but the teenager pulled away. PC Edmund had a 
hold of his arm as he tried to gain compliance over the teenager. Seeing the struggle, 
three other officers rushed over to help, but the teenager would not go down. They 
thrashed about for what seemed an agonizingly long time. PC Edmund would later tell 
me that, “I wanted to CS spray him, but I grabbed the wrong side of my belt and felt 
my ASP. I knew I couldn’t hit him in front of the crowd like that.” The crowd grew 
incensed at the situation playing out in front of them. People were leaning over the 
railings of the Wheatsheaf’s open corridors, yelling down at the officers. The growing 
crowd blocked the pavement in one direction, and the street was a wall of buses. A 
civilian carrying his Islamic prayer mat and wearing a kufi yelled at the officers, “This 
is violence, violence, you are police, police! What have they done to deserve such 
treatment, violence?” Caught in the middle of the commotion, I stood amongst the 
stereo of shouts, radio transmissions, and quarrels. 
 
Eventually, PC Edmund and his colleagues subdued and handcuffed the teenager. 
Community members were screaming as five officers carried the (formerly) cigarette-
smoking teenager to the waiting police van. A tall black woman who had remained 
silent for the duration of the incident suddenly burst out, “What happened here? What 
happened here! Stop and search? Ha, you terrorizing us here, stop and search ha! 
Terrorist, every day on this doorstep. Why? Why?” PC George, who had just arrived 
on scene, explained to the woman what was happening in a calm and reassuring voice. 
As he was doing this, another officer from a unit that had responded to the call for 
assistance walked by the woman and said “Yeah, yeah, see you later, now go on 
home.” (Unknown PC, Watling). One woman, wearing a bandana with cannabis leafs 
on her head approached several officers. “You like this don’t you! You like beating up 
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black kids! What is your number? You’re just a gang!”  PC Joan, in earshot of the 
woman, turned to PC Edmund and I and said in a voice loud enough for the woman to 
hear, “Nice people around here, huh?” She then turned to the woman and said 
dismissively, “Nice to meet you, bye bye.” The woman kept arguing with PC Joan, “It 
took four vans and at least two police cars to deal with one person? One person!”  PC 
Joan began berating the woman.  
 
I was trying to detain him for a search, and that’s why I called for more 
units. If you was there on your own, yeah. If you was there on your own, 
with six of us, I’m sure you’d want to call some of your friends as well, so 
that’s why I called for them. If you’ve got any problems, if you want to 
make a complaint, feel free to go down to the station. (PC Joan, Unknown 
Unit, Watling) 
 
The woman responded, “You lot are jokers, you like all this proper, you like all this 
in’nit. And you wonder why you have problems, problems you have with people. 
Because you deal with people like that.” As quickly as we had arrived, we packed up 
and left the scene. I looked back to see that the crowd was still largely intact and 
angry, but nearly all the officers had dispersed. The following conversation took place 
as we drove back to the station so PC Edmund could process the arrest.  
 
PC Edmund: Quite a thing there. 
PC Hugh: What’d you do? 
PC Edmund: Had a big fucking fight with the bloke! 
PC Hugh: You punch him? 
PC Edmund: A lot. 
PC Hugh: Huh? 
PC Edmund: (excitedly) Yeah, quite a lot! 
Dispatcher: Attention any available units, we’ve still got two outstanding S graded 
calls to attend. Still have a possible assault in SW99, informant states she has been 
assaulted by her manager. Any available units to SW99. 
PC Hugh: Ridiculous! Tell us the CAD love. Oh well, what’d you do him for? 
PC Edmund: Obstructed drugs search. Cause while we were dealing with those other 
two, suddenly heard Joan shout up for more units. I was like, ‘what the fuck’? So I 
went over to him, and he’s getting well aggressive in her face. So I said to him, ‘look 
fella, you’re getting searched as well under Section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 
cause you were with this group that was seen to make away, make off after smell of 
drugs was’, um, because that’s what they called for in’it. And, uh, he starts waiving his 
cigarette right in my face, ‘you aint stopping me’, and I was like, ‘Don’t put your 
cigarette in my face, put your cigarette out.’ And he said, ‘no, I’m not doing it’. So I 
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said put it on the wall’. ‘Nah’, and so when I went for his cigarette he just fucking 
went for me.  
PC Hugh: You get a few digs in yeah? 
PC Edmund: Yeah, yeah. There was like four of us in the corner fighting him. He was 
an aggressive fucker.  
 
When I asked them about the way the crowd reacted, PC Hugh commented, “That’s 
just London in’it. I think a lot of people in London get a mob mentality. I don’t know 
if they see the police as some sort of tool of oppression, some people. I don’t know 
how it is.” After another similarly negative encounter between officers and a group of 
civilians upset over young black men being searched for drugs, another  officer 
commented, ‘They’re just anti-police, they don’t like us stopping people.’ But there is 
evidence that the public understand the need and are supportive of the practice of stop 
and search (Stone and Pettigrew 2000), even amongst young BME men (Fitzgerald 
1999).  What becomes the most salient factor in these situations is how the police 
conduct themselves (Skogan 1994, Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 2009, Waddington, 
Stenson, and Don 2004).  
  
What PC Hugh did not say after the Wheatsheaf incident, and what few officers ever 
came close to saying, was that it was not simply a matter of the public being anti-
police; the simple truth was that there were consistently poor relations between white 
officers and the BME community. At the Wheatsheaf, the crowd was almost entirely 
BME, the suspects were all black, and the officers all white except for a single black 
officer who arrived too late to take part in the fray.  
  
Previous research has identified that the use of stop and search powers can have a 
negative effect on the community’s confidence in police. Only 46 per cent of 12-30 
year olds who had been stopped and searched by police thought they were doing a 
good job, versus 67per cent for those who had never been stopped (Miller, Bland, and 
Quinton 2000). They pointed out that: 
 
While this finding has clear implications for those searched across the 
board, it seems inevitable that people from minority ethnic backgrounds, 
because they are more often searched, will disproportionately suffer from a 
loss of confidence as a direct result of their personal experiences of 
searches. (Miller, Bland, and Quinton 2000, pg. 52) 
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Evidence of the community’s dissatisfaction at stop and search was easily identifiable 
during fieldwork in Watling, especially if the individual being searched was a teenage 
black male. On multiple occasions a passer-by would stop and watch the proceedings 
from a distance close enough to overhear the conversation, but far enough away to not 
be directly intervening. Their looks we often unpleasant in nature, and on at least two 
occasions people unconnected to the individuals asked the young person if they were 
okay. On at least eight other occasions community members questioned officers in a 
less than polite manner about the reasons for a stop. Even when they didn’t stop to 
observe the proceedings, community members walking past a stop would often look at 
the officers conducting the search with clear contempt.  Whereas officers engaged in 
monitoring a crime scene, directing traffic, or patrolling on foot were rarely treated in 
an openly hostile or aggressive manner, officers conducting a search regularly faced 
such attitudes from the public. It should be noted that situations of community 
intervention were almost exclusively observed when the person being searched was 
black and so was the community member.   
 
4.4.1 Creating the Other 
Today, the openly racist language experienced by Smith and Grey (1983) during their 
ethnographic fieldwork in London, or Skolnick in the US (Skolnick 1966) is gone. The 
trend away from such language began with the Scarman Report(1981) and was 
hastened by the MacPherson Report (Macpherson 1999). Before we rush to celebrate 
the end of racism, we must acknowledge that the lack of openly racist language may 
only be an indication that racist attitudes have gone underground, not disappeared 
(Foster, Newburn, and Souhami 2005). Even without overt racism, implicit bias can 
warp the interactions between officers and the BME population (Beckett, Nyrop, and 
Pfingst 2006). Indeed, police prejudice is often thought to be reflective of the wider 
societal perceptions of certain ethnicities (Reiner 2010). Just as we have seen a 
tempering of racist language in common usage in recent years without the absence of 
racist attitudes, so might the police be following suit.  
 
Instead of racism being out in the open, officers often created an ‘other’ who 
represented criminality, and was an outsider to the community (Garland 2001). This 
‘othering’ appeared to be largely directed at young BME men in Watling, and was 
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expressed through the disproportionate use of stop and search; a topic already 
addressed.  
 
However, race was not the only means by which officers categorized the citizenry in 
Watling. Officers regularly referred to the difference between a citizen and a non-
citizen. A citizen was a contributor to the greater good of the community, who 
accepted the middle-class value system that officers believed they represented. After 
he narrowly missed clipping the rear wheel of a fleeing suspect’s scooter, I walked 
with PC Neville around the estate where the suspect had fled. “Wouldn’t have 
mattered none [if we had hit him], wasn’t like he’s a proper citizen. Man [who] steals 
from proper citizens isn’t one himself. Look where he fled to.” In general, ‘citizenship’ 
was dependent on payment of a sufficient amount of taxes. This criterion quickly put 
council tenants as an ‘other,’ unless they could show meritorious participation in the 
local community activities. Of course, officers rarely had insights in to the volunteer 
work of various civilians they came in to contact with, so this possible exemption was 
rarely observed. Additionally, someone who advocated for ‘scum’ was believed to be 
either subversive towards police, a former member of that class, or both. Even those 
who were considered ‘decent folk’ could quickly become ‘Do-gooders’ (Reiner 2010) 
if they were seen to be challenging the application of police powers. 
 
While Garland pointed out that the ‘other’ is portrayed as an outsider engaging in 
disreputable activity, other sources have identified the creation of groups seen to be 
‘police property’ (Reiner 1999, pg. 93). The difference between being police property 
and an outsider is that the outsider is cast by politicians as the villain that increased 
penal sanctions and state control will be able to tackle (Matravers 2011).  The groups 
that are considered ‘police property’ are not necessary deemed to be outsiders of the 
community, merely low-status groups who are viewed as problematic by dominant 
groups, and for which the law is one of many tools used to repress (Reiner 2010). 
Notably, the concept of being ‘police property’ is a social division created by the 
police in order to categorise their understanding of those they are policing. The 
criminal ‘other’ is a political discourse from outside the organization.  
 
In either case, the uniting idea between ‘police property’ and the ‘other’ is there are 
people who do not deserve the same respect and protection as other citizens. For RT 
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officers in Watling, most of the population fit in to the ‘other’ category. This gave 
officers in Watling carte blanch to use their police powers on them. By defining 
criminality as the key characteristic of the harmful outsider, what little empathy and 
pragmatism might have guided the treatment of ‘police property’ in the past was 
wilfully abandoned as suspects lost their status as part of the community. This conflict 
is at the heart of Garland’s ideas of criminology of the self versus the criminology of 
the other.  
 
One criminology de-dramatises crime, allays disproportionate fears, and 
promotes routine preventative actions. The other demonises the criminal, 
arouses popular fears and hostilities, and strives to enlist support for drastic 
measures of control. (Garland 1999, pg. 354)  
 
This created a difficult balance for officers. Some changes in the criminal justice 
system have been based on the normalization of crime by rational actors (Crawford 
2001).  The offender is just another element of the community in a modern society, 
from which the community needs to bolster their internal defences. A small pivot in 
police messaging allows the offender to be an outsider for whom force and state 
control are the only defences. Officers push the offender from the community so they 
can enforce harsh penal sanctions. This would be more difficult for the criminal justice 
system if the offender was seen as being just like other community members but, 
“…the offender is a depraved member of an ‘underclass’ operating within a wholly 
different moral frame” (Crawford 2001, pg. 76).  Once someone is not considered part 
of the community they are plundering, any manner of penal response is justifiable.  
 
The kind of people we’re stopping [and searching] don’t, don’t deserve the 
civil rights, the exact explanation of the station you’re from104, if we’re 
doing it right.  These people have been stopped plenty of times before. (PC 
Mario, RT2) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 Ravensbourne was another Borough in London that had a reputation amongst officers as being ‘as 
bad as Watling’  
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Can we speak perfectly freely? In my opinion, just my opinion, it’s the 
demographic where we are working. The majority of people are slag, 
they’re shit, they’re not like us. If I worked in a different area and I’d 
worked ten years somewhere else in an outer borough, a lower crime 
borough, I probably would have completely different views. I am a product 
of the environment, I am a product of working for ten years in effectively 
one of London’s ghettos and that’s made me the officer I am. That’s 
formed my ideas and concepts as to what a community is with regards to 
police. The majority of people we are engaging with, the areas we’re in, 
they’re low income -if they’ve got any income at all- and they’re involved 
in criminal activity. They’re slags so…they’re generally always going to 
be hostile to officers…The minute you’re in a nicer area, where people are 
working and live normal lives closer to what I’m living, they’re quite 
positive, pro-police. (PC Jack, RT4) 
 
Actions taken against ‘others,’ often in the form of a drugs search, were promoted as 
protecting the tax paying, employed, middle-class. These were the ‘respectable 
citizenry’. The most negative perceptions were reserved for black and Asian youths, as 
they were seen to be problematic. Officers usually learned of their outsider status 
during the first moments of an interaction when an officer would ask, ‘where are you 
from?’ It was assumed that black youths found in ‘white’ neighbourhoods did not live 
nearby and were there for nefarious reasons. “It’s those free travel cards for young 
people. Mayor made it easy for them to conduct their crimes all over, catch a night bus 
home to Ravensbourne105” (PC Mario, RT2). “The widespread perception of black and 
Asian people as members of problematic marginal sections of the population amounts 
to a denial of their 'respectability'” (Waddington 1999a, para 7.5).  
 
Indeed, the individuals being targeted need not have committed any particular 
offences, as a ‘symbolic assailant’ will suffice. This symbolic assailant, “need merely 
to conform to the stereotype.” (Skolnick 1966, pg. 218). However, the idea of a 
symbolic assailant may not be limited to those committing crimes. The idea of RTs 
finding ‘genuine victims’ among the many petty calls is perhaps an unexpected 
development of the ‘othering’ taking place in criminal justice policy. No longer is the 
outsider alone in being a danger to the community through their criminal activity. In 
the mission to thwart crime, resources are scarce, and must be appropriated for true 
victims. As the publicly defined role of policing has shifted away from penal 
                                                 
105 Ravensbourne was another Borough in London that had a reputation amongst officers as being ‘as 
bad as Watling’  
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welfarism, RT officers not only attempt to enforce the will of the state on criminals, 
but also deny that protection to those not deemed to be within the protection of the 
community.  
 
I’m not somebody who’s going to go out chasing after arrests, I’d rather 
just make sure that the job I’m doing is done properly, if I get a decent 
victim, I’ll do everything I can to make sure that happens that they’re dealt 
with properly and in a way that’s good for them. (PC Jenny, RT4) 
 
[The best part of being and RT officer is] helping people that genuinely 
need help as opposed to people that call you and just want you to sort out 
their lives because they can’t sort it out themselves. People that are 
genuine victims of crime that need assistance, catching bad guys, thrill of 
the chase is always good, just getting a result. (PC Rebekah, RT4) 
 
  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter began with a quote from PC Jack. In it he differentiated himself from 
other aspects of the criminal justice system by his role’s focus and willingness to take 
on action. Despite his deeply held pessimism and belief that the community of Watling 
was full of unworthy victims, ‘slags’, and ‘shitbags’, PC Jack saw value in his service 
through action.  
 
As much as I might huff and puff and moan as a lot of police officers do, 
and about the community and all the people that I’ve said, there are times, 
there are times; there are little moments when I feel like I’ve done 
something worthwhile. (PC Jack, RT4)  
 
In this chapter, I have shown that the draw of being ‘on team’ is often related to the 
development of a professional identity built upon the RT officers’ role in maintaining 
order and responding to the calls that no one else in the organization will attend. RT 
officers still see themselves as something sacred - different from the profane 
bureaucracies that govern the rest of people’s lives. For all of PC Jack’s disdain for 
most of the community in Watling, service through action that helps ‘worthy’ citizens 
helps maintain his professional identity. However, maintaining that identity in the face 
of the daily reality of domestic disputes, non-crime incidents, and bureaucratic 
responses, created a conflict that needed to be resolved. RT officers had to act out to 
find or create instances to support their professional identity, while also conforming to 
the needs of the organization. 
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How and why the police ‘understand’ calls as they do is practically 
relevant, for these variegated processes of signification convert human 
cares, worries, dread, anxiety, and obligations into a form that allows the 
police to display their obligation to serve the public. (Manning 1988, pg. 
xiv) 
 
To combat the bureaucratisation of their role, RT officers are drawn towards the 
Sovereign State Strategies that allow freedom of discretion, action, and visible returns 
on the application of police powers. They seek out opportunities to enforce their 
powers as an opportunity to fulfil the identity they believe they have, and seek to 
maintain. RTs do take on some adaptive efforts, such as the cannabis warning form, 
with vigour. When it comes to an adaptive effort that makes their job less taxing, and 
allows them to tackle more serious issues, the officers accept the practice. But where 
partnership and bureaucratization take hold, they are less keen. The varied nature of 
the calls they receive and their ability to utilize discretion allows officers to operate in 
the wide variety of situations they attend. However, the mixed responses utilized by 
RT highlights the conflicted nature of their role and the policies guiding their role, as 
ascribed by Garland.  
 
“The politics of penal modernism are deeply ambivalent. They depend upon the 
ideological orientation of those who staff the institutions, and upon the political and 
legal context in which they operate” (Garland 1995, pg. 188). What Garland says is 
that given the ambiguity in policy faced by RT officers, and their need to maintain 
professional identity, the push towards action oriented activities, particularly stop and 
search, is the result not of the policies themselves, but of the push by the organization 
as it responds to political pressures to show results. This pressure to show results is an 
effort by the state to maintain its claim to power through its ability to bring order to 
communities.  
 
Basing working practices on the goal of bringing order to the community requires 
someone to be causing disorder. The RTs, lacking the connection and long-term 
relationship with the local community fostered by community policing teams, found 
disorder, real or imagined, in their frequent stop and search activity of community 
members. Each person searched, whether found with illegal items or not, was a victory 
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for the RTs, reinforcing their perceived orientation as non-adaptive actors. It is 
interesting to note that many non-adaptive stop and searches results in a cannabis 
Warning Form - an adaptive response to the problem of drugs.  
 
The ‘us vs. them’ mentality that pervades RT policing is born of many factors, but the 
result is clear. Regularly acting out by ‘putting hands in pockets’ may help officers 
sustain a professional self-image as action oriented professionals, but it harms the 
community’s relationship with the police in profound ways, and exposes the gap 
between what police officers want to be and what policing has become. In part, the 
MPS tries to counteract the effect of this acting out through the adaptive efforts of 
community policing initiatives spearheaded by the Safer Neighbourhood Teams. As I 
move to the next chapter examining the working practices of the SNTs it is worth 
wondering if these community policing teams are able to engender partnerships and 
community confidence, or if they are just a new façade on old practices. 
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Chapter 5- Community Policing: Old Wine in New Bottles  
[SNTs] remain at the forefront of our work with communities to tackle 
crime and the fear of crime and to identify and address crime hotspots. We 
will continually improving [sic] our capability to reduce anti-social 
behaviour and disorder. We are committed to tackling crimes that matter to 
the community. We will focus on violent and property crime… and 
concentrate our activity on the most vulnerable and repeatedly targeted 
victims; on the people repeatedly committing crime; and on the places and 
times most in need of policing. We will continue enforcement initiatives to 
reduce local street drinking and anti-social behaviour and to tackle crack 
houses and other drug hotspots. (MPS 2011c, pg. 10) 
 
This chapter will explore Community and Neighbourhood Policing initiatives in the 
borough of Watling. Each ward of Watling had an SNT - a combined force of nearly 
175 sworn officers and PCSOs. Several Community Oriented Policing efforts outside 
of SNTs were also being undertaken in the borough, and we will examine these in 
order to help understand the place of the SNTs within the larger Community Policing 
landscape. The chapter will first look at the adaptive activities of the SNTs, most 
notably their frequent use of foot-patrols as a method of ensuring visibility to the 
public. This will lead to a discussion of their use of partnerships with the community to 
coproduce policing activity and goals. Finally, the chapter will examine how many of 
these adaptive practices and parts of their mandate retain a residue of non-adaptive 
strategies. As the opening quote of this chapter highlights, the message about working 
in partnership is often tied to a strong message about the state’s ability to control 
crime. The conflict between these two messages is evident when looking at the street-
level implementation of community policing, but also helps us to understand the 
context within which their anti-drugs activities take place.  
 
Looking at the two types of teams studied in this research, we see that RTs are 
immediately focused on non-adaptive goals and activities, which have been influenced 
by the need for adaptive strategies. Conversely, SNT’s style of work is most 
immediately oriented along adaptive lines but is inflected by residual non-adaptive 
imperatives. The move away from traditional ‘organisational imperatives’ towards 
community co-produced priorities is an acknowledgment of the inability of police to 
meet the impossible task of eliminating crime(Crawford 2007), and as such is clearly 
an adaptive exercise. 
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The idea of a community focused police presence is not new to Watling. 
Superintendent William of Watling’s CID office started his MPS career as an officer in 
the borough in the early 1980’s and was tasked with community policing efforts from 
the start of his training.  
 
The expectations was you’d have a local team pretty much dedicated to 
policing the local community, so in the same way that you have beats etc., 
the division as it was then was divided into a number of beats and each 
beat had its own sector policing team that had a specific responsibility for 
it. So every beat always had a Home Beat officer that was permanently 
there all the time, but the extension to that was a team of officers who 
pretty much, when they were on duty, focused their activity in that area. 
For me that was the Franklin estate in Collington Square. Haven’t gone far 
in my career… (Supt William, Watling CID) 
 
Things have radically changed for the neighbourhood in the intervening years. For one, 
the ‘home beat officers’ are gone. Instead of a home-beat officer walking the beat, 
these days an SNT officer from the Bunsen Terrace team patrols the now empty and 
crumbling grounds of the Franklin estate106. The SNT is dedicated to that area only, 
and run by a Sergeant with two PCs and three PCSOs. In the era of the ‘Home Beat’ 
officer, and especially as the prestige of foot patrols waned in the late 1980’s (Bennett 
1994), officers assigned to foot-patrol were often rookies or sage veterans, assigned to 
walk a beat either because they needed to learn what policing was about, or because 
they were past their prime. In either case, they were still part of the local Response 
Teams, and could respond to calls that came out over the radio107.   
 
Older officers reported that under the Home Beat system, a sector Inspector would 
organize regular meeting of community members to discuss priorities for the home 
beat officers. However, funds for this work were not ring-fenced, and there was no 
official mechanism of accountability to ensure the stated priorities were acted upon. 
These are the primary advances in the SNT structure. “What we didn’t do then is ring 
fence the resources and at the same time try to dedicate a service to a small area. The 
fact was that when we were on duty we had a wider responsibility as a response team 
                                                 
106 The council wants to tear down the estate, and have moved out almost all the residents. A few 
families have held out, giving the place the appearance of a post-apocolapytic wasteland . In one of the 
more farcical moments of fieldwork, we noticed that council workers were repainting the lines of the car 
park, despite the fact the estate was scheduled for demolition.  
107 Hand held radios were only recently becoming available when Supt William began his career. 
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right across the division.” (Supt William, Watling CID). This meant that community 
policing and response policing overlapped.  
 
However, the British public believes that officers on foot-patrol represent a defence 
against crime (Wakefield 2006) and the development of COP and its eventual 
transformation in to the NRPP reinvigorated the practice as part of efforts to improve 
the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public. During a chat about the role of an 
SNT officer, PC Sam defined it as, “Jack of all trades, master of none, social worker, 
nurse maid, [and] agony aunt” (Brunel Gardens SNT). This description is not far from 
what an RT officer might say about their own role. But whereas an RT officer 
intervenes briefly to put a plaster on the problem, the SNT officer must deal with the 
long-term issues that necessitated calling the RT, and they are tasked with doing so in 
partnership with the community. The SNT is, to continue the plaster metaphor, there 
for wound care management.  
 
5.1 SNT Activities 
In current policy documents SNTs have a distinct role from other units within MPS. 
This is largely due to their focus on proactive work in response to local priorities 
(Home Office 2004a). While foot patrols and community consultation may be seen as 
a return to the original core of policing (Zedner 2006), street-level officers tend to 
devalue the community policing focus despite the efforts of senior police managers 
(Reiner 2010).  As we saw in the previous chapter, in the minds of many officers, ‘real 
policing’ is focused on action, arrest, and the quick resolution of an incident. The 
transition to this ‘new’ form of policing can be challenging for officers (Lord 1996).  
 
Although community-based policing is considered effective by many law 
enforcement departments, existing law enforcement stressors, such as role 
conflict, role ambiguity, and responsibility for people may be intensified 
for the officer practicing community-based policing. The stress originates 
from the conflict between the officers' new and old roles, as well as the 
ambiguity surrounding the application of this new approach. (Lord 1996, 
pg. 504) 
 
This conflict creates stress by demanding officers find solutions to community 
problems that often require interventions beyond the limited powers and remit of the 
police. Whereas an RT officer mainly attends incidents involving individuals they have 
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no connection with, an SNT officer, patrolling and responding to calls in a small patch 
of territory, must become invested in the local area and secure solutions, not just 
arrests: 
 
We want such teams to develop a genuine sense of being responsible for 
and ‘‘owning’’ their local areas. This means the police involving 
communities in negotiating priorities for action and, together with partners 
and the communities themselves, finding lasting solutions to local 
problems. (Home Office 2004a, pg. 48-49) 
 
Suddenly, the police officer needs to be more than a generalist well versed in the broad 
application of policing powers. S/he needs to be a researcher identifying crime trends, 
an analyst deciphering data and producing strategic outcomes, an enforcer of the law, 
and an organizer of the community (Savage 2007). The constable was to be 
transformed from an authority figure dispensing justice, to a leader building 
community cohesion (Home Office 2004a). Doing all of this requires a new type of 
officer, one who can cognitively engage in the new roles, but also emotionally strong 
enough to shoulder the burdens of a community reliant on them for protection (Novak, 
Alarid, and Lucas 2003).  
 
Walking past a disused football pitch in the middle of a large estate with a reputation 
for delinquent youths, PCSO Andy and I stopped to take in the view. It was clear that 
we were being watched by several partially concealed faces behind the windows. The 
ground was still wet from a recent rain shower, and despite the sweet smell of 
petrichor from the pavement, the place looked bedraggled. “I feel for these people, 
yeah, with all that’s going on here. We’re doing a lot, but still get the same complaints 
every time. Same families causing problems, makes living here hard” (PCSO Andy, 
Brunel Gardens SNT).  SNT officers knew the ‘problem families’ and local conflicts 
of the neighbourhood, and were tasked with repeatedly dealing with the same issues 
until they were cleared up. They even had a mobile telephone that members of the 
public could ring directly to get hold of them. But how did they build up this 
knowledge, and what did they do to deal with the problems of the community? 
 
 149 
5.1.1 Foot Patrols 
The most common activity of an SNT, aside from paperwork, was foot patrol. Even 
though the focus of community policing is working with communities to find solutions 
to problematic issues (Lord 1996), the tools available to an SNT officer are limited, 
and foot patrols remain a key element of their daily activities. The foot patrol allows 
officers to be visible to the community and build reassurance - two of the main goals 
of community policing (Stanko and Bradford 2009, Giacomantonio 2009). While RTs 
rarely had anyone on foot unless they were supporting an on-going anti-robbery 
operation, foot patrols were part of the routine activities of SNT officers. An SNT 
might have access to a single unmarked vehicle108 in the station’s vehicle pool but they 
could not rely on having access to the vehicle. Most wards could be crossed on foot in 
15-20 minutes, but SNT officers often took circuitous routes to their destination to 
observe areas they considered problematic. Whereas RT officers tended to stay on 
roads during their patrols, emerging from their vehicles only to attend to incidents, 
SNT officers walked under walkways, through playgrounds, up and down flights of 
stairs, and along pathways.  
 
At first glance, foot patrols seemed to be casual affairs. Lasting between thirty minutes 
and three hours, officers walked while discussing the goings on in their lives. The first 
impression hid discrete activity the officers undertook to increase the efficacy of the 
patrols. Officers often split up to walk on opposite sides of a street, giving them more 
contact with shopkeepers and residents. Officers also believed that two officers 
walking and talking together seemed less open to residents who may wish to speak 
with them. However, few people unknown to the officers ever initiated contact with 
them. Nonetheless, the nature of patrols for an SNT officer was very different from 
that undertaken by their RT counterparts. While RT patrols were fitted in between 
incidents, SNT foot patrols were opportunities to, “…show the community we’re here 
and available and doing what it is they’ve asked us to be doing” (Sgt Reggie, Bunsen 
Terrace SNT).  
 
                                                 
108 I use the term ‘unmarked’ because the car did not have the normal MPS livery across it, nor any 
lights and sirens. It did however have a large magnetic ‘MPS Community Policing’ decal affixed on 
each side. 
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A contingent of youth on the Knottington estate knew their local SNT officers well, 
thanks to the frequent run-ins the two groups had with each other. Some of the youths 
were ‘proper scrotes’ and some just ‘hangers-on’ (PC Clarke, Brunel Gardens SNT), 
but either way the SNT officers would say hello to the youths if they encountered them 
during a foot patrol. That is, if the youths had not scattered at the site of the officers. 
Many of the better-known characters were greeted by name. The officers of Bunsen 
Gardens SNT had worked with youth workers to find ways of keeping the disruptive 
youths away from council sponsored after-school activities that they were regularly 
interrupting.  
 
5.1.1.1 Reactive Aspects of Foot Patrols 
In theory, SNT patrols, like their RT counterparts, provided opportunities to interrupt 
criminal or anti-social behaviour as it was in progress.  
 
It was famously estimated that, on the basis of burglary rates (in the 1980s) 
and evenly distributed patrol, an officer in London could expect to pass 
within a hundred yards of a burglary in progress once in every eight 
years... In practice, random patrol is less about deterring or catching 
offenders and more about providing a symbolic presence that proclaims a 
state of order and reassures the public. (Karn 2013, pg. 11) 
 
Whereas an RT officer would see self-generated work as proactive, an SNT officer 
would see this as reactive in nature. In Brunel Gardens there existed two groups whose 
presence would instantly cause the SNTs to pursue the offenders with great haste, but 
who the RTs never encountered. It may sound silly, but the selling of roasted nuts and 
a three-card monte game were treated as serious infractions by the local SNT.  
 
The nut sellers were particularly crafty. They set themselves up on the middle of a road 
on the border between several wards from two different boroughs, so no team had 
direct reason to intervene. If they did, the sellers would see them approaching, cross 
the border and disappear for a few minutes. This generated a great deal of frustration 
amongst the team members. The nut sellers were never actually listed on the ward’s 
priorities, but the team regularly found themselves scampering after them, the sweet 
smell of candied cashews trailing behind the fleeing cart. Hardly a foot-patrol went by 
without some mention of this threat by an officer or PCSO.  
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Similarly, the three-card-monte team was never included in the SNT’s priorities list. 
The scammers set themselves up in a prime tourist area and regularly entertained 
crowds of 10 to 15 people. Officers believed the card-team was comprised of two men 
running the actual game, two men planted in the audience, two spotters, and one or two 
others at large in the area. The SNT team was convinced that, when not running a 
rigged card game and cheating tourists out of £10 a time, the members of the group 
were pick-pockets. The card team had irked the security manager of a business 
complex next to where they operated. Along with two Brunel Gardens SNT officers, 
the security manager and I descended in to the bowels of the building to the security 
room. Security guards guided several dozen adjustable CCTV cameras to watch the 
action. The security manager, a square jawed former member of the Parachute 
Regiment with the strongest handshake I have ever experienced, pointed out exactly 
what was happening. “You see, they’re playing the game, and on the other camera you 
can see how they’ve got a member of their crew waiting by the bike lockers.” The 
officers had tried to set up an operation against the crew, but even in plain clothes the 
lookouts had spotted the officers and the men running the game had dispersed before 
they could be apprehended109. 
 
At no time during my work with the team did they encounter a crime in progress as 
they patrolled on foot, and as mentioned previously, even if an incident was taking 
place nearby they did not seem to take particular notice110. SNT officers on patrol did 
not respond to calls coming over the 999 system. I was not present during an instance 
when the emergency button was triggered, so cannot comment on their reaction to such 
incidents. This lack of responsiveness to, or engagement in reactive policing that 
occupied the majority of RT time is perhaps to be expected given the differing roles 
for each team (Bennett 1994, Lord 1996, Mastrofski, Worden, and Snipes 1995, 
Skogan 2006b). 
 
                                                 
109 There was talk of having me approach the card dealers myself so that the lookouts would not be 
alerted, but I pointed out that without any powers to arrest or detain the individuals, I would be unable to 
contribute anything to the operation beyond having a good view of the men as they ran away. I was 
reminded of Skolnick (1966) when he drove a truck so the officers he was working with could hide in 
the back. To be honest, while my excuse was valid, I was reluctant to get into such ethically murky 
waters.  
110 In the total opposite manner, RT officers would pay close attention to any car chases being broadcast 
across the MPS remit, in the hope it might head towards them and they would be able to get involved.   
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5.1.1.2 Proactive Stop and Search by SNTs 
Proactive efforts for SNTs focused on persistent problems in the community, and were 
often focused on a specific location or individual. However, like their RT counterparts, 
SNT officers were empowered to conduct proactive stop and searches while in the 
community. That said, SNT foot patrols rarely involved stop and search as 
communication and community interaction was prioritised over enforcement by most 
of the SNT Sergeants. The view expressed by Sergeants I encountered was that stop 
and search was the easiest way to lose the cooperation of community, and that a 
friendly chat could obtain much of the same information a search could. Being a 
community police officer challenged officers who had often spent much of their career 
under the dominant paradigm of action and mission that guided RT officers. Many of 
the SNT officers expressed a sense of pride in providing what they felt was a more 
substantive resource to the community than they experienced as RT officers, but were 
often quick to follow such a sentiment with the reassurance that they would still 
exercise their policing powers if they felt it warranted while conducting community 
policing activities.  
 
…I’m a community police Sergeant, so I manage a community, which is 
Blackburn ward, but at the same time I also am a police officer and I police 
that ward and I have borough responsibilities and general responsibilities. 
So to be honest, I am a police officer, however, I still go out and if I think 
someone’s a robbery suspect or you know other criminal, I [am] still going 
to stop and search them or deal with them, I’m not going to stop doing that 
because I’m a community police officer. However, I do deal with a lot 
more community issues than the [RT] team obviously would ever get 
involved with. (Sgt Richard, Blackburn SNT) 
 
In addition, many foot patrols were conducted by PCSOs without a supporting PC. 
PCSOs are not able to conduct a search, so if they come across a situation where they 
suspect someone has contraband on them, they must detain the individual and wait for 
a PC to arrive on scene. Given the time it can take to walk across the borough, PCSOs 
were not keen to wait around for 15 minutes with an often unwilling civilian.  The 
obvious question is, ‘why doesn’t a PCSO contact a highly mobile RT officer to come 
and assist?’ They did on one or two occasions when they spotted suspects from a 
recent robbery, but felt unable to detain them. In both instances, the inability of the 
PCSO’s to follow proper radio procedures or the directions of the PCs coordinating the 
convergence of supporting units contributed to the failure to apprehend the suspects. 
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RT officers were likely to ignore requests for support from SNTs unless they were tied 
to an incident they were handling, and it was rare that an SNT would find itself 
involved developing situations. While they operated over the same radio channels, it 
was rare that RT and SNT teams communicated directly via the radio. 
 
While many RT officers stopped people who they deemed suspicious in the brief 
moments they drove past, SNT officers had much longer to identify an individual 
while walking, and often already knew many of the individuals in their ward. They 
were less inclined to engage in activities that harassed local residents whose 
confidence they were trying to improve. This was evident in the way local RT and 
local SNT handled boys from Knottington estate. The RT officers knew the boys, and 
would search them if they saw them congregating or if a theft was reported in the 
general vicinity. During these interactions, the boys often challenged the authority of 
the officers. RT officers often responded to such situations by becoming stern and 
reasserting their authority. For example, after losing a suspect during a foot chase 
through the Knotting, several of the regular boys assembled near the scene and began 
mocking the RT officers who had been unable to keep up with the spritely suspect. As 
I stood catching my breath I watched two RT officers from another unit start yelling 
back at the boys that they would be searched and/or arrested for aiding the suspect’s 
escape if they didn’t get their, ‘chubby, pre-pubescent asses off my god-damn streets’ 
(unknown officer, Watling). SNT officers reacted very differently to taunts from the 
boys. 
 
During one visit to the local after-school club on the Knottington estate, SNT officers 
came across a dozen pre-teens. One of the boys, who had just arrived on a customized 
scooter, started to mock the officers as they were speaking to the woman who ran the 
after-school club. He made lewd gestures towards the officers, asking one: “Do you 
polish your Sergeant’s balls in the station? I bet when you bend over to tie your boots 
the Sergeant checks out your bum. Does he ever grab it and tell you you’re pretty?”  
Instead of engaging in banter with the young man, Sgt Steve and PC Clarke ignored 
him and the boy quickly lost interest, going back to showing off his scooter to the 
other children. Later, Sgt Steve commented, “Yeah, he thinks he’s a tough kid, but 
he’s harmless really if you don’t play his game. He gets into stuff now and then, but 
frankly he ends up looking like a fool when he tries to show off.” This display of 
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disrespect would likely have met a more confrontational response from RT officers, 
possibly even arrest under Section 5 of the Public Order Act111. Sgt Steve lamented 
that while it was tempting to search the young man he knew that reacting to the boy 
would undermine the larger goals he had in the community. As he pointed out, his 
priorities did not list, ‘searching mouthy young men’.  
 
5.1.1.3 Checks 
Foot patrols sometimes had a destination, or at least stopping off points that required 
attention. A responsibility of SNTs was to attend to local residents who had been 
victims of crime or were otherwise involved in incidents. Officers would check on 
victims or visit estates to ensure repairs had been conducted on damages during a 
break-in. Officers would also drop in on residents who had reported a problem. These 
could range from one-off problems such as reports of a suspicious person lurking in 
the neighbourhood, or more persistent problems such as noisy youths. One woman in 
the Bunsen Terrace ward called the SNT’s mobile regularly to complain about young 
men urinating in an alley near her flat. The checks provide a connection to the local 
residents, in part because of the direct access to officers that community members have 
via the team’s mobile phone.  
 
We get a lot of phone calls off a lot of residents because obviously they’ve 
all got our mobile number for the team or our email box, so we get emails 
off loads of people from top to bottom on the whole ward; which is quite a 
big ward. Plus we have our reassurance visits, victims of crime, etc. so ye 
we do speak to, or the team speaks to a lot of people on a daily basis. It’s 
really good. (Sgt Richard, Blackburn SNT) 
 
The information for every SNT in London is posted to the MPS website, and includes 
the names and photos of team members, their contact information, and a digital copy 
of their current priorities. In addition, the information is automatically tagged on the 
Home Office crime mapping website, http://maps.met.police.uk/, so people looking for 
information about crime in their neighbourhood can immediately find out about their 
local SNT.  
                                                 
111 Section 5 of the POA states that, “A person is guilty of an offence if he uses threatening, abusive or 
insulting words or behaviour", and officers would on occasion use this to arrest someone swearing at 
them in public. In January 2013, the House of Lords voted to remove the word ‘insulting’ from the 
legislation in response to a campaign by comedians in the wake of several high-profile arrests (The 
Guardian, January 14, 2013) 
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Particular emphasis is placed on the reassurance role after a major incident has taken 
place in a neighbourhood. SNT officers were are able to visit residents and inform 
them about what happened, preventing the spread of rumours and reassuring the public 
that police were taking action. “It’s quite valuable to knock on doors, speak to local 
people, let them know why there were five IRVs on the corner the other night” (PCSO 
Ted, Blackburn SNT). Providing clear accounts to the community about what officers 
are doing is key to improving community confidence (Hohl, Bradford, and Stanko 
2010) and teams are expected to deliver a, “…minimum set of justice information that 
should be proactively communicated to the public on a regular basis in a medium that 
is accessible for all” (Home Office 2010f, pg. 34). However, I observed that many of 
these reassurance visits were focused on finding information on suspects, not 
informing the public about the details of an incident.  
 
5.2 Partnerships: The Community and Other Public Agencies 
In addition to communicating with residents, community policing efforts are 
predicated on the idea that the police should partner with local residents, community 
organisations, and public services. 
  
Making a reality of neighbourhood policing requires a genuine partnership 
between Government, the police service, police authorities, local councils 
and other partners responsible for community safety; and with local people 
themselves having a role. (Home Office 2005c, pg. 9)  
 
The partnerships are seen to operate in conjunction with traditional police powers, not 
alone. “The use of proactive enforcement tactics in combination with alternative 
methods of crime prevention permits the weaknesses of certain approaches to be 
counter-acted by the strengths of others” (Jacobson 1999, pg. vi).  Jacobson is pointing 
out that adaptive activities are seen to provide a way of bolstering police efforts by 
improving the deployment of crime fighting tactics. Much of the organizational effort 
away from street-level is focused on inter-agency partnerships, not direct interaction 
with residents (a job left to the SNTs).  This emphasis on partnerships can be seen in 
the development of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) as part of the 
Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 (CDA) (Hughes and Rowe 2007). The goal of the 
partnerships was to bring together police, local authorities, and other agencies to 
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produce an audit of local crime problems, consult local communities, determine 
priorities, and formulate a strategy to tackle these problems (Phillips et al. 2002). The 
Government allocated £400 million to support the formation of such partnerships, 
which helped to create 376 partnerships within two years. While primarily focused on 
bridging communication gaps between public bodies, businesses and local groups are 
often involved in the partnerships as well (Phillips et al. 2002).  
 
CDRPs may be joined with Drug and Alcohol Action Teams (DAATs) (Home Office 
2005d), which were developed to bring together all local agencies involved in 
addressing substance misuse. This includes Police, Primary Care Trusts, local 
authorities, probation service, social services, youth services, and other municipal 
groups. The Watling DAAT set its 2009/10 goals as, increasing access to effective 
treatment, increasing engagement with problematic drug users, ensuring safety of 
service users, ensuring best value for money, and reducing the level of substance 
misuse112.  
 
In addition to CDRP and DAT partnerships, the Government also created Local 
Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Local Criminal Justice Boards113 (LCJBs), with each 
one following a separate annual review process (Home Office 2007b). LSPs are not 
solely focused on criminal justice issues, and in Watling the LSP has five thematic 
sub-LSPs, including one each for economic strategy, housing strategy, public safety 
(for criminal justice matters), environmental strategy, and children and families114.  
LCJBs were developed to bring together criminal justice agencies in a local area to 
effectively deliver their services, and to take the lead in delivery of Public Service 
Agreements (PSAs) (Lcjp 2008). By creating such partnerships, it was hoped that the 
multiple agencies covering everything from youth offending to imprisonment and 
parole –more than 14 organisations in the case of London- would cease conducting 
their work in a ‘silo’ mode, and coordinate their efforts more efficiently. The London 
LCJB defines its role in delivering a connection to the community in very general 
terms, claiming to have:  
 
                                                 
112 Watling 2010/11 Substance Misuse Needs Assessment 
113 London’s LCJB is referred to as the London Criminal Justice Partnership (LCJP) 
114 Watling Council documents. 
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 …excellent work with communities such as in schools, panels with the 
community and activities based in the court for the public such as open 
days and mock trials. All boroughs also have Safer Neighbourhood Teams 
and Community Payback. (Lcjp 2008, pg. 8) 
 
And therein lays the problem. These high-level partnerships  appeared to operate to 
produce strategy across an area, limiting their direct involvement with community 
members.  They are essentially bureaucratic groups that meet in order to meet statutory 
requirements and receive funding allotments. Community involvement is often seen as 
a mechanism for delivering policy, not shaping it or deciding on allocation of funds 
(Shiner et al. 2004). The direct involvement of the community happens well away 
from the bureaucratic discussion of targets, funding distribution or strategy 
development. No discernible path exists between the discussions in a Ward Panel 
meeting and the decision processes of the LCJB. Meetings for various partnerships and 
the community dominate the schedule of the SNTs of Watling, yet are mentioned only 
once within the entirety of the LCJP 2008-2011 plan (Lcjp 2008). Whether inadvertent 
or deliberate, the disconnect between community and LCJB may not impede their 
continued use as people have tended to report liking the idea of partnerships, but were, 
“unconcerned with the mechanics of local partnerships; they were more interested in 
the outcomes” (Charlton, Morton, and Ipsos Mori 2009, pg. 2). 
 
5.2.1 Working in the Community 
As well as conducting foot patrols and engaging in proactive interventions, SNT 
officers were responsible for meeting with members of their ward. Every SNT held a 
Ward Panel meeting every two months, but there were also informal meetings in 
coffee shops, meetings with Tenants and Residents’ Associations, street briefings, and 
a variety of one-off events. These meetings fit under the heading of ‘partnerships’ 
because they involved listening to community members about issues in the 
neighbourhood. Formal meetings required officers to report on their activity and 
receive new priorities for the next two months. Other meetings were simply ‘gripe 
sessions’ where, “…we have to listen to women complain about rubbish collection115” 
(PC Sam, Blackburn SNT). While the officers were generally taking in information 
from the community, they also informed the community of their activities and 
                                                 
115 While officers regularly used derisive terms to describe suspects, PC Sam seemed to be describing 
complaints with actual rubbish collection. 
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perceptions of local problems. By communicating accurate information during 
partnership events, SNTs sought to bridge the gap between perception of crime and 
actual crime levels (Tuffin, Morris, and Poole 2006, Tuffin 2006), with a view to 
providing reassurance. 
 
5.2.1.1 Ward Panel Meetings 
Public consultation to identify local priorities is an important part of COP (Mastrofski, 
Worden, and Snipes 1995, Ren et al. 2005, Skogan 2006b, Qureshi 2007, Home Office 
2007a, Myhill and Quinton 2010, Crawford and Evans 2012).  Citizen panels give the, 
“greatest chance of reaching a range of demographic groups across diverse 
communities” (Rix et al. 2009, pg. 2). However, the demands of these panels may be 
based on the community members’ own fears, not sober judgment of the crime 
problems facing the community (Loader 2006). Though many policy documents refer 
to the groups as Neighbourhood Panels, they are commonly referred to as Ward Panels 
by the SNTs because they are meant to represent the entirety of a London ward, not 
just a particular estate or neighbourhood116. These meetings are the most prominent 
and formal meetings regularly organised by the SNTs. In consultation with the local 
SNT, Ward Panels help decide priorities for the area and are intended to include a 
range of local residents on the panel, though their meetings are often closed to the 
general public117. Each SNT recruited their panel differently, but none appeared to 
have a set mechanism. In Brunel Gardens’ Ward Panel, the aforementioned security 
manager sat on the panel along with a few business owners and local people. Though 
Brunel Gardens had several large estates, it appeared that only one person was from 
the estates. In all three SNTs, it was the respectable populations that were allowed on 
to the panels (Crawford 1999). 
 
 
 
                                                 
116 In London the SNTs operate based on specific wards, but the size of a Neighbourhood Panel may be 
different in other areas, leading to the more general term being used in policy documents. We will use 
both interchangeably in this research.  
117 Guidance from the MPS on how to effectively run a Neighbourhood Panel stipulates that the 
meetings should be closed to the public in order to keep the meetings focused on reviewing the data at 
hand and determining priorities for the team. They likened this to the services of a jury, where the panel 
listens to evidence and make decisions based on that (MPS 2011d). 
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This panel should be made up of local people whose role is to assess the 
local concerns, identified through community engagement and analysis, 
and establish priorities for policing in the Safer Neighbourhood area. The 
panel gives direction and local advice to the Safer Neighbourhood team, 
although some priorities will require partner to take the lead. (MPS 2011d, 
pg. 2) 
 
All three SNT Sergeants I worked with prepared diligently for their Ward Panel 
meetings, carefully compiling information on tasks they performed over the last two 
months and metrics of the ward’s safety. “It’s an important meeting for us, obviously, 
and we need to come prepared to show them that we’re meeting their targets” (Sgt 
Richard, Blackburn SNT).Whereas other community-based interactions focused on 
local crime problems, Ward Panel meetings were mainly about prioritization. SNTs 
were expected to update the group on the progress of each priority. Although the panel 
can set priorities, it has no official say on the tactics used to carry out these priorities. 
Whereas some community interactions focus on shaping police responses (see the 
discussion on Community Monitoring Groups below), Ward Panels build consensus 
amongst community representatives about whom or what the police should target.   
 
Sgt Reggie seemed both excited by, and dreadful of his Ward Panel meetings. He 
fretted and was nervous leading up to the meeting, but became filled with energy as we 
approached the venue. At the first meeting I attended, located in a small multi-purpose 
room on the ground floor of a sprawling tower block, Reggie brought sandwiches. We 
carried in two trays of sandwiches while the young children using the space before us 
packed up their finger-paints. The panel, comprised mostly of older white women, was 
chatting as we came in. Reggie’s arrival started a well-choreographed routine - women 
moved chairs, prepped food, made tea, and ushered out the last of the children.  Within 
minutes, we were seated and Sgt Reggie discussed his team’s activities and successes 
over the previous two months. Once his presentation was over, Sgt Reggie listened to 
the women discuss problems they were witnessing in the area.  
 
A common complaint from the women was that young people were engaging in anti-
social activities. Whether it was peeing on fences or riding bicycles on the sidewalk, 
these complaints seemed quite personal. In general, they did not address the problems I 
witnessed while patrolling with officers. For example, the neighbourhood had several 
violent robberies in the days leading up to the meeting. The ladies on the panel did not 
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seem to see that side of the community. Reggie took it all in, smiling, providing 
reassurance, and managing to set three priorities the team would focus on. In the end, 
two of the priorities were ones he had suggested, including a focus reducing robberies.   
Bunsen Terrace also had bigger concerns to deal with, and Sgt Reggie was not about to 
let the panel ignore problems they themselves were not party to. He would 
acknowledge the issues being reported by the panel members, but try to remind them 
of larger problems in the neighbourhood. With a bit of horse trading he would often be 
able to ensure that the complaints of the panel members and the needs of the 
community made it on to the priorities list.  
 
SNTs are judged by MPS managers on their performance in regards to the priorities 
agreed by the Ward Panels, not on whether the correct problems have been prioritized 
by the panel. Such important decisions require that the panel duly consider the 
information presented to them, and a Panel Head is often selected to help disseminate 
information prior to the meeting. The Head may also work with the SNT’s Sergeant to 
identify concerns to bring to the attention of panel members at the next meeting.  
 
The structure of the Ward Panels can vary. Some wards have a powerful and dynamic 
chairperson, with a structured meeting and set list of panel members. Other panels 
have an ever-changing roster of participants. I was able to become a voting member of 
my local Ward Panel by simply emailing the SNT Sergeant and attending a meeting. I 
did not mention my research with the MPS or even my research focus118. In these 
loosely organized panels, there are regulars who show up each time, and a slew of 
part-timers who come as and when their availability suits. For Brunel Gardens SNT, I 
only recognized two participants at the two meetings I attended – one was the security 
manager. The MPS views the ideal size of a panel as 10 to 15 people, but the Bunsen 
Terrace panel often has five or six, and Brunel Gardens rarely attracts more than eight 
members. Failure to participate in the Ward Panels and other outreach efforts is a 
general problem affecting neighbourhood policing (Bullock and Leeney 2013) and has 
been identified as a concern by the Home Office (Home Office 2010e). 
 
                                                 
118 Several MPS staff members that I corresponded with during this research have joined their local 
Ward Panel.   
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Inconvenient meeting times and meeting location affected attendance at Ward Panel 
meetings. The Blackburn SNT covered two distinct neighbourhoods. One was a 
predominantly working class white neighbourhood, and the other was part of 
Farmingham, a predominantly black neighbourhood. Sgt Richard reported that the 
residents did not want to attend Ward Panel meetings in the other’s neighbourhood, so 
he would alternate the location of his meetings. Though he had one ward to look after, 
Sgt Richard had actually created two communities to respond to. Both crime trends 
and demographics, excluding ethnicity, were quite similar in each area. Nonetheless, 
the panel alternated locations to avoid having only one part of the ward decide their 
priorities.  
 
Having a select group of individuals represent a ward, with no defined structure to 
ensure balanced representation for all individuals, affects efforts to ensure 
neighbourhood participation in policing (Crawford 1999). At the Bunsen Terrace panel 
meetings, the members were all above 50 years of age, white, and female - a far cry 
from the young, poor, and multicultural neighbourhood around them.  Their view of 
crime and policing may have been radically different than community members unable 
to participate (Bogdanor 2009). Instead of assessing the information provided to them 
by Sgt Reggie, they mainly complained about what was wrong with the 
neighbourhood. As a result, cycling on the sidewalk was regularly made a priority. In 
order to have figures to show the panel at their next meeting, Sgt Reggie had to have 
officers ticket anyone they caught inappropriately cycling. Though he was not fond of 
putting his resources to that end, Sgt Reggie lamented, “…that is what they want 
prioritised, and so that is what my goal is.” (Bunsen Terrance SNT). By acquiescing to 
that demand, he was able to placate the panel enough to get anti-social behaviour 
prioritised despite their other concerns. 
 
The SNT Sergeants had to strike a fine balance between providing information to the 
panel, and also inviting contributions from panel members. Each Sergeant knew what 
priorities they wanted to have by the end of the meeting, and could ensure 
prioritization of at least one or two of these through the deft use of charm and 
authority. The Sergeant would often invoke his expertise on crime fighting to convince 
the panel to agree with him. Luckily for the Sergeants, those attending the meeting 
were often ‘pro-police’, and provided they felt their priorities were reached by 
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consensus, it was possible to include an officer’s suggestions. Sgt Reggie got robberies 
on his priorities list because he explained the impact the robberies had on their victims, 
and insinuated that the community was at risk if his team was not given the 
opportunity to do something. A good SNT Sergeant would essentially make the panel 
meetings an echo chamber. Sgt Reggie reported a crime problem, made the women on 
the panel feel it was an issue of importance, and then let them say that the problem was 
concerning. Once this was done, all he had to say was, ‘let’s do something about it’.  
 
I realize the description of what occurred in this situation could make Sgt Reggie look 
like a sinister manipulator of old-age pensioners. I did not see the situation in that 
light. Sgt Reggie had previously spoken of his concern that the panel was not 
representative of the area, and wanted to ensure he could work on issues affecting 
more than the small group at the panel. As he put it, “The panel isn’t the whole 
neighbourhood, and we’re here for everyone” (Sgt Reggie, Bunsen Terrace SNT). He 
seemed to keep access to the panel quite limited to the regular group of women. In 
doing so, he was playing a risky game. He kept out people who could disrupt the 
smooth running of his panel, but he knew he wasn’t hearing the full community’s 
voice. His way of balancing the limited scope of concerns presented by the pensioners 
was to ensure he brought other problems to the table.   
 
5.2.1.2 Events 
As part of their efforts to increase community confidence, SNTs also held events in the 
community. These often involved services well removed from normal policing 
activities. One such tactic was the ‘Carrot Bus’, which was a modified school bus 
fitted out with computers and gaming consoles. Officers took the bus to a school or 
community centre and let young people play video games and interact with the 
officers. By itself, the ‘Carrot Bus’ only attracted a small amount of interest. While PC 
Hugh was on secondment to Bunsen Terrace SNT, he sought to improve these events 
by partnering with the community. Working with the Tenants and Residents 
Association from a local estate, they arranged for food, a DJ, and a bouncy castle to 
help get a, “street-party going on” (PC Hugh, RT4). He would provide the Carrot Bus, 
some additional officers, and funding from the MPS:  
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I got something like 400 people to turn up, and I built for my event, I 
ended up building reassure [sic] to people in that area where I worked. I 
may not have got much drugs off the streets, but I started to build 
relationships with people in that community. It wasn’t going to be one of 
those things where you turn up, everyone can see you and we will all be 
happy within a week; its long term. You need to show people that you’re 
there for them and like, you may not be straight away getting the results 
you want, but people need to know that from the very beginning they can 
trust police for a start. (PC Hugh, RT4) 
 
At another event, Sgt Reggie arranged for several MPS vehicles to attend an open 
house at a local school. Photographs of the event showed bomb squad vehicles, 
motorcycles, police dogs, and RT cars arrayed in a half-circle in the school’s car park, 
with officers and young people chatting. He smiled throughout his explanation of how 
changing the context of the interaction between young people and officers ensured that 
both groups could come to understand each other better if given the opportunity to 
interact119.  
 
SNT Officers also attended events they did not arrange. For example, Sergeant Reggie 
and his team were asked to attend a meeting of local Somali groups. Sgt Reggie told 
me the Somali community had noticed young people turning to crime, and were also 
concerned about a brewing conflict between two local groups of Somali men. The SNT 
was asked to attend the meeting, not to resolve the situation, and to provide guidance 
and information. This suited the team well as they were able to note their involvement 
to their superiors and also emphasise the need for community groups to take crime-
reducing actions in their neighbourhood.  
 
5.2.1.3 Tenants and Residents Meetings 
Each housing estate has a Tenant and Residents Association (TRA) comprised of local 
residents. They are consulted by the local authority on matters affecting their 
community, are represented on local housing forums, and receive money from the 
local authority to conduct events120. The groups meet on a monthly or bimonthly basis, 
and the local SNT attends to consult about local policing priorities. The group does not 
set priorities for the local team, as that is the responsibility of the Ward Panel. 
                                                 
119 RT officers were known to do this as well. PC George took the RT car to do a show-and-tell at his 
daughter’s kindergarten class.  
120 Watling guide to Tenant and Resident Associations 
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However, complaints from a TRA will often lead the SNT to make recommendations 
about priorities for the estate when they next meet with the Ward Panel.  
 
As each TRA focuses on a small part of the ward and is comprised of individuals 
living within the area, they tend to have a clear idea of what is happening in the 
community. Even if their problems do not make the priorities disseminated from the 
Ward Panel, they will often push their SNTs to act in accordance with their needs. In 
each of the three wards observed during this research, the TRAs were able to maintain 
influence through several means. First, they would often have a representative on the 
Ward Panel. If not, they would demand action of SNT officers attending the TRA 
meeting, stalling progress on agenda items until SNT officers assured the issue would 
be brought to the Ward Panel. Failing that, they pressured SNTs by contacting local 
politicians. In Brunel Gardens, the TRA for the Knottington estate was in direct and 
regular contact with Sgt Steve in order to find out when he would be taking action to 
deal with their issues. In order to minimize the extra work121, the SNT Sergeants were 
keen to include TRA requests when crafting local priorities with the Ward Panel. As 
they were measured on the success of their responses to Ward Panel priorities, any 
additional actions diminished their ability to achieve these goals, and placed additional 
work on the already stretched teams.   
 
The TRA at Knottington estate was the most active of the TRAs served by the SNTs I 
worked with.  Their meetings were held in a dimly lit ground floor common room. 
When we arrived, PC Clarke, Sgt Steve, and I unstacked chairs and put up a long table 
at the front of the room. The meeting started on time, with about 11 attendees present 
in addition to the TRA President, TRA Secretary, SNT officers, and a representative 
from the local council. The focus of the meeting was young people and their anti-
social behaviour. Many residents complained about local youths who were allegedly 
doing everything from tipping over plants to breaking windows. “You need to take 
some action, control these lads, get them back in line” (TRA attendee). Sgt Steve 
spoke about partnership with the council, the schools, and providing after-school 
resources. He tried to reassure the room that action would be taken, but emphasized 
                                                 
121 The SNTs would have to divert resources away from their official priorities to assist with the 
additional problems, and the team would not get credit for effectively meeting this additional problem as 
it does not appear on their priorities list.   
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there were shared responsibilities requiring action beyond what policing alone could 
accomplish. Some seemed content with this idea, but others asked about enforcement, 
arrests, and ASBOs. Sgt Steve was used to handling such situations. He cited the 
increase in patrols and searches in the area, the fall in crime over the last year, and the 
need for the local residents to keep informing him of problems. 
 
At these meetings, Sgt Steve had to create space for his team to be seen as effective 
authority figures. An older man approached me after one TRA meeting and told me 
that he came to the meetings to make sure the police, “get off their asses and take care 
of the local problems” (TRA attendee). At a Ward Panel, Sgt Steve was in control, but 
here he was trying to win the residents over to his way of doing things. 
Simultaneously, he was trying not to overstep his reach in a group where he did not 
have any real authority or power beyond those generally entrusted to him as a police 
officer.  
 
Sgt Steve told me that a previous TRA President had been forced out for being seen as 
too ‘pro-police.’ As a result, each interaction with the group was thoroughly 
strategized in advance. Not all TRAs operated with tension, but it often felt like the 
SNT was coming in to someone else’s territory. While the SNTs were generally 
welcomed by the TRA leadership, the assembled residents often stayed away from 
officers. The officers were aware of their outsider status at these meetings, and 
appeared to make a special effort to engage with people if they had the opportunity. 
 
5.2.1.4 Street Briefings 
Once a week, the members of Blackburn SNT set up a public meeting point on the 
street or in a park and waited for people to talk to them. They expressed some 
misgivings about this approach:  
 
I have done street briefings nearly three years in Watling and nearly two 
years [in] Wilkeston and never had one person come up to me on the street 
briefing to talk about anything, yet we have to do them because that’s what 
the senior management team want because it worked in some little flowery 
village part of the Metropolis. (PC Sam, Blackburn SNT) 
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In order to generate more direct communication, the team went door-to-door to ask 
people if they had any problems. This proved less fruitful than anticipated, and few 
people wanted to speak with the officers and PCSOs. 
 
Brunel Gardens SNT had also adapted their street briefings process in an attempt to 
increase interaction with residents. At least once a month, Sgt Steve and another 
member of the team set up a meeting point at one of several Starbucks stores in the 
ward. They would post a notice in the store a week before and list the visit on their 
webpage, but few people came to see them. Given the two locations they frequently 
visited were next to office buildings, many customers were from outside areas and not 
concerned with local crime issues. The SNT was able to provide guidance, but not 
directly assist with crime problems in their respective areas.  
 
5.2.2 Impacting the Community, Not Just the Individual 
An important attribute of SNTs is their ability to have impact on a scale much larger 
than other units. While RTs responded to individual calls for assistance, SNTs tackled 
issues that affected the community. As described by Sergeant Richard:  
 
Response team, as I said, you just deal…you turn up and you deal with a 
situation; whereas Safer Neighbourhood’s you basically take ownership of 
an issue… It could be very minor but having the potential to escalate, and 
if you’re not there to nip it in the bud it can cause, major issues can 
happen, which would not necessarily impact on that party but would 
impact on the community…More people get involved and more response 
calls will come from because more incidences will start happening. Also, 
with Safer Neighbourhood’s it’s not just policing,  you know you’re 
working with your partners and a lot of issues you can resolve through 
other methods than policing, but you get the right people involved to deal 
with it and you can nip a lot of situations in the bud straight away.  
(Sgt Richard, Blackburn SNT) 
 
The focus on wider community issues prompted SNTs to view crime problems 
differently from their RT counterparts. For example, a string of robberies in the area 
generated different responses from different units. While CID investigated robberies, 
and RTs kept an eye out for suspected vehicles or culprits, the SNTs held reassurance 
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events, including property marking events122 and distributing information on staying 
safe from robbers. They might also deploy more patrols along at-risk areas, or speak 
with locals to gather intelligence. Their interventions largely focused on community 
outreach, but their ability to deploy police powers was always still available if needed. 
Their actions were not necessarily about solving the crime, but about making the 
community feel less threatened.  
 
The borough itself has not got a nice reputation really, it never really has, 
but [we] try and make it as nice as possible because thousands of people 
live here, going about their daily lives, bringing up their children… 
(PC Clarke, Brunel Gardens SNT) 
 
5.2.3 Partnering With the Community to Discuss Stop and Search 
To ensure police retained legitimacy and confidence in the eyes of the community, 
police addressed the problems surrounding Stop and Search. This practice has been 
identified as a key point of conflict between the two groups (MPS 2012a, HMIC 2013, 
Miller 2010). Based on recommendations from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 
(Macpherson 1999), the MPS and MPA developed the Stop and Search Community 
Network. Like all London boroughs, Watling developed a Stop and Search 
Community Monitoring Group (CMG) as part of the Stop and Search Community 
Monitoring Network (CMN).  
 
The role of CMGs are to act as independent overseers of local police 
functions at borough level; examine any apparent unfairness in the way 
they operate; and to hold their local commanders and officers accountable 
on policies and practices so as to assist in driving down disproportionality. 
This also includes supporting police officers through sharing of best 
practice such as the development and engagement in stop and search 
borough initiatives.  Effective groups are not exclusive and should reflect 
their local community/borough diverse population to ensure a fair voice for 
all. (MPA 2009, pg. 3) 
 
The CMG meets four times a year, and the meeting is often attended by the borough’s 
Superintendent for Community, Partnership and Criminal Justice. At Watling, several 
                                                 
122 A property marking event involved officers ‘painting’ invisible liquid on to an object such as a 
phone, laptop, or bicycle. The liquid contained a unique code that could only be seen and read by 
equipment available to police. In this way, it was hoped that stolen items could be recovered and 
returned to victims more easily. There was some deterrence effect if people displayed a sticker on the 
device notifying would-be thieves that the device was marked, but few people used the tags.   
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Sergeants, a few members of a Territorial Support Group, SNT officers, and very 
occasionally a PC or two from an RT were in attendance. There were also several 
community members on the panel. The group was chaired by Ms Brenda Griffin. A 
retiree, Brenda has worked for the council in a variety of community and criminal 
justice roles, and was a member of the Independent Monitoring Board, visiting 
Watling’s custody suites regularly to ensure they were following regulations. She 
focused much of her energy on the CMG, and was active in a variety of local volunteer 
criminal justice efforts.  Twice a year, Brenda invited youth groups to attend the 
meeting so they could shape discussion about stop and search.  
 
As per the requirements to implement a Section 60 in the borough, Brenda was 
supposed to be notified before one was put in place to ensure it was being used fairly. 
During her tenure, Watling had the second highest number of Section 60 
authorizations of any borough, averaging nearly 17 per month. She said she never 
interfered with a Section 60 request, and the only thing she wanted was for officers to 
implement Section 60’s borough-wide, not just on a postcode by postcode basis. Her 
argument was that a Section 60 authorization should affect everyone, not just people 
unlucky enough to live in a certain postcode. Brenda had a strong relationship with 
officers across the borough, and was seen to be ‘pro-police’. Largely, the meetings 
seemed to be empty gestures of accountability.   
 
At every CMG meeting I attended, there was a presentation about stop and search 
figures, and a discussion of what officers were doing to affect those numbers. For 
example, an operation targeting young people carrying weapons. The panel of 
community members did not tend to voice any strenuous objections to the information, 
and rarely even questioned the tactics. I seemed to be the only person other than 
Brenda taking notes at these meetings. I often noticed lower ranked officers in 
attendance appearing bored, staring at the ceiling, or swishing the last bits of tea 
around the bottom of their cups. One older member of the panel was vocal about his 
support and trust of the police, and clearly favoured more stops and searches of young 
people, in order to, “keep the rest of us safe from those kids.” (CMG Member). Brenda 
pushed officers to explain their actions, especially if there was a rise in the number of 
searches. However, she never appeared to inquire past their explanations. 
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The CMG meetings were designed to allow the community to shape stop and search 
practices after years of it engendering poor relationships between the community and 
the police. However, the CMG at Watling provided little critical scrutiny. The senior 
officers trumpeted how many stops there were in a given period, and could offer a 
positive explanation regardless of the numbers. Far from acting as overseers of the 
police and representing the wider community, the CMG–like many of the SNT Ward 
Panels- was made up of white people, over fifty years of age, who were supportive of 
the police and keen to ensure the safety of the community.  
 
Whenever young people were invited to share their views about stop and search, they 
raised the same issues; they were tired of being searched regularly with spurious 
justifications, and felt that many of the officers were rude, aggressive, and dismissive 
of their requests to be treated with respect. The officers often responded that the young 
people were probably being searched because they fit a suspect description. Further, if 
they were polite to officers they would be treated well themselves. On one occasion, a 
15 year old black teenager read a moving poem about his frustration at being searched 
regularly. He had been searched five times the previous week. He had been compliant 
the first two times, but became increasingly frustrated with each search and the 
perceived disrespect from the officers. After delivering a highly emotional poem to a 
room of strangers and senior officers, a TSG Sergeant, the only black police officer in 
the room, told him that if he was polite to the officers, the searches would not seem so 
bad, and would be completed more quickly. This was a message regularly given to 
young people.  
 
On one occasion, I went with Sergeant Harry to the basement of a local church where 
he was going to deliver an outreach programme to a youth group.  The youth group 
had come to a CMG meeting a few months earlier, and I recognised several of them 
from previous stop and searches. The twelve boys were all from Watling, south Asian, 
and between 12 and 18 years old.  
 
As we were heading to the meeting, Sgt Harry confided he had no idea what he was 
doing. “I’m just doing this for my [professional development review] so that I can tick 
off that I’ve done community engagement.” Sitting at the table strewn with crisp 
packets and soda bottles, he looked uncomfortable under the gaze of a dozen sets of 
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eyes. The boys seemed genuinely interested in his presence, but suspicious after 
having had numerous negative encounters with the police. As Harry started talking it 
became clear that this meeting was not about listening to the boys thoughts about stop 
and search. Instead, Harry spent a few minutes discussing the different powers that 
police have to stop and search, followed by an explanation of how the young people 
could avoid problems by consenting to a search and not arguing with officers. His 
argument boiled down to the fact that police were legally empowered to conduct 
searches and would continue to use those powers to fight crime. While the searches 
should be done with courtesy from both parties involved, the police were just doing 
their job and should be respected. This segment of the outreach was followed by a few 
minutes of role play where the boys took on the role of officer and civilian123 during a 
stop and search scenario. For the first scenario Harry asked the boy playing the 
‘civilian’ to mouth off to the officer.  
 
The boy playing the civilian role did so, and the situation quickly escalated to a 
shouting match as both teenagers tried to assert themselves. Harry paused the activity 
and explained how it could have gone much better if handled differently. By this, he 
did not mean the officer should have acted differently, but instead focused on how the 
‘civilian’ transformed a routine stop and search into an unnecessary incident. The boys 
tried to talk about how officers could treat them better, but this was cut off as Harry 
said he had to get back to street duties. When we were seated back in the IRV, he took 
a deep breath: “That went well. All done and dusted with that requirement”. Despite 
the talk of partnership, it seemed to me that Sgt Harry had only shown the boys that he 
was not part of their community and did not see them as equals. Talking to the head of 
the youth group at a community event several months later, I asked him about the 
event. The group leader, seemingly unsure as to my allegiance, politely said how 
enjoyable it had been before excusing himself. The incident illustrated the 
defensiveness of the police around stop and search, and how this shapes the 
community consultation process (Shiner 2010, Delsol and Shiner 2006). 
 
                                                 
123 The two PCs in the room were asked if they wanted to take part, but declined. They said a total of 
maybe 15 words between them during the course of the event.  
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When it came to partnering with the community to discuss stop and search, the reality 
fell far from the ideal posited by the MPA in their description of CMGs. Officers 
attended events, as did a small section of the community, but the meetings were largely 
rhetorical gestures, nodding in the direction of accountability in order to fulfil a 
requirement, rather than ensuring the police were held to account for their actions. This 
façade of accountability plagues the discussions of stop and search between the 
community and the police (Delsol and Shiner 2006). The topic of stop and search is so 
contentious that merely discussing how it is working is not an option at community 
meetings. Instead, the discussion is on hitting targets for positive search outcomes and 
reducing time spent conducting searches. If any problems with stop and search were 
acknowledged at all, they were assumed rectified by the fact that the officers were 
finding contraband at a slightly higher rate than they had the previous quarter. There 
was little evidence to support the latter half of the statement quoted below, taken from 
Watling’s Equality Impact Assessment for stop and search: 
 
The use of all powers has caused a great deal of concern and tension 
between the MPS and certain ethnic groups and still does on occasions, 
however, these concerns are often negated by community leaders 
interacting and engaging with the MPS at frequent meetings and steering 
groups. 
 
5.3 Proactive Enforcement and Interventions 
While community partnerships and a return to face-to-face interactions between 
civilians and the police featured prominently in community policing efforts, the vision 
of community policing also calls for proactive enforcement measures utilizing the 
officers’ police powers. The adaptive orientation of the SNTs mission was inflected by 
residual non-adaptive imperatives. Such non-adaptive imperatives may not entirely 
mirror their RT counterparts, but the rhetoric, effect, and policy statements supporting 
such action are strikingly similar. In one of the earliest pieces championing the 
development of the new Neighbourhood Policing initiatives, the Home Office 
emphasised the role of strong enforcement based tactics when discussing best-practices 
for the new teams. In this description, adaptive practices serve to make more efficient 
use of non-adaptive tactics. Citing work carried out by Cleveland police: 
 
The ‘Dealer a Day’ initiative aims to ensure at least one drugs search 
warrant is executed every day. Officers concentrate on lower level drugs 
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dealers who blight neighbourhoods with nuisance and criminal activity – 
and they rely, daily, on the information and intelligence they receive from 
communities themselves to target offenders. The police follow up this 
intelligence with high profile, uniformed enforcement action – supported 
by media coverage. And they provide local neighbourhoods with 
information about what action they’ve taken – giving advice and 
reassurance to residents. (Home Office 2005b, pg. 8) 
 
While long-term investigations of drug trafficking in Watling were conducted by the 
Drugs and Firearms Squad (DFS), and various CID squads conducted follow-up 
investigations in to serious crimes, SNTs were expected to help uncover problems in 
the community. Upon identifying harmful criminal behaviour, the SNT was often 
expected to act on it.  A major component of the 2007-2010 MPS Drug Strategy 
involved tackling ‘crack houses’. The need to target these locations was justified by 
their negative impact on the community, including an increase in acquisitive crime and 
fearfulness of residents (MPS 2007a). Because the focus was on the impact these 
houses had on communities, SNTs were tasked with taking down crack houses. By 
2009 the MPS Drugs Directorate felt the teams had been so successful at investigating 
and raiding crack houses that they dropped the priority from the 2010-2013 drug 
strategy, then under development. “We’re not even going to list crack houses in the 
next drug strategy because the SNTs have cleared up the problem so effectively. 
They’ve got the local intelligence to find and take down these places.” (Senior MPS 
Drugs Directorate officer)124      
 
Given that drug dealing was defined as an SNT priority, many of the proactive 
investigations undertaken by officers in these teams focused on drugs – primarily in 
the form of drug dealing and cannabis growing operations. Small time dealers who did 
not cause problems were not normally targeted, nor were large scale trafficking 
operations. Rather, the SNTs used local knowledge against mid-level dealers of Class 
A drugs and cannabis growing operations. Cannabis tends to be sold amongst peer 
networks, with only 6% of young cannabis users purchasing from an unknown seller 
(Duffy et al. 2008), so targeting these interactions would be difficult.  However, the 
pungent smell of a cannabis growing operation was easily detectable by officers during 
regular neighbourhood walks. Shortly before I started fieldwork, Blackburn SNT had 
                                                 
124 From (Bear 2009). The Drugs Directorate was unwilling to participate in the doctoral research, but 
several members from the DD were interviewed during fieldwork for my MSc. 
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raided a cannabis growing operation in a local estate that had been detected by officers 
on foot patrols. Over a process of several months, the team identified which property 
the smell was coming from, researched the flat’s power consumption125, and conducted 
a raid after obtaining a warrant. 
 
I was unable to observe a significant enforcement-based operation led by SNTs during 
my doctoral fieldwork, but did have the opportunity during fieldwork with the MPS in 
July of 2009. With this SNT in the borough of Mayne, I witnessed non-adaptive 
response to a local drugs market. The team had heard two years prior about a group of 
Somali youths who were dealing cannabis near the busy outdoor market in their ward. 
They had conducted a prolonged investigation using undercover surveillance, CCTV 
monitoring, and test-purchases to successfully prosecute the group. Those who had not 
received a custodial sentence were given a two-year ASBO banning them from the 
area. When I joined the team the bans had recently expired, and the group was back. 
This prompted officers to re-instigate the operation they had conducted two years 
earlier. Officers would monitor a bank of CCTVs located in a business that overlooked 
the areas where the group was selling cannabis, and would stop and search people after 
they were viewed purchasing the drugs. The officers would take a statement 
confirming where the people had bought the drugs, and use this information in 
conjunction with the CCTV to arrest the dealers after a few more weeks of 
observation. No attempt was made to work with partners in the community regarding 
this action, and the officers considered it to be a classic example of a well-run drugs 
sting. Most of the purchasers were either local people, or individuals who bought the 
cannabis and were apprehended on their way in to the tube to head home.   
 
One factor that influenced community officers to engage in enforcement-led activities 
was the need for ‘signal justice’(Casey 2008), providing “…visible and sometimes 
violent demonstrations of police power” (Dorn, Murji, and South 1992, pg. 97). Just as 
there are signal crimes that trigger fear of crime among residents living in an area, 
SNT officers felt they could combat this fear through visible, pronounced, and well-
                                                 
125 Indoor cannabis growing operations require powerful lighting systems to stimulate plant growth. 
These provide three potential give-aways during their use. The first is that the bright light will show 
through at night from a property, the second is a massive jump in power consumption at the location, 
and the third is a large heat signature that can be identified with thermal imaging.   
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trumpeted action. The idea was that nothing works as well to announce the arrival of 
officers as a battering ram and multiple police vehicles within a cordon of police tape.  
“If people see you take doors, they know you’re doing your job, and maybe they’ll 
give you a bit of intelligence next time you come round their estate” (PC Hugh, RT4). 
The intervention itself is quite powerful, but such action is only the first step of a 
process to provide results that can be shared with the public. The Casey report 
repeatedly calls for the police to deliver ‘straight facts’, “…so that  [the community] 
can see not just what problems are occurring but what steps are being taken to tackle 
them. (Casey 2008, pg. 66). In this way, it is theorized that additional crime will be 
deterred and law-abiding citizens will feel more confident to report problems if they 
believe enforcement action will be taken.  
 
While it has been shown that residents respond well to being given information 
regarding the actions of police (Jackson and Gray 2009, Hohl, Bradford, and Stanko 
2010), the Casey Report argues that informing residents about the punishment is more 
important than just informing them of the action taken. “… we got a strong sense that 
the public look to the Criminal Justice System to ensure above all else that criminals 
are punished for their crimes” (Casey 2008, pg. 45). Given this need for punishment, 
the review argued that information about how cases are proceeding against criminals 
should be shared with communities. Such information is now made available from 
SNTs during their communication with communities at local events, and has also been 
made available on the Government’s crime mapping system.  
 
The SNT faced several problems when organising long-term investigations. Firstly, the 
Ward Panel could change priorities. Time and energy spent developing intelligence 
and obtaining resources was wasted if the Ward Panel no longer felt the issue was a 
priority. This would not stop the SNT from acting, but the teams had to meet their 
panel’s priorities and had little resource to do anything additional. Secondly, the 
limited number of officers on each team meant that assistance from other units was 
often needed to increase capacity or investigatory know-how. For example, Blackburn 
SNT turned to borough-based CID officers when considering shutting down a known 
drug distribution point. The CID officer confirmed that it was a good target, but felt 
that mounting an operation to get a warrant would be too much work for too little 
payoff. As he was not interested in providing assistance, this effectively bought the 
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proposed operation to an end. Finally, SNTs did not operate at night. PCSOs were not 
allowed on streets after 10pm, and most SNT shifts had ended by that time. This made 
surveillance or active engagement in the night time economy difficult. In response, a 
‘Night-Time Economy Team’ (NTET) was formed for the borough and tasked with 
dealing with the associated anti-social behaviour (ASB). This team had interaction 
with the businesses associated with alcohol related ABS, but not the residents.  
 
A further difficulty with conducting proactive interventions based on enforcement-led 
tactics was that they had the potential to dominate the interconnected activities of the 
partners working with the police. At one meeting with borough-level youth workers in 
the spring of 2011, officers from Brunel Gardens SNT sat with workers from several 
agencies discussing how to impact the youth offending problems reported on the 
Knottington estate. While the meeting was held in the offices of the local authority, 
and chaired by a YOT worker, the police officers were clearly in charge. At the 
meeting, it became clear that their partners were paralyzed by bureaucratic managerial 
impediments and spending limits, and the police were the only ones able to offer 
activities against the offenders that fell within their already constrained budgets. This 
was premised on their ability to get their ward panel to prioritize the issue. The officers 
knew each young person discussed in the meeting, citing various interactions with 
them. Only two non-police individuals had regular contact with the group of 
problematic youngsters in the streets, giving the officers a privileged position from 
which to discuss tactics.  
 
Given their domination of the discussion and privileged information about the goings-
on at the street-level, officers took the lead in abating the actions of the youngsters 
through investigation and strict enforcement of the law. This is typical of the police 
approach to partnerships (Crawford 1999). The other agencies could offer support to 
young people and their families once they had entered the criminal justice system, but 
officers were the ones bringing them in. After the meeting, a member of the Youth 
Offending team mentioned with heavy policing efforts and fewer afterschool support 
programmes than ever, she was worried about what young people would get up to over 
the summer.  
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At the community level, enforcement-based activities sent a mixed message to the 
community. How could officers, who did not live in the community or take part in it 
outside their uniformed roles, claim to be both partners and law enforcers? It was 
already difficult when people were unable to distinguish the actions of different police 
units (Casey 2008).  For example, if community members see a drug raid and had not 
had regular contact with the local SNT, they have no way of knowing who was 
involved in the action. All they see is the display of force. It becomes even more 
confusing when the officers planning and executing these raids are the same ones who 
spend their time walking a beat through the courtyard of your estate the next day. How 
do you interact with someone who smiles at you one day as they walk past, and may be 
clad in body armour and fire-proof coveralls as they raid your neighbour the next day? 
 
5.4 Conclusion: Putting a New Façade on an Old Foundation? 
The central theme exhibited in this chapter is that, in contrast to RTs, the work of the 
SNTs is most immediately oriented along adaptive lines, but is inflected by residual 
non-adaptive imperatives. In fleshing out this idea, I have examined the centrality of 
foot patrol, the coproduction of policing, the nature of police community relations, the 
problematic construction of ‘community’ and the limited nature of police 
accountability.  
 
When discussing foot-patrols, I noted they were largely a symbolic action used to 
provide visibility of the officers, but with limited success, or even intention, to combat 
crime. Communication, not stop and search, was the primary activity engaged in 
during these patrols. When it came to working with the community, the SNTs had 
developed methods to ensure their Ward Panels were responsive to the needs of the 
SNT Sergeant while also feeling their suggestions were contributing to the direction of 
local policing efforts. These panels were unrepresentative of the wider community, but 
this fact was acknowledged and actively mitigated by some Sergeants in order to 
provide what they felt was the best service to the wider community. By pushing for the 
inclusion of what they believed to be the appropriate strategic targets, SNT Sergeants 
were highlighting the weakness of civilian oversight and the uninterrupted police focus 
on targeting crime through police enforcement. The COP activities that occurred 
outside the SNT structure lacked effective accountability mechanisms, and highlighted 
that community involvement was there to help deliver policy, not develop it (Shiner et 
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al. 2004). The actions of SNTs and COP activities in Watling exhibit the potential 
conflict for officers imbued with the power to use coercive force but also seek 
community guidance in order to justify using such powers. 
  
The problems observed in the COP efforts of Watling are not unheard of in the 
literature (Bullock and Leeney 2013, Sergeant 2008, Quinton and Tuffin 2007), and 
some argue these problems represent the inherent inability of policing to shed its 
nature as a violence-delivering machine on behalf of the state. “…‘community 
policing’ is best understood as the latest in a fairly long tradition of circumlocutions 
whose purpose is to conceal, mystify, and legitimate police distribution of non-
negotiable coercive force” (Klockars 1988, pg. 240). Klockars’ assertion is that COP is 
simply a new façade, or circumlocution for policing.  
 
I have not sought to argue such a staunch position in this chapter. I agree that the 
community policing efforts are an attempt to legitimize the place of police within the 
community after losing much of that legitimacy in the previous decades (Reiner 2010). 
But where Klockars (1988) sees the introduction of COP as a way of hiding policing’s 
true violent nature, I believe that COP is born out of desperation, not obfuscation. In 
light of the failed efforts of the state to abate crime through the traditional non-
adaptive efforts, something had to be done to secure the continued existence of 
policing. We cannot forget or deny that the deployment of SNTs was part of a larger 
reformation of the criminal justice system. In order to balance the expressive penal 
elements of criminal justice policy that won elections, adaptive reforms were needed to 
secure the continued functioning of the system. Stepping away from the ‘truncheon-
rattling rhetoric’ (Reiner 2010, pg. 139) when working with local communities allows 
officers to engage with those community and then shift responsibility to the wider 
policing family.  
 
With the SNTs in place, the march of non-adaptive practices could continue, and these 
new units could be co-opted in that endeavour while continuing to build legitimacy 
within the community. Though oriented towards adaptive lines, these teams were 
unable to break away from their base nature. Policing could never be fully harmonious 
with community members (Reiner 2010), but the two could work together. “While the 
most prominent measures of crime control policy are increasingly oriented towards 
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punitive segregation and expressive justice, there is, at the same time, a new 
commitment, especially at the local level, to a quite different strategy” (Garland 2001, 
pg. 17). This pressure to adhere to both local needs and to execute policing powers 
generates the most prominent example of structured ambivalence (Garland 2001) seen 
during this research. The SNT Sergeants were required to appease two radically 
different groups - their commanders and the community in which they work. This is in 
addition to their own sense of identity and mission that was imbedded when they 
became an officer. The conflicted requirements can be seen in government assessments 
of the goals of COP.  
 
Giving victims and witnesses the support and protection they need and 
providing strong advocacy for public concerns on crime should be the first 
test of a Government’s determination to tackle crime. Equal in importance 
should be the ability of frontline services that fight crime and deliver 
justice, to do so to the satisfaction of local communities. (Casey 2008, pg. 
19) 
 
Community policing has become a façade due to the paucity of true accountability 
measures and limitations for community members to affect changes to police practices. 
While initially designed to support the structural changes occurring in policing, the 
SNTs had become stuck between the old and new ways of policing. Their design, 
tactics, and partnership activities represent the very ideal of what the new COP was 
supposed to be as policing entered a new phase. But, like the RTs that find their non-
adaptive roles inflected with adaptive priorities, the SNTs are compelled to 
acknowledge and act upon both components of their identity. Now that I have set the 
context for the main thrust of policing efforts in Watling, the next chapter will examine 
the role of drugs for these teams dealing with their conflicted nature.  
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Chapter 6- A Cause for All Seasons: Street-Level Drugs Policing 
“This drug thing, this ain't police work. No, it ain't. I mean, I can send any 
fool with a badge and a gun up on them corners and jack a crew and grab 
vials. But policing? I mean, you call something a war and pretty soon 
everybody gonna be running around acting like warriors. They gonna be 
running around on a damn crusade, storming corners, slapping on cuffs, 
racking up body counts. And when you at war, you need a fucking enemy. 
And pretty soon, damn near everybody on every corner is your fucking 
enemy. And soon the neighbourhood that you're supposed to be policing, 
that's just occupied territory.” (Major Bunny Colvin, The Wire)  
 
“Thus those qualities which policemen have come to admire as constituting 
‘real’ police work are to be found in the work of the narcotics officer” 
(Skolnick 1966, pg. 120)  
 
The first thing I noticed was the battering ram. About the length of a man’s arm and 
twice as thick, with hand holds at the mid-point and rear, the battering ram leant 
against the van that would soon transport six RT officers and me on a drug raid. The 
ram had been repainted many times over the years with different colours, but at this 
stage in its career it looked worn. The paint had flecked off exposing different layers, 
leaving a patchwork of colours. The officers wore fireproof coveralls over protective 
plastic armour strapped all over their body. On top of the coveralls they fastened their 
bullet-proof vests. Several were giving the face shield of their helmet a quick clean 
before we boarded the van. . The officers were to hit a ground floor flat in a sprawling 
local estate where it was believed a significant cannabis distribution operation was 
functioning. Two adults and their two teenage sons were expected to be in residence, 
and both the teenagers were known to be ‘anti126’.  
 
Arriving at the estate just after 7 o’clock in the morning, we parked about 70 metres 
from the building and, as quietly as six officers in full riot gear can, quickly reached 
the front door of the flat and ‘stacked up’127. It was a quiet Tuesday morning, and the 
estate was coming alive with sounds of peoples’ morning routines.  With the sudden 
ferocity of a war cry the team started shouting, “Police! Search warrant! Stand clear of 
the door! Police! Search warrant!” The battering ram swung once, twice, and on the 
                                                 
126 Being ‘Anti’ was short for ‘anti-police’, a designation officers gave to people who had a bad attitude 
towards police. ‘Pro’ was not a term used by officers to designate police friendly groups.  
127 The officers lined up in a predetermined order, each having a specific role once the door was 
breached.  
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third time the door flew open as the wood of the door frame splintered.  The officers 
rushed in, continuing to yell as they charged. 
 
A thorough search of the premises found one small bag of cannabis, for which a 
cannabis warning form was issued. Additionally, a teenage neighbour who had begun 
arguing with the officers guarding the door of the flat was arrested under Section 5 of 
the Public Order Act for repeatedly swearing at the officers. The young man quickly 
identified that I was the only person not in uniform, and decided to direct a tirade at me 
as he was being dragged away. He started screaming about a ‘boat race’ and ‘kebab’.  
Thinking I had misheard, I later asked an officer what the young man had been yelling. 
Without any apparent concern the officer replied, “Oh that, it’s rhyming slang. He was 
saying he didn’t like your face and was going to stab you if he ever saw you again.” 
We packed up the carrier van and proceeded to the next site to be raided that day. After 
the second raid we had lunch, and then most of the officers changed back in to their 
uniforms and finished the shift in IRVs.   
 
This drug raid was a remarkable moment of the fieldwork, but is indicative of only a 
small part of drugs policing in Watling, let alone the policing activity of the teams I 
observed. It was one small raid, lasting only an hour, and netting neither drugs nor 
drug dealers. And yet the event was held on to, retold many times over cups of strong 
tea. It was ‘real policing’.  This chapter will focus on drugs policing by both RTs and 
SNTs, with comments on the large-scale efforts undertaken by specialist squads. Just 
as previous chapters used the ideas of bifurcation to help assess the roles of RTs and 
SNTs, this chapter will use the idea of bifurcation to help structure the examination of 
the place of drugs in street-level policing.  
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Figure 10: Increases in drug seizures per million population, 2001-2010/11 (Coleman 2011) 
 
Drugs policing is dictated by numerous pieces of official guidance. Some guidance is 
the end product of national level policies, some from the MPS, and some from local 
community concerns. Some of these guidelines retain the non-adaptive bite of which 
they were born in political pronouncements, while others bear distinctly adaptive 
elements. We can see this bifurcation in programs like Operation Hawk, which masses 
hundreds of officers to crack down on drug dealing, while at the same time programs 
like the cannabis Warning System (CWS) allow officers to give tickets for previously 
arrestable offences. Some of these policies require a tough-minded action-oriented 
police officer, and some call to a new kind of officer who specialises in community 
service instead of covert surveillance. Garland identifies this unintended overlap as 
part of the remnants of structural change.    
 
…a reconfigured complex of interlocking structures and strategies that are 
themselves composed of old and new elements, the old revised and 
reoriented by a new operational context, the newer elements modified by 
the continuing influence of working practices and modes of thought dating 
from the earlier period. (Garland 2001, pg. 23)  
 
In addition to exploring the adaptive/non-adaptive distinction, this chapter will identify 
what the role of drugs is in the working practices of street-level police officers not in a 
specialist drugs unit. I have already addressed many of the policy development issues 
in Chapter Two, and this chapter will primarily focus on the situation as it is 
experienced, not as it is written. The previous two chapters have given the reader some 
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insight in to the complexities of street-level policing in Watling. The pursuit of drugs 
in Watling is beset with numerous challenges, and often includes conflicting demands 
between personal feelings and professional responsibilities. While I have found two 
distinct rationales that help officers justify their activity, for most the issue exists as a 
useful but ultimately unfulfilling pursuit. Whether acting as ‘Warriors Against Harm’ 
or ‘Normative Order Warriors’, officers have given meaning to drugs work. I will 
show that adaptive strategy or non-adaptive, the whole process at street-level is a 
turbulent, confusing, and ultimately frustrating effort.  
 
6.1 Theory Meets Practice: 
There has been considerable debate about the direction of drugs policy, and the 
implementation of that policy in recent years. But I have found that many of the larger 
developments in policy are significantly reshaped by the time they reach street-level 
officers. I will address this issue before further examination of street-level drugs 
policing in order to clarify what policy ideas reach the street, and their form upon 
arrival.  
 
Many scholars have pointed to the increasing focus on drugs by the criminal justice 
system and the reduction in health based approaches (Stimson 2000). This 
‘criminalisation thesis’ has been supported by evidence highlighting the focus on drug 
related crime (Harman and Paylor 2002, Duke 2006). For some authors, “It is 
sometimes difficult to convey fully to those outside the field the enormity of the 
transformation that appears to have taken place in British drug policy in recent times.” 
(Seddon, Ralphs, and Williams 2008, pg. 818). Others have argued that this turn from 
health based approaches is too simplistic an argument, and that,  
 
…official responses to drugs were never as straightforwardly benign as 
much recent commentary implies and were never wholly committed to 
protecting the well-being of individual users. Early controls carried strong 
moral commitments that were harnessed by the emerging medical 
professions and paved the way for the medico-penal arrangement (Shiner 
2013) 
 
Shiner’s point, that the increasing presence of the criminal justice system in drugs 
policy is but one visible element of how the entire criminal justice system has 
transformed its overall aims, is an important qualification to the criminalization 
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argument. The criminalization thesis retains value in so far as it relates to a view of 
policy discussions and legislation regarding drugs. At those levels, and focused 
exclusively on that topic, criminalization of the population of drug users is occurring, 
and often occurring in the face of public expressions to, ‘champion recovery’ (Home 
Office 2012, pg. 5).  Shiner’s concerns that the entirety of the criminal justice system 
is developing new means of addressing the ‘criminological predicament’ is perhaps 
more evident at the street-level implementation of high-level drug policies. At this 
level, the interplay of adaptive policies with the remnants of a non-adaptive policing 
culture makes it harder to tally the full depth of penal encroachment on previously 
health based approaches. This is made more difficult by policing’s traditional focus on 
criminal justice, not health practices. Additionally it is important to assess what role 
policing has had throughout the changes in drugs policy in the last thirty years. Policy 
documents may detail changes in harm reduction efforts and different classifications 
for cannabis, but that does not necessarily translate to officers on the beat. The validity 
of the criminalization thesis may hold true at one level, and be less salient at another.  
 
Both arguments agree that that there have been significant changes to drugs policy, and 
it is due to these changes that this research must address how those changes are both 
being implemented on the street, and how the perceptions and prioritisations officers 
have towards drugs affects the implementation. Changes to the nature of drugs policy 
have not occurred in isolation, but rather are part of a broader shift whereby the 
consensus of a strong welfare state was surpassed by a risk society focused on 
individualism (Reiner 2007, pg. 129). Officers on the street must contend with a 
mixed-bag of policy developments that have rapidly developed in the last decade 
(Duke 2013). The targeting of Prolific and Other Priority Offenders, increases in stop 
and search rates, and continued crackdowns on drugs, emphasizes one side of the 
structure responding to drugs. In this, the citizenry is a victim, and drugs must be 
repeatedly attacked in order to minimize the risk to the community.  
 
This strategy sets out the government’s approach to tackling drugs and 
addressing alcohol dependence, both of which are key causes of societal 
harm, including crime, family breakdown and poverty. Together, they 
cause misery and pain to individuals, destroy families and undermine 
communities. Such suffering cannot be allowed to go unchecked. (Home 
Office 2010c, pg. 2) 
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Non-adaptive strategies designed to highlight the ability of the police to thwart 
criminals abound here, and publicly this is the face of drugs policing in London and 
across the UK.  
 
An alternative response can be seen at the street-level where officers are regularly 
encountering drugs. Of Garland’s six types of adaptation, the idea of ‘defining 
deviance down’ and ‘redefining success’ stand out most prominently when examining 
drugs policing128 (Lee and South 2008, Shiner 2003, 2013). We can see these elements 
in the official policy guidelines for the cannabis warning system and the increased use 
of cautions for minor drug crimes (Byrne 2009). These efforts themselves only 
represent the defining down of deviance, but how they are counted matters even more. 
On paper these adaptive responses inadvertently show non-adaptive actions. Cannabis 
seizures have jumped from 78,542 in 2002, to more than 171,553 in 2011/12; an 
increase of 118 per cent (Coleman 2012). Cocaine also saw an increase of seizures by 
249 per cent during that time period. Adaptive responses may come to resemble the 
non-adaptive rhetoric of policy documents and party-conference speeches. When this 
occurs, the difference between the two paradigms becomes one of practicality. 
Adaptive solutions allow the façade of state capability and control to remain in the 
public view, but provide space for the system to continue to function. This is to say 
that what the public may interpret as a forceful response, in this case regularly seeing 
people being searched on the street, may actually just be the by-product of the adaptive 
CWS. 
 
In its implementation the CWS, an adaptive strategy on paper, has engendered an 
increased role for state control while decreasing the punitiveness directed at the 
individual. The CWS is an adaptive strategy because it defines deviance down and 
creates an administrative outcome for criminal behaviour. However there is also merit 
to arguments that point out that it has non-adaptive elements; it tries to impart state 
control and reinforcement of the police role in an area otherwise previously ignored by 
many officers. The CWS could very easily be interpreted as police ‘acting out’, 
                                                 
128 A reading of policy documents may seem to show that the adaptive response of responsibilization 
features quite strongly, and this interpretation is correct at many points within the drug prohibition 
apparatus. However, this chapter is about drugs policing at the street-level, and here responsibilization 
features much less prominently during daily interactions.   
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engaging in symbolic actions that emphasise their ability to confront, control, and 
confiscate cannabis. 
   
Drugs, legal and illegal, are a constant presence in the daily activities of RT officers in 
Watling. On some occasions officers were tasked with executing a drug search 
warrant, but this activity was often the result of the unit commander’s initiative. RT4 
conducted at least five drug raids during my time with the team; however RT 2 did not 
conduct a single raid.  The two unit commanders of RT2 during the period of 
fieldwork never directly explained their decision not to engage in drug raids. The 
preponderance of drug situations engaged in by the RTs involved high discretion 
searches for small amounts of cannabis, and Watling has been in the top five of 
boroughs for cannabis possession offences for the last several years.  
 
6.2 Non-Adaptive Efforts Against Drugs 
While non-adaptive efforts are typically embraced by political actors (Garland 2001, 
Shiner 2013), they can and do make their way down to street-level policing. Adaptive 
efforts abound at the street-level, but I observed clear evidence of the propensity for 
officers to embrace and implement non-adaptive practices. Non-adaptive policy found 
its way to the street via two separate paths. The first, in actual policy changes that 
affect what operations and tactics officers use, and the second in messaging about the 
role of policing and the criminal justice system in prohibiting drugs. In this section I 
will consider both issues. I believe that non-adaptive approaches to drugs provide 
something for officers’ professional identity as action oriented individuals; something 
missing in adaptive practices as they are described on paper. The use of drug raids, 
frequent stop and search, and confiscation of drugs supports both a real and a 
figurative boost to officers at the street-level in a way that other aspects of their work 
does not.  
 
6.2.1 Drug Raids 
Drug raids have been a regular part of drugs policing since the very beginning of drugs 
prohibition (Kohn 1992). However, the implementation of such efforts has changed. 
Where once drug raids were typically undertaken by dedicated drugs squads (Collison 
1995), operations can now involve hundreds of officers drafted to engage in massive 
shows of force against drug dealing across a wide area at once. Many of these 
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crackdowns were ‘sticking plaster’ efforts, where energy could be applied to managing 
symptoms as there was little ability to directly impact larger societal issues (Crawford 
and Lister 2007). Some of these efforts are designed to raise the price of drugs by 
limiting their availability, and higher prices have been shown to decrease use briefly 
(Caulkins and Reuter 1998). However it may also push users towards committing 
property crime because of the higher prices (Caulkins et al. 2000). 
 
RTs do not normally handle large scale drug raids, but are sometimes asked to execute 
warrants on low-level dealers and growers that the dedicated Drugs and Firearms 
Squad (DFS) in Watling might not have time to perform129. These raids tend to be one-
off events, however RTs can and do donate manpower when larger operations are 
called for. The information for the small raids normally assigned to RT squads comes 
from a variety of sources.  
 
Information comes in it gets looked at by the intelligence desk for drugs… 
they look to see if it’s a viable operation and that the information is 
actually corroborative somewhere else… they then make a decision 
whether it’s a go-er. If it’s a go-er, and we’ve definitely got to deal with it, 
if its low level stuff, they will build that intelligence picture up to its…a 
point where you can give that job to a team. (DCI Jacob, Watling CID) 
 
 I attended three raids with RT4. Two were of suspected cannabis dealing, and one was 
for a small cannabis growing operation that found 10 plants in a spare room. Both of 
the dealers were operating in closed markets in setups that were a mixture of Retail 
Specialists,  and Opportunistic Irregulars130 (Dorn and South 1990). As such, the 
limited information supporting each raid was obtained without directly purchasing 
from the location. This information can come from surveillance, neighbourhood 
complaints, or in many cases, the use of informants (Dorn and South 1990). This 
meant that the raiders were not sure if there would even be any drugs at the location 
                                                 
129 RTs are sometimes also used in large-scale operations such as Operation Crackdown (Best et al. 
2001), a coordinated effort to target drugs markets across London.  
130 Dorn (1990)says that Retail Specialists are organized drug dealers who do not use a licit ‘front’ 
enterprise, but are organised to supply drugs at the street-level only. Opportunistic Irregulars are those 
would get involved in drug distribution, but are not regularly involved, or particularly organized. The 
two sites raided had the structure indicative of a Retail Specialist, but did not appear to regularly be 
involved in the drug trade as their exclusive occupation. 
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they were hitting131. The raid targeting a cannabis growing operation was based on 
heat signatures gathered by a thermal scan by a helicopter over-flight. The limited 
number of plants the woman possessed and the amateurish setup of her growing 
operation led me to suspect that she was not a high-level dealer.   
 
Speaking about RT4’s commander, the Detective Chief Inspector for Watling’s CID 
unit was happy to hand off warrants to RT4 so they could be proactive. “Yeah with 
Bradley he’s a top, top man Bradley. He’s quite proactive around trying to get his team 
to do a little bit of work like that you know, he just adds a little bit of spice on the daily 
work I think” (DCI Jacob, Watling SLT).   
 
The raids served two key purposes for the RT. Inspector Bradley pointed out that it 
gave officers an opportunity to expand their professional development portfolio, but it 
also appeared to give officers a way to engage in classic police work. The constraints 
of bureaucracy dominated the planning of such raids, especially in relation to the 
conducting of risk assessments before the operation. However, ‘taking doors’ provided 
a temporary transformation for officers to become a ‘new centurion’ (Reiner 1999, pg. 
102), assaulting what they believed to be the sources of many of the problems they 
encountered during their regular shifts.  As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
officers outfitted themselves in the full arsenal of protective and offensive kit available 
to them in preparation for drug raids. The act of taking a van-load of kitted up officers 
in to a community projects police power through the very visible, loud, and protracted 
engagement. 
 
Though drug raids are a non-adaptive practice, officers often hoped to use the raids to 
help build better community confidence in the police. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
131 In addition to not knowing if there would be drugs present, on a raid occurring while I was with 
another team, officers on RT4 didn’t know which door to hit, and ended up raiding the wrong address. 
The PC who planned the raid was admonished in the next parade, and made to buy Krispy Kreme 
donuts for the team. 
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That area that I was working with had been neglected for about 18 months 
and confidence in police had gone… You do a warrant, you see that’s 
where the police reassurance starts coming in; if the police are kicking in 
doors [then] people in that community think the police are here aren’t, 
they’ve done someone’s door and the criminals are going to know if they 
stay around there the community [is] too strong. (PC Hugh, RT4). 
 
 
Figure 11: Drug seizures in England and Wales, with a view on the per cent attributable to the 
MPS 
 
SNTs took the lead in identifying targets for drug raids through local intelligence 
gathering. These efforts were often carried out along with simultaneous raids by 
numerous SNTs as part of large operations. One example is Operation Hawk, an on-
going operation that saw more than 500 drug raids across London in March 2013 
alone. MPS Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe instituted the programme as part of 
his ‘War on Crime’, saying, “Operation Hawk is another way to tackle criminals 
decisively and directly. It’s all about responding to local concerns and acting on them 
to crack down on crime rapidly and effectively” (MPS 2011b, para 4).  Since the 
launch of the operation in November 2011, the operation has executed more than 6,000 
warrants and closed 240 cannabis growing operations. The MPS describes Operation 
Hawk as, “a renewed emphasis on local police tackling local drug dealing using local 
intelligence” (MPS 2013d, para 1). As the information supporting Operation Hawk 
raids often comes from the community partnerships, the operation is testament to the 
use of adaptive policy resources to support non-adaptive mind-sets in policing.  
 
These raids, while exciting work for the officers, may not have been particularly 
effective in thwarting the drug markets in Watling. Previous research has highlighted 
that drug raids on local dealers and raids on traffickers are equally ineffective, and that 
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better antidrug policies are required in order to effect change (Chiu, Mansley, and 
Morgan 1998). Increased enforcement without productive, focused, and community-
wide partnerships is largely ineffective at breaking up drug hot-spots (Mazerolle, 
Soole, and Rombouts 2006), and may actually drive users away from treatment 
services (Lister, Wincup, and Seddon 2007). Caulkins (2002) points out that 
enforcement based approaches allow police to respond quickly and with operations of 
their own design, freeing officers of the constraints of operating within the limits of a 
multi-agency partnership. In these situations, the core functions of policing are 
emphasized to the detriment of moves towards community policing (Zhao, Lovrich, 
and Robinson 2001). However, Lupton et al (2002) argue that low-level enforcement 
efforts can still reduce collateral damage to communities and displace some of the 
dealing, however minimally. Avoiding ‘collateral damage’ such as fear of crime, 
increased crime rates, and divestment can help sustain vulnerable communities 
(Edmunds, Hough, and Urquia 1996). One must question then whether the efforts will 
yield results that justify the high resource costs inevitably incurred with such activity 
(Jacobson 1999).  
 
Whatever their effectiveness, drug raids represent a clear adherence to sovereign state 
strategies, and have been described as a, “visible and sometimes violent 
demonstrations of police power” (Dorn, Murji, and South 1992, pg. 97). The raids 
were an opportunity for the state and the police officers to re-emphasise the myth that 
they can control crime, and did so by ‘acting out’ with knee-jerk reactions (Garland 
2001). The raids also held symbolic value for officers, highlighting both their ability to 
do more than just target street-level users, and also their ability to get the true villains 
of the drugs game  (Collison 1994).  
 
6.2.2 ‘Coming Down Hard on Soft Minds’: The Targeting of Drug Users by Police 
In this section I will focus on how officers viewed their efforts to combat drugs, 
justified their tactical choices, and viewed the offenders they were pursuing. I will 
explore some of these issues as they related specifically to cannabis and the CWS in 
the next section, but I will start with a broader focus on drugs. Street-level officers in 
RTs and SNTs pursued drug users, both actual and suspected, as a significant part of 
their work. While their efforts included both adaptive and non-adaptive engagements, 
the preferred method for most officers was the Section 23 drug search. Whether a 
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search was successful in discovering illegal drugs was often only a secondary concern. 
More importantly, a drug search conveyed the officer’s authority and control. 
Attempting to engage in large-scale efforts to tackle drug crimes could actually 
highlight the inability of officers to achieve their stated goals, but a drug stop did not 
hold that same risk. Officers made the most out of the stop no matter what the 
outcome, using a failed stop to assert authority and gather intelligence (Shiner 2010).  
 
Many officers appeared to find the prospect of an impending drug search energizing. A 
quiet patrol in an IRV could suddenly come alive with the sighting of a civilian 
suspected of carrying drugs, and once this energy was present in the IRV it became 
contagious. No matter the hour, I felt wide awake whenever we were about to conduct 
a search. Discussions on pros and cons of current cannabis policy disappeared in those 
moments leading up to a drug search. Thoughtful discussion was replaced by 
derogatory remarks about drug dealers, and how they were going to find drugs 
because, “…well you know this guy is going to have something on him. Junkie 
probably shot up, you know, used all his heroin already, and that’s what they do, they 
haven’t the willpower to not use it. But maybe he’s got some nabbis still” (PC Matt, 
RT2). Dorn and Lee (1999) might see drugs policing taking on a less heroic approach 
overall, but to an RT officer in Watling, a drug search, however slovenly the suspect, 
was at least a mildly heroic action. It ranked well below a car chase, and certainly 
below arresting a violent criminal, but a drug stop gave officers the opportunity to be a 
‘drug warrior’ for just a moment.  
 
Officers subscribed to the idea of being a ‘drug warrior’ with two different but 
intertwined rationales. The first focused on the idea of drugs as harmful to the 
individual and the community, and the police role in stopping the proliferation of a 
dangerous substance. This ‘harm’ logic tended to be openly expressed and used for 
justification of the police response activity against drug users. The second rationale 
involved officers projecting a normative order upon the drug users. In this later 
trajectory drugs are a symbolic assailant whose presence undermined the rule of law 
and needed to be addressed in order to sustain the organization and the rule of law. 
This second driver for anti-drugs activity was not often openly expressed, and emerged 
from the data only after careful analysis. Officers subscribed to these ideas to varying 
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degrees, and belief in one rationale was not mutually exclusive to believing the other. 
We will address these two rationales in order.  
 
6.2.2.1 Warriors Against Harm 
The ‘harm’ based logic operated on a simple idea that since drugs are bad, stopping 
people from obtaining or using drugs is good. Officers were almost to a person 
convinced that drug use would cause serious psychological problems. Many, even 
those that were not opposed to legalizing cannabis believed that, “Skunk132 rots your 
brain. The chemicals, the smoke; brings on psychosis before you can even say 
‘Rastafarian’” (PC Henry, RT2). “Yeah, you get that brown brain with cannabis” (PC 
Rosanne, RT2). This logic did not preclude an officer from being pro-legalisation or 
decriminalization of cannabis, it was simply seen as a problem associated with the 
drug. As one officer put it, “We’re coming down hard on soft minds” (PC Green, 
RT2).  
 
Describing how he deals with suspected heroin users in neighbourhoods where “people 
aren’t taking drugs”, PC Jack justified the need to intervene through stop and search in 
order to limit damage to the community. 
 
There’s syringes lying around, and I don’t know if you’re aware, people 
who mainline heroin normally immediately take a shit. So there’s 
all…there’s lots of human shit lying around. There’s faeces, needles, 
general filth, blood usually, generally in that area. It’s our job to shield 
these people from that, so that’s where I see my role as; get in there, get 
them stopped or get them nicked, get that cleared away, get that secure so 
they don’t have to see it. We’re not going to stop that person being a heroin 
user; we’re just going to displace the problem to somewhere else. (PC 
Jack, RT4) 
 
It is interesting to note PC Jack’s acknowledgment of displacement, in this case 
referring to spatial displacement of drug users to another borough, a problem 
                                                 
132 Skunk has been hyped in the UK media as a type of potentially dangerous, high-potency strain of 
cannabis, and officers refer to most any green coloured cannabis they find as skunk. Skunk is simply 
high quality cannabis that is often grown with high power indoor lighting, often with a hydroponic 
growing medium, in order to obtain higher levels of the psychoactive chemical tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC) in the plant’s non-flowering buds. There is little evidence to support the idea that higher strength 
cannabis is more problematic than other types of cannabis. Users of higher potency cannabis tend to 
self-titrate to obtain the same level of intoxication as with lower potency cannabis use (Reinarman 
2009). Additionally, claims ascribing adverse mental health conditions to the use of high potency 
cannabis are unsupported in the literature (Mclaren et al. 2008).  
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commonly found with drug enforcement efforts (Hales and Hobbs 2010). This tacit 
acknowledgment of the limitations of police power to affect crime prevention, 
“analogous to squeezing a balloon which subsequently changes shape and distribution 
but does not change in volume” (Crawford and Evans 2012, pg. 779), is one of the few 
cracks in PC Jack’s normally effusive support of harsh penal sanctions.  
 
Additionally, the comingling of drugs and drug related crime were often cited, and 
previous authors have identified that police use the connection to argue for stronger 
enforcement tactics in an effort to thwart both (Seddon 2000, Benson, Leburn, and 
Rasmussen 2001, Bean 2008).  
 
With regards to the Class A drugs, it was a case of, they were linked to all 
of the other…most of the other crimes that we had to deal with, burglars, 
robbers, the motor vehicle crimes, everything was interlinked. The people 
that were [committing crimes] were more likely to be doing it to feed a 
drug habit. (PC Sam, Blackburn SNT) 
 
Stop and search was often sold to both officers and community members as a tool to 
thwart violent crime. “[Searching] serves the joint purpose of detecting those carrying 
knives and other weapons whilst affording reassurance to communities through this 
visible, proactive and effective tactic” (MPS 2011a, pg. 2). The MPS policing plan for 
Watling states that the police need to, “…increase the community’s confidence of the 
use of stop & search as a necessary and justifiable tactic to tackle crime and especially 
weapon enabled crimes133”. This, of course, is in a borough where in 2011 on average 
only 16 per cent of searches were for offensive weapons while 50 per cent were for 
drugs.  
 
The MPS justifies drug searches by arguing that searches will disrupt drug dealers who 
may expose children drugs (Police Foundation 2000). However several authors have 
found that young people tended not to be a part of the local drug markets (Duffy et al. 
2008, Coomber and Turnbull 2007, Egginton, Parker, and Aldridge 2000). 
 
 
                                                 
133 Watling Policing Plan 
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 Young people’s patterns of cannabis acquisition had little or nothing to do 
with ‘drug markets’ as they have been conventionally described, and were 
primarily based around friendship and social networks… Importantly, the 
cannabis supply mechanisms used by our respondents served to insulate or 
distance them from more overtly criminal drug markets. (Duffy et al. 2008, 
pg. viii) 
 
As I highlighted in Chapter Four, some members of the community has a significant 
problem with the way stop and search is carried out. It is true that many ward panels in 
London have directed their SNTs to prioritise anti-social drug use and drug dealing, 
but they may not represent the full perspective of the community. What this means 
explicitly is often quite vague, and may only refer to a small problem group of 
individuals in a set location. While the prioritization gives the SNT a reason to move 
against a specific group that brought about the problem, all officers may use that 
prioritization to pursue drugs throughout the community.  
 
It’s not me who’s saying the drugs are bad, it’s the community, and so my 
feelings on cannabis go out the window, don’t matter. Now I’ve got to go 
after those people, dealers, users, the lot. There’s someone bringing that 
stuff in to Farmingham, and I might not be the guy to catch him, probably 
more likely DFS134, I can push against the ones coming in to buy and then 
stealing to support their habits. (PC Paul, RT4) 
 
…I know it sounds quite severe but that’s what people want, that’s what 
people tell us they want to combat drugs, so you’ve got to be harsh really. 
(PC Clarke, Brunel Gardens SNT).  
 
By creating the outsider who used drugs and most likely committed crimes either as a 
result of or alongside his drug use, the organization openly sanctioned the targeting of 
minor drug offences. The drug-crime link allowed officers who were not particularly 
against the idea of drug use to justify their actions. “I don’t really care about nabbis135 
so much, but it’s all the other crime associated with it. You know how it is? If some 
illegal nabbis is okay, so’s nicking a bike or a wallet136.” (PC Hugh, RT4).  
 
                                                 
134 Drugs and Firearms Squad. A unit targeting drug trafficking and firearms possession in Watling. 
135 Nabbis is slang for cannabis. The term is frequently used by police officers.  
136 Note that the officer here is speaking about criminal behaviour engaged in because the person is 
inclined towards criminal activity and engages in it because they have already successfully engaged in 
obtaining and using cannabis. This is different than the perception officers had of someone who engages 
in acquisitive crime to feed a drug habit.  
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6.2.2.2 Normative Order Warriors 
The harm based rationale was often co-mingled with the less often expressed need to 
assert control over drugs to ensure the primacy of the rule of law. The second line of 
‘warrior’ thinking emanated from the perception of police officers as maintaining the 
power and normative order of the state.  While not entirely in-line with Brodeur’s 
ideas on ‘high policing’137, the officers do engage in activities that, “[reach] out for 
potential threats in a systematic attempt to preserve the distribution of power in a given 
society.” (Brodeur 1983, pg. 513).  Drug stops provided an opportunity to engage 
individuals for intelligence, even if the intelligence was unrelated to drugs (Shiner 
2010). If drugs were found, the inclusion of the individual into the Police National 
Computer would provide an opportunity to identify with whom the individual was 
interacting with, their location, and their identifying information (Collison 1994).  
 
Anti-drugs activity also sent a clear message to drug users and dealers that they were 
of a lesser status than the officers. The power dynamic is wholly uneven during a stop 
and search, with officers physically blocking in suspects as well as dominating the 
direction and tempo of the conversation. Resisting a drugs search provided grounds for 
an immediate arrest, and officers were quick to point this out to anyone who 
questioned why they were being searched. Officers’ frequent use of their police 
powers, even informally, led many drug users to resent the interactions with officers 
(Lister, Wincup, and Seddon 2007).  
 
While it would be tough to argue that a drug search is an ‘expressive penal sanction’ 
exactly as Garland described, the underlying premise behind many of the stops was 
that a harsher police response would remind criminals that the police had the power to 
impact their lives. Officers conducted drug searches on the citizenry, especially young 
men, often expressly to try and punish them for the misdeeds they were unable to bring 
them to court for. On several occasions officers reported that they felt certain an 
individual would not have anything on them, but conducted a drug search due to their 
belief that the young person was up to nefarious activities in general.   
 
                                                 
137 Brodeur was describing the intelligence-led policing of nation states that seeks to maintain normative 
order, and more commonly refers to the work of organisations such as the FBI or MI5 and their efforts 
to combat political protest.  
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More often than not, police maintain the respectable order through the 
mere assertion of their authority: their conspicuous presence at certain 
times and places, 'moving on' the disreputable, stopping and searching 
those who attract their attention not in the expectation of detecting crime, 
but intimidating the recipients of such coercive powers. It is noteworthy 
that the currently fashionable prescription for 'zero tolerance' policing, 
prescribes precisely this kind of harassment for the maintenance of 'civility' 
(another name for 'respectability'). (Waddington 1999a, pg. 8.1) 
 
While the direct outcome of a negative drugs stop might encourage a suspected drug 
user to ‘move on somewhere else’, the larger reason to conduct such a stop seems to be 
that officers feel they are defending the order in society. So, whereas the action of 
moving someone along might seem to be simply displacement and community damage 
limitation, the behaviour emanates from a set of beliefs that push strong intervention 
by police as a way to maintain state control of less desirable populations. Drug users, 
due to their addiction, or at least perceived criminal nature, were valued less than what 
officers believed to be a ‘productive’ class of citizens worthy of police protection. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, those that were considered proper citizens needed police to 
keep the criminals from forgetting their place and disrupting the limited civility 
remaining in the borough.  
 
Indeed, the practice of stopping people for what appeared to be no other reason than to 
assert authority occurred often during car-stops. Officers would regularly check the 
number-plate of vehicles they encountered138. If the vehicle’s information indicated 
that drugs had been found in it at any point previously, it was highly likely that the 
vehicle would be stopped. Many officers cited the likelihood of  encountering gang 
members when searching a previously ‘tagged’ vehicle, and searching a gang member 
for whatever reason was good because it kept them ‘in line’. Of the almost ten stops 
that I witnessed occurring as a result of the vehicle having previously involved in a 
positive drugs stop, only once did officers actually find any drugs139. A key trigger for 
even searching for a vehicle’s information was the presence of two or more young 
black men, which officers associated with gang activity. Choongh (1998) has 
identified that police my view ethnic minorities as a section of the population that is 
                                                 
138 One vehicle in the borough was equipped with an Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) 
camera. This scanned each licence plate of any vehicle driving in front of the police car, and 
automatically scanned the plate, notifying officers if the car was stolen or lacked insurance.  
139 This situation occurred simply because the officer recognised the driver, having given him a cannabis 
warning previously. The officer gave no reasonable grounds other than the previous incident. 
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seen as being in need of discipline140. If the vehicle was a 1-Series BMW containing 
two or more young men, had tinted windows, and was driving at night, it was almost 
guaranteed that officers would at least put the information through the computer 
system141.   
 
6.3 Adaptive Efforts Against Drugs 
Officers in Watling engage in activities that fit with Garland’s ideas about adaptive 
changes to the criminal justice system. Though in some cases they were involved in 
community partnerships, more often officers have taken on informal responsibility for 
implementing some of the key ideas emerging from the damage limitation ethos (Lee 
and South 2008). Most obvious amongst these is the effort several officers made to 
impact the ability for drug sales to occur, without resorting to using their formal police 
powers.  
 
PC Saul would regularly engage in efforts to limit the damage of crime and drugs on 
the community. In one such instance we were parked in front of Club Bandulu, a 
brightly painted bar located on a busy street just at the edge of Farmington. It was just 
after 3am, and the street was quiet. Our IRV’s engine was on, but the lights were off, 
and we sat illuminated by the faint glow of the MDT.  PC Saul turned back to me: 
 
We’ll sit here for a bit. They’re dealing out of the Bandulu, you know, and 
you get junkies coming by to pick up their stuff. They leave needles about, 
nick stuff, pass out in gardens and alleys, and are just generally a problem. 
I’m just going to sit here and keep them from dealing for a bit. Can’t do 
much about stopping the dealing, not my area really, and they never keep 
anything on them, but I can disturb them, and keep the neighbourhood free 
of their mess for a bit. Maybe they won’t come back knowing that we’re 
here. You can see the junkies hiding… They’re just waiting for me to 
leave, but at least I can make them wait. It’s a win. 
 
 
                                                 
140 Support for tougher penal sanctions amongst the civilian population also may be related to 
perceptions of the ethnicity and poverty status of criminal offenders within society (Gilens 1996, 
Iyengar 1995, Roberts and Stalans 1997). 
141 Officers could look up this information on their MDT, or call in to the dispatch channel. Officers in 
the 11 car, not having an MDT, were only able to use their radio, though they would be more careful 
about this as it marked them as police officers.  
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It appeared that his assessment of the situation was correct. Standing behind a bus stop 
about 60 metres down the road two men were trying to appear nonchalant, but doing a 
very poor job of it. They had positioned themselves so a bus stop was between us and 
them, and one of the men kept sticking his head past the edge of the bus stop to look 
towards us. A man and a woman were about to cross the street, heading in the direction 
of the Bandulu, but paused briefly before continuing down the road when they saw the 
police car. Such action would normally have aroused an RT officer’s suspicion, 
potentially causing them to give chase, but tonight PC Saul wasn’t interested in finding 
a small baggie of drugs. Every few minutes a rotund man would emerge from the 
Bandulu, look around, and go back inside. We stayed parked in front of the bar for 
about ten minutes until a call came in over the radio. We drove off; PC Saul availing 
himself of the full complement of lights, siren, and all the torque the IRV could 
muster.  
 
PC Saul’s effort illustrates the management of drugs in the community when strong 
enforcement options are either impractical or unavailable. It would have taken 
considerable resources to get the evidence necessary for a warrant, and further 
resources to conduct the raid and handle the arrests even if his unit were capable of 
such work. But RTs are not drug squads, and the calls for service take priority. As far 
as officers in RT2 were aware, no specialist squad had taken the effort to investigate 
the Bandulu. Managing dealers in this manner happens at the fringes of policing in 
response to the limitations officers encounter when trying to combat criminal 
behaviour, but such efforts have been identified as providing a benefit (ACPO 1995). 
It is the epitome of the adaptive policing idea of redefining organisational success, and 
is in contrast with the increased pressure for harsh penal sanctions of drug dealers 
offered from many vocal sources (Stevens 2011).  
 
Being able to make a small impact on a large problem gave PC Saul comfort that he 
had engaged in ‘good policing’ that night. This redefinition of organisational success 
allowed him to maintain his professional self-image and make an impact, however 
minimal. When I later asked him why he sat in front of the Bandulu, he said, “I was 
able to do something.” While it was his resentment at the effects of drug dealing that 
prompted him to take up a position outside of the Bandulu, it was the satisfaction at 
having temporarily disrupted an opponent he could not best that caused him to use the 
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tactic when the opportunity arose. The tactic was not condoned by official policy, or 
in-line with the need to, “…maximise efforts to tackle drugs…” (Home Office 2010c, 
pg. 14).  In acknowledging that adaptive strategies such as this still provide 
opportunities to engage in policing efforts that are personally rewarding, we can 
understand in part how and why officers have supported the use of such tactics. Some 
might interpret PC Saul’s actions as a sign of impotence, and from a purely 
consequentialist standpoint this might be correct. There were no ‘drugs on the table’ as 
a result of his actions, and any positive effect was short-lived. But this view would 
undervalue the symbolic importance for officers of being able to feel they have 
accomplished something, especially in light of their often futile pursuit of criminals. 
 
6.3.1 The cannabis Warning System: Going After Little Fish 
Street-level drugs policing is dominated by the pursuit of small amounts of cannabis. 
In England and Wales, 98 per cent of all cannabis resin seizures are for amounts less 
than one gram in weight, and only 0.4 per cent of all cannabis seizures are for amounts 
over 500 grams142 (Coleman 2011). In a clear sign of the ‘defining deviance down’, 
the cannabis Warning System (CWS) allows officers to write a formal warning for 
cannabis possession, if the person had not been caught in the previous 12 months and 
is 18 years old.  This allows officers to generate a sanctioned detection in less than an 
hour, a process that could take 10 or more hours with a shoplifting case. For a second 
cannabis possession offence within the year officers can give a Penalty Notice for 
Disorder (PND), which results in an £80 fine. A third incident within the year should 
result in arrest, and offenders will often receive an £80-100 fine from the court, though 
they can face a custodial sentence. Previously the only official option was for officers 
to arrest someone found with cannabis. By deploying the CWS, the MPS hoped to, 
“decrease the time and resources spent on a drug seen to be less harmful than many 
other commonly used drugs” (MPS 2007b, pg. 3). Instead it heralded a massive 
increase in cannabis related activity and searches after the 2004 implementation.     
 
 
 
                                                 
142 To put that in perspective, the average cannabis cigarette, or ‘joint’, is about 0.25 grams (Van Ours 
2007), but can vary between 0.11-0.45 grams (Moeller 2012).  
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This area has mainly cannabis, it’s the main issue in this area, if you go up 
towards central then you’ve got a bit more harder drugs, Class A, Class B. 
But around here is usually people just smoking joints and stuff and, 
although as critics would argue its harmless and what not that’s their 
opinion, but in this job, it’s illegal and we deal with it accordingly. With 
people if it’s their first time they’ll get a cannabis warning. (PC Rebekah, 
RT4) 
 
cannabis is often found as a result of stop and search activity (Lee and South 2008) and 
usually only gets the ‘little league players’ of the drugs game143 (Collison 1995). 
Additionally, stop and search activity against drugs has a low rate of subsequent arrest 
for any reason, with only 6.14 per cent of stops resulting in arrest in Watling, and an 
average of 5.95 per cent across the MPS in 2009/10144. Sitting in the 1-1 car outside a 
late night fried chicken shop, PC Fred (RT4) explained to me: 
 
The big fish get caught, if they get caught at all, by the border agency or the 
drugs teams. No one goes after the mid-sized fish really, and we collect the 
little fish for statistics. We only come across PWITS145 accidentally.  
 
By this he meant that the focus of his work was not tied to the lofty rhetoric of 
‘dismantling criminal networks’ (MPS 2007a, pg. 3), but rather the easily apprehended 
drug users of the community. Of the 232,000 recorded drug offences in England and 
Wales in 2010/11, 86 per cent were possession offences, and of that, 81 per cent were 
for cannabis possession (Measham and South 2012). A significant amount of cannabis 
offences are solely possession related events, with no other associated criminal activity 
(May et al. 2002). For officers in Watling the CWS was a daily reality, and while 
many would have to search through their duffel bags to find the correct citation forms 
for a vehicle infraction, the cannabis Warning Form was usually carried in the front 
pocket of the officer’s bullet-proof vest.  
 
                                                 
143 Between 2009-2011, the borough averaged more than 300 possession offences per month, and less 
than 25 drug trafficking offences. (MPS Borough Data) 
144 Sourced from Freedom of Information request. 
146 A morning shift. Typically begun at 6am.  
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Figure 12: The rise and fall of cannabis warnings 
 
Officers of Watling regularly went out searching for low-level cannabis busts in order 
to ‘get a detection’. As PC Edmund explained to me at the beginning of an early 
turn146, “So many of the little shits around here have nabbis147 on them. It’s pretty easy 
to get something if you turn-over a few of them. You gotta wait though; those lazy 
cunts don’t get up before noon, one o’clock maybe.” His antipathy towards the 
cannabis users did not necessarily translate to a desire to engage stronger penal 
sanctions against individuals caught with cannabis. PC Edmund associated cannabis 
use with a feckless and criminal class, and spoke with disdain about their perceived 
lifestyle choice. However he did not despise cannabis itself. Like many officers, for PC 
Edmund cannabis was viewed as a problem, and people who used cannabis were 
problematic, but it was enough to merely show the state could still exert power of their 
behaviour. Such was the mixed nature of the drive to target cannabis that some officers 
would do what they could to avoid harming individuals whose only infraction was 
related to cannabis possession148.  
 
 
                                                 
146 A morning shift. Typically begun at 6am.  
147 cannabis. Officers used ‘nabbis’ when talking about people being in possession of the drug, but 
would use the full word when discussing ideas about policy or the policing of cannabis.   
148 Provided of course they passed the ‘attitude test’ mentioned in the Response Policing chapter. 
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I found the two boys smoking, and one of them tried to do the right thing 
and said it was his cannabis. I did a check and seen that he’s had his 
warning already, and that it was recent, but he was all right. Nice lad, not 
causing problems, and only, really only found because he’s got nowhere 
else to puff. So I said, ‘yeah, it’s not your cannabis, it was your friend’s, 
because if it’s your friends, then it’s a warning, but if it’s yours, it’s a fine.’ 
He couldn’t really afford £80, and then what; he gets a warrant out for him 
[for failure to pay the fine]. (Sergeant Anne, RT2). 
  
PC Oscar (RT2) told me that he sometimes even asks people facing a PND for their 
second infraction if they would prefer to be arrested instead of given the £80 fine. His 
logic is that after a cannabis arrest the offender will probably only face a caution or 
£20-40 fine, and he’ll get a sanctioned detection and an arrest out of the encounter.  
 
It was not uncommon for officers to purposely drive around a park several times, 
hoping to catch a whiff of cannabis in the air.  In 2002/03, the last full year of data 
before the changes in cannabis policing were introduced, Watling had less than 1,200 
drug possession offences recorded, but this jumped to nearly 4,000 by 2009/10. We 
know that nearly 90 per cent of those 2009/10 drug offences in Watling were for 
cannabis possession (MPS 2012c) and that across the MPS a cannabis warning is 
issued in 69 per cent of cannabis possession incidents. In practice the warning form 
was used in 85-90 per cent of observed cannabis possession incidents in Watling 
during fieldwork. The discrepancy in the observed figures and those released by the 
MPS may be because officers in Watling were ignoring the guidance to issue PNDs 
and arrest for second and third possession incidents within 12 months. Though I never 
observed this directly, two officers mentioned that on occasion they will issue a 
warning when a PND should have been given, provided the individual was compliant 
and remorseful. Another explanation is that not all warning forms make it on to the 
system. Officers reported, and this was never solidly verified during fieldwork, that 
sometimes they would fail to enter a person’s details in to the system while completing 
the paperwork for the form.  
 
Whilst acknowledging that many cannabis related incidents resulted in poor 
interactions with community members, the MPS maintains that the cannabis warning 
system provides a unique tool to improve public/community interaction.  
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As the majority of people accused of cannabis possession are young male 
adults, it is hoped the policy will have had a positive effect in reducing 
friction between young people and police, thereby improving public/police 
relations. (MPS 2010b, pg. 4) 
 
This argument supposes that the introduction of the CWS was the only change to 
cannabis policing in recent years, that officers were deprioritising cannabis, and that 
there would be fewer searches as a result. It fails to account for the increase in 
cannabis offences, the massive increase in the number of drug searches, and the impact 
of numerous unsuccessful searches on relations with the community. Between April 
2009 and March 2010 67 per cent of cannabis offences were for young men between 
18-29, a total of more than 34,400 offences (MPS 2010b). In the months leading up to 
the August 2011 riots, Watling had a 9 per cent hit rate on section 23 searches149, and 
the MPS had doubled the number of drug related stop and searches since 2004 
(Eastwood, Shiner, and Bear 2013). The argument takes no account of the quality of 
the interaction. At every CMG where young people were invited to speak, the main 
issues raised were their anger at being subject to what they perceived to be frequent 
unwarranted searches and the negative attitudes officers displayed to them during the 
searches. Numerous pieces of research, (Skogan 2006a, Glauser and Tullar 1985, 
Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 2009, Hohl, Bradford, and Stanko 2010, Ren et al. 
2005)150, have highlighted how contact between the public and police often results in 
negative impacts on community confidence in police.   
 
We can see clearly how these interactions affect the relationship between police and 
the community by examining a typical stop taking place on a man leaving a café 
known to sell cannabis151. The 53 year old African-Caribbean man was stopped and 
searched for drugs while walking along the edge of a park. He was found to be 
carrying £10 worth of cannabis, and while the officer wrote the cannabis warning 
form, commented:  
 
                                                 
149 Information from FOI request.  
150 The Independent Police Complaints commission recorded a 44% jump in complaints the first year 
cannabis warnings were in use, and the number of complaints continued to rise in line with the increase 
in drug searches, including a corresponding decline starting in 2010/11 and 2011/12. 
http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/en/Pages/stats.aspx 
 
151 This café will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
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I’m an old guy, you know. I’ve been doing this since I was a boy, never 
hurt no-one, never been a criminal. You’re not gonna stop me enjoying me 
weekend puff. Why can’t you spend your time finding the boys robbin’ 
and cuttin’ on people? 
 
In perhaps the most beautiful example of structured ambivalence encountered during 
fieldwork, the issuing officer responded, “You’re right, but you’re still getting a 
warning”. At the end of the encounter the man walked away, shaking his head, and I 
observed him crumple up the warning slip as he put it in his pocket.   
 
6.3.1.1 Officers’ Perceptions of cannabis and the cannabis Warning System 
Officers had mixed feelings about cannabis and the cannabis warning system, though 
they were generally scornful of both. In this brief section I will explore the attitudes 
towards both cannabis as a drug, and also the system in place to address it. Raising one 
issue with officers almost immediately brought up the other. This finding is itself 
interesting. Discussing knives did not automatically bring up sentencing policy or the 
laws on bladed articles, nor did alcohol fuelled incidents in a pub directly lead to 
discussion of licensing laws.  However, cannabis and its prohibitory mechanisms 
seemed to be one and the same in conversation, but not in action. By this I mean to 
suggest that while officers were happy to share their widely varying personal views on 
cannabis and how it should be handled, they all approached cannabis similarly once 
encountered on the street. I will first highlight some of the common ideas officers held 
about cannabis before exploring officers’ views on the CWS. As we will see, they are 
often closely linked.  
 
For many if not most officers, ambivalence about cannabis is the norm. Few felt 
strongly about the drug itself. “It’s the nature and times that we live in, that cannabis is 
there, but as a police officer I won’t feel upset if I don’t find cannabis on people. 
Again, I think the cannabis warning system is wrong, I think it’s wrong. I think it’s a 
bit too soft” (PC Hugh, RT4). Despite the frequency of cannabis incidents, I never got 
the sense that anyone really felt strongly about the drug. Even those who considered it 
a ‘dangerous and toxic substance’ were hard pressed to sustain such arguments for 
more than a few sentences before trailing off in to quiet acceptance of the drug’s 
presence in the community. At one point PC Sam (Blackburn SNT) was discussing 
how he often comes across cannabis when searching people for other reasons. 
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DB: So is that part of the reason you would stop them? 
PC Sam: To get cannabis? No. I’ve got no interest in cannabis. 
DB: What role does cannabis serve in your policing day to day? 
PC Sam: It’s a detection. That’s it.  
 
I estimate that about 25 per cent of officers I worked with told me that they supported 
the taxation and regulation of cannabis, but would only discuss these beliefs in private 
settings or while in an IRV. This position was normally held in the belief that it would 
reduce the problem of drug dealing. None had gone so far as to espouse any potential 
benefits to smoking cannabis; they simply argued that it was no more harmful than 
alcohol, a drug whose abuse they regularly felt the repercussions of. For the most part 
these officers were simply fed up with the current state of affairs.  
 
I don’t think we get to the root of it to be honest with you, I think the 
problems that drugs cause in society, we’re not getting anywhere near the 
root cause of it. Ultimately, someone with a small bag of cannabis on them 
[will] probably do no harm to anyone but themselves. There’s got to be an 
argument for the Amsterdam way of life and say, ‘what harm does that 
actually do? Well let’s regulate it more, make some tax on it and make it so 
it becomes more socially acceptable like smoking and alcohol’. (PC Jenny, 
RT4) 
 
Interestingly the pro-legalisers were not noticeably less active than other officers in 
pursuing cannabis detections via the CWS. Like their counterparts they regularly 
searched individuals under Section 23 for the express purpose of finding small 
amounts of cannabis, and the unexpressed purpose of reminding potential suspects 
who was in charge in the borough. 
 
It is, perhaps, not surprising about 25 per cent of officers viewed cannabis quite 
negatively, leaving a middle 50 per cent not particularly inclined either way. The anti-
cannabis officers opinions included arguments against the drug for every conceivable, 
and some unconceivable reasons. Some reviled the drug for its psychological damage 
to young minds, others for its supposed tendency to lead people on to harder drugs. For 
those who were anti-cannabis there seemed no limit to what the drug was capable of. 
One officer even suggested that dealers in Watling were regularly sprinkling cocaine 
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on to their cannabis in order to make it more addictive and drive up demand for their 
product152.  
 
…cannabis could be one of the starters that pushes people on to harder 
drugs. You start smoking cigarettes, you’re then more likely to smoke 
cannabis, you’re then more likely to take other drugs which could lead on 
to the heroin and crack cocaine because if you smoke cannabis you don’t 
think it’s addictive or dangerous, it’s not until years later that you realize it 
is addictive. People will buy it all the time because they say they can’t 
sleep without it that’s… they think that it helps them sleep but they’ve 
obviously got an addition that they need to feed before they can got to 
sleep. (PC Sam, Blackburn SNT) 
  
…people say to me that drugs should be legal; I don’t really agree with that 
because the amount of people we go to that their problems in life are as a 
result of drugs, even cannabis, that’s why I think when you stop a kid with 
a cannabis joint, I think they should be arrested.…. I think they do need to 
have that experience of being brought to the police station and sitting in a 
cell for an amount of time to think about what they’ve done because you 
know it is a slippery slope. (PC Rebekah, RT4) 
 
When looking at the CWS itself we find a similar breakdown of ideas. A small number 
of officers felt the system worked fine, most were ambivalent or pessimistic, and a few 
thought the whole thing was a complete travesty because it sent a mixed message 
about the harm of cannabis to the public while doing nothing to empower officers to 
fight the drug.  No matter how passionate an officer’s feeling about cannabis or the 
CWS, after a minute or two of discussion the officers’ invariably became ambivalent, 
“Well…it’s just another tool to do the job, I don’t like or hate the cannabis warning 
system, it’s just a way of disposing with certain things” (PC Hugh, RT4).  
 
Some officers liked the warning form for its ease and fruitful reward. It turned a long 
arrest process in to a quick warning, saving them a considerable amount of time for 
each interaction. Several commented that before the advent of the CWS they would 
probably just dispose of a small bag of cannabis instead of going through the time 
consuming formalities involved in an arrest or caution153. “I think that’s what used to 
                                                 
152 Beyond the difficulty, cost, and increased penalty a cannabis dealer would face in doing such a thing, 
there is no evidence from either the Home Office or the MPS that such practices are occurring anywhere 
in England or Whales.  
153 To issue a formal Caution, officers must still arrest and complete all the elements of a normal arrest 
except for writing up charging orders to the CPS.  
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happen before the warnings came in, it used to go down the drain, little bit of cannabis, 
why take yourself off the streets for a tiny little bag of cannabis…what harm does it do 
really?” (PC Jenny, RT4). Most officers who had been on the job since before the 
introduction of the CWS admitted to having at one time or another disposed of 
cannabis in this manner. By doing this officers reported that they avoided tying 
themselves up with a minor crime and could instead focus on engaging the crime 
problems they felt were more problematic for their local community. None of the 
officers reported having disposed of cannabis in this manner since the introduction of 
the CWS. To them, there was simply no reason not to do the form, and in fact they 
were rewarded when they did.  
 
…with the cannabis you know, actually where you probably used 
discretion with a small amount before and you know you could be, ‘throw 
it down the drain and don’t do it again, this is your one warning’, now 
actually you became more… you were actually writing up more and 
putting more people through the system but just for a warning, where 
before that never happened. So actually thinking, it probably backfired a 
little bit because more people actually came through the judicial system 
even if it was just as a warning… (Sgt Richard, Blackburn SNT) 
 
Many officers, regardless of their personal feelings about cannabis, thought the system 
was a symbolic gesture designed for bureaucracy sake, not for effectiveness at 
combating drugs.  
 
It sends out mixed messages. Make a decision one way or another; it’s 
illegal or it's not! They did it for the wrong motivation. They didn’t do it 
because, for the cause of getting people off drugs, they did it for the 
[decreased] paperwork. (PC Jane, RT4).  
 
This sort of derision of the CWS was widespread, but did not necessarily discourage 
officers from using the CWS. The guidelines issued by ACPO (2003) only recommend 
that officers use the warning form, and it specifically leaves the option to arrest at the 
officer’s discretion. If officers were en masse uncomfortable with the CWS, they could 
theoretically arrest every person found with cannabis. But this did not happen. Officers 
persisted in using a system they felt was an ineffective middle ground.  
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It's a means to an end. But I don’t think the first stage has any impact at all 
on the actual users. All you do is give them a telling off and then a little bit 
of paper. They don't even get anything to carry off. They sign the bit of 
white paper and that's it. That’s it. Done and dusted154. (PC Fred, RT4) 
 
The bureaucratization of the process left officers in a position that was difficult to 
maintain. From their perspective they were being asked to exert their power to stop 
and search someone, to detain and deprive of liberty, and then reach an anticlimactic 
end result by only giving the cannabis user a largely symbolic and toothless warning 
slip.  
 
I don’t feel like I‘m making any difference, I just… we take cannabis off 
someone in the street, we give them a warning, and they’re not going to 
stop smoking cannabis are they?” (PC Elle, RT4).  “I don’t really think it’s 
going to make a difference to them, it’s not going to stop them taking it or 
going [to their dealer] again. So in that respect I don’t think it going to stop 
them. (PC Mario, RT2)  
 
In adopting this adaptive policy officers surrendered some of their ability to live up to 
their image of action and enforcement, and had to negotiate the new limits of their 
power. While some might have protested full legalization, the half measure (in their 
eyes) of the CWS saw them taking on bureaucratized roles, losing power and losing 
their place within the community as protectors. This would have been bad enough, but 
the fact that drug users were being given visible evidence of this reduction in power 
only exacerbates the fall from infallibility. When officers could, and did, just put 
cannabis ‘under the boot’ they were able to achieve the same outcome, but were able 
to do so while saving face in front of the suspect. The power to dispose of cannabis 
without formal actions still exists. However officers feel that doing so isn’t viable if an 
officer hopes to keep up their performance figures.  “That’s the animal that the police 
have created. What they want is a nice big set of figures to hand in to the Home Office. 
Whether it is effective policing, well, I think we lost sight of that years ago” (PC 
George, RT4). In response to this bureaucratization, many officers in the middle 50 per 
cent of officers not particularly inclined either way towards cannabis appeared to talk-
up the potential risks of cannabis in order to justify the worthiness of pursuing it. This 
increased threat supported the need to pursue the drug, and helped maintain a sense of 
                                                 
154 PC Fred’s assertion that ‘they don’t even get anything to carry off’ is not accurate. Individuals are 
given a copy of the form once it is filled out. They can refuse to take their copy as sometimes occurs.  
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mission for the officers. This had the knock on effect of making the use of the CWS 
that much more deflating, as it reminded them of the bureaucratized nature of the 
exercise.  
 
Several officers openly argued that cannabis policing was a waste of time, but said 
they would make use of the warning forms to earn detections. The strength of the 
system, for these officers, was the ease with which outputs could be obtained. One 
officer reportedly achieved 72 sanctioned detections over the course of a year, of 
which 68 were cannabis warning forms. This information was confirmed by an 
Inspector of an RT unit and also a member of the borough’s senior leadership team. 
Unfortunately I was unable to confirm this via data from my Freedom of Information 
request.  PC Rosanne commented about this officer, “While the rest of us are going out 
doing the hard jobs, he’s racking up easy detections.” The issue of officers using the 
CWS to accumulate numerous cannabis seizures was acknowledged in Home Office 
data as well.  “The widespread use of this new disposal is thought to have been a large 
contributory factor in the increase in the number of police seizures for cannabis since 
April 2004” (Coleman 2012, pg. 13).  
 
6.3.1.2 Why do Officers Hunt for cannabis? 
As far as cannabis is concerned I don’t really agree with it, never smoked 
it, don’t really want to, never even thought about smoking it, not for me. 
But I know people that have smoked it, I know police officers that have 
smoked it, so you know, I don’t think it’s ever going to go away, it’s 
always going to be there, it’s always going to be…its semi-legalised isn’t 
it? There seems to be that thing that you know they don’t mind it if you 
smoke it in the privacy of your own home and like I get that. I don’t mind 
because at the end of the day it saves me from having to go to certain calls, 
but I think if you smoke it out on the street, smoking it near schools or… 
it’s like sticking your fingers up at the law isn’t it? Why are you walking 
down the road with a cannabis joint for? Makes you think you're above it, I 
don’t like that side of it but as far as if you want to smoke it in the privacy 
of your own home, you’re not going to stop that, and like I say, I don’t 
agree with it but we’re not going to stop it and you know that’s another 
thing, [cannabis users] could be funding terrorism they could be 
funding…god knows. (PC Dominic, RT4) 
 
In this section I will begin to explore some of the reasons why officers went against 
their own personal beliefs and professional judgment, and made dedicated efforts to 
find cannabis. I had encountered officers who were staunch legalisers and others who 
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would wipe the plant from the earth if given the power, and yet all seemed willing to 
uniformly administer the CWS. In every other component of their work, barring 
domestic incidents, discretion and personal attitudes shaped the implementation of 
police powers.  
 
Searching individuals suspected of possessing cannabis was not necessarily entirely 
about drugs. Officers knew that any item found during a drug search, something for 
which they had no specific reasonable grounds to conduct a search, contributed to the 
detection of crime and order maintenance that lay at the heart of their role. Targeting 
suspected drug users for ancillary reasons was an accepted practice I discussed earlier 
in this chapter. It was assumed that those people willing to break the law by possessing 
cannabis, or appearing likely to possesses cannabis, would be more likely to have other 
contraband items on them as well. Sometimes an S.23 search appeared to merely be a 
convenient reason to search. Adding one more search under S.23 would not raise an 
eyebrow given the high number of searches and perception amongst officers that the 
population was riddled with drug users, and might even result in praise for being 
proactive. 
 
Additionally, coming across something tangible was a reward in itself. Many of the 
situations officers found themselves in over the course of a shift left them with little to 
show for their work other than paperwork, lacking even a clearly identifiable positive 
outcome. Given the propensity of ‘non-crime’ domestics and robbery reports for RT 
officers, and meetings and foot patrols for SNT officers, finding a bit of cannabis 
allowed the officer to hold up their ‘trophy’ to their colleagues. This effect could be 
replicated by any contraband including knives or other weapons. Cannabis, being more 
prevalent, and easier to find than knives or weapons, provided an opportune target. 
Many an evidence bag was proudly displayed to fellow officers. Often it was little 
more than a fifty-pence sized piece of cannabis:   
 
…for me it’s the same, any drugs…but that goes to other things as well 
like I just like the thought of finding something even if it’s a case of knifes, 
weapons, someone that’s carrying equipped to steal or something like that, 
just the actual act of finding it is quite nice. (PC Neville, RT4) 
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I like [finding cannabis]. I quite like it; I like the feeling I get… It’s a 
strange feeling because you feel like if you find someone with it, it’s 
almost a relief for that shift because you know that you can come back at 
the end of the day and say, ‘ye, I’ve got this, I found cannabis’. Everyone 
will pat you on the back, ‘well done, you got cannabis.’ (PC Rebekah, 
RT4) 
 
Being rewarded with positive reinforcement for finding cannabis was widely reported. 
“I tell [people I’m searching] how it is… that I will get more credit for taking this little 
bag of cannabis off you than I will for dealing with a rape so… lets crack on shall we” 
(PC Jenny, RT4). This statement from PC Jenny could not have been more prophetic. 
Only a few weeks after recording her interview PC Jenny was the first officer on scene 
to a rape at the very beginning of her 12-hour shift. She spent the rest of the day with 
the victim and coordinating the initial police response. It was quite visible when she 
finally arrived back at the station how drained she was, and she still had to tag and bag 
all the evidence; a time-consuming process itself. She made herself tea and got to 
work, no congratulations from team members or her managers. Earlier that shift an 
officer had come back to the station with two cannabis detections and received praise 
from the officers gathered in the writing room as well as from the Sergeant.  
 
Finding cannabis was not seen by the officers as being a particularly glamorous bust, 
but it was something, and sometimes they needed that win. “…that’s what you want to 
be a police officer for, to fight crime. It doesn’t matter how upstairs class it is. And 
see, the importance of it for a police officer, it could be something very minor, but it’s 
a crime” (Sgt Richard, Blackburn SNT). Incidents with weapons, assaults, or other 
crimes still in progress were a much bigger draw for RT officers to attend to, but these 
types of calls were not always available and so other work had to be found.  
 
Low-level cannabis possession was also about as high up the drug distribution chain as 
officers could regularly penetrate. If officers wanted to pursue drugs at the street-level, 
low-level cannabis was the quickest and easiest way to find some.  
 
It’s tough to find coke because the bankers and middle class types are all 
using it at parties together, or in the loo at work. Junkies hide away in the 
shadows; don’t come out unless it’s for more heroin or to nick stuff for 
more heroin, and then use it real quick but kids puffing some skunk are just 
daft, right out in the open. (PC Edward, RT2)  
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Street-level dealers are harder to come across than users. In England and Wales in 
2010/11 only 14 per cent of drug related incidents recorded were for non-possession 
offences, a category that includes trafficking, possession with intent to supply, and 
manufacturing (Coleman 2011). “Class A it’s more of a [drug] squad thing to deal with 
people who are dealing. You may be lucky and stop [someone] with an amount of 
drugs on them, and you’ve caught them before they’ve gone and sold it, however it’s 
more luck than judgement” (Sgt Richard, Blackburn SNT). Class A dealers were also 
known to try and protect their distribution opportunities and supply, and would flee if 
they were approached. This made catching them difficult and potentially dangerous. 
On several occasions officers of RT2 had unsuccessfully chased a particular heroin 
dealer who liked to sell from the corner of a park on a busy intersection. Each time 
officers had to expend significant resources searching the area, and had come up empty 
each time. Additionally, the officers believed that CPS had decided to reduce all 
distribution charges down to possession unless the suspect had been caught as part of a 
larger operation or was found with multiple kilos. As the latter was almost never going 
to happen, RT officers felt that pursuing suspected dealers of Class A drugs was not 
worth their time.  
 
6.3.1.3 Going after cannabis for a detection  
One of the most common reasons to go for cannabis was the ease with which officers 
could generate a sanctioned detection.  
 
…finding someone with a joint of cannabis marks as a detected crime. So 
you know, you can find someone with a cannabis joint, fill out a five 
minute form on the street, book it in to custody, put on a crime report that 
takes ten minutes, show them as the suspect, show them as the accused; 
bang, you’ve got a detection. And I’ve had the same thing for a job that has 
taken me like weeks to do all the paperwork for it…I think it’s a little bit 
wrong. It’s quite pot-luck finding someone walking down the street with a 
joint. It doesn’t necessarily mean you’ve worked hard; whereas doing a 
week’s worth of paperwork does! It is hard work! (PC Neville, RT4) 
 
There were few routes available for officers to obtain a sanction detection. Traffic 
citations did not count, and were considered a waste of time unless the offence was 
particularly egregious. While the officer might be the first on scene to a serious 
incident, because they are not involved in the investigation and eventual charging of a 
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suspect they will not get the detection for that crime, even if they catch the perpetrator 
themselves. Finding weapons, drugs, robbers, or shoplifters were the main way one 
could earn a detection.  Several officers reported that they would specifically search 
for cannabis early on in a shift in order to ‘get it out of the way’ and be able to focus 
on responding to crimes they felt were important to the community and themselves. “If 
I get some cannabis first thing, I can spend the rest of the shift doing real police work, 
going to good calls, doing my job” (PC Fred, RT4).  
  
While there are multiple avenues for how to precede once cannabis has been found, 
including a PND and arrest, most officers were reluctant to use anything other than the 
formal warning. Officers were hesitant to use alternative options for three main 
reasons. Firstly, the other options took more time while achieving same outcome for 
both the officer and the offender. Officers earned a detection whether it was a warning, 
PND or arrest. The individual with cannabis was largely given what officers viewed as 
a ‘slap on the wrist’ as even arrested individuals were often just cautioned and not 
imprisoned.  
 
The fact that a cannabis warning cannot be given to a minor led some officers to avoid 
searching young people they suspected of possessing cannabis. The benefits of a quick 
detection via a cannabis warning would have been lost had they had to go through a 
full arrest and booking process. Despite the policy requiring under-18s to be arrested, 
at least 30 cannabis warning forms were issued to 11-17 year olds by the MPS in 
2009/10155. Secondly, officers who were ambivalent about cannabis felt that issuing a 
warning was the least harmful option available to them. “I’ve got my detection, you 
know, he got told off. It’s not going to stop him, no impact, no consequences, and I 
mean, does he even need that? I’m here to deal with scrotes156.” (PC Russ, RT2).  
 
Arrests for cannabis possession were rare, accounting for only 19 per cent of cannabis 
related incidents across London in 2008/09 and 2009/10(MPS 2010b). The only arrest 
for possession of cannabis witnessed during fieldwork was of a man who had three 
warnings in the last year, and was quite argumentative with officers when they caught 
                                                 
155 FOI Data obtained via Release. 
156 ‘Scrotes’ is slang for useless men, usually involved in criminal behaviour, and is short for ‘scrotum’ 
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him smoking a joint as he walked along the road about two blocks from the police 
station. I observed more than 15 cannabis seizures during my fieldwork, and all the 
others were handled with a formal cannabis Warning form.   
 
 
Figure 13: cannabis Seizures vs. Cannabis Usage (Coleman 2012, Roxburgh et al. 2012) 
 
The only officers who seemed uninterested in pursuing cannabis were the small 
number who did not care about meeting professional development goals. PC Marcus 
(RT2) told me on my first day of fieldwork that, “I do what needs doing, not what I’m 
told. Hasn’t hurt me none.” These officers were effective peace-keepers and social 
service providers (Punch 1979) during incidents, but appeared ineffective on paper. 
This small group of officers held themselves above what they viewed as a system that, 
measured formal outputs, but not the quality of the outcomes. PC Marcus worked to 
achieve good outcomes, which he interpreted as dealing fairly but firmly with suspects, 
supporting team members, and not flinching from any task that would support their 
larger mission to maintain order in Watling. 
 
6.3.2 Partnering with Communities 
 Partnership with communities is at the heart of many areas of drugs policy, most 
notably in areas of drug treatment and consultation between police and local groups to 
identify specific drug problems (Dawson and Cuppleditch 2007, Edmunds, Hough, and 
Urquia 1996, Hadwen 2012, Home Office 2004b, 2007c, 2008, 2010c). These 
partnerships are often defined at the national level, as is the case with Crime and 
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Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) mandated by the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 (Fitzgerald et al. 2002). In Watling the DAAT and CSP are one organization 
called the Watling Partnership Programme (WPP). The WPP is run by an executive 
board that includes representatives from the MPS, London Fire Brigade (LFB), British 
Transport Police157, UK Border Agency, National Health Service (NHS), National 
Treatment Agency (NTA), Transport for London (TFL), and other public sector and 
charitable groups. Its aim is to, “…bring together a range of statutory, voluntary and 
community sector services to work together to reduce crime and disorder, the fear of 
crime and improve health outcomes”158. Their yearly commissioning plans leave out 
how exactly they will impact drug use or partner with the police services beyond 
continuing the DIP programme and, ‘working in partnership to tackle criminality 
associated with drug misuse and supply’.   
 
It is perhaps, not surprising that officers of RTs had little knowledge that such 
partnerships existed, and even less familiarity about their role. Asked about whether 
they had ever met with the DAAT before, most RT officers responded with, ‘who?’   
SNT officers tended to have more knowledge about such working partnerships, but 
even they were quite removed from the processes and decision making. While the 
SNTs held their Ward Panel Meetings and partnered with local groups within their 
ward, they did not seem to interact at the borough level. Without an apparent feedback 
connection to broader efforts across the borough and the entire MPS, partnerships with 
the community appeared to be isolated efforts within an organization still largely 
focused on non-adaptive efforts. This finding in Watling is echoed in previous research 
where it was noted that national level policy promoting community partnerships often 
resulted in stronger centralized control that left local actors unable to effectively 
interact with their neighbourhood-level partners (Fitzgerald et al. 2002).  
 
It is interesting to note that the local council’s page on criminal justice issues mentions 
many types of community safety and enforcement issues, and even has a section on 
‘drugs and alcohol’. However in that section there is no actual mention of drugs, let 
alone how the local council is working with the MPS to combat them.  
                                                 
157 The British Transport Police handle policing for all rail and light rail in England and Wales. Officers 
in Watling regularly referred to the BTP as the ‘Badly Trained Police’.  
158 Watling CJP Commissioning Plan, 2012/2013 
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6.3.2.1 Ward Panel Drug Priorities 
Each of the SNTs involved in this research had drugs related issues as one of their 
local ward priorities during the course of this research. The two most commonly listed 
priorities relating to drugs were either, ‘anti-social behaviour and drug use’ or ‘drug 
dealing and using’. The former often appeared to be code for teenagers smoking 
cannabis in the area. There were serious cases of ASB involving bullying, harassment, 
vandalism, and intimidation, but these were extreme cases and quite rare. Most often 
officers were sent in search of teenagers puffing on cannabis in stairwells.  
 
When residents were aware of open drug dealing, or SNT officers were able to 
convince them such activity was taking place, Ward Panels enthusiastically called for 
the police to intervene. The tactical responses to such priorities involved classic police 
responses involving investigation, raids, arrests, and penal sanctions. As I discuss in 
detail when discussing Operation Hawk, the use of such tactics involved anything but 
adaptive responses, and relied upon the power of battering rams instead of 
partnerships. These raids could be combined with dispersal orders and ASBOs in order 
to keep the offenders away from the area after their release from prison. In these 
experiences we can see how an adaptive policy construction was rerouted to provide 
continued support for non-adaptive penal responses.  
 
6.3.2.2 KINS Network 
Officers on SNTs utilised the Key Individual Network (KIN) to disseminate 
information to the community159, particularly after drug raids or other serious 
incidents.  
 
KIN members are residents and/or local business people who have a 
commitment to making their community a safer place. They work closely 
with the local police team to represent the thoughts, feelings and concerns 
of the local community. They are also relied upon at times of critical 
incident to act as a portal for information flow. (MPS 2012b, pg. 26) 
 
                                                 
159 I made the mistake of referring to it as the, ‘Key Informants Network’ once and was quickly 
corrected! It was made very clear to me that the KINs members get information from the MPS, they are 
not informants to the MPS. 
 216 
The programme operates on the belief that informing communities about police 
activities helps improve community confidence (Home Office 2010f). “You’d want to 
know why there were three carrier vans full of TSG down your block last night? Better 
we tell them than let the rumour mill spread falsehoods” (Sgt Reggie, Bunsen Terrace 
SNT). This type of information sharing has been shown to improve community 
confidence (Jackson and Gray 2009, Hohl, Bradford, and Stanko 2010). The KIN was 
seen as a way of improving both the ability to disseminate police messaging, and 
increase its trustworthiness as it would appear to come from community members and 
not the police. It was also hoped that the KIN would pass information to other 
community members in a way that supported the key confidence boosting ideas of 
fairness (Mastrofski 1999) and positive engagement (Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 
2009) between police and community members. 
 
6.3.3 DIP Testing 
As part of the Government’s push to ‘break the drug crime link’, the Tough Choices 
programme was rolled out across England and Wales between 2003 and 2005/06 
(Polly 2007). This was seen as a core effort to create multi-agency partnerships, 
bringing health based efforts in line with crime control efforts (Hunter, Mcsweeney, 
and Turnbull 2005). By 2011 the process was embedded in 23 of the 43 police forces 
in England and Wales, with more than 230,000 tests being conducted each year (Home 
Office 2011b). DIP employed targeted drug testing on anyone arrested for 21 crimes160 
commonly assumed to be committed by Class A drug users (Home Office 2010a). 
Offenders are administered an oral swab to test for the presence of opiates and cocaine, 
but not for any other illicit drugs161 (Hunter, Mcsweeney, and Turnbull 2005).  
This included a package of training police and health care workers to work together as 
a series of new initiatives was put in place to bring cocaine and heroin users in to 
treatment. This included Testing on Arrest, Required Assessments, and Restrictions on 
Bail. “The programme involves criminal justice and drug treatment providers working 
together with other services to provide a tailored solution for adults - particularly those 
                                                 
160 One of the 21 trigger offences is an open trigger that can be activated with the approval of an 
Inspector. In essence, anyone can be tested if an Inspector believes the individual has a drug problem. 
161 The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime has announced that from 2013/14 they will remove the 
ring-fence around the money allocated for DIP testing in order to allow for an increased focus on testing 
based on local concerns, and are open to the idea of enabling, “police to routinely test for the presence 
of other drugs and to add to the list of trigger offences” (Hadwen 2012, pg. 1) 
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who misuse Class A drugs - who commit crime to fund their drug misuse”(Home 
Office 2010d, pg. 9). By 2011 more than £900 million had been spent on the 
programme (Home Office 2011b). The programme emphasizes the need to treat drug 
problems by providing services in partnership with the community and appropriate 
providers in each area, and the funding streams which initially came from a central pot 
have moved to a local funding model under the Coalition Government. By 2011/12 
approximately 42 per cent of the nearly 70,000 people admitted to drug treatment each 
year were referred by the criminal justice system in one form or another (Roxburgh et 
al. 2012). 
 
These services were to be undertaken by Criminal Justice Intervention Teams (CJITs) 
in partnership with the police and local council. In Watling a Drug and Alcohol Action 
Team (DAAT) sets policy for the local DIP. However, the DIP services in Watling are 
run in partnership with a health and social care charity that coordinates a number of 
such programmes across England. Their office in Watling is in a non-descript brick 
building on a small road that comes off the high street. The charity offers: 
 
…treatment and care services to drug users who are involved in the 
criminal justice system. The new service offers an integrated end to end 
support service, with enhanced pathways to engage service users and move 
them into treatment and wraparound services away from drug use and 
crime. (Charity’s Home Page)162 
 
Watling has three police stations equipped with DIP testing equipment. If an offender 
is arrested for any of the ‘trigger offences’ they are subject to an oral swab that can 
detect cocaine and heroin. Of those tested, only about 25 per cent came back positive, 
with 40 per cent of those positive hits coming from offenders arrested for theft (Home 
Office 2007c). Despite spending quite a bit of time in the custody suite with officers, I 
rarely heard about DIP. At one point I sought out several sources to confirm that the 
programme was even in-place in the borough. The seemingly disconnected nature of 
DIP and officers’ duties is due to two factors. Firstly, the testing is often handled by 
officers or staff assigned to work in the custody suite, and secondly because any follow 
up is with the health providers or the courts, not with the officers (Hunter, Mcsweeney, 
and Turnbull 2005). 
                                                 
162 Specific details omitted to retain anonymity.  
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The lack of visibility of DIP testing speaks to a larger issue than just its prevalence. 
The only aspect of DIP officers are exposed to is the act of arresting the individual. 
They often do not administer the test, and are not involved in the initial assessment or 
follow up care. Their interaction with the programme is infrequent, brief, and only at a 
surface level.  Though it is an adaptive policy, officers are not exposed to the actual 
partnerships. They often derided the idea of DIP testing, assuming that it meant 
individuals were ‘let off’ from criminal charges because they were drug users.  
 
If you nick a bike, push em’ off and fall, fall hard and hurt their arm, all 
fucked up now, what is that? I got you on ABH, theft, maybe even 
possession if I catch you once you’ve scored. But you know, it’s not right 
that after chasing you down alleys, you test positive for heroin, and 
suddenly all is forgiven and you’re having a nice chat with some middle-
class twat who just wants to get you a warm bed and some soup before 
having you chat with ‘the group’ about why you’re such a thieving bastard 
because your mom never loved you.  (PC Henry, RT4) 
 
Suspects are required to participate in the initial testing under a statutory requirement 
of PACE 1984. Failure to do so can result in prison time, fines, or both. This potential 
sanction is employed because, “…in order to remain credible, criminal sanctions must 
exist and be used where required” (Polly 2007, pg. 8). Additionally, suspects are tested 
before they have been charged with a crime, and in fact may never actually be charged. 
The Government justifies this coercive state power by highlighting the drug crime link.  
 
Testing on arrest identifies [drug users] at an earlier stage in the criminal 
justice process. It is part of a range of measures under the Drug 
Interventions Programme, which delivers an end-to-end system to help 
individuals address their drug misuse. It is very likely that a number of 
those persons arrested but not charged with an offence will be involved in 
crime. The aim is to reduce their need to engage in crime to fund a drug 
habit, leading to an overall reduction in crime. It is, therefore, a reasonable 
and proportionate measure on the grounds of crime reduction and public 
protection. (Polly 2007, pg. 10) 
 
6.4 The Difference Between Class A Drugs and cannabis 
The ambivalent attitude many officers had towards cannabis was not replicated when 
discussing Class A drugs. Here, more than any other aspect of drugs policing, officers 
believed that the power of the state should be harnessed to punish Class A drug users. 
Describing how to handle heroin addiction, PC George bluntly commented, “Build 
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more maximum security prisons.” Most officers were adamant that Class A drugs were 
destructive and harmful for the community, warranting the full weight of their police 
powers. The officers’ arguments tended to follow Goldstein’s (1985) tripartite theory 
on crime associated with drug use, arguing that that drug dealers’ conflicts caused 
violence, Class A drug users committed acquisitive crime to support their habit, and 
that these drugs created psychological problems. Primarily though, officers focused on 
acquisitive crime as their primary rationale for the difference between Class A drugs 
and cannabis.  It is not surprising officers should understand their role in this way. 
Police have always been involved in the drugs issue from a crime perspective, not the 
health related activities that have come and gone in drugs policy (Shiner 2013). 
Additionally, the take-over of the drugs issue from the health services by the criminal 
justice system, and the prominence of policing within policy documents for the several 
decades (Seddon 2006, 2000) has disconnected them from any minimal stake in health 
related drugs policy initiatives that might previously have existed. This take-over shifts 
not only the pathways available to drug users, but further emphasises the drug problem 
as a crime problem necessitating management by police, despite the increasing move 
towards recovery-based approaches in the current drugs strategy (Duke 2013).  
  
Class A drugs I think are slightly different and I think you’ve got to see the 
sad cases you see of people who really do have horrible, horrible 
addictions to it and because of that are shoplifting and prostituting 
themselves and all of that, but then what does taking their little fix of 
Heroin off them achieve, it doesn’t achieve anything does it. (PC Jenny, 
RT4) 
 
Most officers believed that drug users committed crime to fund drug use. The concept 
of Class A drug users committing acquisitive crime to fund their drug habit is well 
established in both policy and the literature (Bennett, Holloway, and Williams 2001, 
Home Office 2004b, 2007a, 2010d). However, this propensity towards acquisitive 
crime may only reflect about 3 per cent of drug users (Seddon 2002) as most drug 
users only use occasionally and without problems (Warburton, Turnbull, and Hough 
2005).  The Government has tacitly acknowledged this fact through the development 
of the Prolific and Other Priority Offenders Programme (PPOP), introduced in 2004 in 
conjunction with PSA 23(Home Office 2009b).  The PPOP is not solely aimed at drug 
using offenders, though three quarters of the people entered in to the scheme by 2007 
reported that their crimes were fuelled by a desire to obtain money for drugs (Dawson 
and Cuppleditch 2007).  
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The PPO is based on three strands: prevent and deter crime, catch and convict 
offenders, and rehabilitate and resettle. It is an example of a mixed-bag of policy 
directives, featuring adaptive courses of action in the first and last strands, and a 
continued effort to arrest-away crime problems. Police stations in Watling had posters 
up describing the PPO scheme in the corridors and the PC’s writing room, but no-one 
seemed to take notice. The only part of the programme officers experienced was the 
‘catch and convict’ strand, and this was no different for one offender to the next, PPO 
or otherwise. As they rarely came across a non-problematic heroin user, the officers 
were unconvinced that such a population exists. Such users might exist for powder 
cocaine as it was seen to be a middle-class drug, ‘taken at dinner parties’ (Supt. 
Harold). 
 
Cocaine is more associated with going out, and when you’re out you want 
to have a good time, you’ll do a quick line in the toilet and then buzz the 
night away. Heroin is generally…I go to a lot of crack dens and see a lot of 
heroin users163. It’s normally people at the bottom of society, they’ve got 
nothing left to give society, it’s taken, it’s right over them…the only thing 
they live for is that hit of heroin they get each day. (PC Hugh, RT4) 
 
The portrayal of Class A drug users and abusers as being ‘damaged goods’ also meant 
that many officers felt some degree of sympathy for them. When officers came across 
an addict covered in sores and filthy, they were forced to confront the possibility that 
people they considered to be ‘baddies’ were actually in a sorry state.  Despite the 
desire to throw away the key on many of these drug users, the damaging effects of 
addiction engendered a sense of sympathy amongst many officers. This sympathy did 
not occur for cannabis users. Cannabis users were seen as a means to an end, deserving 
little sympathy because what they were doing something illegal and stupid but not 
compelled by addiction or resulting in such damage to the individual. .  
 
You could say someone that uses Class A drugs, that is an addict, that sort 
of desperation that they’ve got especially if you’ve been having dealings 
with them for shop lifting of whatever, and they look so ill and they’ve lost 
all their, well they haven’t got family close to them, they’re friends are 
other drug users and they just look so ill. Like, they’re not in the best of 
health and yet you can just see that drugs are their life, that is the most 
important thing to them. (PC Elle, RT4) 
 
                                                 
163 The term ‘crack den’ was used to describe any location used for taking drugs. 
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When we've seen people  coming through here who are heroin and crack 
users, and you look at their lifestyle and the kind of thing they're in to, it's a 
question of which came first, their drug use or their lifestyle? Which one 
bounces off the other one? Whether it's because there's a massive problem 
in their life and they've turned to drugs, or because they've turned drugs 
they've then turned to crime and to other drugs. (PC Mario, RT2) 
 
The message sent by the MPS about the differences between different drugs was also 
quite important in shaping the officers’ impression of the problem. Though stop and 
search for cannabis was conducted under the same legal powers as a search for heroin, 
the bureaucratic nature of the CWS sent a strong message about the role of officers. By 
defining down the deviance of cannabis by instituting the CWS, the organization could 
not appear to also ‘soften’ its approach to Class A drugs, and the targeting of such 
drugs was supposed to intensify once the CWS took effect. Officers were disconnected 
from the treatment side of Class A arrests, and the organization condoned crackdowns 
on Class A drug users in order to adhere to their rhetoric about being tough on drugs. 
The only options available to officers encountering Class A drugs were to arrest the 
individual or to ignore the offence. Whereas a warning form for cannabis quietly 
emphasized their position as bureaucrats, the power to arrest emphasized their unique 
role as protectors of the community. No matter the excitement of bringing in a bag of 
cannabis, it was tempered by the fact there was no suspect in handcuffs as well. The 
power to arrest, to deprive a citizen of their liberty, was a power that officers exercised 
regularly but were conscious of the seriousness of a situation that an arrest symbolised.  
 
I think Class A is different. I think that's mainly because you can't give 
street warnings. It’s not a quick and easy detection. If someone is carrying 
Class A then you have to arrest them, and it's a little bit more serious. With 
Class A it's an arrest, then they have to be interviewed, and then the 
substance has to go up for analysis. (PC Eleanor, RT2) 
 
Though current UK drug strategy points out various pathways for addicts to live drug 
free lives (Home Office 2010c), these often begin with addicts being arrested. The 
conflicted nature of the policy was felt as street-level. As mentioned above, officers 
recognized addiction as problem and saw some need to get addicts help. At the same 
time, the officers were disconnected from any treatment avenues, and as such were 
exposed only to the part of the process involving arrest.  Policy documents may 
discuss the broad partnerships and treatment avenues developing to assist addicts, but 
that reality is far removed from the street-level encounters officers are experiencing.  
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6.5 Conclusion: The More Things Change, the More They Stay The Same 
This chapter has covered considerable ground. It began by assessing how the 
criminalization thesis resonates at the policy level, but has progressed to show that 
street-level implementation of drugs policy is carried out, at least in Watling, by 
officers conflicted about their role in addressing the problem of drugs The limitation 
with the analysis of this chapter clearly rests in its ability to accurately depict police 
practices from before the period in which was directly observed. Never the less, in 
exploring both the adaptive and non-adaptive responses to drugs we see that there have 
been substantial developments in the policy sphere, and significant changes in drugs 
policing statistics, indicating some changes have reached the street-level. These policy 
changes have affected the different units in different ways.  
 
The CWS is a constant part of policing practice for RT officers in Watling. As I have 
shown, officers have found a variety of reasons to make use of the system even when 
they are not particularly enthused by the process. Additionally, the CWS has reshaped 
the pursuit and outcome of cannabis possession based encounters. Where previously 
officers tossed aside small amounts of cannabis if the attitude test was passed, they 
have almost entirely abandoned such practices within the teams I observed164.  
 
RT officers go about their work with much the same range of attitudes towards drugs, 
and employing the same tactics that featured in in previous ethnographies that covered 
the subject (Manning 1980, Wallace, Roberg, and Allen 1985, Smith and Gray 1983, 
Collison 1995). How they can express their attitudes may be redefined, especially 
under the CWS, but it is largely intact. Officers regularly stop and search individuals 
solely to find drugs, as they have done since they were given that power. The 
frequency of these searches has increased, and at their core they remain a vehicle to 
enforce norms and assert authority.  Officers still conduct raids, ignoring the need for 
joined-up services to participate in order to be effective (Chiu, Mansley, and Morgan 
1998). Additionally, the use of DIP might be seen to be a new turn in bringing together 
the criminal justice system and drug treatment opportunities, but these partnerships 
                                                 
164 I believe that the absence of such informal outcomes was not based on my presence. The officers 
were willing to engage in numerous actions not in line with official guidance while in my presence, and 
there were ample opportunities for them to dispose of some cannabis in to the gutter without anyone 
other than those of us at the incident knowing about it.  
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remain out of sight for most officers. They are obscure ideas that reside outside of the 
limited field of view officers have of the rest of the criminal justice system. Drug 
addicts still get arrested, brought in to a custody suite, and put in a cell. The only 
change is that now they have a quick swab of their saliva along the way. For all intents 
and purposes for a street-level officer, it was ever thus.  
 
Identifying where drugs policy has come in to the play for SNTs is quite easily spotted, 
for without the Community Policing that has fuelled the rise in partnership, 
responsibilization ethos, and produced a focus on reducing the fear of crime, these 
teams would not even exist. Drug distribution being a signal crime (Innes and Fielding 
2002), SNTs provide opportunity to calm those community concerns and become a 
visible part of the united front against such problems. Beyond their birth as agents of 
implementing adaptive policies, the SNTs serve another vital role, this time for non-
adaptive policy. The SNTs are harnessed to gather local intelligence and use that 
information to launch drug raids (MPS 2007a). It is nothing new to conduct drug raids 
(Collison 1995), but having a team dedicated to doing so based on locally gathered 
intelligence, and community identified concern is a direct result of the implementation 
of community policing ideas based on adaptive policy.  However, I said that the drug 
raids are part of non-adaptive responses. Indeed, while the spur to conduct the raids 
arises from community partnerships enabling the flow of intelligence, the raids are 
ultimately designed to assert the state’s ability to protect the citizenry and impede drug 
distribution.  
 
Let us go back to PC Hugh’s own words in the previous chapter. He cites that with 
intelligence from the community he was able to conduct operations, and that in seeing 
him conduct those operations the community felt protected and more willing to 
provide further intelligence to his unit. This is exactly what the MPS and central 
Government hoped would happen with the deployment of the SNTs (Home Office 
2004a, 2005c, Tuffin, Morris, and Poole 2006, Home Office 2007d, 2007b). In this 
limited regard, we can consider their work a success, and also see how large scale 
policy goals make their way to the street-level. When combined with Shiner’s 
information regarding the increased use of penal sanctions for drug crimes (Shiner 
2013), we can see that SNTs are a manifestation of both adaptive and non-adaptive 
roles.  
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Interestingly, while the action PC Saul takes outside of The Bandulu is clearly an 
aspect of adaptive practice, his action reinforces policing’s authority to prevent 
criminal activity; an idea that is at the heart of sovereign state strategies.  The power he 
can command as a representative of the state’s prohibition of drugs is retained, even if 
the method of expressing it has changed. Even in inaction, the officer projects his 
authorization to use coercive force, something that sets him apart from any other part 
of the criminal justice system, or society at large (Bittner 1975). This aligns with 
Garland’s views that while the same criminal justice infrastructure remains embedded 
in society, the deployment of its powers has changed (2001, pg. 168). Attempting to 
try and arrest all those potential criminals that looked at the IRV would have been 
impossible and only served to highlight the inadequacy of police to control drugs. It is 
in this situation, perhaps even more than in relation to cannabis warning forms, that we 
can see how adaptive strategies serve to retain some sense of state control in an 
otherwise uncontrollable scenario.  
 
What we see when looking at these two types of units is that adaptive and non-
adaptive anti-drugs efforts are intertwined, each allowing the other to exist and thrive. 
Garland described the new structure of the criminal justice system as being schizoid 
(2001, pg. 110), but when examining drugs policing at the street-level, adaptive and 
non-adaptive developments are also symbiotic. Each is a façade facing away from the 
other, its internal trusses and beams supporting the other, like two people using each 
other’s weight as they sit back-to-back. 
 
To maintain its authority, the neo-liberal state needs to promise protection, and so must 
take a non-adaptive stance when publicly addressing the problem of drugs. From this 
perspective we can see that criminalization of British drugs policy is just another 
aspect of neo-liberal search for security in the face of uncertainty.  Neo-liberalism 
promises security to the citizenry, but to do that it must criminalize and punish to show 
it has control (Ericson 2007).   This is why we see things like Operation Hawk, where 
thousands of officers are rallied to engage in large operations that bring forth highly 
visible ‘acting out’. But the state is incapable of maintaining such efforts continuously, 
and so it must also develop adaptive responses to drugs. This gives room for the less 
heroic stance necessary to free up resources to address other areas of securitization that 
would be undermanned if the state’s full weight and penal sanctions were constantly 
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applied to drugs alone. This brings about the partnerships and responsibilization that 
are at the heart of adaptive strategies. By bringing in DIP and the CWS, the myth of 
being able to stop drugs is upheld through their regularly reported statistics, supporting 
the punitive rhetoric. The State says, ‘we are acting against drugs, and here are the 
numbers to prove it!’ Never mind the figures pertaining to drugs have inadvertently 
come largely from the CWS, an adaptive strategy designed to reduce the time and 
energy spent pursuing such drugs deemed to be less harmful to communities than other 
social or criminal activities. The punitive rhetoric and non-adaptive policies supports 
the ability for administrative actors to engage in activities below the radar that actually 
fit their needs as practitioners.  
 
From this symbiotic framework we can begin to see how some new policies filter 
down, and yet many things remain the same at the street-level. The CWS was able to 
affect policy because it supported the public image of maintaining control over drugs 
with the practicalities of quick enforcement for officers on the street. Trying to 
prosecute all cannabis users would be futile, but writing them warnings is efficient and 
still asserts control. DIP puts the responsibility for sobriety in the hands of the addicts 
and drug treatment workers, while reinforcing the idea that crime problems are the 
result of drug addicts. SNTs ‘take down doors’ like has been done for decades, but do 
so at the apparent behest of the local community. Such enforcement and constant 
patrolling of a neighbourhood would perhaps have a very different reaction from the 
community if it were proposed as an occupying force. 
 
Two important questions arise from this analysis. How do you project the success of 
both adaptive and non-adaptive efforts at the same time, and how do you get officers 
on board? Both adaptive and non-adaptive efforts need to show they are generating 
results or politicians will face a backlash from the community (Matravers and Maruna 
2004). Here the drug user has found themselves as both a target for policing’s need to 
police, and a public’s need to find blame. They meet the needs of both groups, and 
have the added bonus of giving the politicians someone with whom they can espouse a 
desire to help in to recovery instead of prison. In order to show the state can effectively 
control, you need to show that you are engaging. Just like an officer who does not 
witness what happens to an addict after DIP testing, a large amount of public’s 
perception is based on what they see being done and what they are told is being done 
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(Hohl, Bradford, and Stanko 2010), and the practicalities of implementing drugs 
policing is of less concern to them. 
To get officers on board, you need to make the engagement fit their professional 
culture, individual identity, and need for efficiency of operation in the field. The CWS, 
while adaptive in nature, allows officers to express their ‘harm’ and ‘normative order’ 
rationales through the use of stop and search. While larger shifts in the criminal justice 
system continue to emphasise their role as street-level bureaucrats, the pursuit of drugs 
abates that striking reality for a time. Even the SNT officers committed to community 
partnership resort to non-adaptive drug raids when presented with intelligence from the 
community.  
 
Two important questions arise from the above discussion. Firstly, how do you ensure 
that officers with a heterogeneous opinion on drugs actually adhere to the new anti-
drugs policies taking place? I will suggest in the next chapter that, as the old saying 
goes, ‘what gets measured gets done’ (Bevan and Hood 2006). Secondly, how do you 
get the figures to show you’re standing strong in the face of drugs without inundating 
the criminal justice system? The answer is that you need to make it easy for officers to 
look tough.    
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Chapter 7- A Profitable Venture for All: Performance Management 
in Policing  
…performance management is a set of discourses and practices that 
generate [performance indicators] within a stream of other spectacular and 
mundane signs. The constructions we make and the meanings we grasp in 
order to move forward are our own: a foundationalist alternative is not 
possible. From a postmodern perspective, [performance indicators] are 
never going to be more than "hocus-pocus," and the role of researchers 
should not be to speak as if they can be "grounded" but to show how 
tenuous such claims are. (Dorn 2000, pg. 311-312) 
 
In this chapter I will lay out the final piece of my analysis, interpreting why we have 
witnessed the developments in street-level policing seen throughout this thesis and 
borne out in official statistics showing an increase in recorded drug offences. I will 
argue that the increased presence of New Public Managerialism, injected in to the mix 
of adaptive policies and non-adaptive rhetoric, has created a situation whereby police 
officers are largely disconnected from the organizational goals and policy directives. 
This is often referred to as an organization being ‘loosely coupled’ and I will explore 
that particular condition further in this chapter.  
 
Before addressing the evidence to support my argument I will briefly discuss issues 
related to problems in the establishment of NPM, to support those ideas already 
discussed in Chapter Two. Many of the changes in policing came together at around 
the same time, pushing against each other, creating a loosely coupled officer corps. In 
loose coupling, “…agents are disconnected from organizational goals” (Knight 2008, 
pg. 4), and I will explore what this looks like in policing. From this I will show how 
drugs policing, and cannabis in particular, were in the right position to fulfil the needs 
of operational officers to meet the various pressures they faced.  
 
The Farmingham police station is located on the corner of the high street and Lombard 
Road. About 350 metres up Lombard Road, in the heart of Blackburn Ward, is a row 
of rundown local shops, including a dry cleaner, two cafes, a pound shop, and a social 
club. While there is a fair amount of foot traffic passing in front of the shops, only the 
social club and Johnny’s café seem to have customers. The social club is frequented by 
a regular crowd of older Turkish men, and if you walk past the open door you can see 
them sitting at card tables, smoking, playing cards, and watching football. The café, by 
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contrast, does not have a regular clientele. Instead, it seems to attract all manner of 
people - young and old, male and female, white and black, a steady stream of people 
come in and out of the café. There are two notable differences between Johnny’s café 
and most other cafes in London: no one seems to stay more than a minute or two at 
Johnny’s, and no one ever exits the shop with a sandwich or cup of tea in their hand. 
They go in, re-emerge quickly with no outwardly visible food products, and leave the 
area. Or at least they try to leave the area.  
 
Sitting about 70 metres down the road from the café, the 1-1 car from RT2 is parked 
amongst the local cars. It is early evening, and with people returning from work we 
were lucky to find a parking spot with a good sight line to the café. It only takes a few 
minutes before we have our first target. A man parks his work-van about 40 metres the 
other side of the café from us, gets out, goes in to the café, and comes back less than a 
minute later. He starts up the van and drives past us before turning towards the high 
street.  
 
PC Michael and PC Edward have been excited since they first saw the man park his 
van. PC Michael starts the 1-1 car and makes an immediate U-turn as he pulls away 
from the curb, but already we’ve lost sight of the van and so he pushes the accelerator 
hard. PC Edward starts writing down the number plate along with the time and 
location in his notebook. We catch up to the van just as it begins to turn on to the high 
street, and PC Michael turns on the lights and siren. The officers ask the man to leave 
the vehicle and explain that they believe he is in possession of drugs based on his 
visiting a known drug hot-spot. They search him, but come up empty. The man’s 14 
year old son sits in the passenger seat of the van watching PC Edward search through 
all the nooks and crannies where one could hide a bag of cannabis inside the front of 
the van. PC Michael turns to the man, “C’mon mate, I know you’ve just bought drugs, 
so just tell us where it is and we won’t have to tear apart the van. You probably wanna 
get home to the misses…that’ll happen soon as you show us where it is.”  As the 
officers come up empty handed, the man shows signs of becoming increasingly 
frustrated at the officers. He is shaking his head and muttering as he crosses, 
uncrosses, and re-crosses his arms repeatedly. 
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Finally, PC Edward makes the man’s son get out of the van, and finds the bag of 
cannabis wedged in to the seat where the boy had been sitting. Later, after the incident 
was concluded, the officers told me why finding cannabis on the son was problematic. 
If the man had the cannabis on him it would have resulted in a cannabis warning. If the 
boy is the one in possession of the cannabis, they would have to arrest him, as the 
guidelines state that those under 18 are not eligible for a cannabis Warning. This is 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it would take them several hours of paperwork to 
do this, depriving the whole team of the 1-1 car’s valuable ability to enter an area 
undetected165. Secondly, they were concerned the father would ‘kick off’ if they tried 
to arrest the son. That would require even more paperwork and potential injury.   
 
 PC Michael beings to tell the father how his son could be facing arrest, but he is 
willing resolve the situation with a warning if the man will admit the drugs are his. PC 
Edward stands to the side, boxing the man in between the officers and a fence, thumbs 
hooked in to the arm-holes of his Met-vest while nodding in agreement with PC 
Michael. The man beings to shout at the officers, “You lot are just being rude! Why 
are you coming after me? I work, I’m not hurting anyone here. Why you gotta go after 
my son? Leave my son alone!” PC Michael reiterates that they do not have to go after 
the son if the father will agree that it is his cannabis. The man agrees. He tells officers 
that he has been given a warning once before and is willing to get another if it protects 
his son. Within a few minutes the cannabis warning form has been completed and we 
are heading back to the café to see if we can bust another person. 
 
As the reader has probably ascertained, Johnny’s café sells cannabis. Every officer in 
Watling knows this. That is why RT2 starts nearly every shift by having the 1-1 car 
park down the road at one of several points where they can observe people coming and 
going in to the cafe. Officers reported that their goal was not to deter visits to the 
location, but rather to obtain sanctioned detections via the CWS. During my time with 
RT2, I observed a near 100 per cent hit rate for searches of people coming out of the 
café. “I sit here because that’s the job of the 1-1 car. We get some detections, and the 
                                                 
165 The anonymityability of the unmarked 1-1 car to go undetected is extremely useful when searching 
for suspects after an incident, as it allows the police to enter an area search without alerting people to 
giving away their presence. . More importantly, as officers are unarmed, the 1-1 car is the first to 
respond to firearms calls because they can assess the situation and guide in other units that would 
otherwise be open targets to a gunman.  
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Gov166 is happy. Get’m early, and then we can move on to real policing” (PC Michael, 
RT2). I sat outside Johnny’s café with three different pairs of officers over the course 
of fieldwork, and each said almost the same thing: they were highly encouraged by 
their managers to apprehend cannabis users for the specific purpose of issuing 
cannabis Warning Forms to individuals leaving the café. This was done, according to 
the officers I worked with, with the explicit intention to make the team’s performance 
appear better. Once officers had caught one or two individuals with cannabis, or calls 
requiring the 1-1 came in, they could abandon their observation of the café. But all 
good things must come to an end, and later in this chapter I will discuss the demise of 
this golden goose.  
 
Because of the presence of the ‘cannabis café’ Blackburn ward registered six times as 
many drugs possession charges per month compared with the average across all the 
other wards of Watling.  Compared to neighbouring wards it had more than twice as 
many drug possession offences167. This ‘Golden Triangle’ around the café had 
significantly higher drug offence rates than other areas of the borough, and together 
they significantly affected the overall rate of drugs possession offences in the borough. 
Officers reported that the practice of sitting outside the cafe in an unmarked car had 
been going on for several years, but that officers had known about and been targeting 
people around the café since 2005. PC Mario reported that during a particularly fruitful 
shift he had managed to issue 14 cannabis Warnings while sitting outside the café.  
 
                                                 
166 A male officer with the rank of Inspector, in this case an Inspector in charge of a Response Team. A 
female officer in charge of a Response Team is referred to as Ma’am.   
 
167 The high levels of drug possession offences in the neighbouring wards may be due to the fact that the 
café resides on a stretch of Lombard road that essentially forms an isthmus between the two major 
sections of Blackburn ward. As such, if someone emerges from the café and goes in either of two 
cardinal directions they will be within the next ward in less than 100 metres. This means that some 
people are marked as having been caught in an adjacent ward, though they came from the café in 
Blackburn ward.  
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Figure 14: Drug offences per thousand population in and around Blackburn ward (MPS 2013a) 
 
 
Figure 15: Watling drug offence rates compared to London average (MPS 2013a) 
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Policing has had to embrace New Public Managerialism as part of the adaptive 
strategies created as government retreated from the ‘war on drugs’ mentality that had 
guided much previous policy (Dorn and South 1990). The incorporation of NPM came 
on top of a multitude of changes that had been eroding the core ideas of the role of 
police since the 1980’s. Adaptive policies, community work, and partnership, all 
destabilized the organization by formally emphasising a type of policing that required 
officers who could build partnerships, not just subdue suspects. 
 
My analysis shows that because of NPM, officers found themselves in a position of 
having to meet statistical requirements to validate their effectiveness while feeling the 
effects of this destabilisation, and they responded to this perverse incentive structure 
by distorting one aspect of their policing practice(Sergeant 2008). Pursuing cannabis 
warnings in response to performance management pressures took an adaptive strategy 
designed to shift police focus on to more harmful drugs, and provided a non-adaptive 
opportunity for officers to reassert what they felt were core elements of their 
professional identity, even if cannabis had not previously held such stature. Officers 
were not forced to pursue cannabis, but nor were they free to ignore its potential as a 
quick solution their professional and emotional needs. The perverse incentive structure 
of the performance management culture and the availability of issuing a warning for 
cannabis pushed officers to go for the ‘easy pickings’. 
 
Officers were pulled away from the community focused approach the organization 
sought to take by having to perform to output measures that were unaligned with the 
new community focus.  Nowhere in the MPS policy documents, nor those of the Home 
Office will we find reference to a concerted push to target low-level cannabis 
possession. Both officers and the MPS management agree that cannabis should not be 
a priority; however the outcome based performance targets created an opportunity to 
stabilize both their professional identity and support their professional development in 
addition to meeting the performance target. Bevan and Hood (2006) have shown how 
incentives to hit targets shapes the response of public bodies as they seek to avoid 
embarrassment and punitive sanctions. Garland describes the incorporation of 
incentive structures in the criminal justice system as part of a transition from ‘social’ to 
‘economic styles of reasoning, that potentially, “ skew practice to fit performance 
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indicators, limit the discretion of field staff, and diminish an agency’s real 
effectiveness in order to maximize the practices that are most easily measurable.” 
(Garland 2001, pg. 189) My argument goes a step farther, and highlights how there are 
ancillary reasons why it benefits front-line staff to hit those targets. Yes, they are 
encouraged to hit the targets by unit commanders, but they also receive a benefit as 
individual professionals.   
 
7.1 Problems of New Public Managerialism in Policing 
The introduction of NPM did not revolutionize the policing landscape, clearing away 
the remnants of old ways in the flood of new regulations. Rather, as I have shown 
throughout this research, old remnants remain, and the intersection of old and new can 
seem conflicted. This conflict can also be seen in performance management efforts 
which employ very different indicators. The deployment of SNTs and the introduction 
of the CWS each reinforced a focus on a particular type of performance assessment. 
The SNTs were to be judged on the confidence-based service outcomes, and RT 
officers were to continue to be measured on their outputs in the form of detections and 
arrests (Herrington and Millie 2006). In this way we again see evidence of community 
policing being used as a, ‘strategic buffering’ (Zhao, Lovrich, and Robinson 2001), 
protecting core functions and putting on a positive face for government while most 
officers continued to be assessed on the basis of traditional, non-adaptive, crime-
focused outcomes. These types of measurement schemes engender a culture of 
performance, not a culture focused on responsiveness to the community (Fitzgerald et 
al. 2002). NPM may put pressure on officers to abandon the valuable but 
umenasurable aspects of community policing (Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith 2011). 
 
This highlights an additional problem that can arise in performance management 
efforts. The focus on external crime reduction targets can harm the internal leadership 
of the organisation. Instead of providing leadership to officers in the field, senior 
officers focus on managing the efforts to reach targets. Shilston has pointed out that 
many of the quantitative measures implemented by New Labour failed to capture the 
micro level detail that would let policy makers actually learn from the measures they 
put in place (2008). 
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Within a performance management framework the primary characteristic is 
seen to be the commitment not to an organisational vision but to 
conformity in both running and delivering services while also aiming to 
achieve externally set targets. The primary emphasis here is directed to the 
effective management of targets rather than on qualities of leadership 
which have become within this context almost entirely redundant. 
(Loveday 2008, pg. 122) 
 
The problem of synecdoche, the taking of one measured part of an organization to 
represent the unmeasured elements, can increase the problems engendered by a focus 
on figures and not the larger organisational vision (Bevan and Hood 2006, Manning 
1979). If what are being measured, in this case sanctioned detections, are an inaccurate 
measurement of performance, then officers can obtain the requested detections while 
providing a poor service. Even worse, the possibility of gaming the statistics (Bevan 
and Hood 2006) can occur, whereby efforts are made to shape the appearance of 
statistics to fit with the PIs. This is especially problematic in the case of ‘target’ based 
performance approaches (Hood 2007). Bevan and Hood (2006) identify three types of 
gaming that can occur. In ‘ratcheting’ the future targets are based on the ability to hit 
current targets, and so organisations are incentivised to only meet their current targets 
even if they are capable of exceeding them. In ‘threshold gaming’ units operating 
below the target must raise themselves to the standard, but high performing units are 
perversely incentivised to let their performance levels fall to the standard. The final 
type of gaming, 'output distortions', is the most visible form in Watling street-level 
policing. In this type of gaming, targets are achieved, but the positive results come at 
the expense of other areas of practice not measured by the set of PIs. In the case of 
Watling, ‘target gaming’ meant that performance targets for detections were achieved 
through the use of cannabis warnings, but this potentially pulled focus away from more 
harmful criminal activity, and most certainly impacted the relationship with the 
community. 
 
Without unity in the direction that performance frameworks were pulling officers, the 
organization created a situation in which there was no uniting direction. Bratton (2009) 
believes that performance management regimes can unify the organization towards a 
shared understanding of purpose, but in Watling at least, the fragmented nature of the 
different performance management regimes seemed to engender disunity between 
SNTs and RTs.  
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7.2 Problems of Loose Coupling 
Loose coupling originates in organizational theory, and describes situations where the 
stated goals and objectives of an organization are not perceived to be aligned with the 
daily activities of the organization (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Through the 
implementation of performance indicators that do not align with the reality of what 
officers experience during their shifts, visible distance is created between the street-
level officers and the police organization. This misalignment can be extremely 
deleterious (Legrand 2003). As the organization is asked to regularly reshape its 
priorities (and corresponding performance indicators) based on ideological and 
political expectations, the structure of the organisation will loosen in order to allow 
agents to maintain a role as they see fit.  
 
In response to these multiple, vague, and often conﬂicting external 
demands, government bureaucracies, like the police, assign more 
importance to agreed upon procedures than uncertain outcomes, exist as 
loosely coupled organizational systems, and are characterized by decision 
making practices that tend to be more ceremonial than substantive. (Willis, 
Mastrofski, and Weisburd 2007, pg. 180) 
 
Officers working in a loosely coupled environment are able to distance themselves 
from the organization and create opportunities to nullify policy through their 
adherence to street-level practices that remain in-line with the law and their own 
perception of the role of policing (Crank 2010). “…loose coupling themes serve to de-
couple line activity from organizational goals and policies when they are perceived by 
officer to obstruct of undermine the ability of the police to do their work" (Crank 2010, 
pg. 6).  
 
Loose coupling recognises that there is a gap between formal structures 
and work practices. Formal rules are often broken, decisions are often 
unimplemented, or if implemented have unintended consequences. 
Performance systems are subverted or are too ambiguous to provide much 
guidance. Attempts to control and co-ordinate activities in organisations 
leads to conflicts and loss of legitimacy. (Knight 2008, pg. 5) 
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Viewed from a different perspective, this might be referred to as police discretion. 
However there is a difference between an officer deciding when and how to create a 
formal response to (illegal activity) they observe, and the ideas of loose coupling that 
highlight the disconnected and contradictory nature of daily activities and 
organisational direction. Loose coupling does not argue that officers are using 
professional judgement to subvert formal rules, but rather that they are doing so in 
reaction to the actions of the organisation. Officers were emotionally invested in at 
least some of the stated aims of the organisation, but were disoriented by the 
contradictory nature of what they were being asked to do in the different teams, 
frustrated by the focus on performance  management,  and were distanced from what 
they and the organisation considered to be priorities. This was because of the perverse 
incentive structure that has been inadvertently created by the CWS and NPM, which 
encourages officers to game the system by going for easy pickings. Loose coupling 
gives officers the space to purposefully stand still amidst the ever flowing changes in 
policing policy due to the gaps created between officers and the official direction of 
the organisation. Without transitioning officer culture or enjoining all units to a 
common performance management framework, officers can pick and choose how they 
interact with organisational priorities based on what suits their style.  
 
RT officers have no connection to the confidence-based statistics that guide SNT 
activities, nor do they have much connection with the myriad of internal statistics 
produced by the MPS. During parade an Inspector may announce how the team ranked 
in the monthly figures, and may even plead for them to accomplish certain goals, but 
once out on the streets they are largely left to their own devices. 
 
[I’m told to] get as many as you can. Cannabis detection makes prizes at 
the end of the day; it’s all to do with performance figures again. I don’t 
think the police should be judged on performance like a business, because I 
don’t think the police is a business, it’s a force. It’s not a force, it’s a 
service in the sense that we are there to deal with the needs of the public, 
and I understand that, but to manage teams on how many cannabis 
detections they get; I don’t think it’s right. (PC Hugh, RT4) 
 
 During parade I noticed that crime hotspots were highlighted on a map of the borough, 
and officers were advised to pay attention to those areas. I knew that Blackburn SNT 
had recently put robberies as a Ward Panel priority. Though the robberies in that ward 
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were shown on the map, the fact that it had been listed as a community priority did not 
accompany the little green triangles that marked the location of each robbery. For the 
RT officers it was about stopping crime, not about how the community perceived those 
crimes.  
 
It's the politics of it. The amount of resources that are wasted, on us 
chasing these ridiculous figures, it breeds people like Insp Bradley. Now 
he is completely figures whipped! It's all that fucking matters to him, 
detections and arrests. Well, you know, is it working? I don’t think it is. I 
don’t think it is at all. We're just keeping the lid on things [on the street]. 
(PC George, RT4) 
 
Officers in Watling felt even more disconnected from the organization when they felt 
proud of the work they had done but felt underappreciated for that work because it did 
not fit neatly in to a performance indicator. As I discussed previously, PC Jenny came 
back from dealing with a rape and received little recognition of her work while another 
officer who brought in two joints was congratulated by the Sergeant. With no arrest in 
hand, and plenty of evidence to tag and place in evidence bags, PC Jenny was 
occupied with the paperwork for some time after her return and was largely left alone 
by the team. She did not say anything at the time, but in her interview only a few 
weeks previously: 
 
I just think it’s a bit stupid really, it’s the figures orientated policing isn’t it 
really. The end of the day, if you can get a tiny piece of cannabis off 
somebody it equates to a detection, whereas 12 hours dealing with a rape is 
just 12 hours spent not doing anything that’s going to get you a figure. (PC 
Jenny, RT4) 
 
7.3 Just Say Yes to Drugs… Policing 
How, then, are performance management regimes driving officers to engage in a 
policing activity for which they apparently have limited interest?   
 
 …we’re a response team but we get targets [for] arrest and detections, 
whereas our objective should be to answer the calls. That should be the 
objective, and the only one, [and] anything else that you get as a result of 
that should be a bonus. The problem is because of [targets] we then get tied 
up with so much stuff that we don’t need to be doing because people -not 
on this team but on other teams- go, ‘we’ll just arrest everyone!’ because 
it’s easier, we get a figure for it. (Sgt Moses RT4) 
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I don’t put any pressure on my officers to get detections, although they 
may feel that there is pressure, from up high they have a…they have to get 
two arrests and one detection a month, which works out to twelve 
detections and twenty four arrests a year. So there is that pressure in some 
ways; if it’s not achieved then they’re not put against the wall and shot. 
(Sgt Harry, RT4) 
 
It’s because it’s easy pickings and we go back to this measuring 
[detections]. At the end of the day if you drive past and you see someone 
walking out of [the café], nine out of ten times they’ve got drugs on them 
so you’re going to stop them, you’re going to get a positive stop, you’re 
going to find some drugs on them…it’s not rocket science you know, and 
at the same time that’s what you want to be a police officer for; to fight 
crime. It doesn’t matter how upstairs class it [is]. And see the importance 
of it for a police officer, it could be something very minor, but it’s a crime. 
(Sgt Richard, Blackburn SNT) 
 
Though policy documents (Home Office 2010c, 2007a) may measure success in 
combatting drugs through measuring admission to drug treatment programs or 
international trafficking organisations disrupted,  these are not relevant to the 
experiences of officers on the street. At the street-level, outputs matter. Whether part 
of the CWS or the number of crack houses closed down, selected output based 
performance indicators are seen by unit commanders and the SLT to represent how 
well an officer performs or how well their team is performing. Community Damage 
Limitation efforts (Lee and South 2008) may improve the outcomes of policing efforts 
by engaging with the issues directly affecting local communities, but those efforts do 
not translate to the local PC trying for a promotion to Sergeant. In the eyes of many 
officers, the figures give ammunition to the Government to highlight successes in 
targeting drugs.  
 
From above it’s what they want, because on paper [cannabis warnings are] 
classed as a drug related offence with a clear up at the end of it. So yet 
again it’s the Home Office counting those guidelines that they can go and 
say at the end of the year, ‘well we have 10,000 drug related offences and 
we had 9,800 of them were cleared up’. But it’s just a guy on the street 
with a little bit of cannabis, a joint. It’s not 10,000 dealers, it’s not the big 
end of the scale, so that’s where the annoyance lies. (Sgt Moses, RT4) 
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A Home Office press release stated the following in October 2010:  
 
Statistics out today show 224,080 drug seizures were made in England and 
Wales by the police and the UK Border Agency last year as part of their 
work protecting communities from the harm of drugs. While this figure is a 
seven per cent fall on the previous year when 241,473 seizures were made, 
they also reveal intelligence led enforcement has led to a rise in the 
quantities seized by police forces of the most dangerous drugs, including 
cocaine, crack and heroin168. (Home Office 2010b, pg. 1)  
 
We know that in recent years about 65% of cannabis seizures are for possession level 
offences169, so given the 168,547 herbal and resin cannabis seizures170, I calculated 
that 49 per cent of all drug seizures in 2009/10 involved small amounts of cannabis 
(Mulchandani, Hand, and Panesar 2010). The chart below provides a representation of 
the impact on drug seizure statistics that cannabis possession offences have.  
 
 
Figure 16: Drug seizures, with and without cannabis possession offences, England and Wales 
 
That the increase in recorded cannabis and other drug offences is largely a function of 
performance management initiatives, and not an increase in drug usage rates, and has 
been noted elsewhere.  
 
                                                 
168 It should be noted that 78 per cent of those drug seizures involved cannabis, while only 18 per cent of 
the seizures involved Class A drugs. 
169 See Chapter 2 
170 Seizures of cannabis plants are excluded from this figure as it is unlikely that individuals found with 
plants would be charged with simple possession offences.  
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The use of out of court disposals such as cautions, cannabis warnings or 
Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs) increased rapidly for both adults and 
youths during the mid-2000s then reduced in 2007/08. These changes 
coincided with the introduction of the Offences Brought to Justice (OBTJ) 
target in 2002 and its subsequent replacement in 2008 with a revised target 
designed to focus effort on bringing more serious offences to justice. This 
target has now been removed. (Ministry of Justice 2010b, pg. 7) 
 
The Ministry of Justice (2010a) has pointed out that it was not only drug related 
activities that saw an increase in their frequency during this period. A large increase in 
all out of court disposals took place, coinciding with the Public Service Agreements 
undertaken by New Labour, and decreasing upon the removal of the targets associated 
with those PSAs. This increase in out of court disposals highlights the adaptive 
changes occurring in the criminal justice system. 
 
These outcome based measures are used to demonstrate activity and bolster police 
legitimacy. At a Police Community Consultative Group meeting one night I sat in the 
back row of a the community centre and listened to Watling’s borough commander 
deliver his report. He mentioned community satisfaction rates, and covered the 
improvements in response times and decreases in burglaries, but his presentation was 
not focused on those items. Rather, the overriding message was that the police were 
taking action, conducting operations, and actively pursuing criminals. This was evident 
because they continued to arrest and process large numbers of offenders. The message 
was well received, as was the commander, and those in attendance seemed satisfied 
with the overall picture of the borough. Even at community meetings, and in a time 
when the government had officially moved beyond the measurement of outputs, the 
borough commander used these indicators to show that his officers were targeting 
criminal behaviour, rather than demonstrating the impact that this was having on the 
lives of those to whom he was speaking.  
 
Street-level officers are aware of the larger organizational and political transformations 
being undertaken, but they are only minimally involved in shepherding those 
developments. 
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7.3.1 An Opportunity to Stand Firm 
Amidst all the policy changes taking place in policing, officers have been disconnected 
from the larger organizational goals by the regular redrafting of performance 
management standards in the last decade. Instead of being pulled in new directions 
each time the political wind shifts, they have planted their feet. With the advent of the 
CWS and a renewed push for output based measures of success, officers have 
identified that drugs and cannabis in particular allow them to fulfil the expectations of 
their managers enough to free them from adherence to larger restructuring of the 
organisation. Targeting cannabis fits within the mission oriented nature of the classic 
police culture, and so meeting the performance measurements on the back of low level 
cannabis busts does not impinge on the sense of self or sense of mission that officers 
are seeking to maintain. At the same time, because their targets are being met, they can 
pursue aspects of policing that matter more to them. “I’m just not interested in the 
whole cannabis thing as some others are. I don’t like cannabis any, so it’s no bother to 
do. Take’s a bit of pressure off from the Gov, then I can go do my thing, police, police 
things that matter” (PC Matt, RT2).  
 
This focus on low level cannabis detections is not evident in any of the national level 
drugs policy materials, nor the MPS drug strategy and represents a practical response 
by officers to meet their professional needs. As Manning said: 
 
Even when policy is set, articulated, and flows down the line to agents, it 
rarely actually constrains them, and they continue to act in line with their 
own perceptions of the practical problems of drug enforcement. The 
central problem of drug policing, from the agent’s perspective, is not moral 
but distinctively practical. The aim is to define the work in ways that will 
allow the occupational members involved to manage it, to make reasonable 
decisions, control it, parcel it out into the meaningful, solvable, and 
understandable units and episodes, and make this accomplishment 
somewhat satisfying day after day. (Manning 1980, pg. 16-17) 
 
Officers have always had to make policy work in order to achieve their own aims as 
well as the institution’s (Lipsky 1980). The current iteration of performance 
management techniques has generated new and specific avenues through which the 
officer is able to meet those needs, irrespective of the larger changes in the 
organization and the role of police officers.  
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If unit commanders simply asked officers to go get more cannabis, this by itself would 
not engender the response we have seen in statistical data on drug seizures. Cannabis 
lacked legitimacy as ‘real policing’ before the advent of the CWS, and the CWS was 
an effort to further deprioritise the issue of cannabis amongst police officers (May et 
al. 2007). Additionally, we can view the CWS as part of the wave of adaptive changes 
brought in to policing that included the organisational refocusing on community 
policing. However, the confluence of a destabilised role for police officers, pressure to 
hit performance targets, and the ease of securing detections through a cannabis 
warning changed the role of low-level drugs policing. With the introduction of the 
CWS the status of cannabis was raised as officers constructed a modified 
understanding of the place of cannabis in policing to support the new focus on finding 
the drug. Officers in Watling developed neutralisation techniques to inwardly confirm 
why they are engaged in such practices, and discussions about gateway theory, drugs’ 
connection to crime, and the psychosis inducing effects of cannabis are brought up 
regularly to defend the CWS171. What was an adaptive effort by any normal measure 
(as seen in its use of summary judgement and the defining down of deviance) was 
reconstructed as a tool to promote a bygone idea of policing. With the CWS, officers 
in Watling were able to stand firm in the face of changes.  
 
Where officers might previously have put cannabis under their boot, their discretion to 
do so remained, but they had no reason to engage in that behaviour when a reward 
awaits them for only minimal additional effort.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
171 See the previous chapter. 
 243 
…whereas before you might have said, ‘it’s a small amount, what are you 
doing you stupid’, they passed the attitude test, you have discretion, is it 
worth bringing them in? …Whereas now you have these forms, I can just 
fill this form in and I’ve got a result for it, and we are more result driven 
than we were when I started you know. There’s all these indicators, 
performance management, it’s broken down into spread sheets. It wasn’t 
like that when I first started… if you didn’t have two arrests a month you’d 
just get a letter in your tray from your inspector you know, when you could 
walk out and nick two beggars in a day where I started off… you wasn’t 
measured like you are now. Everything’s broken down into stops, your 
percentage rate of success in stops, how many tickets you issue, you know 
everything, you’re micro-managed on a massive scale now so when these 
things change definitely more people got issued tickets when they probably 
would never have been issued before.  (Sgt Richard, Blackburn SNT) 
 
7.3.2 Rewarded for Detections  
Officers not only find that going for cannabis provides them with an opportunity 
engage in policing activity that will keep management content, and their professional 
self-identity fulfilled, they are also actively rewarded for obtaining arrests and 
detections. The primary way this is done is to award training courses based on who is 
producing the figures the Sergeants and Inspectors are asking for. 
  
[Detections] keeps the Sergeants off your back… everyone has their own 
reasons for getting targets. When you’re on a response team and you’re 
getting to that stage where you want to do a driving course -driving courses 
are like the big thing on response team- once you get that you’ve kind of 
like made it, so the build up to that you are desperately trying to get your 
figures to get the driving course. I was in a position where I didn’t feel like 
I was going out and desperately trying to grab everyone I could, but at the 
same time I was lucky enough to be in a position where you know, on the 
bit on the lead up to the course I just had good postings and arrested quite a 
few people, so it just added weight to it. But it does seem to be quite a big 
thing; if you’ve got your figures you will get a driving course. So you 
could be the worst officer in the world but out getting arrests because 
they’re handed to you on a plate, and you will get a driving course. (PC 
Neville, RT4) 
 
I feel the pressure sometimes because if you want to go anywhere in your 
career in this job you’ve got to sort of say ‘I’ve got this amount of 
detections and I’ve been to this many serious incidents that I’ve run’. So 
it’s like you’re trying to prove yourself, and it’s the only way that you’ll be 
considered for courses. (PC Elle, RT4) 
 
They want us to get figures. The Gov does… He’d rather have two 
detections for cannabis than for us to have brought someone in and dealt 
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with it ourselves. You know the Gov. He's detection crazy. I mean, you 
were in the briefing this morning. He wants detections, detections, 
detections! It's seen as a sign of performance for him. It basically comes 
down to the fact that we do things because... I would rather spend all day 
stopping cars, but when it came to reviews and courses I would get fuck 
all. If I took five cannabis spliffs off the street a day, I'd be the fucking 
Gov’s golden boy. I'd get whatever [training] course I wanted, which is 
ridiculous, but you have to do what they want, to an extent. (PC Edmund, 
RT4) 
 
The training courses are important to officers because they allow for them engage in 
new and exciting areas of policing while also progressing in their career172. The basic 
driving course allows officers to drive a car with no siren, and this is followed by the 
IRV driving course, and eventually an RT driving course. Beyond that there are 
courses for every specialization in the MPS, and you need to accrue them in order to 
build a portfolio if you ever want to go for promotion or work on anything other than 
an RT.  
 
PC Dominic had attended many courses in his five years at the MPS, and was 
preparing for his upcoming move to an OSU when I interviewed him. Fellow PCs 
described him as a good officer because of his ability to handle difficult calls, work as 
a team player, and his ability to find hidden drugs. The Gov and Sergeants on team 
liked him for those reasons, but also because he brought in lots of arrests and generated 
his share of detections. As mentioned in Chapter Four, he was dubbed ‘Super Cop’ by 
his colleagues. PC Dominic was looking forward to his move to OSU, but when we 
spoke he described the move as being about getting more action, not necessarily long-
term career progression. He mostly like advanced training because they provided him 
with interesting experiences he wouldn’t otherwise have.  
 
Ye [I’m a] response driver. I‘ve done the public order training, cycle 
trained, enforcer training so you can hit a door down…they try and make it 
scientific and you, force equals mass times acceleration, so it’s like being 
at a science lesson or something but…ye, it’s good fun though. (PC 
Dominic, RT4)  
 
                                                 
172 In the MPS, training opportunities can be used to develop new skill sets, but do not necessarily mean 
that an officer is looking to move away from RT or SNT work, or advance in rank.  
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Even for officers not seeking a transfer to new opportunities within the MPS, the need 
for detections helped to avoid being transferred to a unit they were not interested in 
working in. ‘Good’ police officers are able to show their unit commander that they are 
a part of the team, and that means not only supporting fellow officers, but supporting 
the team’s reputation by producing the figures the commander is asking for.  
 
It's the easiest way to show, or at least people think, it's the easiest way to 
show what you've done in a shift... Yeah, because you get a hand over at 
the end of the shift, and it's like, ‘what's your return on work?’  They don't 
look at how many calls you went to or how many reports you put on. 
They'll look at how many stop and search you've done, and how many 
arrests. And how many detections…. Especially if you're young in service, 
you've got to show 'willing' because they're so many compulsory transfers 
now to different areas. If you want to stay on team, you've got to be able to 
show that you can work on team, and that you can get figures, as well as 
answering calls. (PC Eleanor, RT2) 
 
In addition to excitement, courses offer a financial reward. Officers that attend 
specialist search courses can be called to help with investigations in to shootings, or 
sweeps of public venues ahead of events. These calls often come on short notice, and 
without time to amend normal shift patterns, the officer is able to collect overtime. The 
courses also supported those officers that sought promotions, providing them with the 
skills necessary to take on leadership in higher ranks.  
 
7.3.3 Quantity over Quality 
The pressure and reward opportunities presented to officers skews the implementation 
of policing activities to those actions that will generate the necessary figures. In 2000 
the MPS recorded 19,619 drug possession offences. By 2009 that figure had reached 
71,383, of which 82 per cent were for cannabis (Mulchandani, Hand, and Panesar 
2010). The practice of targeting minor offenders to generate the necessary volume of 
arrests and detections is well documented (Hope 2008, Police Federation 2008, Select 
Committee on Home Affairs 2008). This is often accomplished through use of stop and 
search activity for drugs (Bear 2011, Bear and Shiner 2011, Eastwood, Shiner, and 
Bear 2013). As discussed previously, the regular interactions with community 
members during a stop and search tend to have negative impacts on the relationship 
between the two groups (Skogan 2006a).  Instead of primarily considering the impact 
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an encounter will have on the community, officers place the requirement to obtain 
detections and conduct searches at the forefront of their decision making  process.  
 
When I was doing my probation I was set [by] Sergeant George 10 stops a 
month, so that was stop and searches, so you had to do at least 10 stops and 
searches a month. But I think that…I don’t think you can put a number of 
stop and searches because you may have days where there is nothing going 
on… then the sergeant goes ‘I want 10 stops from you today’ and if you 
don’t get it you get a bit of telling off. I mean it’s again, rock and a hard 
place, but then again I am happy with what I am doing. I know what’s right 
and what’s wrong; if I can’t get 10 stops I am not going to make grounds 
up, I would never do that. (PC Hugh, RT4) 
 
Officers’ perception that the community was comprised of a significant population of 
criminals was supported by the organizational messaging that emphasized bringing in 
as many arrests and detections as possible. Even a failed search allowed officers to 
engage in ‘proper’ policing. By targeting drug users officers were not liable to become 
mired in unpacking difficult situations or community problems. They could simply 
search, detect, and write up drug incidents without concern for the impact on the 
community members once they had either left the scene or deposited them in the 
custody suite. Whether a particular street interaction went well was not judged by the 
quality of the interaction, but rather by whether it yielded a detection.  
 
Would love to just have a couple of units just surround the estate and catch 
them all. If you searched them all, you’d have five or six detections from 
that. It sounds really sad doesn’t it? In the fact that I'm looking at it in 
positive outcomes, detections, when I should be saying something like, 
'reducing the drug dealing' or something like that. But for me, it’s more 
about detections. I just find that, when I'm listening to myself, thinking 
how sad the situation is. (PC Fred, RT4) 
 
The focus on detections may also emphasise catching, as PC Fred put it, ‘small fish’. 
While there was a massive increase in the number of drugs possession offences dealt 
with by the MPS, there was not a corresponding increase in the number of drugs 
trafficking offences. In 2001 the MPS dealt with 3,716 drugs trafficking offences. 
While this peaked at 5,184 in 2005-06, by 2012-13 it was back down to 3,726. This 
miniscule increase in 13 years was in stark contrast to the current 140 per cent increase 
in drugs possession offences (MPS 2013c). 
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Figure 17: Drug possession versus drug trafficking offences in the MPS between 2000-2013 (MPS 
2013c) 
 
 
7.3.3.1 Making More Work: 
 The push for drugs fuelled an increase in drug seizures on paper, but the statistical rise 
may not have correlated precisely with the amount of drugs officers encountered. It 
may have simply been the case that officers were previously encountering drugs, but 
using their discretion to deal with the situation informally. Now, in the face pressure to 
hit performance targets, many officers had altered how they policed. The push to hit 
targets was effective at altering the policing practices because officers were also 
inadvertently provided an easy method obtain their figures in the form of cannabis 
Warnings. However this also increased the number of people being drawn in to the 
CJS, even if only peripherally.  Government research backs up the findings of net-
widening encountered in this research.  
 
There appears to be a clearer indication that the increase in out-of-court 
disposals is in part the result of ‘net-widening’… following the 
introduction of cannabis warnings there was a significant rise in offences 
of cannabis possession brought to justice, but that there were no marked 
changes in the numbers of convictions and cautions for this offence. This 
would support assertions that the disposal provided the police with a quick 
and effective means of dealing with offences which would previously have 
resulted in no sanction. (OCJR 2010, pg. 9) 
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7.3.4 Breeding Discontent 
The drive for performance indicators made the officers resentful and feel disconnected 
from organization. In their eyes the goal had shifted from protecting people to 
appeasement. Whether this was appeasement of community members trying to 
‘dictate’ police responses, or appeasement of Government ‘bean counters’ demanding 
figures, the process of using performance indicators had impacted the relationship 
officers had with their professional identity and the organisation. Instead of enjoining 
officers to take part in a larger battle against crime that most harmed the community, 
the use of PIs that were easily met by drugs, and so targeted by team leaders, made 
many officers feel that they were being pushed away from meaningful work (though 
some convinced themselves that cannabis was meaningful work). 
  
It’s a lie isn’t it, it’s a fudge of the figures, its… the police itself shouldn’t 
really have targets apart from reducing crime, that should be it…Why 
should we have, why should the police…especially drugs because you’re 
going to find it anyway you shouldn’t need to be targeted from above 
saying you need to have X, Y and Z because you should be doing your job 
anyway, it sort of detracts from other things, if you need to have so many 
drug detections or drug arrests that’s what you’re going to go for but you 
might miss other things 
 
[Politicians and Senior MPS officers] focus on figures, so overall crime 
figures have come down, so this has gone up, so to counter that we need to 
sort out vehicle crime for the last two months of the calendar year. Our 
Governors are telling us, ‘forget everything else go out there and sort out 
vehicle crime, I need that done!’ He needs that done, because he’s asked it, 
because he’s asked it! Rubbish! Because people are still getting robbed out 
there Gov, but that’s not important now because at the end of the month 
there’s an election coming up. That sort of stuff we could do without, we 
could do without that. Let the police run the police. You know, let’s not 
have it actionable to political whims, who’s in power at the time. (PC Jack, 
RT4)  
 
Even while obtaining the figures that the team leaders wanted, the officers were giving 
up part of their ability to tackle the crimes they felt themselves capable of impacting. 
There was strong consensus that without the lure of an easy detection, drugs and 
especially cannabis would cease to receive the attention of officers at all ranks. 
Without the reward of a detection: 
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They would disappear off the face of the earth. They’d get rid of [the 
warning forms] because there’d be no point! Once they've stopped 
counting them, then the commanding ranks will lose interest in them, and 
they'll turn their interest to whatever is interesting them. (PC Jane, RT4)  
 
Officers believe that the MPS stands apart from other police organisations in the push 
for detections. Offices reported that colleagues in other police organisations did not 
have to resort to meeting certain detections and arrest requirements173.  
 
There is no reason for us to get detections and arrests anymore. It's only the 
Met that is only still wanting [sic] them. The City of London police, as 
soon as Theresa May got rid of the policing pledge; they got rid of the 
requirement for detections and arrests. (PC Fred, RT4) 
 
This belief further undermined officers’ perception of the organization. They were not 
part of a large problem with policing nationally; rather it was their organization that 
was singularly misguided.  
 
7.3.5 Blaming Command 
There was a tendency for officers to lament the focus on statistics, and blame the 
command structure for forcing them to engage in practices clearly aimed at improving 
the statistical appearance of the teams. I observed that each RT unit commander 
emphasized obtaining detections and arrests to varying degrees. Targets for the team, 
and comparisons between different teams were reviewed at parades for RTs and were 
occasionally mentioned at the start of SNT shifts. While RT unit commanders focused 
on the number of detections and arrests their team had made, the SNT Sergeants 
focused on community confidence figures and the progress of ward-panel priorities. 
However, whether officers engaged in these activities was not just the result of 
directives from commanders.  
 
Officers were not beholden to operating in line with every piece of guidance they were 
given. Clear evidence of this can be seen in the lack of stop and search forms willingly 
handed out during stops. Commanders regularly asked officers to fill out the forms, 
begging them to do so in order to avert any future problems, but much of the time the 
                                                 
173 I only know this to be true at Thames Valley Police, and cannot confirm this at any other police 
service. 
 250 
forms were either not completed, or the community member was told they would have 
to appear at the station to get the form. From this we have evidence that officers could 
engage in unsanctioned activity, and therefore also know that they did not necessarily 
have to engage in all sanctioned activity. Given the discretion that officers have once 
they are out on the street (Mclaughlin 2007), officers could avoid actually going after 
drugs if they were determined to avoid such practices. Few did, as it was simply too 
easy to accomplish, and a necessary part of career progression for all but the most 
cynical and senior constables. 
 
The unit commanders received blame for such practices abounding, but this can be 
seen as an attempt by officers to protect their sense of what their role was. By blaming 
commanders for their frequent pursuit of small amounts of cannabis, the officers could 
justify engaging in behaviour they were not particularly fond of. This displacing of 
blame is similar to the reaction of officers in the face of changes made to stop and 
search practice as a result of inquiries in the murder of Stephen Lawrence (Shiner 
2010). The message that pressure from commanders was causing them to engage in the 
pursuit of statistics also was a visible way of showing that they were taking on-board 
changes to the organization, even if they did not like them. The display of obedience 
helped divert attention from how officers were not engaging in other reforms as they 
were supposed to do. The relationship created between commanders and PCs by the 
development of PIs can be seen as a symbiotic one. Unit commanders were able to 
produce the stats they needed to keep their command and rise through the ranks, while 
PCs were given an opportunity to easily meet the requirements and cement their 
preferred cultural norms that were under threat. Through the detections obtained via 
the CWS, officers were able to justify their continued inhabitation of the role of ‘crime 
fighter’ even as the inability to actually fulfil that role was evident in the rest of their 
daily working lives.  
 
7.4 The Café  
Johnny’s Café was the goose that laid the golden egg, and unlike the farmers that 
killed the goose out of greed in the original fable, the officers of Watling were content 
to let it keep producing for them. It was considered by most to provide a valuable way 
of obtaining the necessary detections in order to provide officers the space to target 
other problems without worrying about whether they were earning a detection:  
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Bit of a piss take to be honest, but it’s what it is, detections for the team. 
Be like taking away Christmas to close it up, and what would happen then? 
They just go somewhere for their cannabis that we didn’t know about (PC 
Rosanne, RT2).  
 
As long as the café produced, it was left largely to conduct its business. The café was 
allowed to profit, as were the officers. Asked about what harms the café brought to the 
area, Sgt Richard, the head of Blackburn SNT, said, “Probably none.” Pressed further, 
he said, “Other than that it is criminality, it says to people, ‘I can be a drug dealer and 
stand in this area, on the same street as the police station and no-one’s going to do 
anything about it.’” Sgt Richard told me that the premises had been raided several 
times over the years, but each time they found hardly any drugs, and the café was up 
and running again in short order.   
 
Not that all officers liked the idea of sitting outside of the café. Many were frustrated 
that sitting outside of a known drug spot and stopping people was what the job had 
become. These officers viewed the targeting of drugs in order to gain detections as 
detracting from ‘real’ police work. 
 
The general feeling of most of the people on our team is that we would 
rather be out, certainly in the unmarked car, you'd rather be out looking for 
proper stops. You would stop someone in a high robbery area and come 
across a weapon. Prime example is yesterday. We stopped, me and Lisa, 
we stopped four young Lads around the corner. The only one that actually 
managed to give us his details had a screw driver in his pocket and was a 
PYG member. The other three are probably gang members, but they didn’t 
give their details so we don't know, but you got four gang members, four 
potential gang members walking around, one of them armed, and that's a 
proper stop, that’s proper, you know. Let's get in there, put ourselves on 
offer. Let’s get in there to stop a little bit of crime that actually matters.  
That, we quite happily do, we want to do... Anybody can sit outside of a 
cannabis cafe unmarked. The only crime you're really stopping then is 
someone taking some cannabis that they're going to smoke on another day, 
whereas at least with something like that [weapons search] you're stopping 
crimes against a victim. (PC Mario, RT2) 
 
If you sit in front of the cannabis cafe you might get a detection, but if you 
search three people at 3am in Framingham, who are clearly up to no good, 
it doesn't show as anything, but you've probably done more. (PC Eleanor, 
RT2). 
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Officers of the Blackburn SNT did try to take action against the café. I attended a 
meeting between PC Sam and a detective from the borough’s CID. PC Sam was trying 
to develop an operational plan to eventually raid and shut down the café. There had 
been no direct complaints from the community about the café at that point, but the 
team wanted to show their proactive abilities and launch a raid. The detective knew 
exactly which café Sam was discussing as soon as the meeting began, and quickly shot 
down the idea of raiding it. His stated reasons were that it would take too much time 
and intelligence gathering to put together enough evidence for a raid, and that funds 
could not be spared for an operation that would not catch any large scale distributors or 
Class A drugs.  
 
The café did not survive indefinitely. It continued supplying the local population with 
cannabis and the local officers with detections for another nine months after I 
completed fieldwork. In the early 2012 the MPS released a statement that, ‘following 
concerns raised by local residents’, officers from Blackburn SNT raided the café, the 
social club, and the dry cleaners, arresting four men, and seizing £8,000. The statement 
went on to say that in the lead up to the raid the MPS had conducted a ‘targeted stop 
and search operation’ around the café. In the year before the raids there were an 
average of 35 drug possession offences a month in Blackburn ward174, but in the year 
following, the average dropped to only 12 per month.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have laid out what I believe to be the primary explanatory factor 
driving the surge in cannabis policing over the last decade. That performance 
indicators were given such weight at the same time officers were feeling disconnected 
from the organisation’s shift in focus, created an unintended outcome.  Both the 
organization and the community suffered due to the emphasis on NPM.  
 
Though officers often resented having to go after low-level drugs, many tried to justify 
their actions as being ‘real policing’, while quickly achieving a detection, and not 
really altering their actions on the street. The predominance of hitting targets that 
                                                 
174 As discussed earlier in the chapter, many cannabis warnings were issues in other wards as the café 
was near the intersection of three wards.  
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aligned with only a small aspect of police performance allowed officers to hit that 
target in manner that required only peripheral adherence to the pressures for changes in 
other areas of policing. Additionally, the aspect of policing being measured aligned 
with classic ideas of police culture, emphasizing enforcement and action instead of 
adaptation and community engagement. Officers were emotionally invested in at least 
some of the stated aims of the organisation, but were disoriented by the contradictory 
nature of what they were being asked to do in the different teams, frustrated by the 
focus on performance  management  and were distanced from what they and the 
organisation considered to be priorities because of the perverse incentive structure that 
has been inadvertently created by the CWS and NPM, which encourages officers to 
game the system by going for easy pickings.   
 
Instead of serving as a platform to renegotiate the ideas of what it means to be a police 
officer, the performance indicators I observed during fieldwork helped cement 
outdated stereotypes for a new generation of officers. NPM has provided a rallying 
point whereby the officer corps can stand firm and police in a manner that meets their 
professional identity and career aspirations. In doing so, the pace of reform towards 
community based policing practice can be tempered by the act of being, at least on 
paper, a ‘good police officer’. Unfortunately, what it means to be a good police officer 
is quite different than what it means to be a good police service. 
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Chapter 8- Conclusion 
8.1 Recap of the Thesis 
This thesis has explored the working life of street-level officers, with a particular focus 
on the execution of drugs-related activities within their wider remit. I have shown how 
officers in Watling worked for a conflicted organization within a conflicted policy 
landscape, leading to a conflicted role. Through the policing of drugs officers found a 
way to stand firm amidst changes to policing they were disconnected from, and 
ensured they maintained a self-satisfying professional identity. That such activities met 
performance targets was an important factor in officers choosing drugs as the 
mechanism by which they stood firm against changes to policing. The following will 
review how I came to these conclusions. 
 
In the Literature chapter, I explored four distinct areas underpinning the thesis. These 
areas included an examination of the policing literature, drugs literature and policy, 
New Public Managerialism, and the theories of bifurcation proffered by Garland 
(2001). In exploring the policing literature, I drew particular focus to two important 
ideas; discretion and culture. Both discretion and culture are, in the eyes of many of 
the respondents, under attack in Watling. While there is debate about the continued 
resilience of police culture (Waddington 1999b, Reiner 2010, Chan 1997, Foster 
2003), this section ultimately concluded that maintaining an illusory police culture 
may be more important to officers than whether that culture actually exists. Discretion 
is also explored in light of Lipsky’s ideas of how street-level bureaucrats exercise 
discretion to fulfil their role (1980). The tempering words of Evans and Harris (2004) 
reminded us that discretion is not necessarily good, and can even shield misconduct. 
More importantly, discretion is incredibly difficult to regulate as it is at the heart of 
policing (Scarman 1981) and officers operate with little oversight on the street (Novak 
et al. 2002).    
 
In exploring the drugs literature, I traced the development of drugs policy, contrasting 
the criminalization thesis (Seddon, Ralphs, and Williams 2008, Stevens 2011) with 
Shiner’s (Shiner 2013) idea that British drugs policy has always had an undercurrent of 
punitiveness that has become more prominent in recent decades, rather than suddenly 
developed. I then explored how policy documents for England and Wales reflect 
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multiple approaches to dealing with drugs. Importantly, a strong war-like stance 
focused on ‘winning’ through employing punitive responses has been reshaped in 
recent years with a less heroic stance (Dorn and Lee 1999) that accepts ‘disrupting’ 
drug trafficking organisations as a victory in strategy documents. Though the goalpost 
has moved, the state apparatus driving towards it remains largely the same. These 
strategy documents instruct the criminal justice system to take account of community 
partnerships and target only the most harmful drugs (Home Office 2010c). However, 
they reflect a near total absence of discussions about low-level cannabis despite the 
drugs’ predominance not just in drug-related police activity, but as a part of all 
policing activity.  
 
The chaotic nature of UK drugs policy, and the drive to hit a redefined set of 
performance targets, leads to the over-arching theoretical component of this research. 
Garland’s (2001, 1996) theories on bifurcation in the criminal justice system helped 
this research to understand the multitude of anti-drug efforts operating at all levels in 
British drugs policy. While Garland only briefly addresses how drugs policy relates to 
his theories, the development of British drugs policy – vacillating form its history of 
penal-welfarism to more coercive enforcement, and back towards welfarism in the face 
of failure on the drugs war – makes Garland’s theories an ideal mould with which to 
help structure my arguments.  
 
In Chapter Three, I prepared for the empirical chapters by explaining how this research 
was conducted. In many ways, this project was classic police ethnography and faced 
many of the same challenges as its predecessors (Skolnick 1975, Manning 1980, 
Collison 1995, Smith and Gray 1983). Unlike its predecessors, this work used a new 
form of digital ethnography that allowed the researcher to capture data without delay, 
and with a depth unavailable in traditional methods. In the methodology section, I 
began to show how officers’ activities often involved intervening in complex situations 
requiring both them and the researcher to be flexible, but within the strict limits on 
their behaviour.   
 
The following chapters on Response Policing, Community Policing, and Drugs 
Policing, highlighted the teams’ working practices. By differentiating between the 
units, we were able to clearly see their working practices, and therefore able to 
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contextualise the drugs chapter. In the RT chapter, I showed how the backbone of 
British policing builds itself up to an image that can be difficult to meet. Focusing on a 
sense of mission and ‘hedonistic love of action’ (Reiner 1999, pg. 91), RT officers 
attempted to maintain order and thwart criminal activity, even while knowing their 
impact is often limited. Their acting out in the form of frequent drug searches helped 
generate action and a sense of impact - a feeling that was often scarce in their working 
lives. Additionally, the pressure for detections felt by RT teams in Watling began to 
emerge, and its alignment with officers’ need to create action and control became fully 
evident in the Performance Management chapter. A distinct sense of ‘us vs. them’ 
pervaded officers’ work and impacted their interactions with the community.  
 
In the Community Policing chapter, I traced how and why the shift towards 
community policing took hold, highlighting how it was an attempt at accountability 
(Chan 1999), a response to the inability to impact crime rates (Garland 2001), and the 
need to improve community confidence in the police (Barnes and Eagle 2007, Hohl, 
Bradford, and Stanko 2010, Home Office 2005b). Behind the façade of partnership and 
alternatives to punitive enforcement measures, the SNTs that emerged to implement 
this strategy had the same powers and tactics available to all police officers. Their role 
as officers did not change. Instead, the way their performance was measured was 
altered, and their interaction with the community was increased. The organisation 
grappled with a conflicted identity as it sought to determine how to marry the role of 
police officer and that of community liaison. In addition, this chapter highlighted that 
the SNTs are not always partnering with the full breadth of the community, and may 
be basing their activities on the desires of a limited set of influential community 
members. This chapter began to highlight that the community policing model may not 
be naturally aligned with policing’s history and methods (Bennett 1983). 
 
In the Street-Level Drugs Policing chapter, I first experienced the thrill and let-down 
of a drug raid, before examining the debate about developments in drugs policy and 
policing. Some have argued that the criminalization of British drugs policy has fully 
transformed the issue (Seddon, Ralphs, and Williams 2008), while others approach the 
subject as one of change throughout the criminal justice system (Shiner 2009, 2013). 
They key idea here is that street-level drugs policing cannot be understood in a 
vacuum, and the analysis of the guiding policy documents must be taken in context 
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with the larger changes to the landscape - something this thesis has tried to do with the 
environment of the police officers. This chapter also allowed exploration of the 
cannabis Warning System in detail. The CWS was constantly being utilised by 
officers, and I explored the conflicted nature of how officers may lack negative 
feelings towards cannabis, but ardently target the drug. Even in adaptive partnerships, 
drugs policing strained the relationship between SNTs and the community, particularly 
when officers invoked tactics that ran counter to the community’s desires. The 
implementation of drugs policing was seen as a smash-and-grab affair, with officers 
having little understanding of why they were engaging in such practices, and often 
unwilling to see their actions as the ‘less heroic’ (Dorn and Lee 1999) conditions in 
which they were operating. 
 
The Performance Management chapter connected the previous work to identify what I 
believe is the coalescing force behind the increases in low-level drug seizures seen in 
the UK since 2004. In this chapter, I showed how New Public Managerialism 
interjected itself in to policing practice with surprising results (Maguire and John 
2006). While the fragmentation of police culture and reshaping of the organisation 
buffeted officers, the ease with which NPM targets could be met provided a simple 
activity that allowed officers to find stability within changes. The output measures 
used in NPM asked officers to engage in the type of policing that emphasized their role 
as protectors of the community; the CWS gave them the perfect tool with which to 
achieve those goals. Johnny’s café was but the most flagrant example of officers 
pursuing easy detections. I described how this ‘loose coupling’ created a situation 
whereby RT officers were not embedded in the changes occurring in the organisation. 
This situation was exacerbated by the fact that their targets were unaligned with those 
changes.  
 
The story of this thesis is one of pressures, and of how policies, organisations, and 
officers react to those pressures. I have covered how the officers in Watling lacked a 
stable platform from which they could operate. Not only was their role changing, but 
also their culture and performance measurement framework. The structured 
ambivalence at each stage of the process had unforeseen results, and this thesis has 
charted those results as they interacted with the daily working life of officers. The 
combined pressures for change actually generated space for officers to stand firm if 
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they turned their attention to policing small amounts of cannabis, fuelling a significant 
increase in drug seizures between 2004-2009.  
 
8.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
This thesis has covered considerable territory, but contributes to knowledge in several 
specific areas. The primary aim of this research was to understand why there was such 
a dramatic increase in drug seizures in recent years by examining how drugs policing 
fits in to the working lives of police officers. That focus was not diluted by developing 
contributions to academic knowledge in several aspects. Rather, the multiple 
advancements in research are a sign of the complexity of the situation.   
 
8.2.1 Explored Street-Level Policing of Drugs 
Whereas much previous research on drugs has focused on advancements in policy 
(Acevedo 2007, Bammer et al. 2002, Bayer and Oppenheimer 1993, Bennett 1983, 
Bennett and Holloway 2010, Bessant 2008, Caulkins and Tragler 2004, Chen, 
Skidelsky, and Social Market Foundation. 2001, Egginton, Parker, and Aldridge 2000, 
Fazey and Bewley-Taylor 2003, Fischer 2003, Higate, Lart, and Hughes 2006, 
Kleiman 1992, Maccoun et al. 2002, Meier 1992, Monaghan 2012, Niskanen 1992, 
Reinarman 2009, Reuter and Stevens 2008, Ritter 2009, Seddon 2000, 2006, Shiner 
2013, Stevens 2011, Wodak 2007), or the broader challenges of policing drugs in our 
society (Bean 2008, Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006, Benson, Rasmussen, and 
Sollars 1995, Chiu, Mansley, and Morgan 1998, Dorn and Lee 1999, Dorn and South 
1990, Hunter, Mcsweeney, and Turnbull 2005, Murji 1998, Newburn and Elliot 1998, 
Wallace, Roberg, and Allen 1985), this project has brought street-level issues to focus 
- a necessary point of reference to improve the delivery of drugs policies.  
 
Street-level policing has previously been studied by ethnographers. In particular, Smith 
and Gray (1983) were most influential to this project. However, additional authors’ 
shaped how to approach the difficult task of ethnographic fieldwork with police 
(Norris 1993, Westmarland 2001, Mastrofski et al. 1998, Hammersley and Atkinson 
1995, Pearson 1993, Rowe 2005). Drugs policing has also been studied, with most 
researchers focusing on drug detectives (Bacon Forthcoming, Collison 1995, Manning 
1980, Loftus and Goold 2012). Where this work differs is its focus on how drugs 
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policing fits in to the working lives officers not assigned to drug squads, and the depth 
achieved through observing the same units over the course of a year.   
 
Previous research identified that public sector workers will ‘game’ the system (Bevan 
and Hood 2006) when given performance management targets based on a simplistic 
understanding of their performance (Munro 2004). This has been found in policing 
(Rogerson 1995, Johnsen 2005, Reiner 1995) and specifically drugs policing (Dorn 
2000). In this work, I have shown how the pressure to achieve quantitative targets has 
altered police working practices, resulting in a massive increase in drugs stop and 
search and drugs seizures. These activities provide officers an opportunity to shore-up 
the foundations of a classic style of policing. This pursuit of low-level drugs no longer 
aligns with the community policing values the organisation projects to its ‘customers’. 
This understanding of the role of current  performance management structures goes 
beyond the simple adage that ‘what gets measured gets done’ (Rogerson 1995). Instead 
of seeing increases in drugs incidents as a sign that officers are simply responding to 
the changes in the organization, this thesis argues that officers are engaging in a 
concerted effort against drugs to avoid changing the style of policing that meets their 
perception of the normative order of policing. Officers can ‘act out’ in a way that 
secures their career ambitions and sense of mission without having to acquiesce to 
larger changes. 
 
This research also provided an up-to-date accounting of what street-level policing 
looked like in the lead up to the August 2011 riots. While this project cannot ascribe 
causality between the police actions in Watling and disturbances elsewhere in London, 
a clear picture of the relationship between the police and the community in Watling 
was obtained during fieldwork. I was able to witness how the relentless use of stop and 
search created frequent abrasions to the police/community relationship. The 
recognizable policing practices observed in previous ethnographies of street policing 
are visible throughout this work. If the practices in this research seem familiar and 
reminiscent of a policing of the past, it is because the purpose of many of these 
practices seemed to be aimed at ensuring the past is retained by the organization, 
despite significant policy changes and a focus on community policing. What have 
changed are the factors driving such activities. Where once officers had legitimacy and 
exercised their power as a way of maintaining order, in the modern era of fractured 
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legitimacy, the increased effort to exert their power is the end result of a schizoid need 
to project sovereign control while meeting performance targets achieved through the 
dissemination of warning forms.  
 
8.2.2 Using  Garland to Understand Drugs Policing  
Though Garland has rarely spoken of drugs in his work, others have already used his 
ideas in relation to drugs policy and policing. Using Garland’s ideas, these authors 
have contributed much insight to help resituate a contextualized understanding of the 
relationship between drugs and crime (Seddon 2006), and the reshaping of drugs 
policy in late-modernity (Shiner 2013). Others have even used Garland to explore the 
implementation of community partnerships (Skinns 2003). Using Garland to explore 
the issue of drugs, whether at a policy or practical level, is prudent because British 
drugs policing displays clear evidence of how the, “…criminological predicament gave 
rise to a process of accommodation and adjustment”, and Garland’s analysis of the 
bifurcated construct “is clearly implicated” (Shiner 2013), if not prominent in his own 
writings.  
 
However, as far as I have able to ascertain, this thesis is the first research to utilize 
Garland’s theoretical ideas to explore the practical context of street-level policing. To 
be clear, the purpose of doing so was not to prove whether the theories were correct at 
this level. Instead, Garland’s ideas were used to help understand the often-contrasting 
activities and attitudes on display during fieldwork. By bringing Garland’s ideas in to 
street-level policing, I was able to not only examine their robustness at this new level, 
but also bridge the gap in understanding the impact policy changes can have at the 
point of implementation.  
 
I have shown the division between those invested in the task of implementing 
community policing models that are adaptive in nature, with those tasked with 
maintaining order by exercising police powers to bring punitive rhetoric to bear. 
Splitting the organization solely along a path delineated by the task of the unit is crude. 
However, in doing so I have exposed that roles are not limited to one set of tactical 
responses.  Exploring the policing of Watling through the lens of bifurcation has 
provided increased ability to contextualize the developments of policing in a way that 
a less demarcated approach would have failed to allow. More importantly, the ideas of 
 261 
bifurcation actually helped identify the conflicted nature of each unit’s role within the 
policing structure. Looking specifically at drugs in Chapter Six, the conflicted nature 
of the various tactical endeavours was made clearer by using the ideas of bifurcation.   
 
In examining the utility and frailty of the ideas of bifurcation, this research has 
uncovered a new and perhaps important caveat to the discussion of Garland and 
bifurcation. Instead of simply seeing NPM as one element of adaptive changes, this 
thesis has highlighted the importance of such initiatives on the policing landscape. 
Future research may wish to parse out the importance NPM on the development of 
policing practice.  
 
8.2.3 New Digital Ethnography Methods 
In addition to exploring the role of drugs in street-level policing this work has also 
contributed to the advancement of ethnographic methods that could be harnessed by 
researchers from many disciplines. Where once small notepads or scraps of paper 
served to record the interactions, conversations, and personal thoughts of an 
ethnographer in the field, this research has harnessed readily available technology to 
create a more robust way of recording data. Instead of deciphering short-hand notes 
written quickly during and observation, or long-hand notes written well after the fact, 
digital ethnography allows researchers to capture a tremendous depth of detail 
efficiently and accurately. Moreover, it allows the researcher to recall the data more 
precisely and improve the utility of the information collected in the field.  
 
In this thesis, I have not only developed an idea for how to conduct digital 
ethnography, but have also provided the reader with detailed descriptions of how it 
was used in the field. Through refinement of the process, future researchers will be 
able to quickly record detailed field-notes, avoid ‘retrieval induced forgetting’ 
(Wimber et al. 2009), and improve episodic memory recall to use data effectively.  
This will help future ethnographic researchers avoid some of the questions of accuracy 
that current qualitative practices face.   
 
8.3 Policy Recommendations 
As this research has touched on general street-level policing, community policing, and 
drugs policing, I will direct my policy recommendations to each of these areas, with 
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the wider issue of NPM connecting all three. With regard to the place of drugs within 
street-level policing, the recommendations herein speak to larger problems of 
policing’s legitimate use of coercion. If I were to condense the policy 
recommendations across all three areas in to a single idea, it would be that all 
performance management frameworks will impact the organization they are applied to, 
and so we must thoroughly consider not just what we want to measure, but what we 
want the organisation to look like. If the performance indicators do not align with that 
vision, then something needs to be reconsidered. 
 
The analysis of this project has identified that the most contentious issue within 
policing remains the use of stop and search, primarily in the hunt for drugs. The tactic 
has been the focus of much debate from scholars (Lustgarten 2002, Mastrofski 2004, 
Skogan 2006a, Delsol and Shiner 2006, Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 2009, Morell et 
al. 2011, Quinton 2011, Bear 2012, EHRC 2012) and also from the government (MPA 
2005, MPS 2009b, 2011a). Current guidelines are constructed in such a way that 
officers have broad capabilities to define ‘reasonable grounds,’ while having little 
oversight in to their practices given that they are part of the ‘low-visibility’ (Goldstein 
1960) of street policing. What oversight does exist is lax and not taken seriously by the 
officers in Watling. Early on during fieldwork, I often felt sad and angered while 
watching an aggressive officer search a young person for little reason other than being 
black and standing on the corner. The idea of ‘police property’ (Lee 1981) becomes 
not just a convenient academic term, but a very real condition when a person is 
handcuffed and pressed against the side of an IRV. Through acknowledging my 
feelings during these situations, I was able to see how my own ideas shifted during the 
course of my time with the teams, a situation that may very well happen to new 
officers on team. What had been a sick feeling in my gut when I first started with the 
teams became a gut feeling that there must be something illicit taking place when 
viewing those same people who had engendered empathy only a year earlier. I saw 
first-hand how the frequent use of stop and search was a tool not just for the 
community, but for the officers to reassert their normative order to new recruits. 
Through repeated exposure, one becomes numb to the dehumanising aspects of a 
search, finding justification through spurious logic.  
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The point here is that current legislation and policy on stop and search mean that the 
tactic is used time and again as one of the few remaining tools of order maintenance, 
and it is often not used well. Officers in Watling search with little justification, are 
aggressive, use language that could be interpreted as demeaning, and show little 
empathy for those they are detaining. This happens to citizens of all races and creeds, 
but especially to those who are black and south Asian. While no top-down legislation 
or policy developments will abate this behaviour overnight, improvements to the 
training, recording practices and oversight of officers conducting stop and search 
appeared to be in desperate need in Watling. One possible avenue to curb such 
practices is the use of body-worn video equipment, currently under examination by 
others at the LSE (Rieken 2013). 
 
Efforts to reshape the performance management framework of MPS units might prove 
more fruitful than training and oversight, and reducing the number of negative drugs 
searches will reduce disproportionality levels (EHRC 2013). “In all five police forces 
during the course of the Commission’s study, this reduction [in stop and search] has 
followed firm action to prohibit the use of stop and search as a formal or informal 
quantitative performance indicator” (EHRC 2013, pg. 39). MPS Commissioner 
Bernard Hogan-Howe introduced new KPIs for stop and search, including reducing 
negative drug searches by 50%, achieving a 20% hit rate on S.60 searches, and having 
at least 20% of searches target weapons. Watling has improved in each of these areas, 
but failed to achieve any of those targets as of the March 2013 Stop and Search report 
issued by the MPS. Unfortunately, I am unable to ascertain whether the changes to 
organization-wide targets have also affected performance targets levied at individual 
officers or teams within the borough. These new organizational targets are the result of 
the community outrage following the riots. While it is certainly admirable that the 
MPS recognizes the damaging effects of numerous failed drug searches, and the 
disproportionality in S.60 searches, simply reducing the targets as part of a quantitative 
restructuring will not be successful if the changes do not account for how the 
organization will respond to meet the new targets or how the changes will impact 
officers. The problem of loose coupling and the perception of working to hit 
misaligned targets will only worsen if reactionary changes to PIs are sought by 
managers disconnected from street-level concerns.  
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Simply changing the targets and publicly releasing the improved figures also impacts 
on community policing initiatives. Adapting the PIs provides the organization with 
reference points they can bring to public discussions about policing. These figures are 
a synecdoche for police actions on the street, and do not necessarily improve public 
perception of officer behaviour. More importantly, PIs do not provide accountability 
mechanisms that increase democratic control. In this sense, the changes are more, ‘old 
wine in new bottles’(Manning 1988) for communities still left without a proper voice. 
This research has repeatedly seen how local priorities are subjugated to the will of 
officers’ priorities. While many of the SNT officers were deeply committed to the 
goals of community policing, the structure they operated in prioritized a different type 
of policing activity and its associated performance measures. Additionally, RT officers 
know little, if anything, about local concerns, and have no incentive structure to work 
to support those concerns in their police activities.  Without a concerted effort to adapt 
and adopt community policing to be a more integrated part of Watling’s policing 
strategy, the efforts of the SNTs will continue to be dominated by the stronger punitive 
policing efforts. The introduction of the Local Policing Model in Watling after the 
conclusion of fieldwork for this research may have accomplished this goal, but further 
examination is required.  
 
Finally, the pursuit of drugs - especially the focus on low-level cannabis seizures - is 
primarily driven by the performance management framework in place in Watling and 
the MPS. Researchers must be careful not to oversimplify the situation and think of the 
issue as solely a matter of incentives to meet targets, but appreciate the broader nature 
of the activity as a way of maintaining professional identity amidst organisational 
changes. I have shown that officers construct a narrative allowing them to target drugs 
despite having personal opinions that are often in stark contrast to their policing 
activities. This allows them to find meaning in their pursuit of the detections they need 
in order to stay in the good graces of their managers. The pursuit of a new target, say, 
the number of conversations with community members each shift, could just as easily 
be taken up with vigour by the officers. On paper, these goals would almost certainly 
be met. However, the quality of the interactions on the streets would not necessarily 
improve. The idea that it is the quality of such interactions that matters (Hough et al. 
2010) would be overlooked. Additionally, if the new ‘conversations’ target did not 
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meet the needs of officers to uphold their mission as they perceive it, there is the 
potential to further disconnect officers from the organisation’s direction. 
 
A significant shift in the policy landscape must be considered to improve the 
implementation of policing efforts. The bifurcated rhetoric and practice experienced by 
officers on the street creates space for them to disconnect from changes to policing, 
exacerbating the problem of loose coupling. Garland (2001) described adaptive 
strategies as the hidden product of those working to maintain the functioning of the 
state. However, this hidden process has made its way into official policy in the form of 
community policing and the drive for community confidence. The state appears 
confused, publishing guidelines that promote tough enforcement measures against 
drugs and the ‘others’ who peddle them, while also endeavouring to create a new 
responsiveness to the community and policies designed to push addicts in to treatment. 
The two tracks of criminal justice policy development inevitably put pressure on those 
caught in the middle. Like tectonic plates slowly smashing together to form jagged 
peaks, the confusion found in British policing policy, particularly in drugs policy, is 
jolting the communities caught above the fault lines.  
 
Does this mean that one track must be abandoned? Some would argue that police are 
incapable of taking on the ethos of community policing while maintaining their 
traditional role (Bennett 1983, Klockars 1988). I cannot go so far as to agree with total 
abandonment, primarily because the need for community policing outweighs the 
difficulties of implementing it. Therefore, what must change is the bifurcated nature of 
policy development. It is one thing to have adaptive policies emerge from practitioners 
seeking to obtain some inroads against an impossible task, but it is another to publish 
strong rhetoric extolling the power of the state while also promoting the state’s 
compassion and willingness to engage in partnership. This becomes even more 
problematic if the partnerships in question are not, in practice, what they claim to be 
on paper. 
 
Criminal justice policy needs to acknowledge the limitations of the state openly; 
abandoning insincere punitive political rhetoric for an honest discussion about what 
society actually wants the role of policing to be. Despite government advice and 
popular support, Labour moved cannabis from a Class C drug to a Class B drug. The 
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move was entirely political (Pearson 2007), and is a prime example of the 
misconstrued nature of current enforcement efforts. In order to create a police service 
that is responsive to the community and respects the individuals within, the larger 
policy ideas must convey respect and a desire to support the whole community. If the 
message presented to officers is fragmented, and performance indicators are easily 
fulfilled by targeting low-priority crime, officers will never holistically remove the 
habits and cultural norms that bring them in to conflict with the community. Only by 
shifting the way the entire organization operates and thinks about its role in society 
will criminal justice policy be able to bring officers along with the organization as it 
develops. Currently, the bifurcated structure of criminal justice policy creates a space 
for officers to stand firmly for a culture that is no longer aligned with the 
organisation’s mission. This shift cannot happen within the organization by itself, and 
needs larger forces to contribute to a unified direction of policing in England and 
Wales. 
 
8.4 Outlook  
In this final section, I will address the limitations of this research. Further, I will look 
at how future research efforts might build on these shortcomings to advance the 
current findings. 
  
8.4.1 Limitations to Current Research  
This project achieved much of what it set out to do, but there are certainly areas with 
room for improvement.  Extending fieldwork in light of the August 2011 riots and 
refining in the digital ethnography methods might have been useful, but were not 
available. In regards to the analysis and conclusions reached from the data, this project 
has admittedly reached far in attempting to explain the role of drugs in street-level 
policing and the reasons why NPM was able to successfully drive officers to pursue 
low-level drug seizures. I will discuss the limitations of concluding such a finding.  
 
Far and away, the biggest disappointment of this project was the curtailment of 
fieldwork only hours before a seminal moment in British policing. The riots that swept 
across London in August 2011 did not spare Watling. While being present over the 
course of three days of disorder would have certainly produced interesting field-notes, 
the weeks and months following the disturbances would have provided a unique 
 267 
opportunity to observe how officers interpreted the causes of the riots and how they 
dealt with the aftermath. Alas, this was not possible in the current research. I had made 
too clear a break with the teams, and it would have been disingenuous to return only to 
observe such salacious moments. I feared that, in their eyes, I would have ceased to be 
an observer interested in policing, and become a carpetbagger in post-riots Watling. 
However informative a pre/post comparison of policing practices might have been, the 
possibility of being considered an interloper kept me from pursuing the opportunity. 
Certainly, one cannot predict such occurrences during fieldwork, but this project might 
have offered additional analysis if such an opportunity had been available.  
 
In assessing the impact of PIs on policing activity, and the role they played in the loose 
coupling within the organization, this thesis has made a fairly substantial claim. I have 
argued that officers are misappropriating the goals of NPM to resist being directed by 
either of the bifurcated pressures impacting their work. The obvious limitation to this 
assertion is that I only observed five units within one borough, and over a relatively 
short period of a single year. Crucially, this research began only three months after 
Theresa May dispensed with the Single Confidence Target. As such, the organization 
could rightly have been in a state of flux. In addition, the borough had seen several 
gang murders in the year leading up to fieldwork, and several during fieldwork. This 
could have fostered an aggressive attitude amongst the officers who were regularly 
exposed to violent acts and horrific injuries. I know that the inhumanity I witnessed 
during fieldwork made me both revolted and angry that people could treat each other 
with such wilful violence. These factors could explain a certain ‘hardening’ of the 
policing style of officers in the borough.  
 
There will undoubtedly be questions as to the validity of my conclusions as they 
pertain to this specific borough during this specific time. Certainly, the myriad of 
influences, personalities, and situations presented in this work undermine the idea that 
the actions of nearly 75 men and women are reacting to changes to the organization in 
a similar fashion. I would answer this assertion by pointing out that while uniformity 
in belief is never certain, and the effort to uphold a bygone type of policing culture not 
necessarily explicit, the conclusions of this research highlight the larger effects of the 
performance management programmes instituted in policing. Some officers may truly 
hate drugs, and some may have no problem with drugs at all - that is not the point. 
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Drugs, and cannabis in particular, have become a useful way of policing that fits with 
officers’ idea of what policing should be. Whether or not an individual officer engages 
in anti-drugs activity does not change this conclusion. In the actions of other officers 
who pursue drugs vigorously to meet PIs, space is created whereby the whole team can 
de-couple themselves from the ideas of partnership, procedural justice, and community 
oriented work.  
 
8.4.2 Future Research 
This project has shown that police ethnography is alive and well, and can still be a 
valuable tool to advance our knowledge of police practice and the impact of policy 
developments. As mentioned, this research took place in one London borough and at a 
time of great flux. Additionally, this research brought the ideas of bifurcation to bear 
on a topic not originally covered in depth by Garland (2001). Future research efforts 
can surely take on these limitations.  
 
Even though Theresa May had abandoned the SCT in May 2010, the infrastructure 
supporting both the outcome and output-based measures still reigned supreme in 
Watling. Now that time has passed, the teams have been reorganized, and a new 
borough Commander has been appointed, revisiting the borough might prove a fruitful 
exercise. Perhaps with the café closed and PIs amended in the wake of the August 
2011 riots, officers have found other ways to retain the culture and policing styles. 
Only another stint of fieldwork could explore these issues.  
 
 
The fieldwork was also quite limited in scope. Future research efforts should consider 
expanding the base of operations. Comparing two or three areas would allow for 
comparisons that might highlight how NPM affects practices differently, and how 
loosely-coupled officers are to the organization. Using teams, similar to Quinton 
(2011) with the Home Office, or Mastrofski and Parks with their structured fieldwork 
(Mastrofski and Parks 1990), could allow us to explore a whole police service, not just 
a single borough.  
 
Finally, the use of bifurcation has helped this research make sense of the complex 
changes and forces shaping street-level policing in Watling. Without such a theoretical 
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base, I would have struggled to dissect the diverged policies and their onslaught of 
conflicted practices. Using this theoretical base to explore drugs policing made sense 
to examine the forces shaping drugs policy development in the previous forty years 
(Shiner 2013). While criminologists have praised Garland for The Culture of Control, 
drugs policy researchers have been slow to utilize this concept. Research into the 
development of policy must find a way of bridging theory in to practice; Garland’s 
work provides an important route to do just that.   
 
One enticing opportunity for research could come from exploring how officers react if 
cannabis no longer earns a detection. Recently, the MPS has discussed piloting this 
idea. We also see there is room to change measurements in policing as a nearby 
borough saw the use of stop and search removed as a PI. With this in mind, a future 
project may wish to see what happens when officers no longer receive detections for 
bringing in cannabis. The focus would not just be on how their policing practice 
changes, but on what steps they take to ensure the survival of their police culture. If 
my conclusions are correct, we would expect to see new policing practices emphasized 
that ultimately push the classic style of policing onto the citizenry. This would be 
unfortunate, but would help us understand how to mitigate such activity.   
 
 
 
 
8.5 Final Thoughts 
In a meeting held for prospective doctoral students while I was a Master’s student at 
the LSE, Professor Julian LeGrand warned us that we should always remember our 
doctoral research is a narrowly concentrated piece of work, not our opus. He reminded 
us that we would have our entire careers to create our opus, but for the PhD we should 
set our minds to a specific research question, answer it thoroughly, and move on. I was 
prepared to follow this sage advice. Unfortunately, the passion one must have in order 
to pursue a topic for four years can also engender a desire to seek answers to questions 
beyond their thesis. I have attempted to avoid this, while still addressing the broad set 
of factors impacting my research questions. Whether I have struck the appropriate 
balance is a judgement I cannot make from my position buried within the project.  
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What has been established in the preceding pages is that the place of drugs in the 
working lives of non-specialist street-level officers is dictated by a confluence of 
pressures acting on the core of policing. In Watling, an eroded sense of identity, 
coupled with changes to the structure of policing and the opportunity to prove one’s 
worth through near-valueless performance indicators, fuelled an explosion in the 
targeting of drugs. A loosely coupled police organisation produced new ways of 
working with their ‘customers’ without providing a transitionary experience for 
officers nurtured by a different formula, and with a performance management structure 
that hindered change. It is perhaps no wonder that Garland says that, “the public police 
look much the same way today that they did thirty years ago” (2001, pg. 169). This is 
what officers seemingly desire, despite many changes to the organisation, the 
community, and the role of policing. Bevan and Hood understood that, “governance by 
targets rests on the assumption that targets change the behaviour of individuals and 
organizations...’ (2006, pg. 8). The assumption, at least in the case of policing, has 
proven correct; but the changes are being dictated by the officers, not the target 
makers. 
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Appendix B : Consent Form for Social Science Research 
Title of Project: Adaptive and Non-Adaptive Policing of Drugs in London   
Principal Investigator:  Daniel Bear (D.Bear@LSE.ac.uk)  
Supervisor: Dr Michael Shiner (M.Shiner@LSE.ac.uk)  
 
1. Purpose of the Study: This study will use interviews with relevant MPS staff and 
stakeholders to assess how national policy on drug policing is reflected in street level 
implementation. There is a particular interest in the use of community policing.  
2. Procedures to be followed:  You will be interviewed for approximately one (1) 
hour. The questions deal with a variety of subjects related to drugs policy, community 
policing, community confidence, and discretion.  
3. Statement of Anonymity:  Your identity will not be associated with your 
responses. Electronic data will be stored and secured in password protected files, and 
hard copies of written records will be kept in a secure environment.  In the event of 
publication or presentation resulting from the research, no personally identifiable 
information will be shared. Results of this study may be used for teaching, research, 
publications, or presentations at scientific meetings, but your identity will not be 
revealed.  You will be allowed to choose your pseudonym.   
4. Discomforts and Risks:  There are no physical risks in participating in this research 
beyond those experienced in everyday life. Though you are provided anonymity, the 
disclosure of information to the researcher may be used in the final research product, 
and become public knowledge. There is no remuneration. You can ask questions about 
this research at any time during the interview or afterwards.  
5. Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this research study is voluntary. 
You may choose not to be a part of this research study.  There will be no penalty to 
you if you choose not to take part.  You may refuse to answer any question, or stop the 
interview at any point. Any data gathered before you quit the research may be kept and 
used by the researcher. 
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6. Data Recording: Your responses will be recorded in a digital audio format in order 
to ensure accuracy in the research. These recordings may be transcribed by a 
professional transcriptionist or the researcher. As mentioned previously, these 
recordings will be kept in password protected files, and the researcher will ensure that 
the transcription is done in line with all professional social science standards.   
 
Statement of Consent 
I (print your name and rank) _______________________________________ give my 
informed and voluntary consent to take part in this research study. I have read and 
understand the consent form presented to me.                                                  
 
 
Interviewee Signature: _____________________________  Date: ___________ 
 
PI Initials: 
 
________ 
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Appendix C: Street Level Policing Interview Information Sheet 
1. Are you male or female? Please tick the box that applies to you. 
 Male   
 Female   
  
2. How old are you? Please write your age in years in the box  years 
   
3. What is your ethnic group? Choose ONE section from A to E, and then tick the appropriate box to 
indicate your cultural background. 
 
 A. White     
 British     
 Irish     
 Other white background (please write in)     
      
 B. Mixed     
 White and Black Caribbean     
 White and Black African     
 White and Asian     
 other Mixed background (please write in)     
      
 C. Asian or Asian British     
 Indian     
 Pakistani     
 Bangladeshi     
 Any other Asian background (please write in)     
      
 D. Black or Black British     
 Caribbean     
 African     
 Any other Black background (please write in)     
      
 E. Chinese or other ethnic group     
 Chinese     
 Any other (please write in)     
     
4. What is your religion  
 None     
 Christian     
 Buddhist     
 Hindu     
 Jewish     
 Muslim     
 Sikh     
 Any other religion (please write in)     
     
Participant Code: 
 
 ______________ 
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Appendix D: Interviewee Information 
 
ID Code Pseudonym Rank Team 
Years 
Policing 
Interview 
Date 
Interview 
Length Age Ethnicity Gender 
SUPPSLT02 Harold Supt SLT 21 21/09/2010 1:06:59 44 
White 
British Male 
INSPRT01 Bruce Insp RT2 23 05/12/2010 0:38:34 42 
White 
British Male 
PCRT03 Jenny PC RT4 5 30/03/2011 0:44:35 29 
White 
British Female 
PCRT04 Rebekah PC RT4 1 30/03/2011 0:44:44 24 
Black 
Caribbean Female 
PCRT06 Elle PC RT4 2 31/03/2011 0:45:13 24 
White 
British Female 
PCRT05 Neville PC RT4 4 31/03/2011 0:51:24 24 
White 
British Male 
SGTRT01 Moses Sgt RT4 9 01/04/2011 1:02:08 38 White Irish Male 
PCRT01 Hugh PC RT4 2 06/04/2011 1:02:34 28 
White 
British Male 
PCRT02 Jack PC RT4 11 06/04/2011 1:10:25 34 
White 
British/Irish Male 
PCRT07 Dominick PC RT4 3 12/04/2011 0:56:12 24 
White 
British Male 
SGTRT02 Harry Sgt RT4 8 13/04/2011 0:51:40 28 
White 
British Male 
PCRT08 Marcus PC RT4 8 13/04/2011 0:55:06 26 White Welsh Male 
CMT01 Brenda N/A N/A N/A 13/04/2011 1:15:45 60 White/Asian Female 
INSPRT02 Bradley Insp RT4 16 10/05/2011 1:18:07 35 
White 
British Male 
PCOSU01 Callum PC OSU 6 18/05/2011 1:04:18 27 
White 
British Male 
PCSNT01 Clarke PC Brunel 8 13/07/2011 0:43:23 43 
White 
British Male 
PSSNT02 Steve Sgt Brunel 15 13/07/2011 0:43:45 ? 
White 
British Male 
DSDFS01 Oliver DS DFS 21 13/07/2011 1:11:26 40 
White 
British Male 
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PSSNT01 Richard Sgt Blackburn 14 20/07/2011 1:09:39 36 
White 
British Male 
PCSNT02 Sam PC Blackburn 11 20/07/2011 1:24:29 32 
White 
British Male 
SUPPSLT01 William Supt SLT 26 01/08/2011 0:58:27 48 
White 
British Male 
DCI01 Jacob DCI SLT 27 01/08/2011 1:01:01 ? 
White 
British Male 
INSPSNT01 Ned Insp SLT 30 02/08/2011 1:28:04 ? 
White 
British Male 
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Appendix E : Interview Schedule for PCs and PCSOs 
• Intro Questions 
o Length of Service 
o Expectations as PC 
o Why join   
o Where headed 
 
• Role 
o How do you see your current role? 
o How has your view of policing changed during your service? 
o What is your biggest challenge in this role? 
o What is best part of this role? 
o How do you manage the multitude of demands placed on you? 
o What role does the community play in your policing activities? 
o What do you think about the focus on community confidence in the Met? 
o How has your job changed in the last few years? 
 
• Communication 
o How well do you know the policies that guide your actions on the street? 
o How would you describe your communication with the community? 
o Are there any instances you can think of where you had a communication 
problem with a civilian, not including situations involving a language 
barrier? 
o How would have changed your communication if you had a ‘do-over’ for 
that scenario? 
 
• Drugs 
o What are the drug problems like in this area 
o Do you have a lot of acquisitive crime associated with drugs 
o What are the limits of your ability as a police officer to deal with drugs 
o What are some successes you’ve had with the drug problems in this area 
o What is your view of drug users 
o What would you change about the current legal framework around drugs 
o What would you change about the current policy about drugs in the Met 
o What makes you search someone for drugs 
o Are police the right group to be at the sharp end of the stick in combating 
drug use? 
o Do you think police can eradicate drugs? If not, what can they do? 
o What changes to drug laws would you make? 
 
• cannabis 
o How does cannabis fit into your activities  
o How does the effort against cannabis affect your wider efforts as police? 
o How have things changed since the move to class C, and then back to B 
o What purpose to cannabis warning forms serve 
o What would be the ideal policy for dealing with cannabis 
o How are cannabis users different than other drug users? 
o How much does a gram of cannabis cost in your area? An 1/8? An Ounce? 
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• Stop and search 
o What is GOWISELY? Why is it there? 
o Do you always fill out a stop and search slip? Why wouldn’t you? 
o How do you think the community views stop and search practices 
o What things do you think would improve this opinion. 
o How did you feel the first time you searched someone? 
o What directives have you been given about searching people? 
o What would make you decide to search someone? 
o Why do you think there is a disparity in the ethnic makeup of police 
searches? 
 
• Specific Officer Traits 
o Can you think of a specific officer that does their job in an exemplary 
fashion? 
 What is it that makes them so good? 
 How do other officers engage in the same practices, but not to the 
same level as that officer? 
o Can you think of an officer who does not do their job well? 
 What about their work is problematic 
o How would you rate yourself as an officer? 
 What is your best quality as an officer? 
 
• Priorities 
o What are your current priorities? 
o How do you go about addressing these priorities? 
o What role to statistics play in your policing practices 
o Do you feel pressure to meet statistical figures? 
 Does this pressure affect your policing practices in a way that 
makes you uncomfortable? 
o What matters most to you as a police officer? 
 
• Wrap Up Questions 
o If you were Met Commissioner, what would you change? 
o Are there areas where you feel change is warranted but probably won’t be 
addressed by the Met? 
o Is there anything you’d like to ask me? 
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Appendix F : Interview Schedule for SLT/Inspectors/Sergeants 
 
• Intro Questions 
o Length of Service 
o Expectations as PC 
o Why join   
o Where headed 
 
• Role 
o How do you see your current role? 
o How has your view of policing changed as you moved through the ranks? 
o What is your biggest challenge in this role? 
o What is best part of this role? 
o How do you manage the multitude of demands placed on you / your 
officers? 
o What role does the community play in your policing activities? 
o Who do you answer to? 
o What do you think about the focus on community confidence in the Met? 
o How has your job changed in the last few years? 
 
• Communication 
o How well does the Met communicate larger policy goals to street level 
staff? 
o How well do officers communicate with each other? 
o How well do police communicate with the community? 
o Are there any instances you can think of where you had a communication 
problem with a civilian, not including situations involving a language 
barrier? 
o How would have changed your communication if  you had a ‘do-over’ for 
that scenario? 
o How would you describe your style of leadership? 
o What do you expect, in terms of communication between your officers and 
the public, when your officers are at a call? 
 
• Drugs 
o What are the drug problems like in this area 
o Do you have a lot of acquisitive crime associated with drugs 
o What are the limits of your ability as a police officer to deal with drugs 
o How do you instruct your officers to deal with the issue of drugs 
o What are some successes you’ve had with the drug problems in this area 
o What is your view of drug users 
o What would you change about the current legal framework around drugs 
o What would you change about the current policy about drugs in the Met 
o How would you like your officers to go about searching for drugs 
o Are police the right group to be at the sharp end of the stick in combating 
drug use? 
o Do you think police can eradicate drugs? If not, what can they do? 
o What changes to drug laws would you make? 
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• cannabis 
o How does cannabis fit into your police officer’s activities  
o How does the effort against cannabis affect your wider efforts as police? 
o How have things changed since the move to class C, and then back to B 
o Why are cannabis warning forms important to your officers and you 
o What purpose to cannabis warning forms serve 
o What would be the ideal policy for dealing with cannabis 
o Why should officers search for cannabis? 
o How are cannabis users different than other drug users? 
o How much does a gram of cannabis cost in your area? An 1/8? An Ounce? 
 
 
• Stop and search 
o What do you expect from your officers when they’re searching people 
o How well do officers comply with the stop-slip requirements 
o How do you think the community views stop and search practices 
o What things do you think would improve this opinion. 
o How did you feel the first time you searched someone? 
o How do you think regularly searching civilians affects officers? 
o Do officers comply with stop-slip requirements? 
o What directives do you give your officers about searching people? 
o What would make you decide to search someone? 
o Why do you think there is a disparity in the ethnic makeup of police 
searches? 
 
• Specific Officer Traits 
o Can you think of a specific officer that does their job in an exemplary 
fashion? 
 What is it that makes them so good? 
 How do other officers engage in the same practices, but not to the 
same level as that officer? 
o Can you think of an officer who does not do their job well? 
 What about their work is problematic 
 
• Priorities 
o What are your current priorities? 
o How do you go about addressing these priorities? 
o What role to statistics play in your policing practices 
o Do you feel pressure to meet statistical figures? 
 Does this pressure affect your policing practices in a way that 
makes you uncomfortable? 
o What matters most to you as a police officer? 
 
• Wrap Up Questions 
o If you were Met Commissioner, what would you change? 
o Are there areas where you feel change is warranted but probably won’t be 
addressed by the Met? 
o Is there anything you’d like to ask me? 
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Appendix G : Working with The Teams 
Dorn and Lee (Dorn and Lee 1999) highlight that the policy responses required by a 
modern police force vary across the ranks and the type of unit. I worked with two 
types of units that regularly implement aspects of drug policy initiatives in order to 
observe the different ways they approached their policing duties. This section will 
provide an insight in to the structure and culture within the two main RTs that were 
engaged, and also discuss the role of gatekeepers in this work.  
 
This project entailed work with five different teams; two Response Teams, and three 
Safer Neighbourhood Teams. Response teams are comprised of up to 40 officers each, 
usually with four sergeants, and one Inspector. Some officers, usually three or four per 
team, will be qualified as RT drivers, meaning that they can drive the high-powered 
BMW that is called upon for pursuits or more serious incidents. Usually these are more 
senior or exemplary officers. There are supposed to be two of these cars on a team, but 
in practice there is often only one deployed. The RT car is quite powerful, and it was 
not unusual to hit 80mph or more when responding to a call in an RT car.  About half 
the team will be qualified as a response driver. These officers operate the Vauxhall 
Astra Incident Response Vehicles (IRV), and are qualified to drive to emergencies 
with the lights and sirens on.  
 
Each borough has a two letter abbreviation, and Watling’s is WG.  This abbreviation is 
worn on each officer’s shoulder, next to their three number shoulder identifier. As 
there are two response teams in WG, they are designated WW and WS. The vehicles in 
a response team are also numbered. A 2-x vehicle is and IRV, 1-8 is a robbery 
response car, 1-1 is an unmarked car used for observing dangerous situations and 
doing drugs policing, and a single digit car is for the RT car. For example, WS22 
would be an IRV from the WS team, and WW1 would be the RT car for WW.   
 
Farmingham Response Team: RT2 
The first team I began working with was Response Team 2 from Farmingham Police 
Station. I was put in to contact with one of their Sergeants by Supt Anera, and we 
arranged for me to start going out on with the team shortly thereafter.  Team 2’s 
Inspector was named Charles Kingsley, and I would later find out that he was actually 
 314 
raised in Watling. Inspector Kingsley welcomed me to his team, and never once made 
me feel as though I was imposing on his or his officers’ time. He conveyed strength 
and leadership with an ease and confidence that confidently toed the line between 
commander and colleague. He could join in with the banter at a canteen table, and 
quickly turn to issuing instructions from that same seat if a call came over the radio. 
This style seemed to resonate well with his officers. He gave them space to moan 
about the things officers moan about when not in the company of the higher ranks, but 
was also accessible and regularly took part in discussions with officers. He moved on 
mid-way through my fieldwork, and his replacement had a very different leadership 
style.  
 
Inspector Rachael told her team on her first day as their commanding officer that she 
was, “…a response officer, always have been, and never want to be anything else.” 
Where the other inspectors primarily based themselves in the station, Inspector 
Rachael insisted on being out on the street as much as possible. She would, at times, 
even make arrests and search suspects. This angered many officers because she would 
sometimes be too busy doing this to provide guidance on developing situations.  She 
was an intimidating woman, with an almost permanent scowl. Replacing Inspector 
Kingsley, Inspector Rachael’s style didn’t gel with the team, and nearly every officer 
on team complained openly about her leadership. I rode with her only once, and we 
never developed a good working relationship. She declined to be interviewed for this 
research and I would mostly try to avoid her during my last several shifts with the team 
because I got the distinct sense that she had tired of my presence.  
 
The Sergeants of the team were able middle management, and their organization skills 
inside the office were backed up by very strong street skills when they attended the 
scene of incidents. Of all the officers I met during my time in the field, Sergeant 
Sharon stands out as one of my favourites. With her semi-hidden smoking habit and a 
loud Yorkshire voice, Sgt Morrison did not abide bullshit. She could manoeuvre 
through the bureaucracy of the MPS, connect with the PCs on the team, and take 
control of incidents on the street with a calm but firm attitude. Response Team 2 had 
many officers who were young in service, but there were several old hands with more 
than 20 years on the job, and their seniority and knowledge were attributes called on 
regularly during difficult situations. The team’s PCs were a tight-knit group, though 
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there were two officers on the team that were generally disliked by the rest of the team. 
It was explained to me that these disliked officers ‘winged about everything’ and 
chimed in with their opinion to conversations that they weren’t a part of. This 
apparently would have been a small problem, except these officers were also, ‘shit 
police. They don’t have the attitude or composure, and I don’t trust them to get my 
back.’ (PC Dave, RT2). One of the officers had failed public-order training because 
she couldn’t complete an obstacle that was considered fairly easy to overcome, and for 
several weeks afterwards she would talk about her old shoulder injury and how it 
probably was why she couldn’t pass the course.    
 
This team was populated by more characters than any other I worked with. Each 
officer seemed to have carved out a distinct personality, as separate from their 
colleagues as possible. There was PC Mitch, a kindly older PC who never wore his 
bulletproof vest, wore loafers instead of boots, and seemed to shuffle along amiably 
even in rapidly escalating incidents. Mitch loved to go and converse with the local 
prostitutes to ensure they were safe and took a keen interest in protecting vulnerable 
people. Despite Mitch’s apparent care for people, he rabidly hated Chinese 
immigrants. On early morning patrols he would stop and search anyone he suspected 
of being an illegal immigrant, and detain them until they could prove to be in the 
country legally. There was also PC Paula an RT driver and former horse breeder. 
 
The team, unlike others I would work with, made break times a very communal event. 
The canteen at Farmingham Station had erratic hours, and the kitchen itself was rarely 
open to serve food when the officers needed it on a night shift, but the dining area was 
the place to bring your meal when your allotted break came. Two tables were pushed 
together end to end near the back of the canteen area, and this is where Response 
Teams would always eat. During my time in Farmingham station with RT2 and other 
units, I never saw a non-RT unit eating at that table. Even visiting officers and 
Territorial Support Group teams somehow seemed to know that the table in question 
was the domain of the RT on duty at that time. The table’s location at the back of the 
canteen provided some empty space where officers could have enough room to sit with 
their colleagues whilst being able to shed their Personal Protective Equipment  but 
keep it nearby. The tables also provided an area where the officers could sit and talk in 
relative comfort during their shift.  It was the scene of storytelling, a break from the 
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dangers outside, and the place where you could be assured of a chocolate biscuit and a 
hot cup of tea at even the most unsocial hour.  
 
Officers of RT2 covered the southern section of the borough, an area that included 
some particularly notorious parts of London due to especially violent crimes over the 
years. As previously mentioned, the ward of Farmingham itself was the only one in 
which black residents were a majority, and officers mentioned this fact to me on 
several occasions. Despite this racial makeup, there were no black officers amongst the 
30 strong team. There were a number of women on the team, but almost the entire 
team was white-British. There was one male officer of Turkish decent, and one south-
Asian female officer. This different makeup of the police and the citizenry of the area 
was quite stark, and several instances occurred where groups of young black residents 
had quite negative encounters with groups of all white police officers. This is not to 
assume ethnic differences caused the negative experiences, but it was certainly 
palpable that there was a difference in the makeup of the groups, and that sentiment 
was expressed by the residents.   
 
Ulverston Response Team: RT4 
The second RT I would work with was based at the other 24-hour response station in 
the borough. RT4 was led by Inspector Bradley, a man who had a sterner and formal 
leadership style than Inspector Kingsley in RT2. He was approachable and seemed 
genuinely concerned with the well-being of his officers, but he demanded good 
performance from them. Inspector Bradley was in his early 30s and had been a police 
officer his whole career. He was on a clear upward trajectory through the ranks and 
was respected as one of the best Inspectors in the borough by the Senior Leadership 
Team. He displayed what I felt was a genuine kindness towards me throughout my 
fieldwork, providing access to his team in whatever capacity I needed. At RT2 I had to 
call a PC or Sergeant to let me in to the building each time, but at RT4 I often called 
Inspector Bradley to let me in to the building. Admittedly this may have been in part 
because his office was right next to the main entrance, while the Sergeants’ office was 
located much farther away. The team’s opinion of Inspector Bradley was split. Some 
viewed him as, “a quality Inspector, good in tough spots and friendly, if a bit too 
driven” (PC Paul, RT4). Another regularly referred to the Inspector in a mock German 
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accent because of the pressure Inspector Bradley put on his officers to be the best rated 
RT in the borough.  
 
RT4 at Ulverston rarely ate in the canteen onsite, but preferred to gather in the PC’s 
Writing Room. Eating in there meant that you had to try and find space between the 
computers to put your food, but afforded the distinct advantage of giving the officers a 
space to themselves. A canteen can be filled with officers from any number of teams, 
or even senior staff members. The PC’s Writing Room was for PC’s only, and filled 
with the photo shopped pictures of colleagues, Police Federation announcements, and 
the kettle. So serious was the sanctity of that space, no one ever actually included the 
words ‘PC’ when describing the space. It was simply, ‘the writing room’. During the 
debate about police pay initiated by Home Secretary Theresa May, several pictures of 
her appeared on the walls of the writing room adorned with sketches of numerous 
penises pointing towards her face. The jokes that were too crass for crime scenes or 
Parade found a welcome reception in the writing room. Sergeants stepped in to that 
office only rarely, and usually to let people know when they could go home at the end 
of the shift. This was less the case at RT2 in Farmingham. There, the writing room was 
located right between the Sergeant’s office and the Inspector’s office. Still a place of 
sanctity, the lack of privacy meant that the dirtiest jokes had to wait until one could 
extricate oneself to the car-park area where privacy could be ensured.  
 
RT4 had many officers with less than 5 years of service, including several that had 
started their career as a PCSO.  The officers on RT4 would have been the most random 
group of people assembled if it had not been for their shared current profession and 
uniform. They came from all walks of life, social classes, and backgrounds. The 
former west-end dancer turned police officer riding with the former-paratrooper. The 
action oriented twenty-something officer riding with the 50 something female rookie 
nicknamed ‘Gran’. The ginger Sergeant with a soft voice sitting across from the hard-
as-nails ‘Sergeant God’. I came to spend more time with this team than RT2 in 
Farmingham, and I don’t know why that was exactly. There was a level of team 
cohesiveness at RT4 that made it a good place to work. I cannot say that I was able to 
glean better data from RT4 than RT2, or that the experiences were any more or less 
exciting with the different units. There are perhaps then only two reasons why I spent 
more time with RT4 than RT2. Most important of the two, RT4 allowed me in to their 
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professional lives with a seamless ease that I didn’t experience at RT2. This is not to 
downgrade the value of the data or the welcome I received from individual officers at 
RT2, but simply describes how the label of outsider seemed to shine less brightly 
across my forehead with RT4. Secondly, and far less importantly, RT4 would 
sometimes give me a ride home at the end of a shift. The near universal refrain by 
officers in that situation being, “It’s the Commissioner’s petrol, not mine”.  
 
One factor that improved my working relationship with RT4 was being involved in a 
car crash with officers from RT4 in the first month of my fieldwork with them. During 
a response to an ‘I grade’ call an hour in to a day shift on a frosty Sunday morning, I 
was in the backseat of the RT car driven by PC Marcus when we were broadsided by a 
Renault while speeding through an intersection on a red light. No one was seriously 
injured in the accident, but we were all shaken up.  Personally my neck hurt a lot, but I 
refused to acknowledge the pain since the neither of the officers involved appeared to 
be injured. I stood outside in the sub-zero temperatures for two hours as all manner of 
officers came to take evidence and evaluate the accident. As I was still somewhat new 
to the team, I didn’t know what I could and couldn’t talk about with the officers 
involved in the crash for fear that I might somehow taint evidence or bias future 
testimony. It was very lonely and cold standing in the middle of the closed off street, 
pieces of both vehicles at my feet. I felt like I was watching some movie unfold around 
me as the police tape went up and ambulances started arriving. My relationship with 
Marcus would be because somewhat awkward as a result of the accident. He was 
aware that I had filled out a witness statement, and for several months the Crown 
Prosecution Service hung the threat of prosecution over him. Having not seen my 
statement, he couldn’t be sure if I’d written a favourable version of the accident. 
During that time he wasn’t able to drive for the MPS, a role he cherished deeply. PC 
Marcus made a point of telling the team how much he enjoyed sitting as a passenger 
and not having to do anything during that period. At one point I ran in to Marcus in the 
car park, and during our conversation I slipped in that I had written a ‘good’ witness 
statement, and that I couldn’t see how CPS would pursue a case. Things between us 
improved after that.  
 
The accident, painful as it might have been, bonded me with officers of the team. 
When the story came up over the next few weeks, I was able to engage in the 
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storytelling process. In those moments I was no longer the random civilian listening 
passively to stories of past adventures. I am confident that the experience strengthened 
my position with the team. The fact that I refused medical treatment, stayed cool in an 
otherwise traumatic situation, and stayed on to finish the rest of the shift were certainly 
noticed by officers. Several commented on my composure and pointed out that I had 
already experienced a fairly rare event for police officers. Some officers questioned 
whether my presence on the team was a good omen, preventing more serious injuries 
during the accident, or a bad omen in that my presence caused the accident.  This was 
debated several times over the course of the next few weeks, and again when I was in 
another, much less serious accident, while with two other members of the team a few 
months later.  
 
Gatekeepers  
The issue of gatekeepers in ethnography’s well documented by the likes of Liebow 
(1967) and Whyte (1955). Gatekeepers at the ground level can play an instrumental 
role in what you get to see and how you see it. The command structure of the police 
may have helped overcome some obstacles as team leaders were told by 
Superintendent Anera that I would be joining their unit.  While this would not ensure 
that individual officers would be willing to participate, it did lay down an expectation 
that was beneficial for my access. Similar methodology has proven successful at 
generating confidence and support from the ranks to enable effective research (Wilson 
1968, Smith and Gray 1983, Collison 1995). Due to the nature of this work I was 
presented with several gatekeepers in the form of team leaders, each one requiring 
individualized relationship maintenance.  This became even more important when Supt 
Anera left Watling just two months in to my fieldwork. At that point, I lost my patron 
in the borough’s Senior Leadership Team, and had to rely on the team leaders 
continued support to maintain my access.  As access was never guaranteed, but had to 
negotiated on an on-going basis, I remained constantly vigilant to my perceived role, 
the attitude of the gatekeepers, and the officers themselves (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1995). I was fortunate that I never experienced (or at least was aware) of any time 
where the gatekeepers tried to keep me away from sensitive, disorderly, or 
troublesome situations (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). 
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Working with Teams in the Field 
At the time fieldwork began in Watling, officers on Response Teams worked 12 hour 
shifts, typically doing three day shifts followed by two nights. The shifts ran either 
from 6-6 (at Farmingham) or 7-7 (At Ulverston), with two one-hour breaks built in. 
Given the frantic pace of operations in the borough it was rare that officers would get 
more than an hour of break time in total during a shift, often split in to several small 
chunks of time. This pattern changed in April of 2011, switching to an eight hour shift. 
When working with a Response Team, I would arrive about 15 minutes before the 
scheduled start of the shift, and make my way to the briefing room after being let in to 
the building. The first activity for the team was to Parade.  
 
The Parade unfortunately lacked any marching and was just a briefing with a 
PowerPoint featuring recent crimes, wanted suspects, and missing persons. Officers 
also received their vehicle assignments and break times during Parade175. Those 
arriving late to parade had to purchase donuts for the team during the shift176. SNTs 
also did a version of Parade, but given the different start times for various team 
members, it was not a formal briefing. The few minutes before the Parade started were 
always the most challenging part of the shift for me because it was the most relaxed 
time for the officers. There wasn’t any suspect fleeing or suspicious person loitering 
nearby to take their attention. At any moment they could have leeringly turned their 
attention to me and my intrusion in to their job (Skolnick 1966). But they did not. My 
presence, like that of a PC from another team, a Special Constable on a single shift, or 
any other random MPS staff never outwardly disturbed the quiet banter and boot-tying 
that proceeded the start of the briefing.  
 
At my first visit to a team I would be introduced by the team Sergeant, and asked to 
say a few words. These were critical moments and I should probably have had a well-
rehearsed speech on tap. I did not.  The lack of prepared rhetoric was deliberate 
                                                 
175 In what is perhaps a sign of the bureaucratised nature of the profession, assignments were not read 
out by name. Rather the vehicle call-sign was read out, followed by the shoulder numbers of the 
assigned officers, and their assigned break periods. For example, ‘Whiskey Whiskey two-one, nine 
seven seven and three five six, 23 and 02.’ Though pairings would often remain the same for a month of 
shifts, the assignments were read out at each parade.  
176 Ordinary donuts were tolerated, but Krispy Kreme donuts were considered the standard to be met, 
especially for officers young in service. Forcing an officer to incur a financial penalty for informal 
punishments was strictly forbidden, but the practice was accepted without complaint.  
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because I feared that a well-rehearsed speech would sound like a well-rehearsed 
speech, and not an honest accounting of my purpose there. I told the officers that I was 
a student177, and that the purpose of my being with them was to observe how street 
policing of drugs took place in Watling. I confirmed that I was not a reporter, that they 
were free to not participate without fear of repercussion from the MPS, and that 
anything they told me would be anonymised before entering the public domain.  
 
After attending the pre-shift parade I would either be assigned to a car by one of the 
team’s Sergeants, or would request to go out with a specific car. Usually I was 
assigned by the Sergeants for the first few shifts with a unit, but I would branch out as 
my familiarity with the team grew. I wanted to ensure that I had a chance to ride with 
most officers on a team early on in the process, and was reasonably successful at 
accomplishing this. Additionally, asking officers myself instead of being assigned by 
the Sergeant gave the officer the chance to decline participation more easily. Though 
none ever did, I felt this approach was more ethical on the grounds that it was more 
consistent with the principle of informed consent. 
 
 Starting out with one car did not always mean I would stay with that team for the 
entire shift. Arrests take a long time to process, and the paperwork involved in 
processing them does not lend itself to allowing an officer to converse with a 
researcher. This was especially so if there were multiple arrests or it was for a 
complicated case. In one notable instance, I went out with WG22, and within five 
minutes he had arrested three Chinese men on immigration violations. It was a good 
thing I switched cars, because he was tied up processing the men for nearly seven 
hours. While I was interested to see the range policing activity and how drugs fit in to 
that, spending seven hours watching an officer do paperwork on immigration 
violations was not going to generate the data I needed. I had limited time in the field 
and sometimes had to make the decision to pursue activities that would generate better 
opportunities for relevant data collection.  
 
                                                 
177 Mastrofski et al. (1998)  note that the role of ‘student’ may be less threatening to officers than police 
staff or government researchers engaged in the same activity.  
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If a situation arose where officers would be off the street for a considerable period, I 
had a choice to make. Did I wait, or did I join another team? There were a myriad of 
factors that went in to making a decision on this, but more often than not I would join 
another team if the delay was estimated to be for more than two hours. Officers 
seemed to support these decisions by and large, and to understand why I would not 
want to wait around for several hours. On occasions where I did wait around, I largely 
found that I had no one to talk to. Sitting in the station allowed me to absorb quite a bit 
of data from listening to the radio, making tea, smoking with officers on their breaks, 
and writing up field-notes; but it was not as informative to do so.   
 
When a new car came in I would tell them my previous team was ‘stuck writing up 
multiple bodies’, and could I join them. Upon getting in to a vehicle with an officer for 
the first time, I would reiterate the basic confidentiality and anonymity issues I 
informed them of when I first joined the team. My spiel went something like this: 
 
Hi guys, before we head out I just need to remind you of a few things. 
Firstly, I’m not a reporter, or DPS178. I’m a PhD student doing research on 
street-level policing of drugs. Basically I’m interested to see how and when 
drugs become a part of what you have to deal with as police. Anything you 
say to me today is anonymised, and by that I mean that I won’t ever tell 
anyone your name, your unit, or what borough we’re working in when I 
write up my research. The Met knows the units I’m working with, but I’ll 
never give them officer names for anything you say. You don’t have to let 
me join you during your shift, and if you don’t want me along at any point, 
for any reason, you can just drop me off at the station without any 
repercussions I’d prefer it if you did that as opposed to just leaving me in 
the middle of Farmingham, but you are welcome to do just that if you find 
my company too awful to bear.  When we’re out and about I tend to come 
along no matter the situation, but you are free to direct me as you see fit if 
I’m doing anything that you think jeopardizes you, your partner, the 
civilians involved, or my own safety. Basically, I can be told to piss off 
just like you might any other citizen who is too close to a dangerous or 
intense situation. I don’t engage in policing activities, but if you’re taking a 
kicking you can call on me for help like you would a civilian. I will tend to 
stay out of your way and not engage with citizens, but if people ask who I 
am you can tell them whatever you want. I’d prefer if you told them that 
I’m a researcher, but if the situation is such that you need to tell them 
something different, go right ahead. Are you guys okay with all that? Any 
questions? 
 
                                                 
178 DPS is the Department for Professional Standards, and they handle internal disciplinary matters.  
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No officer ever directly turned me away from joining them, though a few seemed a bit 
suspicious of me at first. I solved this by finding an opportunity to join the suspicious 
officer when they were paired with an officer I had ridden with before. 
 
In the car we tended to talk about a variety of things well beyond the subject of the 
research. A natural transition into policing and drugs issues was easily achieved once 
the police had a call or spotted someone suspicious. By letting the topic of policing 
emerge naturally I was able to achieve two important things. Firstly, I cemented my 
own position by not being excessively nosey. If I had pressed for information before 
officers were comfortable with my presence I might have been seen to be using them 
as research subjects, mining them for information. Secondly, the actual topics emerged 
more holistically, and were not limited to what I thought we should be discussing. For 
example, I let officer broach the subject of ethnicity. Once the topic was there, then I 
would expand and question as needed, but I believe this lead to a more comfortable 
relationship with the officers. Towards the end of the fieldwork I would occasionally 
adopt a more direct line of questioning when out with officers with whom I had 
developed a good relationship. This was done in order to clarify previous information I 
had been given, or to probe deeper in to a line of questioning begun during a previous 
shift. This targeted effort elicited useful data, but I used it sparingly because I felt it 
drained a bit of the social capital I had built up with officers.  
 
Upon arriving at the scene of incidents I would exit the vehicle with the officers. 
However, this was not always an easy feat. Firstly, the room behind the passenger in a 
Vauxhall Astra is quite limited, and many times my foot would get stuck underneath 
the seat. Moreover, sometimes the child lock would not have been disabled when I first 
joined the car. This would leave me unable to open the door from the inside, and I 
would have to ask the officers to let me out of the vehicle. Easily corrected once 
noticed, this still provided a bit of an annoyance for both parties, and it was a clear 
indication of outsider status with the team.  
 
Jumping out of the car quickly was an important aspect of police activities. For 
officers it represented being in control and providing an urgent response to people in 
need. For me, it meant not getting left behind. In one incident I was with PC Gareth as 
we did an area search for a robbery suspect. His partner had got out to search through a 
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street market on foot, and was to meet us at the end of an alley. Just as we turned into 
the alley a youth perfectly fitting the description of the suspect spotted us and bolted 
towards open parkland. PC Gareth was out of the car in a flash, but my foot got stuck, 
and in two seconds it took to free it I was already 20 metres behind him. I ran as hard 
as I could for nearly 300 metres, but kept losing distance as they skirted around corners 
and hopped over fences. Suddenly I turned a corner and they were nowhere to be seen. 
Without a radio to hear what was happening, I made my way back to the car. A few 
minutes later PC Gareth emerged from the gap between two small blocks of flats. He 
was covered in sweat, but empty-handed. 
 
Though I took deliberate care to not appear to be a police officer, I made the decision 
to follow officers if they engaged in a foot pursuit. In vehicle pursuits I had no say in 
the matter, and frankly the adrenaline rush of a vehicle pursuit makes it impossible to 
maintain the dispassionate demeanour of an observer179. Foot chases were different. 
For a start, they were more frequent. I was involved in only two genuine vehicle 
pursuits, but five lengthy foot pursuits and two additional instances that ended after 
just a few meters.  
 
I chose to take part in foot pursuits for several reasons. Most importantly I wanted to 
see how officers understood their role, and part of that was seeing how they reacted to 
a ‘decamp’180.  It also was a way of separating me from the image they may have had 
of a researcher. Officers would often ask me during my first shift with them what time 
I would be going home. Officers mentioned that the few civilians who had done a ride-
along never stayed for the full tour, and they never wanted to see the boring bits of 
police work. My response was always the same, ‘I go home when you go home.’ I felt 
that if I was going to be there for the full shift, I might as well be there for the full 
experience. This also was part of the constant struggle to gain and maintain respect in 
the macho environment I was working in. Also, to be totally frank, I didn’t want to be 
                                                 
179 So powerful is that rush that the Met has a special sticker placed in front of the passenger seat that 
details exactly the information an officer needs to put out over the Main-set during the pursuit.  
Listening to other units call out a pursuit over the Main-set, their voices take on a frenzied pitch, a 
combination of the adrenaline, speeding car, and the fact that there are probably three radio channels 
suddenly ablaze with information.  
180 A ‘decamp’ was the general term for a foot pursuit in progress, but it was most often used in 
conjunction with someone exiting a vehicle and running away. A call of ‘Decamp! Decamp! Decamp!’ 
over the radio generated a significant response from other units, second only to the emergency button 
being activated.   
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stuck alone with the car. I wasn’t a police officer, and sitting by myself in a police car 
was an open invitation for civilians to misconstrue my role and identity.  Luckily foot 
pursuits were rare, brief, and largely an empty gesture. Officers in their late twenties or 
older, loaded down with an extra 8-10kgs of gear, aren’t nearly as fleet of foot as the 
youths who ran from them.   
 
My goal upon arriving at an incident was to stand close enough to hear exactly what 
was transpiring without being in the way, or appearing to act as a police officer. I made 
sure to never stand between an officer and civilian/suspect, or to block in a civilian so 
that that they were surrounded by what they might assume were three police officers. 
Positioning myself in this manner meant I was sometimes a bit of an unknown quantity 
to civilians interacting with officers. It was clear to most people that I was with the 
officers, but not one myself. What I was remained a mystery to many, and I can only 
guess at the explanations they came up with for my presence181. At one scene a group 
of youths was being stopped after it was reported that they were harassing people and 
knocking over bins. Lined up against the wall, the crew of 14 year olds gave flippant 
answers to the officers and giggled at their own comments. At one point a small boy 
who appeared to have carefully shaped the faint moustache just beginning to appear on 
his upper lip looked over at me. Studying me from head to toe and back again, he 
turned to the officer searching his friend. “Who’s that guy with the thing on his 
face182?” Before I could say anything, the officer snapped back, “What does it matter if 
he’s the king of Siam or CID? You need to be worried about me, not him.”   
 
Sometimes I ended up in the middle of a rapidly escalating situation. In one instance I 
had positioned myself about four meters behind a group of three officers who were 
talking with an apparently drunk and belligerent 19 year old black male about 80 
metres away from a large warehouse party. A young man had been shot only blocks 
away a few days before, and both police and the community were on edge. Suddenly 
from behind me a group of ten young men appeared, yelling at the officers about the 
fact they were harassing their friend. They seemed to understand that I was not a police 
                                                 
181 This ethical issue will be covered in detail at a later point in this chapter.  
182 I have a port-wine-stain birthmark on my left cheek.  
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officer, and did not direct any of their comments to me183, but I was now between the 
officers and the group of young men, trapped by a shrub wall behind me. As the 
tension escalated, other officers who had been standing on the periphery of the initial 
stop came rushing up behind the group. I felt trapped, and the tension continued to 
mount as the volume of the shouting increased. Eventually I slipped away from the 
crowd when the man involved in the initial stop was handcuffed and dragged away. 
This action caused the crowd to follow him towards the waiting van, and I headed back 
to the car I had arrived in.  
 
I was authorized by the police to accompany them into people’s homes during 
incidents. If it was a particularly small home or an intense situation, I stayed near the 
door. I made sure to enter the premises last, and stand quietly without touching 
anything.  In homes I faced a particular ethical dilemma. While officers were allowed 
to enter someone’s home in an emergency, I was not an officer, and therefore could be 
asked to leave. I tried, whenever the situation allowed for it, to inform people that I 
was not a police officer, and that they could ask me to leave at any point. Sometimes 
the situation was too tense, the visit too brief, or the person too inebriated to allow me 
to disclose this information.  Out of more than 300 incidents I attended, at least 50 
involved entering someone’s home. On only one occasion was I asked to leave, and I 
did so courteously and promptly. 
 
 The incident in question occurred in a small flat strewn with old fast food wrappers 
and furnished with only two folding beach chairs, a TV, and a small bed. The man who 
lived there had apparently invited a woman home with him from the pub after a ten 
hour drinking session so the two of them could smoke cannabis together. The female 
victim reported that after they were high the man tried to grope her breast and kiss her, 
and she called the police. While the police were talking to him in his bathroom, he 
became quite agitated. He started screaming at them all to leave, but they told him they 
would not. When he turned to me and started screaming that I had to leave I politely 
excused myself and explained to the officers that as a researcher I was obliged to 
respect his wishes at this time. He was quite confused by my withdrawal, and 
                                                 
183 Though several did keep looking at me, as if trying to decipher who I might be. My jacket was 
zipped up, so they could not see that I had a bullet proof vest on.  
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temporarily calmed down as he tried to process what had just happened.  He was 
subsequently arrested for sexual assault.  
 
This encounter produced one of the oddest moments of my fieldwork. A few minutes 
before I was asked to leave, I was standing in the living room of the flat, and the 
female victim came up to me. Before I could say anything, she moved quite close to 
me and began to study my face. I have a Port Wine Stain birthmark on my left cheek, 
and her eyes wandered all over my face for about ten seconds. I stood there silently. 
She smelled of beer, sweat, and cigarettes, but I remained still as she scanned me from 
only inches away. After she had thoroughly examined every pore, she turned, walked a 
few feet away, and then turned back to face me. She said, ‘You’ve got a beautiful soul 
inside you, and it radiates such intense energy, such goodness, such beauty. That’s 
why you’ve got a birthmark. It’s an expression of how much goodness shines inside 
you.’ With that, she turned and pulled out a half-smoked joint from her purse… in 
front of a room full of police officers 
 
In general I remained with a team for as long as possible. At times this meant being in 
quite boring situations. During one large fire I was with an IRV that was assigned to 
block access to the street, about 200 metres from the fire itself. For three and a half 
hours we stood in the cold, the officers directing people on alternative routes to their 
destination as the early morning darkness slowly gave way to the dawn.  We were 
stuck there for an hour past the end of the shift, and I politely declined the officers’ 
offer to have a unit come and take me back to the station184.  
 
Work with Safer Neighbourhood Teams 
Shifts spent with the SNTs were quite different from shifts with the RTs. They tended 
to be much slower in tempo, with fewer incidents, and less sense of urgency. SNTs 
accomplish a great deal of their work though foot patrols in their assigned 
neighbourhoods. As such, shifts with an SNT meant a lot of walking. Patrols were 
                                                 
184 It should be noted that I didn’t spend the entire time standing with the officers by the police tape. At 
one point they suggested that I go closer to the actual action and see what was going on. I ended up 
spending about 15 minutes leaned up against a fire truck, having a front-row view of the fire-fighters 
attacking the large fire. It was certainly a spectacular sight to watch, however the smell of smoke 
permeated my coat and lasted for several weeks.   
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directed to pass by known trouble spots, to follow up with complaints from civilians, 
and to generally ‘fly the flag’ as it were.   
 
A typical shift with an SNT involved accompanying one of the PCs or PCSOs while 
walking through the area. These team members had developed an intimate knowledge 
of the areas they worked in. They knew all the back alleys and the names and 
addresses of all the problematic members of the community. Their slower pace 
allowed them to absorb details of the neighbourhood, and they would often encounter a 
friendly nod or smile from a citizen they recognized.  I generally walked alongside the 
team member, free from the physical barriers of an IRV that clearly defined my place 
compared to the officers’. Walking alongside someone as an equal is quite different 
than always having to sit in the back seat. While this may have made me appear to be 
another officer to someone taking a cursory glance, I maintained the same positioning 
and role during encounters alongside SNT members as I did with RTs.   
 
Appearance 
I also made sure to keep my goatee-beard and hair trimmed short, and always showed 
up freshly shaved. My coat was a fairly standard black North Face waterproof jacket 
during cold weather, and a soft-shell fleece in slightly warmer situations. Both were 
rugged, practical, and not flashy in any way. I made sure to always have a standard kit 
when in the field. This included a small torch, a pair of latex gloves185, chewing gum, 
an extra pen, my iPhone186, an external iPhone battery, and a handkerchief187. The gum 
proved especially useful in encouraging dialogue. On several occasions when 
conversation had dried up as we wearily passed the early morning hours of a shift, 
offering a piece of gum to the officers would reignite discussion. The torch also came 
in handy several times when an officer would either have forgotten, or was 
experiencing a problem with their torch.  All officers on an RT carried a duty-bag 
(usually a small duffel bag) that they left in the boot of the vehicle. This contained 
various forms, equipment, high visibility coat, snacks, and the other various bits and 
                                                 
185 Though I had no interest in getting involved in emergency situations, I was around situations where 
there were considerable amounts of blood, and the potential of being called to assist in a medical 
situation was always possible. I specifically purchased a box of gloves that were a different colour to the 
off-white ones worn by police and medics.   
186 More on the use of the iPhone as a research tool can be found in the Methods chapter. 
187 Most of these items were kept inside the pockets on my bullet proof west, making them bulge just 
like that of officers’ vests which were full of pocket books and other bits and bobs.  
 329 
bobs that might be necessary over the course of their shift. I too carried a bag, though 
smaller than the standard officer’s bag. In there I always kept my recorder, consent 
forms, notebooks, snacks, and extra warm clothes. The bag could have stayed at the 
station during shifts with RTs, but putting it in the vehicle along with the officer’s was 
a powerful symbolic gesture that I was joining them.  When out with SNTs the bag 
was left in the station since I usually accompanied them during foot patrols. 
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Appendix H : Freedom of Information Request 
August 5, 2012 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
I am a PhD Candidate in the Social Policy Department at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. I am currently engaged in research that will be used 
to help complete my PhD. I am seeking data related to the implementation of drugs 
policy and community policing initiatives by Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) units 
across the city. I also have specific questions relating to the borough of [Watling]. This 
information is sought under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA 2000).  
 
Community Policing Data: 
 
Please provide me with any reports (either formal briefs/memorandum, or tables 
outlining the data) that discuss the results of the Public Attitude Survey (PAS) for the 
MPS as a whole.  
 
Please also provide  any reports on the PAS specifically for the borough of [Watling], 
for the years 2006-2012.  
 
Please provide me with any reports that discuss the results of Victim Response 
Surveys (VRS) for the MPS as a whole.  
 
Please also provide  any reports on the VRS specifically for the borough of [Watling], 
for the years 2006-2012. 
 
What is the budget allocated for Community Policing in the MPS for each year 
between 2006-2012?  
 
What is the budget allocated for Community Policing  to the borough of [Watling] for 
the years 2006 - 2012.  
 
Please provide me with the daily engagement reports for the [Bunsen Terrace, Brunel 
Gardens, and Blackburn] Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNT) in the borough of 
[Watling] from August 2009 – August 2012.   
 
Please provide me with any reports on the effectiveness of the community policing 
initiatives of the MPS as a whole.  
 
Please also provide any reports on the effectiveness of community policing initiatives 
for the borough of [Watling]. 
 
Please provide me with any ‘heat maps’ showing the community confidence levels in 
the borough of [Watling], based on data gathered between 2008-2012. 
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Drugs Policing Data: 
 
Please provide me with copies of the Monthly Report on Drug Crime produced for the 
monthly management briefing and the Drugs Directorate that contains information on 
the FYTD statistics on drugs crime within the MPS. 
 
 Please provide me with any policy, tactical, or strategic guidance documents that deal 
with police enforcement of drug laws, and are issued to leaders of SNT, Drug Squads, 
or Response Teams in the borough of [Watling] between 2004-2012. 
 
 Please provide me with the total number of stop and searches taking place under S.23 
of the Misuse of Drugs Act, the success rate for finding prohibited items, the number 
of seizures for each class of drug, and the number of cannabis warning forms issued, 
broken down by borough, and covering the FY2004/2005-2011/2012.  
 
Please note that I am making this request based on evidence in my research that 
several data collection softwares are currently in use by various public bodies. It is on 
this basis that I am confident the questions above should not violate the cost 
restrictions set out in s. 12 FOIA 2000 and the s.3 of the Freedom of Information and 
Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004. I am more than happy 
to work with you in regards to prioritising certain sections and deadlines for 
responding with the material if that will help you put together the various items I’ve 
requested. For the purpose of clarity, I would also like to confirm that the information 
being requested relates only to datasets of a depersonalised nature. 
Should you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me via 
the below email address.  I look forward to your written reply, within 20 business days 
as specified by section 10 of the FOIA 2000. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Daniel Bear 
PhD Candidate 
The London School of Economics, 
D.Bear@lse.ac.uk 
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Appendix I : Thematic Coding Framework 
Primary Thematic 
Grouping Secondary Thematic Grouping 
Tertiary Thematic 
Grouping 
Cannabis Issues   
   Alternatives to Cannabis Warning 
System 
 
  Cannabis as part of larger crime 
issues 
  
  Cannabis without Detection   
  Disposal of Cannabis   
  Frustration with situation   
  Mental Health Issues   
  Not a Community Priority   
  Passion for finding cannabis   
  Reasons for Going After Cannabis   
 
  Only in it for the detection 
 
  Responding to Community 
Demands 
 Views on Cannabis warning system   
  Who Gets Caught   
Communication   
   Communicating Large Scale Policy 
Goals 
 
  with management   
Community Issues   
   Can't Meet Community's 
Expectations 
 
  Community Perception of police   
  Dislike the Community   
  Efforts to Improve Community 
Confidence 
  
  Hostile Community Reaction   
  Not understanding the community’s 
feelings 
  
  Suspicious of Community   
  Who Participates in Dialogue   
Creating the Other   
   Reciprocating Respect  
  Sympathetic Addict   
  Tax Payer vs. Non Tax Payer   
  Worthy Victim   
Discretion   
   Changes to discretion  
Domestic violence   
 Expectation of 
joining police 
  
   Becoming Police  
  Community Confidence Part of 
Imagined Role 
  
Improving   
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Community 
Confidence 
  Challenges in Working with the 
community 
  
 
  Disparate Nature of 
Community 
 Superficial Changes   
  Visible Sign of Community’s 
confidence 
  
Incorporating 
Priorities 
  
 Managing Drug 
Problems 
  
   Futility  
  Getting Small Amounts   
  long term success of drug war   
Participation   
   People Don't Participate  
  
  Performance 
management 
 
   Effect on Policing Practice  
  Alternative Performance 
Management 
  
  Pressure for detections   
 
  Not Getting Credit for good 
policing 
 Alignment with Working 
Practices 
  
Politicisation of 
Policing 
  
 Problems in the 
past 
  
 Procedural Justice  
   As a part of standard policing  
  As a tool for compliance   
  Using Procedural Justice Against 
Citizen 
  
Psychological 
Needs of Officers 
 
   Achieving something  
  Getting something tangible   
  Managing Stress   
  Not being bothered   
Race issues   
   Denying race as an issue  
  Different Reactions between 
whites and blacks 
  
  Going after people because of 
criteria, not skin colour 
  
  Justifying Racial Discrepancy in 
Stop and Search 
  
  Reverse Racism   
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‘Reality’ of Policing   
   Constrained by Job  
  Doing something worthwhile   
  Empty Efforts   
  Making Things Work   
  Pessimism   
  Policing as Excitement   
  Policing as Boring   
  Product of Experiences   
  Professionalism   
Role of Response 
Officers 
  
   Adaptable to the situation  
  Being a Hero   
  Broadening of Role   
  Burnout   
  Dealing with Non-Police Matters   
  Disconnect from Community   
  Job is Challenging   
  Looking Down on SNTs   
  Prioritisation of Time   
  Proactivity   
  Response Role in Community 
Confidence 
  
  Role of 11 Car   
  Shit Calls   
Role of SNT   
   Anti-Social Behaviour  
  Developing Communication 
Lines 
  
  Good for Promotion   
  Intelligence Building   
  Long-Term Investigations   
  Right Person for SNT   
  Telling Community The Problem   
Stop and Search   
   The Attitude Test  
  Causes for Stop and Search   
 
  Just Search Everybody 
 
  Look like they need a 
search 
 
  looking at the car 
 
 Search for Suspects 
 
  When To Not Search 
 Community Engagement with 
Stop and Search 
  
  Community Reaction to Stop and 
Search 
  
  Handling Groups   
  Keep it casual   
  Motivation to stop and search   
  Officer Safety   
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  Only Guilty People Object   
  Preserve Dignity   
  Reaction to Performing Your First 
Stop 
  
 
  Changes to attitude of 
conducting searches 
 Resentment at Stop and Search   
  Section 60 and it's use   
 
  Avoiding its use 
 Stop and Account   
  Stop slips   
 
  Reasons to not give a stop 
slip 
 
  The necessity of stop slips 
 Stopping the wrong people   
Using Force   
 View of Drug Users   
   Different types of users  
  Friends who used drugs   
  Singular Focus is Drugs   
  Young People and Drugs   
View of Drugs   
   Come Down Hard on Drugs  
  Drugs as unstoppable   
  Drugs Cause Crime   
  Finding Drugs By Accident   
  Harm of Drugs   
  Some Sympathy   
  Views on Cannabis   
War mentality   
   Policing VS Serving  
 
Against Harm 
 
 
Normative Order 
  
